Russia's Ability Research Articles

The impact of the russian-ukrainian war on economic processes in russia: analysis and forecasting

In this article, the author examines the impact of the war in Ukraine on the Russian economy, analyzes and forecasts some of the main factors. The relevance of the issue under consideration is due to the fact that the economic situation in Russia directly affects Russia's ability to continue the war in Ukraine. Therefore, the purpose of the article is to analyze and forecast the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on economic processes in Russia. Despite the fact that officialstatistics are mostly classified or distorted by Rosstat, the analysis shows that the economic situation in Russia is getting worse. For the past six years, the Russian economy has been experiencing strong inflation, and in the current environment, inflationary processes have intensified significantly. Eventually, the Kremlin will face a problem: either to continue fighting in Ukraine, or to boost the economy, or to move to a large-scale money issue, which will lead to even higher prices. The National Welfare Fund has shrunk by almost a third and continues to shrink. That is, without additional investments of foreign capital, Russia will not be able to raise the economy and conduct military operations.The key policy rate was forecasted using neural networks based on the method of group consideration of arguments using the GMDH Shell program. The forecast shows that in 2023 the key policy rate may increase to 23%.The article shows how the national welfare fund of Russia has been reduced, and the federal budget expenditures are analyzed. The author gives the estimated expenditures of the Russian Federation for the first year of the war and the budget deficit. According to experts' estimates, an approximate figure of the need for funds to support combat operations in the current conditions is provided. The materials of the article are of practical value for analysts, economists and anyone who studies the Russian-Ukrainian war from the point of view of the economic component.

The Ability of Russia’s Federal Security Service to Influence the Executive Through its Apparatus of Seconded Employees

The French statesman Count Mirabeau once said about then-state Prussia that it “is not a state that has an army, it is an army that has conquered the nation.” 1With some irony, we can apply this statement to the situation in modern Russia by modifying it in this way: Russia is not a state that has a security service; it is a security service that has been ruling the nation. Russian Federation as the successor of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), takes much from the latter in terms of the instruments and the means used by its security agency – the Federal Security Service or the FSB ( Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti). Despite formally proclaiming a democracy, Russia has saved many of the USSR’s “best practices” in state governance, which cannot be considered genuinely democratic. In this article, we look at the FSB’s historical prerequisites and present-day legal bases for using its officers seconded to other government entities and conclude its role concerning Russia’s executive branch. 1“Honoré-Gabriel-Riquetti de Mirabeau,” Drouot Group, accessed July 10, 2023, https://drouot.com/en/l/16525755--mirabeau-honore-gabriel-rique.

ТОРГОВО-ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЕ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО РОССИИ И КИТАЯ В УСЛОВИЯХ САНКЦИОННОГО ДАВЛЕНИЯ ЗАПАДА

The article is devoted to the problems and prospects for the development of trade and economic relations between Russia and China under the sanctions pressure of the West. The dynamics of trade between Russia and China, the commodity structure of Russian exports and imports are considered. It is emphasized that the growth of trade exchange between the two countries does not mean that Chinese companies refuse to trade with Western countries. By expanding trade with Russia, Chinese firms are interested in minimizing the risks of falling under secondary Western sanctions. Russia's intention to implement the policy of "pivot to the East" is proved. The ability of Russia, despite sanctions, to find markets for energy resources, to reorient Russian oil and gas supplies from the European to the Asian market, where China is the main buyer of Russian energy resources, is emphasized, purchasing Russian oil at low prices. The desire of Chinese companies in the conditions of leaving the Russian market of Western firms to occupy the vacated product niches is noted. The features of the development of investment cooperation between Russia and China are revealed. Emphasis is placed on reaching a qualitatively new level of economic interaction between the border regions of the two countries. It is concluded that Russia plans to expand economic cooperation with China in the future.

EU sanctions landscape: amid bypasses and excessive compliance

The current EU sanctions policy over 18 months showed its potential, including the negative effect on the major European economies. The article analyzes these developments as well as special features of the 11th sanctions package, aimed at strengthening the control of previously imposed barriers and limiting Russia's ability to avoid sanctions with help of third countries. Based on the example of Germany, the article analyzes the instruments used by the EU and the discussion that business and political circles are conducting in search of cost and risk reduction. It notes a fundamentally new ability of the EU to not only impose individual sanctions, but also suspend the import of sanctioned goods into countries violating sanctions in general.

