Chemical Process Safety Research Articles

SPECIAL FEATURE SECTION: SAFETY OF CHEMICAL PROCESSES Are MSDs Safe? Reflections at the MSDS's 20th Birthday1

ADVERTISEMENT RETURN TO ISSUEPREVArticleNEXTSPECIAL FEATURE SECTION: SAFETY OF CHEMICAL PROCESSES Are MSDs Safe? Reflections at the MSDS's 20th Birthday1Giora AgamView Author Information Pi2Chim Ltd., Consultation Services in Chemical and Biotechnological R&D, Beer-Sheva, Israel E-mail: [email protected]Cite this: Org. Proc. Res. Dev. 2004, 8, 6, 1042–1044Publication Date (Web):October 5, 2004Publication History Published online5 October 2004Published inissue 1 November 2004https://doi.org/10.1021/op034201+Copyright © 2004 American Chemical SocietyRIGHTS & PERMISSIONSArticle Views438Altmetric-Citations1LEARN ABOUT THESE METRICSArticle Views are the COUNTER-compliant sum of full text article downloads since November 2008 (both PDF and HTML) across all institutions and individuals. These metrics are regularly updated to reflect usage leading up to the last few days.Citations are the number of other articles citing this article, calculated by Crossref and updated daily. Find more information about Crossref citation counts.The Altmetric Attention Score is a quantitative measure of the attention that a research article has received online. Clicking on the donut icon will load a page at altmetric.com with additional details about the score and the social media presence for the given article. Find more information on the Altmetric Attention Score and how the score is calculated. Share Add toView InAdd Full Text with ReferenceAdd Description ExportRISCitationCitation and abstractCitation and referencesMore Options Share onFacebookTwitterWechatLinked InReddit Read OnlinePDF (27 KB) Get e-AlertsSUBJECTS:Granular materials,Manufacturing,Materials,Redox reactions,Safety Get e-Alerts

The new risk paradigm for chemical process security and safety

The world of safety and security in the chemical process industries has certainly changed since 11 September, but the biggest challenges may be yet to come. This paper will explain that there is a new risk management paradigm for chemical security, discuss the differences in interpreting this risk versus accidental risk, and identify the challenges we can anticipate will occur in the future on this issue. Companies need to be ready to manage the new chemical security responsibilities and to exceed the expectations of the public and regulators. This paper will outline the challenge and a suggested course of action.

Security vulnerability assessment in the chemical industry

AbstractAfter the events of September 11, 2001, Air Products and Chemicals Inc. (APCI) developed a Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) methodology, consistent with the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) guidelines. This methodology is designed for efficient and thorough evaluation of a large number of facilities, ranging from small industrial gas sites to large chemical plants. This methodology evaluates the potential consequences and attack scenarios at a facility and the attractiveness of the facility as a terrorist target. The team then provides recommendations for engineering and security improvements. Participation in early SVA development exercises with industry and governmental agencies made it clear that it is critical to have a team approach that includes process safety, security, and site operations functional expertise.This paper presents an overview of the APCI SVA methodology and summarizes major findings and lessons learned. Findings from an SVA provide multiple levels of protection for our assets and the public. The engineering and security solutions from the evaluation are intended to deter, detect, delay, and respond to an attacker. They include: Inherently safer alternatives such as reducing inventory, designing fail‐safe systems, and improving plant layout. Enhanced physical security systems such as fences, access control, and monitored intrusion detection. © 2004 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 23: 214–220, 2004

Making the business case for process safety using value-at-risk concepts

An increasing emphasis on chemical process safety over the last two decades has led to the development and application of powerful risk assessment tools. Hazard analysis and risk evaluation techniques have developed to the point where quantitatively meaningful risks can be calculated for processes and plants. However, the results are typically presented in semi-quantitative “ranked list” or “categorical matrix” formats, which are certainly useful but not optimal for making business decisions. A relatively new technique for performing valuation under uncertainty, value at risk (VaR), has been developed in the financial world. VaR is a method of evaluating the probability of a gain or loss by a complex venture, by examining the stochastic behavior of its components. We believe that combining quantitative risk assessment techniques with VaR concepts will bridge the gap between engineers and scientists who determine process risk and business leaders and policy makers who evaluate, manage, or regulate risk. We present a few basic examples of the application of VaR to hazard analysis in the chemical process industry.

