Anselm Of Canterbury Research Articles

The Two-Wills Theory in the Franciscan Tradition: Questioning an Anselmian Legacy

The medieval Franciscan John Duns Scotus famously distinguished between two different wills, which are characterized by an affection for advantage or happiness and an affection for justice. He identified the source of his theory in the earlier medieval thinker, Anselm of Canterbury, who first articulated the distinction. This article will demonstrate, however, that there is significant disparity between Anselm and Scotus’ understanding of the two wills. To this end, the article will explore the two wills theory articulated by Scotus’ predecessors, Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, who together composed the so-called Summa Halensis, the founding text of the Franciscan intellectual tradition. These authors drew on John of Damascus’ distinction between thelesis and boulesis to delineate the theory that Scotus attributed to Anselm. However, their theory was just as distant from the Damascene’s original understanding as Scotus’ was from Anselm. In demonstrating this, the article seeks to highlight the originality of the Franciscan theory while at the same time allowing its sources to be interpreted on their own terms.

Desire and Debt Satisfaction in Anselm of Canterbury and Hadewijch of Brabant

Desire and Debt Satisfaction in Anselm of Canterbury and Hadewijch of Brabant

ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THE WORK MONOLOGION

Throughout the history of philosophical thought, both theologians and philosophers have tried to bring arguments in favor of the existence but also of the essence of God. Anselm of Canterbury uses the rational approach to prove God's existence in both the Monologion1 and the Proslogion2 . The work Monologion or on the divine essence represents a landmark for the rational demonstration of the existence and essence of God, through the degrees of perfection of the divine being. Instead, in the work Proslogion his approach is a rational one (a priori) and logically argues the existence of God. In the work Proslogion, Anslem recalls that his first work is an unsuccessful attempt, by weaving several arguments, concatentione multorum argumentorum to demonstrate the reason of faith3 , and what can be observed is the similar way (almost synoptic), in which he begins his and the following works, both in the Proslogion and in Why God became man

Anselm of Canterbury: Teacher of Prayer by Benedicta Ward, S.L.G (review)

Anselm of Canterbury: Teacher of Prayer by Benedicta Ward, S.L.G (review)

Религиозные идеи и средневековое судопроизводство. Несколько замечаний об иконографическом повороте в истории права

The article explores legal medieval iconography in its inextricable connection with the religious ideas of the time and ecclesiastical settings reflected in the canon law, theology, and hagiography. The first steps in this direction were taken only in the beginning of the 21st century, even though the iconic turn in historical research has been discussed for decades. Nevertheless, recent publications on legal medieval iconography still come from the pen of art historians, philologists, or literary critics, but not legal historians. As a result, the analysis of the content of these images is often replaced by mere descriptions. The author offers quite a different approach. Instead of studying miniatures and marginalia only as illustrations to the text to which they are formally attached, she attempts to relate the content of these images with medieval religious ideas. Such a turn of study necessitates references to ecclesiastical texts, and in each individual case, as the author accentuates, it requires a distinctly specific source. Thus, the analysis of the miniature from the “Coutumes de Toulouse” (end of the 13th c.) requires the reference to the Decretum of Gratian and the Liber sextus of Boniface VIII, according to which the artist interpreted the degradation of clerics. The marginalia from the “Coutumes de Bordeaux” (1438), which illustrates the death sentence imposed on thieves, recalls the doctrine of atonement developed by Anselm of Canterbury. The image of the Virgin Mary in the scene of fox Renard’s hanging from the Smithfield decretals (second half of the 14th c.) refers to the ideas of the parasudic procedure liberatus a suspendio, repeatedly described in Marian hagiography. The treatise of French theologian Jean Gerson “Requête pour les condamnés à mort” (end of the 14th c.) should be considered as a starting point for changing the iconography of the death penalty in the next century. In general, as the author concludes, the comparison of medieval legal images with the works of canonists, theologians and hagiographic writings allows not only to understand the deeper meaning inherent in miniatures, but also to clarify the dating of manuscripts, the principles of the artists’ work and their relations with clients.