Assessment of climate change impacts on buildings, structures and infrastructure in the Russian regions on permafrost

Russian regions containing permafrost play an important role in the Russian economy, containing vast reserves of natural resources and hosting large-scale infrastructure to facilitate these resources’ exploitation. Rapidly changing climatic conditions are a major concern for the future economic development of these regions. This study examines the extent to which infrastructure and housing are affected by permafrost in Russia and estimates the associated value of these assets. An ensemble of climate projections is used as a forcing to a permafrost-geotechnical model, in order to estimate the cost of buildings and infrastructure affected by permafrost degradation by mid-21st century under RCP 8.5 scenario. The total value of fixed assets on permafrost was estimated at 248.6 bln USD. Projected climatic changes will affect 20% of structures and 19% of infrastructure assets, costing 16.7 bln USD and 67.7 bln USD respectively to mitigate. The total cost of residential real estate on permafrost was estimated at 52.6 bln USD, with 54% buildings affected by significant permafrost degradation by the mid-21st century. The paper discusses the variability in climate-change projections and the ability of Russia’s administrative regions containing permafrost to cope with projected climate-change impacts. The study can be used in land use planning and to promote the development of adaptation and mitigation strategies for addressing the climate-change impacts of permafrost degradation on infrastructure and housing.

When Media Worlds Collide: Using Media Model Theory to Understand How Russia Spreads Disinformation in the United States

Ever since the 2016 U.S. elections, disquiet about the role of Russian propaganda in the U.S. media system has grown into outrage and fear. How has one authoritarian state been able to wreck so much havoc in the U.S. media system? The answer lies in a relatively small area of political communication scholarship: the study of national media models. Scholars ranging from Fred Siebert to Paulo Mancini have eloquently articulated how closely media systems reflect their national political systems and cultures. While this debate has remained mostly academic, it now holds the key to understanding (and trying to control) the vulnerabilities to disinformation in the U.S. media ecosystem. This paper pushes back against the idea that media literacy of the audience is the critical problem in combatting ‘fake news’ created as disinformation by other countries. The U.S. media audience has not fundamentally changed in the past two decades. What has changed in the way in which media is supplied to the American public, notably the decline of traditional news, the fragmentation of the information space online, the rise of news distributed within trusted circles via social media platforms, and the flooding of the U.S. news supply with both foreign and domestic disinformation. In thinking about the role of Russian propaganda as one central challenge to the U.S. media system, it is clear the affordances of the Russian media system strongly favor the ability of Russia to exploit the U.S. media sphere. Under the Russian media system, journalists are considered mouthpieces for political interests and mold information to support those in power, unfettered by the U.S. ideal of media in service to the public or a greater truth. The U.S. media cannot completely ignore these messages, but must expend precious resources refuting or attempting to find some sort of impossible ‘balance’ between disinformation and actual news. Nor can the mainstream U.S. media counter with its own disinformation, as this violates American media ethics. This paper will discuss evidence from the 2016 U.S. elections to showcase the role Russian disinformation has played in undermining the U.S. media system and how it has dovetailed with other challenges to the supply of information to U.S. citizens. The paper also will suggest possible solutions to the issue of Russian disinformation, with an emphasis on how social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter should acknowledge their essential role in preserving the free media system and significantly increase their efforts to help the American audience to identify disinformation.

Promoting Russia abroad: Russia's post-Cold war national identity and public diplomacy

ABSTRACTAs the Soviet Union fell, the ideological glue that was the source of national unity and identity was no longer present in post-Cold War Russia. Recently, however, Russia has made attempts to redefine itself in the post-Cold War world, establish a new national identity, and project it to the world. Russia's exercise of public diplomacy and soft power differ starkly from most Western countries, as the Russian approach is defined by a top-down, centralized nature that emphasizes a nationalist message to its target audiences. The Russian approach has been marked by a tendency to locate and mobilize sympathetic Russian diaspora populations, but an aversion to building networks among those who do not presently share Russia's foreign policy goals. This approach has led to significant limitations on Russia's ability to persuade foreign publics and build new partnerships. Such tendencies are especially evident through an examination of Russia's public diplomacy in Ukraine, where attempts are made to mobilize Russian diaspora communities, while other potential audiences are diminished. This paper argues that the inherent contradictions, limitations, and divisive nature of Russian public diplomacy are especially evident in the case of the Crimean annexation and inhibit Russia's ability to influence and persuade non-Russian audiences.

