Sacrificial Moral Dilemmas Research Articles

Choosing between bad and worse: investigating choice in moral dilemmas through the lens of control.

People's preferences for the utilitarian outcome in sacrificial moral dilemmas, where a larger group of individuals are saved at the cost of a few, have been argued to be influenced by various factors. Taking expected utility (EU) theory into consideration, we investigate whether the expected effectiveness of actions elucidate certain inconsistencies in moral judgments. Additionally, we also explore whether participants' role in the dilemma as the executor or a superior who merely makes a decision, which is carried out by a subordinate, influences judgments-a factor generally overlooked by classical EU models. We test these hypotheses using a modified moral dilemma paradigm with a choice between two actions, one highly successful and the other more likely to fail. Both actions are either expected to result in a favorable outcome of saving five individuals by sacrificing one or an unfavorable outcome of sacrificing five to save one. When the efficient action is anticipated to lead to a favorable outcome, in line with EU models, people almost invariably choose the efficient action. However, in conditions where the EUs associated with efficient and inefficient actions are close to each other, people's choice for favored outcome is above chance when they act as agents themselves. We discuss the implications of our results for existing theories of moral judgments.

Making moral decisions with artificial agents as advisors. A fNIRS study

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is on the verge of impacting every domain of our lives. It is increasingly being used as an advisor to assist in making decisions. The present study aimed at investigating the influence of moral arguments provided by AI-advisors (i.e., decision aid tool) on human moral decision-making and the associated neural correlates. Participants were presented with sacrificial moral dilemmas and had to make moral decisions either by themselves (i.e., baseline run) or with AI-advisors that provided utilitarian or deontological arguments (i.e., AI-advised run), while their brain activity was measured using an fNIRS device. Overall, AI-advisors significantly influenced participants. Longer response times and a decrease in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity were observed in response to deontological arguments than to utilitarian arguments. Being provided with deontological arguments by machines appears to have led to a decreased appraisal of the affective response to the dilemmas. This resulted in a reduced level of utilitarianism, supposedly in an attempt to avoid behaving in a less cold-blooded way than machines and preserve their (self-)image. Taken together, these results suggest that motivational power can led to a voluntary up- and down-regulation of affective processes along moral decision-making.

Risky mindset: prior exposure to risk increases utilitarian choices in sacrificial moral scenarios

Evidence of cross-domain spillover into the moral domain has been limited to altruistic and consumption behaviors. Building on the literature on spillover effects and domain-general decision processes, we predicted that choice behavior in the economic domain would affect subsequent choices in sacrificial moral dilemmas. We tested this prediction using hypothetical risky gambles and vignettes for moral dilemmas. We found that prior exposure to risky gambles increased utilitarian responses toward sacrificial moral dilemmas. Mediation analysis suggests that this is due to the spillover of a cost–benefit mindset. This mindset increases the probability of making utilitarian-type choices when faced with moral dilemmas but does not affect moral judgment. These results suggest that moral decisions are susceptible to cross-domain spillover effects. Moral values might get easily traded off in transactional scenarios in which cost–benefit analysis is a dominant decision strategy.

To beckon or not to beckon: Testing a causal-evaluative modelling approach to moral judgment: A registered report

Moral judgments are increasingly being understood as showing context dependent variability. A growing literature has identified a range of specific contextual factors (e.g., emotions, intentions) that can influence moral judgments in predictable ways. Integrating these diverse influences into a unified approach to understanding moral judgments remains a challenge. Recent work by Railton (2017) attempted to address this with a causal-evaluative modelling approach to moral judgment. In support of this model Railton presents evidence from novel variations of classic trolley type dilemmas. We present results from a pre-registered pilot study that highlight a significant confound and demonstrate that it likely influenced Railton's results. Building on this, our registered report presents a replication-extension of Railton's study, using larger more diverse samples, and more rigorous methods and materials, specifically controlling for potential confounds. We found that participants' judgments in sacrificial dilemmas are influenced by both direct personal force, and by whether harm occurs as a means or as a side-effect of action. We also show the relationship between a range of individual difference variables and responses to sacrificial moral dilemmas. Our results provide novel insights into the factors that influence people's moral judgments, and contribute to ongoing theoretical debates in moral psychology.