Saint Anselm and Gaunilo on the Existence of God

"The best-known version of the ontological argument was formulated by Saint Anselm of Canterbury. With his argument Anselm tried to prove the existence of God. In my paper I restate all the propositions of Anselm’s argument, and also present Gaunilo’s counter-arguments. Finally, I raise some problems that further analysis of the argument could benefit from. Keywords: Saint Anselm, Gaunilo, existence, God, ontological argument"

Anselmian Defense of Hell

This article constructively retrieves St. Anselm of Canterbury’s theory of retributive justice and provides a defense of what can be called the retributive model of hell. In the first part of this article, we develop the place of retributive punishment in Anselm’s thinking and discuss how and when retributive punishment is a good thing. In the second part, we apply Anselm’s thinking on retributive justice to the problem of hell and provide a defense of how hell, defined as a state of receiving retributive, damnatory, and irreversible punishment, is good. We then address a series of objections. Despite some criticism that both Anselm and the retributive model of hell receive in the contemporary literature, Anselm’s account of retributive justice can make unique and constructive contributions to the contemporary discussion of hell; by retrieving and applying Anselm’s thought to the problem of hell, we intend to kill two birds with one stone.

Anselm of Canterbury: A rational account of Christian faith

Anselm of Canterbury: A rational account of Christian faith

“Revelatio Absconditorum”: On the Possible Contribution of Saint Bonaventure to the Contemporary Philosophical Discussion on Divine Hiddenness

In the contemporary version of the discussion around the problem of God’s hiddenness, which was initiated by the argument presented by John Schellenberg, the problem is posed in a way that differs significantly from its traditional presentation. However, there is no shortage of references to thinkers of the past who have grappled with the problem of divine hiddenness. Among these, there are occasional references to authors belonging to the medieval period: Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas. However, none of the authors involved in the contemporary dispute refers to the thought of Bonaventure. In my paper, I intend to present and discuss the themes related to divine hiddenness that can be found in the theological works of Bonaventure. I will show their place and importance in the theological system of the Master of Bagnoregio. I will also indicate possible ways in which these themes can be used in contemporary philosophical discussion.

At høre det uhørte: Teologisk epistemologi som dialogisk livsorientering

What does it mean to listen to what cannot be heard? In this article, the “unheard-of” is explored along two different tracks: (a) as something God-given or divinely revealed (in the context of theology and philosophy of religion) and (b) as something egregious or criminal (in the context of ethics and trauma studies). Theological epistemology is here developed with a special focus on the limits of the cognition and knowledge of God in Christianity (Anselm of Canterbury, Luther) and contemporary Judaism (Buber, Levinas), and on the significance of dialogue and second-person encounters. Epistemology is connected with a hermeneutics of the senses, where the human being is regarded as a witness who “listens” to something transcendent which can only be articulated on the basis of acoustic or auditory metaphors but nonetheless remains inaudible. In relation to an ethical and religious life-orientation (Kant, Stegmaier, etc.), listening is described as medio-passivity “in-between” activity and passivity, subjectivity and alterity. It is argued that the listener’s personal responsivity (Waldenfels) and responsibility (Buber, Levinas) remain opposed to “resonance” (Rosa) and an “echo” (Nancy) that has no distinct voice. Methodologically, epistemology as dialogical life-orientation is seen as part of a theory-practice feedback-loop which requires patient, hospitable listening practices in view of irresolvable theoretical tensions and fruitful paradoxes that always spur further thought.

Motif Inkarnasi dalam Soteriologi Yohanes Duns Scotus

John Duns Scotus offered an alternative perspective to respect on the mystery of salvation by examining the motive behind the incarnation. Scotus believed that salvation is Christocentric: Motive wise, God incarnate is not primarily anthropocentric, which focuses on the sinfulness of humankind, as traditionally understood in the Catholic Scholastic Theology and taught by Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas, but as a total manifestation of His love. Scotus’ Christocentric approach to salvation is in line with his thought on freedom and charity. Scotus believed that God would still have become incarnate even if man had never sinned in the Þ rst place because by taking the form of man, God embodied His love in a total way to His beloved creations.Scotus’ Christocentric salvation is relational because God is involved with the whole creation in person. Consequently, the Cross is not merely the means of redemption, but as manifestation of God’s inÞ nite loveand His self-giving. Through this essay, the author aims to compare those two approaches and to show the unique character of John Duns Scotus’ soteriology.
 Abstrak
 Yohanes Duns Scotus menawarkan perspektif alternatif untuk merefleksikan misteri keselamatan dengan mengkaji motif di balik inkarnasi. Dalam refleksi tradisional Teologi Skolastik yang dikembangkan Anselmus Canterbury dan Thomas Aquinas, motif inkarnasi dipahami dalam perspektif antroposentris: keberdosaan manusia menjadi alasan inkarnasi. Bagi Scotus, inkarnasi dan keselamatan bersifat Kristosentris: inkarnasi merupakan manifestasi total kasih Allah. Pendekatan Kristosentris Scotus terkait keselamatan sejalan dengangagasannya tentang kebebasan dan kasih. Scotus percaya bahwa Allah.
 Kata kunci: Yohanes Duns Scotus, Anselmus Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas, soteriologi, inkarnasi, cinta kasih, kebebasan.

