Safety Case Regulations Research Articles

Investigation and analysis of ship to platform collision incidents on the UK continental shelf: highlighting trends between the enforcement of offshore regulations and the occurrence of vessel to platform collision incidents

An offshore installation is exposed to ship collision risk from in-field and passing vessels. Both categories of collision have occurred on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS), and both have the potential to result in catastrophic damage to the installation, although to date only significant consequences have been observed in UK waters. World-wide, catastrophic collisions with installations have occurred resulting in severe damage to vessels and installations, leading to loss of life and environmental damage. This led to the authors investigate the occurrence and reporting of ship to platform collisions on the UKCS 1971–2017. It was found that there were periodic fluctuations in the occurrence of collision accidents. This research analyses the accident trends in order to determine the whether the fluctuations were a regular occurrence and, if so, what was the cause. 511 ship to platform collision incidents between 1971 and 2017 were subject to analysis, in terms of damage classification, the vessel type, month of occurrence and a comparison of the release of regulations with the fluctuation of incidents. Subsequently, this analysis has identified a key trend between the reporting of offshore collision incidents and the release and enforcement of offshore Safety Case regulations.

What difference has the Cullen Report made? Empirical analysis of offshore safety regulations in the United Kingdom's oil and gas industry

Anecdotal evidence from the United Kingdom's offshore oil and gas industry indicates that risk-based safety regulations, introduced in the aftermath of the 1988 Piper Alpha disaster which killed 167 offshore workers, have improved safety outcomes such as reducing fatalities and dangerous occurrences. However, the empirical dimensions of this supposed improved safety record in the literature is scanty. This paper explores the relationship between the safety regulatory regime and safety outcomes in the UK offshore oil and gas industry from 1995 to 2011 using multivariate regression analysis based on the generalized linear modelling framework. We assess the trend and impact of the regulatory changes implemented through the safety case regulations on major hazard risk indicators such as hydrocarbon releases controlling for technical factors such as type of offshore facility, facility location, water depth, production levels, and external factors such as oil prices, acting as a measure of the prevailing macroeconomic activity level. The results show a statistically significant industry-wide decline in hydrocarbon releases between 1995 and 2011 (average marginal effects), after controlling for location, water depth, installation type, installation age and other factors. This reflects both the commitment of operating companies and the regulator to reducing major accident hazards in line with the principles underlying the safety case regime. Other offshore jurisdictions could focus major accident reduction efforts predicated on goal-setting safety case principles which identify key safety-critical elements of an oil and gas installation and put in place risk-based mitigation measures.

Offshore Oil and Gas Installation - Aging and Life Extension

This article, written by Senior Technology Editor Dennis Denney, contains highlights of paper SPE 146225, ’Aging and Life Extension of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations,’ by Iain Wright, ABB Engineering Services, prepared for the 2011 SPE Offshore Europe Oil and Gas Conference and Exhibition, Aberdeen, 6-8 September. The paper has not been peer reviewed. More than half of the offshore oil and gas installations in the UK Sector of the North Sea have been operating for at least 20 years. Most assets are approaching or operating beyond their original design intent. With the rise in oil and gas prices and advances in technology, there is an increasing requirement to extend the operational life of these assets. Safety-case regulations were modified to include a technical justification for extended operation, and the UK Health & Safety Executive (HSE) launched Key Programme 4 (KP4) to ensure that all duty holders have suitable management systems in place to address aging-related issues adequately. Introduction Coupled with the age is that most installations have encountered considerable changes in the composition of the well fluids over the life of the field and that there is an increasing trend for additional subsea tiebacks. All of these issues have raised concerns regarding the integrity and fitness for purpose of the structures and equipment for this extended life. This study aimed to answer key questions relating to aging and life extension. Aging and Life Extension According to HSE Research Report RR509—The Plant Ageing Guide, “Ageing is not about how old the equipment is. It’s about what is known about its condition, and how that’s changing over time.” This definition is illustrated in Fig. 1. During the initial operation phase, design faults, installation issues, commissioning issues, or early-life operating faults are realized. Once equipment is in the mature stage, it generally is operating well within design limits, routine inspection and maintenance are being undertaken, and, in general, there is slow degradation. During the aging stage, the design limits for the equipment are approached, process changes usually have taken place, frequent repairs are required, and the overall degradation rate increases. In the end-of-life stage, the safe operating limits for the equipment are approaching, advanced inspection techniques are required at closer intervals to determine fitness for purpose, major repairs are required, and there is accelerating deterioration. The key to longer-term reliability and safety is to establish effective management systems early on to prolong the mature stage, because starting at later stages requires considerably more effort and cost.

Global process industry initiatives to reduce major accident hazards

In the past 10 years, the vapor cloud explosion at Texas City, the ammonium nitrate explosion in Toulouse, a pipeline disaster in Belgium, and three near total loss events in Norway have highlighted that major accident process safety is still a serious issue. Hopes that PSM or Safety Case regulations would reduce process events by 80% have not proven true. The Baker Panel, convened after Texas City developed a series of recommendations, mainly around leadership, incentives, safety culture and more effective implementation of PSM systems. Many US-based companies are working hard to implement the Baker recommendations. In Europe, an approach built around safety barriers, especially relating to technical safety systems, is being widely adopted. The author’s company has carried out a global survey of process industry initiatives, for both upstream and downstream activities, to identify what the industry itself is planning to enhance process safety in the next 5–10 years. This paper presents a summary of some of the major programs and initiatives as apply to traditional oil majors, newer national oil companies, and the chemical industry. These are a mixture of Baker recommendations, barrier approaches and tighter integration of process safety and asset integrity. While the factor of 10 improvement achieved in occupational safety over the past 20 years seems unattainable for process safety, a factor of 3–4 improvement in the next 20 years does seem possible. This would call for significant effort on the part of operators, but the benefits fully justify the effort.