The effect of foreign language and psychological distance on moral judgment in Turkish–English bilinguals

Abstract People's judgements differ systematically while reading moral dilemmas in their native or their foreign language. This so-called Foreign Language Effect (FLE) has been found in many language pairs when tested with artificial, sacrificial moral dilemmas (i.e., Trolley and Footbridge). In Experiment 1, we investigated whether the FLE can be replicated in Turkish (native) – English (foreign) bilinguals using the same dilemmas (N = 203). These unrealistic and decontextualized dilemmas have been criticized for providing low external validity. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we (1) tested bilinguals with realistic scenarios which included the protagonist's age as a source of identity (child, adult, neutral), and (2) investigated the FLE in these scenarios (N = 467). Our results revealed that the FLE was not present in Turkish–English bilinguals, tested either on sacrificial dilemmas or realistic scenarios. Psychological distance of the scenarios, protagonists’ age and the perceived age similarity with the protagonist affected moral judgments.

Machines and humans in sacrificial moral dilemmas: Required similarly but judged differently?

There is an increasing interest in understanding human-machine differences in morality. Prior research relying on Trolley-like, moral-impersonal dilemmas suggests that people might apply similar norms to humans and machines but judge their identical decisions differently. We examined people's moral norm imposed on humans and robots (Study 1) and moral judgment of their decisions (Study 2) in Trolley and Footbridge dilemmas. Participants imposed similar, utilitarian norms to them in Trolley but different norms in Footbridge where fewer participants thought humans versus robots should take action in the moral-personal dilemma. Unlike previous research, we witnessed a norm-judgment symmetry that prospective norm aligns with retrospective judgment. The more required decision was judged more moral across agents and dilemmas. We discussed the theoretical implications for machine morality.

Moral reasoning through the eyes of persons with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia.

Persons with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) can exhibit apparently antisocial behaviors. An example is their tendency to adopt utilitarian choices in sacrificial moral dilemmas, i.e. harmful actions to promote overall welfare. Moral cognition models interpret such tendencies as deriving from a lack of emotional engagement and selective impairment in prosocial sentiments. We applied a qualitative approach to test those theoretical assumptions and to further explore the emotional experiences and values of people with bvFTD while they contemplate moral scenarios. We conducted semistructured interviews with 14 participants: 7 persons with bvFTD and 7 older healthy controls. Transcripts were coded using ATLAS.ti 5.0. During the moral reasoning task, persons with bvFTD reported more positive emotions than negative and showed significantly less cognitive precision in their moral reasoning compared to controls. Persons with bvFTD also organized their choices predominantly around kindness and altruism, and their responses reflected higher rule compliance. Our study showed that bvFTD persons' utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas did not arise from an emotionally disengaged or antisocial perspective. Instead, they were underpinned by positive emotionality and prosocial values. These findings enrich current understandings of moral cognition and highlight the importance of incorporating mixed methods approaches in dementia research that take into consideration the viewpoint of cognitively impaired individuals.

Effects of perspective switching and utilitarian thinking on moral judgments in a sacrificial dilemma among healthcare and non-healthcare students

During the COVID-19 pandemic, healthcare professionals have often faced moral challenges, which required them to choose between endorsing self- or other-sacrifice for the greater good. Drawing on the altruistic rationalization hypothesis and trait-activation theory, this study investigates (a) whether healthcare students’ endorsement of utilitarian solutions to sacrificial moral dilemmas varies when they are confronted with the minority group, majority group, or third-person perspective on the given dilemma and (b) whether individual differences in utilitarian thinking, as measured by the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (both instrumental harm and impartial beneficence), predict endorsement of utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas. The study population was divided into a group of healthcare students and a group of non-healthcare students. It was found that the members of both groups expressed a stronger pro-utilitarian position when making moral dilemma judgments from a majority perspective than from the two other perspectives. However, a difference was observed with healthcare students being more reluctant to endorse the utilitarian action than their non-healthcare counterparts in the self-in-majority context. The instrumental harm component was a significant predictor of utilitarian judgments in the healthcare group, but impartial beneficence significantly predicted utilitarian judgments in the non-healthcare group in the self-in-majority context.

Dual-process moral judgment beyond fast and slow.

De Neys makes a compelling case that the sacrificial moral dilemmas do not elicit competing "fast and slow" processes. But are there even two processes? Or just two intuitions? There remains strong evidence, most notably from lesion studies, that sacrificial dilemmas engage distinct cognitive processes generating conflicting emotional and rational responses. The dual-process theory gets much right, but needs revision.

Psychological value theory: The psychological value of human lives and economic goods.