ДИНАМИКА РАЗВИТИЯ НАЛОГОВОЙ СИСТЕМЫ И НАЛОГОВОГО АДМИНИСТРИРОВАНИЯ В РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

The main purpose of this article is to investigate the process and summarize the results of changes in the tax area in Russia with regard to the evolution of the national tax system and the tax administration reform. To this end, the methods of historical analysis and comparative study are used. Based on these methods, the evolution of the tax system of the Russian Federation is described from the point of view of the dynamics of transformation of the tax structure and modification of the tax rates, as well as changes in the forms and instruments of tax administration. To research and estimate the competitive ability of Russia in the international financial framework, an evaluation of the contemporary Russian tax system is made in regard to the tax burden level and general fiscal conditions for doing business. It is demonstrated that the ongoing reform will help Russia become a more attractive place for doing business. Basic stages in the development of the Russian tax system, along with the main features of taxation, are identified. As a result of an analysis of the development of tax administration in Russia over the past 25 years, general stages in reforming and institutionalizing tax administration are summarized. In order to investigate the capacity and resources of the Russian tax system and tax administration, the results of implementation of some new services and procedures are evaluated. Mid-term and long-term perspectives for the development of the tax system are outlined, followed by an overall conclusion.

Measuring technological trends: A comparison between U.S. and U.S.S.R./Russian jet fighter aircraft

Measuring and forecasting technological change is a crucial issue from various points of view. This is particularly important in the case of weapon systems as this would enable technological performance and operational capabilities to be assessed in relation to potential threats. This paper measures and compares technological trends in U.S. and Soviet Union/Russian jet fighter aircraft by estimating the relationship between the first flight date and a set of performance and technical characteristics of these aircraft. From the point of view of technological advantage, we find that U.S. jet fighters were, on average, approximately 2 years ahead of the former Soviet Union/Russian jet fighters during the entire jet fighter era. Nevertheless, the technological advantage has swung from one side to the other during specific periods as particular models have been introduced. Finally, the development of 5th-generation jet fighters, in particular the development of the F-22 Raptor, has placed American technology about 20 years ahead of Russian technology, a difference that has never occurred before. This finding casts doubt on the ability of Russia, as the inheritor of the former Soviet Union aircraft industry, to match American technological progress in jet fighter aircraft.

A comparative analysis of the European and Russian support schemes for renewable energy: return on European experience for Russia

Russia possesses enormous potential for the development of renewable energy sources. Given the necessity to modernize the economy and stimulate innovation, the exploitation of this potential is increasingly recognized as a national political priority. Replacing traditional fossil energy sources with renewable energy in the Russian fuel mix will also have a positive impact on European energy security and climate policy. The European partners thus have an interest in stimulating this development. Sharing with Russia the lessons learned from the European experience in the field of renewable energy policy could be a way to assist Russia in its efforts to develop adequate regulatory mechanisms to stimulate renewable energy investments. This contribution argues that this attempt can only be successful if the European and Russian partners ‘speak the same language’ in terms of renewable energy policy. It therefore proposes to compare the support mechanisms developed by EU Member States with the Russian scheme in order to highlight potential misunderstandings in the concepts and instruments used. Moreover, this contribution argues that the European Union will only be convincing in its approach towards Russia if it avoids a ‘normative hegemonic’ behaviour. Rather than presenting its rules as ‘best practice’, the European Union should highlight what went wrong with its approach so as to avoid repeating the same mistakes in Russia. It appears from the European experience that regulatory instability constitutes the most important obstacle to a successful renewable energy policy. The readiness of the Russian authorities to meet investors’ concern of stability will therefore determine Russia's ability to attract private investments in the development of its enormous renewable energy potential.