Comments: Damage Assessment

Editor's column The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the US Gulf of Mexico calls to mind other industry accidents that brought intense public and political scrutiny. Oil and gas industry experts see a general pattern that these incidents follow, with the end result often being that industry procedures and safety measures are improved. Some of the most visible industry accidents over the past several decades—including the Piper Alpha explosion, Santa Barbara oil spill, and the Exxon Valdez spill—followed a process of litigation, regulation, a tightening of safety standards, and opportunities for the development of new technology. Industry- and government-led inquiries soon follow, even as the discovery process in litigation brings facts to light. In January 1969, a blowout off the coast of Santa Barbara, California led to a spill of more than 3 million gallons of crude, harming wildlife and miles of beach, and led to a moratorium on offshore drilling. The disaster was considered a major contributor to the growth of the environmental movement in the US. Momentum for major environmental legislation had already been building and, over the next several years, the US Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act, which required environmental-impact studies, and the clean air and water acts. The effect on the oil and gas industry in adapting to these new regulations was enormous. In July 1988, an explosion and fire on the Piper Alpha production platform in the North Sea about 120 miles off of Aberdeen killed 167 people in one of the industry’s worst disasters. The UK government-led Cullen Enquiry followed, which made more than 100 recommendations for changes in North Sea safety procedures, all of which were adopted by the industry. The Piper Alpha incident led the industry to adopt a comprehensive risk-analysis system for offshore operations (the Offshore Installations Safety Case Regulations), which remains an important part of North Sea operations. The 1989 spill of 11 million gallons of oil from the Valdez tanker along Alaska’s southern coast was the largest spill in US history, although just the 40th largest spill worldwide. It caused the industry to mass resources to establish a comprehensive oil-spill response system and led to the use of double-hulled tankers. Industry observers believe the current incident may lead to sharing of information to determine exactly what happens in these situations and the development of technologies that offer a last line of defense beyond blowout preventers. Already, the industry has formed two task forces, bringing together industry experts to identify best practices in offshore drilling equipment and operations, which will make recommendations to the US Department of the Interior. There is also hope that, as with past incidents, the entire safety culture of the industry is improved, from the large operators down to the smallest of contractors. As one former executive of a major operator commented, “The future of the oil and gas industry will depend on how well we demonstrate a deep-seated safety culture within operating excellence and high quality.”

IEC 61511/An Aid to Comah and Safety Case Regulations Compliance

IEC 61511/An Aid to Comah and Safety Case Regulations Compliance

Performance of high strength steels used in jack-ups

Abstract The introduction of the Safety Case Regulations in 1992 and subsequently the Design and Construction Regulations for installations on the UKCS in 1996 has led to new goal-setting requirements for the demonstration of adequate structural integrity, including materials performance. High strength steels, generally defined as steels with minimum yield strengths of 450 MPa, are widely used in jack-up construction. However, information on the properties of these materials is limited compared with that for conventional offshore steels and consequently recommendations on the use of these materials are limited in current codes and guidance. There is a need for further information on the properties of high strength steels used in jack-up construction if greater confidence in these materials is to be established and a significant amount of research has been performed over the past five years. This paper identifies research in this area and reviews results in the light of current codes and guidance requirements (including the draft ISO standard), with particular emphasis on the fatigue, fracture, static strength, fire and blast performance of jack-up steels.

Standards in reliability and safety engineering

This article explains how the highest “world class” levels of reliability and safety are achieved, by adherence to the basic principles of excellence in design, production, support and maintenance, by continuous improvement, and by understanding that excellence and improvement lead to reduced costs. These principles are contrasted with the methods that have been developed and standardised, particularly military standards for reliability, ISO9000, and safety case regulations. The article concludes that the formal, standardised approaches are misleading and counterproductive, and recommends that they be replaced by a philosophy based on the realities of human performance.

Risk perception by offshore workers on UK oil and gas platforms

This paper reports the first investigation of risk perception by workers on offshore oil and gas installations on the UK Continental Shelf, following changes in offshore safety legislation in the wake of the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988. The Offshore Safety Case regulations (Health and Safety Executive, 1992, A Guide to the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations) put the onus on the operator to identify the major hazards and to reduce the risks to As Low As is Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). The regulations specifically state that Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRA) must be used when preparing the Safety Case. However, people do not use QRA when making everyday judgements about risk; they make subjective judgements known as risk perceptions, which are influenced by a number of different factors. This study was designed to complement the extensive QRA calculations that have already been carried out in the development of Safety Cases. The aim was to measure subjective risk perception in offshore personnel and examine how this relates to the more objective risk data available, namely accident records and QRA calculations. This paper describes the Offshore Risk Perception Questionnaire developed to collect the data and reports on UK offshore workers' perceptions of the risks associated with major and minor hazards, work tasks and other activities aboard production platforms.

Offshore Safety Management Systems: Current Practice and a Prescription for Change

Safety performance on the UK continental shelf is normally of a high standard, although there are still many “minor” accidents. However, a comparative analysis reveals that major disasters in the North Sea have forced up fatality statistics, indicating that there is a need for improvement. The Cullen Report on the Piper Alpha disaster and the ensuing Safety Case Regulations are evaluated in light of safety performance. While the regulations are a major step in the right direction, apparently there are gaps in the provision. Such gaps cannot be filled solely by following the principles of total quality management. Problems with the regulations include the fundamental approach to public inquiries, the problems of objective versus prescriptive regulations, technological bias, the behaviour of management and management systems, communication problems, difficulties with quantitative risk assessment, key concepts within the regulations (ALARP and acceptance), change management, the nature of safety management systems and ignoring the natural environment.