Practicing chemical process safety: a look at the layers of protection

This presentation will review a few public perceptions of safety in chemical plants and refineries, and will compare these plant workplace risks to some of the more traditional occupations. The central theme of this paper is to provide a “within-the-fence” view of many of the process safety practices that world class plants perform to pro-actively protect people, property, profits as well as the environment. It behooves each chemical plant and refinery to have their story on an image-rich presentation to stress stewardship and process safety. Such a program can assure the company’s employees and help convince the community that many layers of safety protection within our plants are effective, and protect all from harm.

Process safety in the future—A view from the chemistry

AbstractThis paper advances the thesis that a complete assessment of the chemical process safety must be founded on specific chemical hazards data. Usually, these data can only be obtained from appropriately designed experiments using the correct testing techniques. The basis of safety and the window of safe operations arise from the relevant process safety data.BakerRisk's experience with the chemical processing industry (CPI) has shown that the PSM elements Safety Information, Process Hazards Analysis, and Operating Procedures are often documented without adequate hazards test data for the covered process. The information is often qualitative; it may be taken from inappropriate laboratory data and may not address the specific process deviation or worst‐case situation(s). This lack of hazards test data represents an information void that tabletop or literature process hazard analyses alone cannot fill. Five observations and recommendations are offered: Chemical process safety supported by hazards testing is the right thing to do, whether the process is covered or not and whether the process is at the manufacturing stage or not; Hazards testing to identify and evaluate potential upset conditions should be an integral part of a company's process safety program. It is a major information source for process hazard analyses; The information obtained is specific to the thermodynamics and kinetics of the process chemistry; The information enables clear identification of operational, thermal, and reactivity hazards of processes involving highly hazardous chemicals; The scope of the chemical hazards testing should be matched with the quantities of chemicals involved and the development stage of the product. © 2004 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 23: 163–169, 2004

Best practices in incident investigation in the chemical process industries with examples from the industry sector and specifically from Nova Chemicals

This paper will summarize best practices in incident investigation in the chemical process industries and will provide examples from both the industry sector and specifically from NOVA Chemicals. As a sponsor of the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), an industry technology alliance of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, NOVA Chemicals participates in a number of working groups to help develop best practices and tools for the chemical process and associated industries in order to advance chemical process safety. A recent project was to develop an update on guidelines for investigating chemical process incidents. A successful incident investigation management system must ensure that all incidents and near misses are reported, that root causes are identified, that recommendations from incident investigations identify appropriate preventive measures, and that these recommendations are resolved in a timely manner. The key elements of an effective management system for incident investigation will be described. Accepted definitions of such terms as near miss, incident, and root cause will be reviewed. An explanation of the types of incident classification systems in use, along with expected levels of follow-up, will be provided. There are several incident investigation methodologies in use today by members of the CCPS; most of these methodologies incorporate the use of several tools. These tools include: timelines, sequence diagrams, causal factor identification, brainstorming, checklists, pre-defined trees, and team-defined logic trees. Developing appropriate recommendations and then ensuring their resolution is the key to prevention of similar events from recurring, along with the sharing of lessons learned from incidents. There are several sources of information on previous incidents and lessons learned available to companies. In addition, many companies in the chemical process industries use their own internal databases to track recommendations from incidents and to share learnings internally.

Updated CCPS Investigation Guidelines book

Incident investigation standards and performance criteria continue to improve. In recognition, the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) undertook a major project to upgrade and update the Incident Investigation Guidelines originally published in 1992. These significantly expanded guidelines provide a practical resource for effective investigation of process-related incidents, and reflect changes in good practices and expectations of regulators. This paper highlights the content of the new guidelines with special emphasis on what is new and improved. Entirely new chapters address the topics of legal considerations, the near-miss event, and continuous improvement of the investigation system. The objective of the guidelines is to allow chemical process organizations to develop and implement an incident investigation management system that is effective in identifying underlying causes.