Security in a multiethnic Russia: Is the 'melting pot' boiling over?

AbstractNationalist rallies and interethnic clashes in December 2010 on Moscow's Manezh Square and in other Russian cities led to an increased level of public discussion about the need to improve interethnic relations in the country and to combat xenophobia. Despite an expansion of official rhetoric and the introduction of various new initiatives, however, contradictory policies and ambiguous political messages run the risk of leaving ethnic tensions to simmer without addressing their root causes, and may even aggravate them. Improving security for all of Russia's ethnic groups will require more consistent, concrete actions and will depend on Russia's ability to address sources of broader social discontent.

How United is United Russia? Regional Sources of Intra-party Conflict

The United Russia party has been given the role of the dominant party in the Russian political system, both at the national level and in all regions. Nevertheless, the party lacks many of the institutional characteristics that would allow it to play an autonomous role, particularly in regional politics. United Russia lacks an effective patronage system; personnel decisions are in the hands of other actors. The party is highly centralized, yet subject to pressure from governors who are only formally subordinate to the party. Intra-party democracy is minimal, and the regional party organs lack financial independence. Conflicts among regional elites take the form of a struggle for control over the party, and this hinders United Russia's ability to establish strong regional organizations. This appears to be the desired outcome; the Kremlin uses the party as a screen to conceal its efforts to micro-manage regional political developments.

Russia's External Debt, Solvency and Options for Alternative Capital Inflow

At the beginning of this year, Russia owed about $158 bn to foreign governments, Western banks, and multinational lending agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Russia inherited a part of this debt burden from the former Soviet Union, while the rest of it has been accumulated during the transition years. The analysis in the report suggests that the problems of Russia's ability to service its external debt and the solutions to these problems are to be found in structural issues (especially fiscal issues) rather than in features of the current account. The short-term alternatives for financing Russia's external debt are limited. Significant budget cuts in government spending are unlikely in the near future, money printing would only add to inflation, and receipt of new credits is neither likely nor recommended. The hope of investors who are interested in Russia is that the government will take the route of structural reform. The money earned from Russia's trade surplus remains a significant source for debt finance. However, the extent to which Russia can rely on this source depends greatly on world market developments, particularly changes in natural resource prices. Also the Russian authorities will only be able to reap the full benefit of the trade surplus if they can drastically reduce capital flight, which again leads us back to the necessity of structural reforms. In the long-run, without significant improvements in state finances and the investment climate, Russia will continue to have difficulty in making external debt payments and attracting new financing from international capital markets. A debt write-off deal with the Paris Club similar to that, which Russia reached with the London-Club, would ease the debt burden in the short-run. However, this would not solve the fundamental problems. Instead, the long-term solutions lies in new investments, which are the engine of sustainable economic growth. Structural reforms, starting with tax reform, will encourage investments and also encourage people to pay taxes. An increase in real income stimulated by investments also leads to an increase in tax revenue, provided that fiscal discipline is maintained. It remains to be seen whether Russian decision makers have enough political will and fiscal discipline to move from words to actions and implement long-promised structural reforms.

Russia and the European Union: An Outlook for Collaboration and Competition in European Natural Gas Markets