Here, we present a strong test of the hypothesis that sacrificial moral dilemmas are solved using the same value-based decision mechanism that operates on decisions concerning economic goods. To test this hypothesis, we developed Psychological Value Theory. Psychological Value Theory is an expansion and generalization of Cohen and Ahn's (2016) Theory of Subjective Utilitarianism. Psychological Value Theory defines a new theoretical construct termed Psychological Value, measures Psychological Value using a traditional psychophysics paradigm, and predicts preferential choice from those measurements using a value-based computational model. We evaluate the validity of Psychological Value Theory across six experiments. In Experiment 1, we use Psychological Value Theory to estimate the perceived Psychological Value of human lives and economic goods. The data reveal that perceived Psychological Value of lives is highly influenced by individual differences of people but minimally influenced by the number of people in a group. In Experiments 2-5, we demonstrate that when used as input in a value-based computational model, perceived Psychological Values of human lives accurately predict participants' RT and response choices to sacrificial moral dilemmas. In Experiment 6, we replicate these findings for decisions involving economic goods. We cross-validate our results with multiple data sets using multiple methods. We conclude that the same value-based processes underlying economic decisions also underlie choices involving human lives. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Age-related differences in Default Mode Network resting-state functional connectivity but not gray matter volume relate to sacrificial moral decision-making and working memory performance

Older adults make fewer utilitarian decisions than younger adults during sacrificial moral dilemmas, which are associated with age-related reductions in Default Mode Network resting-state functional connectivity. Decreases on tasks associated with fluid cognitive abilities, such as working memory capacity, are also associated with age-related Default Mode Network changes. Regions within this network demonstrate some of the greatest age-related gray matter atrophy. Age-related changes in structure and function of the Default Mode Network may be associated with poorer working memory capacity and reduced utilitarian moral decision-making. Alternatively, recent theories suggest that age-related changes to Default Mode Network function may be adaptive in the context of tasks that include socioemotional components. As such, reduced within-network resting-state functional connectivity of the Default Mode Network may be associated with differential outcomes in moral decision-making for younger and older adults. In the present study, there were no age-related differences in working memory capacity. Older adults were less likely than younger adults to indicate the utilitarian option when trials involved Instrumental harm. Generally, increased within-network resting-state functional connectivity of the Default Mode Network was associated with better working memory performance in both groups, and reduced bias to endorse the utilitarian option during Incidental dilemmas compared to Instrumental dilemmas in younger adults. Older adults with similar moral decision-making behavior to younger adults demonstrated increased coupling between Default Mode Network and Salience Network regions. These findings suggest that Default Mode Network functional integrity may be differentially associated with age-related changes to working memory capacity and sacrificial moral decision-making.

Moral decision-making during the COVID-19 pandemic: Associations with age, negative affect, and negative memory.

The COVID-19 pandemic provided the opportunity to determine whether age-related differences in utilitarian moral decision-making during sacrificial moral dilemmas extend to non-sacrificial dilemmas in real-world settings. As affect and emotional memory are associated with moral and prosocial behaviors, we also sought to understand how these were associated with moral behaviors during the 2020 spring phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. Older age, higher negative affect, and greater reports of reflecting on negative aspects of the pandemic were associated with higher reported purchase of hard-to-find goods, while older age and higher negative affect alone were associated with higher reported purchase of hard-to-find medical supplies. Older age was associated with what appeared at first to be non-utilitarian moral behaviors with regard to the purchasing of these supplies; However, they also reported distributing these goods to family members rather than engaging in hoarding behaviors. These findings suggest that advancing age may be associated with engagement in utilitarian moral decision-making in real-world settings more than the sacrificial moral decision-making literature would suggest.

Moral decision making in adolescents: The effects of peer attachment, interpersonal affect, and gender.

Sacrificial moral dilemmas are a useful tool for understanding how individuals reconcile concerns for aggregate welfare with the emotional aversion to deliberately, personally harming others. Yet little is known about how adolescents respond to such dilemmas, even though adolescence is a crucial period for moral development. The present study sought to investigate how adolescents respond to such dilemmas, with a focus on gender differences, age differences, and the role of two individual differences factors: peer attachment and dampened interpersonal affect. For this cross-sectional study, 103 adolescents (mean age = 14.5, SD = 0.81, range = 12-16; 54% girls; 41% Black, 24% White, 15% multiracial, 9% Hispanic/Latin, 3% Other, 2% Asian/Pacific Islander, 1% Native American, 5% no response) were recruited from the local community (Brooklyn, NY, USA). Adolescents responded to a series of sacrificial moral dilemmas. Then, participants and their caregivers completed questionnaires to assess adolescents' callous-unemotional traits (e.g., lack of empathy) and the quality of their peer relationships. On average, participants endorsed committing personal harm for the greater good in 53% of their responses. Girls endorsed personal utilitarian sacrifice more than boys. Peer attachment, but not dampened interpersonal affect, was associated with increased endorsement of personal utilitarian sacrifice. Age and responses to dilemmas were not associated. Our results suggest that peer relationships are an important part of adolescent moral decision-making, for girls in particular. Our results also indicate that adolescents' utilitarian responses to conventional sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect a decreased aversion to interpersonal harm.