Divine Action and Dramatic Christology: A Rereading of Raymund Schwager’s Jesus in the Drama of Salvation

This article shows that and how Raymund Schwager’s five-act dramatic Christology is at the same time a theology of divine action that takes a Christological, personal, dialogical and dramatic approach. Secondly, this article develops a methodological approach of Jesus in the Drama of Salvation, in which Schwager draws on Anselm of Canterbury and thus understands theology as an unfinishable project of “conversion of thought”. This methodology is developed further in the form of a continuous self-application of theological insights to one’s own theology, so that Schwager’s dramatic five-act theology of divine action opens up to ever new readings. In this way, thirdly, Schwager’s dramatic theology of the Gospels is developed in the direction of a biblically based dramatic-kairological phenomenology of divine action. According to this, God acts through and in Jesus by means of events that make the kingdom of God present to people in an exemplary way, thus pulling them out of previous entanglements of catastrophe and placing them in situations of new beginnings. This liberating action of God towards salvation does not overwhelm the free choice of human beings, but places them in Kairoi, i.e., in extraordinary times of salvation, in which they are released to actively accept this offer of salvation in favour of a salvific self-transformation, or to reject God in an aggravated way. On the methodological path described above, this kairological salvific action of God, mediated by Jesus’ proclamation of the kingdom of God and by the work of the Holy Spirit, is grounded in God’s new creative action of the incarnation of Jesus Christ. In this way there emerges an expanded sphere for God’s personal and dramatic kairological salvific action, which embraces the whole of creation.

Reframing Anselm and Aquinas on Atonement

AbstractThomas Aquinas's vision of atonement is generally considered more conceptually expansive than Anselm of Canterbury's. Where Aquinas's multipartite account of Christ's passion incorporates a variety of biblical motifs, Anselm appears to narrow the focus to satisfactory debt-repayment alone. This article proposes two approaches for reframing the comparison between the two accounts. I argue first that both Anselm and Aquinas considered debt-repayment necessary but not sufficient in itself to accomplish all that is needed for the remittance of sin and the restoration of humanity. For Anselm, as for Aquinas, Christ must also liberate captives, defeat the devil, amend Adam's sin by recapitulation and win merit in which his members participate. The first reframing thus locates Anselm in much closer proximity to Aquinas than has generally been supposed. The second reframing throws light on a significant divergence between the two. I argue that the kenotic trajectory of abasement and ascent, pictured in the Philippian hymn, is put to strikingly different use by each theologian. This second reframing throws into sharp relief Aquinas's emphasis on Christ's suffering as a theological priority which Anselm does not share. Looking to Anselm's Benedictine context, I contend, yields one possible means of accounting for this departure.

From author to authority: Anselm’s public reputation and the Council of Bari (1098)

ABSTRACT Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1109) was considered an authoritative learned writer across Latin Christendom in his own lifetime. This essay argues it was his triumph at the Council of Bari in 1098, where he delivered a full-length speech on the Procession of the Holy Spirit and was cited by the pope as an authority, which elevated him to such an unusual status for a living author. The proposition is advanced by three arguments. Setting out the historical context, the first explores how Anselm came to be charged with a major conciliar assignment. The second examines events before and during the council, and assesses his achievement in terms of medieval literary theory. The final section demonstrates how his new renown provided a readership in regions where his works had not previously penetrated. The evidence derives from contemporary remarks and early manuscripts, many of which have gone unobserved in Anselmian scholarship.

Anselm of Canterbury and the many senses of “being”

This article presents the so-called “ontological argument” from a comparison with the “regula” Anselms establishes in his Monologion, c. 15. This rule would allow, under a certain respect, to consider existence as a perfection attributable to God, even though it does not possess the same ontological status of any other attribute, i.e. cannot be considered a real predicate. Consequently, it is possible to outline the different senses in which Anselm understands the notion of “being” and the conditions under which existence and real perfection can transcend the sphere of creatures and help conceiving God. This distinction of the senses of being would later allow for existence to be considered a perfection, just as real predicates are, but according to a completely different meaning.