Abstract: In the aftermath of recent natural gas and oil supply disruptions to European markets, Russia's long-term supply stability and Europe's natural gas market developments are of utmost concern to both the producer and the consumer. As Europe's indigenous supply declines, it will rely more on gas imports. Concurrently, Russia's domestic gas consumption is growing, its infrastructure continues to age, and Gazprom will continue to rely on both Central Asian imports and growth from independent gas producers to meet its long-term supply commitments. This article discusses a medium-term outlook for Russia and the European Union and outlines the barriers that are inhibiting competition and collaboration in the energy sphere. Keywords: competition, energy markets, energy security, European Union, natural gas, oil, Russia ********** In the past year, the security of natural gas supplies has emerged as one of the top issues of concern for countries in Europe, for the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and even for the United States. Concerns about natural gas security reflect uncertainty about available natural gas supplies, how supplies are delivered to the market (by pipeline or by liquefied natural gas tanker), and how much is paid for these supplies. In the aftermath of natural gas and oil supply shutoffs from Russia, Europe is trying to ensure its own security of supply through diversification and energy efficiency. Russia is trying to ensure energy security by diversifying its customer base, investing in the entire value chain (not only the upstream), and ensuring adequate investment levels both in its own energy supplies and those of its Central Asian neighbors. The way in which the policies of regional and international organizations differ from the policies of individual states is hampering progress on energy market liberalization and energy efficiency programs, both of which are necessary to achieve stable market relationships between producers and consumers. To accurately frame the policy debate, one must understand the current and future role that natural gas plays for Europe's energy mix. Europe's demand for natural gas is increasing and Russia is the region's main supplier. However, Russia's ability to invest in upstream natural gas development over the next several years will directly contribute to Russia's natural gas production growth and Europe's security of supply. In the meantime, several alternative energy sources and hedging instruments are expected to mitigate Europe's dependency. For the region to best take advantage of these options, continued regional natural gas market liberalization is necessary. Europe and Russia's Natural Gas Interdependence In 2006, Europe depended on Russia for 34 percent of its natural gas imports, including European LNG imports (see figure 1). In contrast, Russia depended on Europe for 60 percent of its natural gas exports, sending the remainder via pipeline to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), predominantly Ukraine and Belarus. (1) In evaluating Europe's true dependency on Russian natural gas imports, it is essential to understand the role that it plays in the total energy mix. In the decade after the mid-1990s, oil's share in Europe's primary energy consumption fell by around 3 percentage points while natural gas's share increased by twice this amount, to around 24 percent of final consumption. On the one hand, Europe's natural gas consumption growth could slow in the future. Since the mid-1990s, EU demand for natural gas has been growing at a rate of around 4 percent per year. (2) The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that, over the next several years, the EU's demand for natural gas will grow at a slightly lower rate, by around 0.8 to 1 percent per year between 2004 and 2015. (3) Even though the growth rate is expected to slow in the next several years, as figure 2 shows, Europe's natural gas import dependency is still more than 30 percent higher today than it was only a decade ago. …

So What Changed? The 1998 Financial Crisis and Russia's Economic and Political Development

Abstract: At the time, the August 1998 financial crisis was described as a watershed in Russia's development. This article looks at the reasons the crisis had a minimal effect on Russia's economy and argues that the political effect of the crisis was more marked. The growth that has occurred in the Russian economy since 1998 may mean that a reoccurrence of crisis will not be as benign as the 1998 crisis turned out to be. Keywords: financial political economy, Russia, virtual economy Introduction It is nearly a decade since the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia. At the time, the crisis marked a turning point in the development of Russia's economy. In its immediate aftermath there was some expectation that it would be the prelude to what promises to be a long and painful period of insolvency and crisis, (1) and would lead rapidly to another, more severe, financial crisis. (2) These predictions have not come true. Indeed, Russia's financial crisis experience would seem to be an enviable one: it has not caused a loss of economic sovereignty with international agencies asserting their influence over economic policy as a condition of alleviating the problems of currency collapse and debt default, nor did it presage a period of economic depression. Instead, the power of the Russian state has grown since 1998 and Russia has experienced a near uninterrupted economic recovery since 1999 with gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging 6.8 percent per annum from 1999 to 2005, growth in industrial production averaging 7 percent per annum from 1999 to 2005, unemployment falling from 13.2 percent in 1998 to 7.7 percent in 2005, and average wages rising from $108 to $301 a month. If the 1998 crisis had an effect on Russia, it was positive. Why was the impact of the August 1998 financial crisis so muted economically in Russia? Russia's economic success since 1998 is not because of any particular negative or positive economic effect of the crisis. The crisis of 1998 was not more devastating or influential because of the peculiarities of Russia's postcommunist economic system and the chief problem of this system, the lack of capital to reform industry and create a more competitive economy with a diversified export structure. This problem endures. This article argues that three factors shaped the influence of the August 1998 financial crisis on domestic forces and the subsequent development of Russia's political economy: the legacies of the USSR, the way that earlier reforms under President Boris Yeltsin benefited a small number of financiers and exporters, and the political fall out of 1998. Each of these was largely responsible for shaping one of the main segments of Russia's political economy: the sectors of the economy--those branches of the economy that produce mainly for domestic consumption and do not receive a great level of foreign investment, the sectors of the economy, and the government/state. Each of these segments of Russia's political economy has a peculiar relationship to the global economy. The national economy is isolated from it, receiving benefits indirectly from the general rise in national wealth from energy exports. Its role is passive; its character and structure in the 1990s meant limited foreign involvement in Russia's economy and little pressure to respond to the 1998 financial crisis in ways that would ensure continued capital inflows from abroad. The transnationalized economy and the state have more active relationships with the global economy and are in competition to facilitate Russia's relationship with the global economy. At the moment the state has the upper hand in this relationship. This might, if recovery carries on long enough, eventually turn into a successful response to Russia's problems. However, Russia's ability to grow depends on moving resources into the national economy to modernize it. If it does not, it will bear the cost of a large, unmodernized industrial sector, just as it did in the 1990s. …