Design Measures for Industrial Safety in Chemical Engineering Processes

performance criterion is often based on risk parameters (accident frequencies). Criteria and methods for the quantitative evaluation of risk in the chemical and oil refining industries have been considered in detail in [1, 2]. Methods of determining costs in the development, manufacture, and installation of safety measures are fairly fully reflected in the special literature [1, 3–5]. We can give a formalized representation for selecting preventative measures. One has a list of preventative (protective) measures for a process that are both desirable and technologically feasible. We denote by M the set of all indices to the measures in the list (M is an integer-valued set). Each measure is characterized by the following parameters: Sj (j ∈ M) cost and bj (j ∈ M) reliability. One has a list of equipment items whose failure initiates an accident (maximal undesirable event). That list corresponds to the set L of indices for the equipment in the list. A measure of the reliability for each element is put as ai (i ∈ L). Failure or implementation of a protective measure is described by means of Boolean variables (yes or no), and all combinations of failures (causes) leading to such an event may be specified by the Boolean function F. The graphical representation of that function is a failure tree or barrier diagram [1, 2]. Such a Boolean function can often be represented in the form where Fk are also Boolean functions. The functions Fk correspond to independent branches of the barrier diagram and the failures occurring in it, which are linked together by the logic function on the basis of the above symbols. The best set of preventative measures Mk is then formulated as follows:

SACHE: 17 years of promoting teaching of safety to chemical engineering students

The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) began the Safety and Chemical Engineering Education (SACHE) program in 1985. The objectives of SACHE are to encourage the incorporation of safety content into the chemical engineering curriculum, to develop safety content for chemical engineering courses, and to provide opportunities for faculty members to learn about process safety from industrial experts. Since 1985, SACHE membership has grown to more than 120 member schools. SACHE continues to provide course content, annual chemical process safety workshops at industrial facilities for chemical engineering faculty, and supports a number of AIChE student awards to promote safety awareness among chemical engineering students and faculty.

CSB'S reactive chemical hazard investigation: Description and lessons learned

AbstractThe U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) began operations as an independent federal agency in 1998. Its primary mission is to prevent chemical‐related incidents (fires, explosions, or toxic releases) in commercial or industrial settings by conducting incident investigations, reporting on causes, and issuing safety recommendations. This paper discusses some findings of the reactive chemical hazard investigation that originated from CSB's investigation of a runaway reaction at Morton International in 1998. As a result of this investigation, the Board made recommendations to promote the safe handling of reactive chemicals. Incident data sources were surveyed to determine the number and impact of reactive chemical incidents. Through site visits and surveys, the Board gathered information about reactive chemical hazard management for select small, medium, and large companies within the chemical industry. OSHA and EPA were also surveyed to determine current regulatory approaches for managing reactive chemical hazards and to identify future agency plans. This paper focuses on evidence that supports the Board's findings and recommendations on improving reactive chemical process safety.

Chemical process safety: fundamentals with applications, 2nd edition (2002)

Chemical process safety: fundamentals with applications, 2nd edition (2002)

Characteristics of fire and explosion in semiconductor fabrication processes

AbstractThe characteristics of fire and explosion in semiconductor fabrication processes differ from those in the chemical process industries. Case studies are given to illustrate the common, as well as peculiar features of fire and explosion in the fabrication processes. In particular, the process exhaust systems, usually involving flammable, pyrophoric and corrosive gases and vapors, were shown to be a major fire and explosion source. With some preliminary understanding of the semiconductor process, standard chemical process safety knowledge can be readily applied to semiconductor processes.

Application of relational chemical process safety databases for lowering mean failure rates

AbstractThis paper proposes a linkage among accident, failure rate, and reactivity databases for process safety applications. The objective of the relationships among these databases is to bring all relevant information on both equipment and chemicals into one relational database. Such a database will make possible a better understanding by plant personnel about the reliability of plant equipment and the potential danger of process chemicals. Consequently, accidents should be reduced.This research shows that relationships can be established among the three databases, and the examples presented demonstrate how it is done. Improving equipment reliability, calls for an approach of meeting the mean of failure rate data rather than the “industry best practice.” Modifications of current accident databases are proposed to develop effective relational databases that can help improve the safety performance of industry.

Integration of interlock system analysis with automated HAZOP analysis

Abstract The paper details the integration of a method for the analysis of interlock systems with a software support system for HAZOP analysis. The proposed software aims to enhance the potential of HAZOP in terms of depth and efficiency of the analysis. This enhancement is reached through the continuation of the hazard and operability analysis, limited to a group of events which may hold high risks for the plant and/or surrounding environment. The analysis technique of the emergency interlock systems and other plant protection measures proposed by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) of the American Institution of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) has been assumed as a starting point. The system carries out interactively HAZOP analysis of a plant and identifies the presence of possible interlock actions through the analysis of the plant P & I diagram and then visualises the individual interlock systems starting the design phase in which it is possible to analyse and change interactively the single interlocks systems, in order to obtain the required reliability.