Hegel’s Camel. From the History of Reconciliation to the Theory of Atonement

Abstract The paper discusses the relationship between “atonement” and “reconciliation” in systematic theology, claiming that Hegel’s concept of reconciliation (Versöhnung) continues to influence contemporary English-speaking theology. It is argued that the so-called theories of atonement often tacitly assume “Hegel’s camel”, an idea consisting of three propositions as follows: (i) atonement is a consistent umbrella concept that pertains to the systematic explanation of the entire work of Christ, (ii) atonement contains both an overarching rational insight and a moral code of conduct that provide an apology for the truth of Christian faith, (iii) Anselm of Canterbury has seminal importance when this rational atonement is explained. The paper complements the author’s historical-critical discussion of “reconciliation” undertaken in St. Andrews Encyclopedia of Theology.

St. Anselm of Canterbury on God and Morality

Abstract Anselm of Canterbury, as a classical theist, does not hold that there is a moral, or value, order independent of God. What is good, indeed what is necessary and possible, depends on the will of God. But Anselm’s development of this claim does not succumb to the problems entailed by divine-command theory. One such problem addresses the question of whether or not the moral order is available to reason, bracketing Scripture and Church teaching. Anselm holds that to be just is to conform to God’s will. Nevertheless Anselm proposes a eudaimonistic ethical theory that allows reason to assess moral principles. And Anselm holds that the non-believer recognizes justice, even before he can appreciate the more general category of “good.”

Saving Eternity (and Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will): A Reply to Hasker

William Hasker and I disagree over whether or not appealing to a particular understanding of divine eternity can reconcile divine foreknowledge with libertarian human freedom. Hasker argues that if God had foreknowledge of a particular future choice, that choice cannot be free with libertarian freedom. I hold, to the contrary, that, given a certain theory of time—the view that all times exist equally—it is possible to reconcile divine foreknowledge with libertarian freedom. In a recent article, “Can Eternity be Saved? A Comment on Stump and Rogers”, Hasker makes it clear that one of the fundamental disagreements between us lies in what each of us takes to be required for libertarian free will. In the present paper I outline the version of libertarianism that I find plausible, then explain how a libertarian free choice can be foreknown by God. (I call my approach “Anselmian”, in that it is based on my interpretation of the work of St. Anselm of Canterbury.) Then I will explain why Hasker finds this reconciliation unacceptable since it fails to do justice to what he takes to be required for libertarian freedom. Finally, I will argue that Hasker is wrong to insist upon his analysis of free will.

Uma defesa contemporânea do argumento ontológico hegeliano

The ontological arguments for the existence of God are some of the most controversial arguments in the history of philosophy. Although the argument inaugurated by Anselm of Canterbury had great historical defenders, such as René Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz and Kurt Gödel, it also had important names among the objectors, such as Thomas Aquinas, David Hume and Immanuel Kant. In this paper, I intend to fill the lack of attention to the writings of G.W.F. Hegel on the ontological argument. I will argue that the Hegelian formalization of the ontological argument is able to overcome some of the classical and contemporary objections that are raised to the ontological argument, thus enabling the resurgence of a strong argument for the existence of God.

‘Something than which nothing greater can be thought’ and Kant'sEns Realissimum

AbstractIn this paper, I explore Kant's much-studied critique of the ontological argument, seeking to place Immanuel Kant and Anselm of Canterbury more directly in contact with one another; I do this in two ways. First, I discuss the historical reception of the ontological argument in Kant's eighteenth century context. Second, I move the discussion away from the firstCritique, and look towards Kant's Pre-critical discussion of the ontological argument inThe Only Possible Argument, where he initially sets out his primary objection. By shifting the focus towards these areas of Kant's thought, I aim to achieve three interrelated goals. First, I show that Kant had a limited knowledge of the history and origins of the ontological argument, which was transmitted to him through Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, who put a Cartesian spin on it. Second, I provide textual evidence which shows that Kant's objection does not succeed against Anselm's argument. Third, I elucidate that Kant's identification of God as theens realissimumis compatible with Anselm's identification of God as ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’.