Russia at GHG Market

In the first Kyoto commitment period Russia could be the major supplier for the greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions market. Potential Russian supply depends on the ability of Russia to keep GHG emissions lower than the Kyoto target. In the literature there is no common understanding of the total trading potential of Russia at the international carbon market. In this paper we focus on CO2 emission, which constituted nearly 80%of Russian GHG emission. We compare different projections of Russian CO2emission and analyze the most important factors, which predetermine the CO2emission growth. In a transition economy these factors are: Gross Domestic Product(GDP) dynamic, changes of GDP structure, innovation activity, transformation of export-import flows and response to the market signals. The input-output macroeconomic model with the two different input-output tables representing old and new production technologies has been applied for the analysis to simulate technological innovations and structural changes in the Russian economy during transition period. The Russian supply at the international GHG market without forest sector may be up to 3 billion metric ton of CO2 equivalent. Earlier actions to reduce CO2 emission are critical to insure theRussiansupply at the international carbon market. With regard to the current status of the Russian capital market, the forward trading with OECD countries is only the possibility to raise initial investments to roll no-regret and low-cost GHG reduction. This paper discusses uncertainties of RussianCO2emission dynamics and analyzes the different incentives to lower the emission pathway.

Contra Coercion: Russian Tax Reform, Exogenous Shocks, and Negotiated Institutional Change

The view of institutions as coercion rather than as contracts dominates the comparative politics literature on both institutional creation and the politics of economic reform. The emergence of a collectively optimal tax code in Russia demonstrates the limitations of this emphasis on coercion. This new tax code was not imposed by a strong central leader, mandated by international institutions, or the result of state capture by powerful economic interest groups. Rather, it is the product of a mutually beneficial exchange between the Russian government and the Russian oil companies. Russia's ability to negotiate an effective tax regime also suggests the conditions under which and the microcausal mechanism whereby exogenous shocks promote institutional change and economic reform. Owing to their mutual vulnerability and interdependence, the August 1998 financial crisis generated widely shared perceptions among these actors that the payoffs of cooperation had changed. Yet the economic reform institution that resulted required a series of incremental strategic moves that established common knowledge.

The ZATO Archipelago Revisited - Is the Federal Government Loosening Its Grip? A Research Note

IN THE LITERATURE,1 the closed cities of Russia or ZATO have been described both in terms of their geographical location and public finance. The system of closed cities can be seen as a fiscal archipelago weakening Russia's ability to become a true federation. This note examines how the closed cities fared during the 1998 crisis, using very recent 1998 annual budget data combined with earlier 1996 data to reveal a public finance crisis within cities containing some of Russia's most sensitive production plants. In addition, new data reveal that regions where the cities are located do interact fiscally with the closed cities but only in the area of road maintenance. As in earlier work, severe data limitations restrict the analysis to a descriptive one, with 11 cities assumed to be representative of the larger, unknown ZATO population. The cities are scattered across Russia plus the space centre of Leninsk in Kazakhstan. Most closed cities are heavily subsidised by the federal government as tax revenue collected within each city is insufficient to cover even basic expenditure needs. What tax revenue is collected is dominated by federally controlled taxes that are supposed to be shared with lower levels of government (the profit, VAT and personal income taxes). As in other Russian cities, true local taxes that remain 100% at the city level generate little revenue, ensuring that each closed city has little own revenue authority and remains dependent on federal authority. We first discuss the 1998 annual budgets of 12 closed cities, and then compare