Many heads are more utilitarian than one

Moral judgments have a very prominent social nature, and in everyday life, they are continually shaped by discussions with others. Psychological investigations of these judgments, however, have rarely addressed the impact of social interactions. To examine the role of social interaction on moral judgments within small groups, we had groups of 4 to 5 participants judge moral dilemmas first individually and privately, then collectively and interactively, and finally individually a second time. We employed both real-life and sacrificial moral dilemmas in which the character's action or inaction violated a moral principle to benefit the greatest number of people. Participants decided if these utilitarian decisions were morally acceptable or not. In Experiment 1, we found that collective judgments in face-to-face interactions were more utilitarian than the statistical aggregate of their members compared to both first and second individual judgments. This observation supported the hypothesis that deliberation and consensus within a group transiently reduce the emotional burden of norm violation. In Experiment 2, we tested this hypothesis more directly: measuring participants' state anxiety in addition to their moral judgments before, during, and after online interactions, we found again that collectives were more utilitarian than those of individuals and that state anxiety level was reduced during and after social interaction. The utilitarian boost in collective moral judgments is probably due to the reduction of stress in the social setting.

Individual and Environmental Correlates of Adolescents' Moral Decision-Making in Moral Dilemmas.

While extensive research has been conducted on adults’ judgments in moral sacrificial dilemmas, there is little research on adolescents. The present study aimed at: (1) adding further empirical evidence about adolescents’ moral decisions (deontological vs. utilitarian) in sacrificial moral dilemmas and (2) investigating how these moral decisions relate with gender, school grade, emotional traits (callous-unemotional traits), context-related experiences (perceived parental rejection and community violence exposure), and moral-related factors (moral disengagement and universalism value). A sample of 755 Italian adolescents (54.7% females; Mean age=16.45, SD=1.61) attending the second and the fifth year of secondary school took part in the study. Two sacrificial trolley-type dilemmas (where harmful actions promote the greater good) were presented. In the “switch” scenario (impersonal sacrificial dilemma), the choice is whether to hit a switch to save five people killing only one person. In the “footbridge” scenario (personal sacrificial dilemma), the choice is whether to push a large man off a footbridge saving five persons. For each scenario, participants had to indicate whether the proposed action was “morally acceptable” or not. Data were analyzed performing generalized linear mixed models. Our results showed that: (1) Adolescents were more likely to indicate as admissible to hit the switch rather than to push the large man; (2) male adolescents, compared to females, were more likely to say it was morally acceptable to intervene in the footbridge dilemma, whereas younger adolescents said it was morally acceptable both in the switch and the footbridge situations; and (3) higher levels of callous-unemotional traits, perceived parental rejection, and moral disengagement, on the one hand, and lower levels of universalism, on the other hand, were associated to higher admissibility to intervene in the footbridge scenario. Higher community violence exposure was associated with a lower propensity to intervene in the switch scenario. Overall, the present study expands the research on sacrificial dilemmas involving a sample of adolescents. The findings support previous studies concerning the role of emotions in making moral decisions but, at the same, open new perspectives regarding the role of contextual experiences and moral-related factors.

Rational, emotional, or both? Subcomponents of psychopathy predict opposing moral decisions.

Recent research has documented a small but significant correlation between psychopathic capacities and utilitarian moral judgment, although the findings are generally inconsistent and unclear. We propose that one way to make sense of mixed findings is to consider variation in perspective‐taking capacities of psychopathic individuals. With this in mind, we had criminal offenders (n = 60), who varied in their psychopathy levels according to the Psychopathy Checklist‐Revised (PCL‐R), respond to common sacrificial moral dilemmas (e.g., trolley dilemmas) under different conditions. In a baseline condition, participants simply responded to the sacrificial moral dilemmas as is typically done in previous research. In an “emotion‐salient” condition, participants had to reason about the emotions of another person after solving moral dilemmas (deliberative processing). In the “emotion‐ambiguous” condition, participants saw images of people in distress, after solving moral dilemmas, but did not have to explicitly reason about such emotions (spontaneous processing). The four PCL‐R facets predicted distinct interference effects depending on spontaneous versus deliberative processing of hypothetical victim's emotions. The findings suggest that the use of a multi‐faceted approach to account for cognitive and moral correlates of psychopathy may help address previously mixed results. Implications and future directions for theory and research are discussed.