Safe process development from reaction hazards testing

A thorough, in-depth understanding of the reactive nature of chemical processing operations is the first step to accomplishing the reduction of risks of these operations to a tolerable level. This understanding may be obtained through a laboratory evaluation using recognized and accepted process safety testing technologies as well as the conventional process hazards analysis. A systematic process safety testing program characterizes the reactive nature of both the desired and undesired chemistry. These data are needed to define the critical limits of temperature, pressure, power output, concentration, and dosing rates of processes involving reactive chemicals. The minimum basic data are the variation of energy (or power), temperature and pressure as a function of time, and reaction mass composition. The realistic use of these data requires an understanding of both the limitations of some laboratory data for scale-up and acceptable safety margins for industrial size operations. This paper will briefly review the current regulatory environment for chemical process safety, describe the integration of various calorimetric test techniques, and illustrate the use of data from isothermal differential scanning, and adiabatic calorimetry for improving process safety. An example, taken from the investigation of an accident involving the reaction between an amine and chlorine-substituted derivative, demonstrates the use of calorimetric data in understanding the origin and progress of the accident. Suggestions for how to improve process safety, based on the calorimetric information are also presented.

Quantitative business decision-making for the investment of preventing safety accidents in chemical plants

This paper proposes a new quantitative method of supporting business decision-making while investing safety related facility and service. This method suggests the priority of investment relevant to safety within limited budget, so most possible hazards can be removed or the company may not invest money for the acceptable hazards depending on the bud. The typical theory that risk is equivalent to the multiplication of frequency and severity, given by CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety) in American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), is modified to consider more detailed classifications. The criteria of decision are determined by the manager's survey. Computation of R matrix results the priority of investment and the investment is finally chosen by the decision criteria. This method is proved to be effective in reducing safety accidents by proper management through the analysis of real accident data of a Korean petrochemical company for using Yonsei Safety Information Management System (ySIMS). We collected 5500 accident data for one and a half year by using the ‘detailed classification sheets’ including more than 60 accident cause types. As a result of applying this system to the company, the number of accidents of class A and B was significantly reduced in 6 months after the systematically chosen investment by 70% and 62% that was from 33 to 10 and from 122 to 47, respectively. The aim of this study is to manage safety accidents properly and to prevent major accidents from petrochemical industry.

SACHE case histories and training modules

AbstractTraining can be simplified. Vivid slides of case histories of accidents, supplemented with easy‐to‐use lecture notes for the universities and industry, are now available through AIChE's Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Since 1991, a committee composed of approximately seven academics, seven industrial representatives, and three government representatives have worked together to produce teaching modules for use in the undergraduate educational experiences at colleges and universities. This committee, called the Undergraduate Education Committee (UEC), was established by CCPS to enhance chemical engineering undergraduate education in the area of chemical rocess safely. To date, the committee has produced 6 problem sets, and 15 case histories/training modules that consist of slides and lecture notes. These products are made available to universities who join a group called SACHE (Safity and Chemical Engineering Education) and can be used by instructors in classroom and seminar formats. The focus for this paper is a summary of case histories available (Tank Failures, Nitroaniline Reactor Rupture, Seveso, Bhopal, and Pasadena). Industry can also benefit by usin these informative modules in training their tecffnical employees.

Chemical Process Safety: Learning from Case Histories , 2nd edition; Roy E. Sanders; Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, UK and Boston, MA, 1999, 289 pages, £45.00

Chemical Process Safety: Learning from Case Histories , 2nd edition; Roy E. Sanders; Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, UK and Boston, MA, 1999, 289 pages, £45.00

Development of CD-Titles for the Education of Chemical Process Safety

CD-titles of educating chemical processing operators on the safety is developed to prevent accidents such as fire, explosion and toxic material release. As chemical processes are automated, operators become apart from field processes, The lack of operator's actual experience increases the possibility of human errors specially during the emergency situation. To diminish these situations, safety education systems are developed based on multimedia technique such as 3D modeling, animation, stereo viewing, sound effect and interactive communication. The systems include three applications: furnace, process control and gas synthesis education systems. Each education system is made as a form of CD-title.