KAZAK LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT I: BASICS

In the struggle for investor dollars, the Central Asian Republic of Kazakstan seems to be leaving its rivals in the dust. One reason for its success is a more receptive attitude towards investment on the part of senior official; but another is a strong law reform program which, alone, has produced the first tax code in the CIS, a new Foreign Investment Law, a comprehensive securities law and legislation dealing with petroleum and mineral rights, and licencing procedures. Gold and other precious metals are also an important attraction to Kazakstan. New precious metals law is discussed herein. In the competition for mineral resource investor dollars, two Central Asian republics continue to widen their lead over Russia in their ability to offer a stable working environment and terms which come closer to international and industry standards, particularly with respect to precious metals. This lead is significant among other things because the Russian blocking position (that is, Russia's ability to deny the landlocked Central Asian nations access to international markets) in the precious metals area is far weaker than it is in the case of mineral resources which are bulkier and more complicated to transport, like oil, gas and pig iron. As one industry spokesman recently remarked in an interview with the Financial Times, The Russians may have a stranglehold on pipeline projects, but gold bullion can simply be loaded on a plane and flown out. We will waive bye-bye to the Russians at 30,000 feet as we fly over them. Law on Precious Metals and Stones (the Law), which went into effect on July 22, 1995, allows foreign investors and legal entities with foreign participation to export precious metals processed from raw materials mined in Kazakstan and establishes domestic market of precious metals. This long awaited law is of the highest significance to foreign investors and it represents a decisive step towards

The republic of Sakha (Yakutia): The evolution of centre‐periphery relations in the Russian federation

Russia's greatness will be magnified by Siberia and the Arctic Ocean.1 THE 1991 COLLAPSE of the Soviet Union was an epic event. It resulted in the dismemberment of the USSR and the less tangible, but nonetheless real, unleashing of centrifugal forces of ethnic nationalism and regional self-determination. Political leaders and political analysts alike realised that once the principle of the immutability of borders was abandoned, a Pandora's box had been opened, triggering a process that had no pre-determined end point or natural conclusion. To illustrate this process Bremmer offered the term 'matrioshka nationalism'.2 Just as ever smaller dolls emerge from within a Russian matrioshka doll, ever smaller states would assert their independence from within the new states of Eurasia. To some degree, 'matrioshka nationalism' appropriately describes the early post-Soviet experience in Eurasia. While not internationally recognised, Abkhazia and South Ossetia achieved a precarious de facto independence from Georgia. In Moldova, the Trans-Dniester Republic maintains an equally ambiguous existence. Meanwhile, the possibility of a Crimean break from the Ukraine continues to enliven the political atmosphere. Not surprisingly, the Russian Federation, with its 89 components, has faced a wide variety qf challenges to its sovereignty. While the Chechen Republic has been the most serious threat so far, a number of Russia's components have claimed varying degrees of sovereignty. Despite these visible signs of breakdown, the Russian Federation has not succumbed to the Soviet pattern of disintegration. Russia's ability to stem the tide of state disintegration is not entirely a surprise. Three critical centripetal factors are at work in Russia.3 First, the Russian Federation's population is considerably more homogeneous than the Soviet population. While the Soviet Union was largely composed of ethnically determined components, Russia is much less so. More than 80% of Russia's population is Russian. The Russian Federation is composed of 21 ethnically defined republics and 68 territorially determined components.4 The latter category includes 49 regions (oblasti), one autonomous region, six territories (kraya), two federal cities (goroda) and 10 autonomous areas (okruga). Together these territorially determined components, henceforth regions,5 account for about 70% of Russia's territory and more than 80% of its population.6 In the republics, which have retained more economic and political autonomy than the regions, the titular population is a majority of the population in only five (the Republic of Tuva, the Chechen