Testosterone and cortisol do not predict rejecting harm or maximizing outcomes in sacrificial moral dilemmas: A preregistered analysis

Contemporary moral psychology explores the biological underpinnings of morality, including how neuromodulators influence moral judgment and decision making. Some studies suggest that higher circulating testosterone is associated with increased acceptance of sacrificial harm, such as killing one person to save five lives, consistent with utilitarian ethics and inconsistent with deontological ethics. However, most studies employ conventional analytic techniques that conflate concern about outcomes with reduced concern about sacrificial harm, many are statistically underpowered, and none examine potential regulating effects of cortisol. Therefore, we examined whether salivary concentrations of testosterone and cortisol jointly predict sacrificial dilemma judgments among a large sample of undergraduates (n = 199). We utilized an advanced cognitive modeling technique (process dissociation) to independently assess sensitivity to causing harm and maximizing outcomes, preregistering the prediction that higher testosterone would predict reduced harm-rejection rather than increased concern for outcomes, especially among people low in cortisol. However, neither testosterone, nor cortisol, nor their interaction predicted sacrificial dilemma response tendencies. Such findings raise questions about the robustness of past evidence suggesting links between testosterone and sacrificial dilemma judgments.

Insecure and insensitive: Avoidant and anxious attachment predict less concern for others in sacrificial moral dilemmas

Developmentally calibrated, adult attachment guides social decision making. We examined how insecure attachment styles relate to complex social decisions—moral dilemmas. Prior work failed to dissociate deontological (harm-rejecting) from utilitarian (outcome-maximizing) decisions, treating them as inversely related. Using process dissociation, we found avoidant attachment predicted less harm rejection—partially through lower empathic concern—whereas anxious attachment was not associated with moral responses across two samples (Study 1). Measuring attachment via inclusive multi-scale composites, we replicated the finding that people high in avoidance rejected harm less often, and also found that people high in anxious attachment rejected harm and maximized wellbeing less often (Study 2, preregistered). These relationships were mediated by lower empathic concern, lower desire to help others, and higher need to belong. Insecure attachment, whether avoidant or anxious, may distract from the emotional and moral concerns involved in avoiding harming others and increasing their wellbeing.

Utilitarian choices in COVID-19 dilemmas depend on whether or not a foreign language is used and type of dilemma

ABSTRACT We were interested in exploring the associations and effects of experimental language (i.e., native – L1, or foreign – L2), dilemma type (i.e., personal – D1 or impersonal – D2), the digital device participants used (i.e., PC/laptop or smartphone), along with gender and age in sacrificial COVID-19 and non-COVID moral dilemmas. We performed two studies involving 522 participants aged 18 to 69 in April 2020. In Study 1, we found no significant associations between the dilemma type and the digital device. However, most participants chose to sacrifice an older COVID-19 patient in a critical medical condition to prioritize rescuing similar, younger patients (i.e., 45-year-old males). Results also suggested that male and younger participants were more likely to choose the utilitarian option when the sacrificial dilemma was presented in French. In study 2 (i.e., non-COVID-19), participants made significantly more utilitarian choices in the personal dilemmas presented in French. Results are discussed concerning the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic context and its emotional impact on moral judgment.

The search for predictable moral partners: Predictability and moral (character) preferences

Across six studies (N = 1988 US residents and 81 traditional people of Papua), participants judged agents acting in sacrificial moral dilemmas. Utilitarian agents, described as opting to sacrifice a single individual for the greater good, were perceived as less predictable and less moral than deontological agents whose inaction resulted in five people being harmed. These effects generalize to a non-Western sample of the Dani people, a traditional indigenous society of Papua, and persist when controlling for homophily and notions of behavioral typicality. Notably, deontological agents are no longer morally preferred when the actions of utilitarian agents are made to seem more predictable. Lastly, we find that peoples' lay theory of predictability is flexible and multi-faceted, but nevertheless understood and used holistically in assessing the moral character of others. On the basis of our findings, we propose that assessments of predictability play an important role when judging the morality of others.