Russian Foreign Minister Research Articles

Reflection of the Taiwan Issue in the Diplomatic Discourse of Russia, China and the United States at the Present Stage

The article deals with the actual problem of reflecting the Taiwan issue in the diplomatic discourses of Russia, China and the United States. The source of the analysis was the texts of the diplomats' speeches for 2023. The following diplomats and politicians' interviews, speeches, and statements were examined: US Secretary of State — A.J. Blinken, Chinese Foreign Ministers — Qing Gang and Wang Yi, Russian Foreign Minister — S.V. Lavrov. As part of the studied issue of diplomatic discourse, an article by Russian diplomat V.F. Pryakhin about the upcoming visit of E. Blinken to Beijing was also analyzed. For the authors, key characters and words used in the speeches of diplomats who carried emotional and expressive connotations were of immediate interest. Considering diplomatic discourse as a form of communication between diplomatic officials and studying it by analyzing the specific language used in spoken or written language of diplomats, allows us to notice even minor changes in relations between states. When, instead of the usual and accepted emotionally restrained style, diplomats begin to use emotionally colored phrases in speech, we can talk about an increase in tension in communication between states. The works of domestic and foreign scientists were analyzed in a brief historiographical review of the issue under consideration. The purpose of the analysis was to study how the attitude to the Taiwan issue affects the diplomatic discourse of the main parties to the conflict: China and the United States, as well as the diplomatic discourse of a third party — Russia. Content analysis as a research method was used. The results of the study are presented in the form of a table of the three countries’ diplomatic discourses’ main elements, as well as in the form of a graph of expressiveness in the texts of different speeches. It was revealed that the Russian and Chinese diplomatic discourses are the most expressive.

The End of the Soviet Union Revisited. Evidence from Ministerial de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba (MINREX)

ABSTRACT This article uses a qualitative historical analysis to scrutinise previously underutilised documents housed in the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba (MINREX) archive in Havana to examine Cuban-Soviet relations during 1991, the final tumultuous year of close Havana-Moscow relations. Specific focus will be given to the MINREX reaction to the August 1991 coup in Moscow and its aftermath. This article will offer several new findings. Principally that throughout 1991 MINREX officials firstly attempted to affect the bilateral relationship by both lobbying Soviet officials while in Cuba, and they proposed utilising glasnost for their own purposes. This proposal was despite a conceptual aversion to the Soviet process. Secondly, MINREX officials endeavoured to lobby Russian officials, including trying to facilitate a meeting with Andrei Kozyrev the Russian Foreign Minister. These endeavours were notwithstanding the adverse reporting of Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President, and his actions during 1991 in both the MINREX documents and Cuban state media.

Relations between Russia and the DPRK in 2023

2023 witnessed a marked surge in contacts between Russia and the DPRK. Active mutual visits were the main event and the main surprise. In summer Russian defense minister Sergey Shoigu visited Pyongyang, in September North Korean leader Kim Jong-un came to Vladivostok to meet President Vladimir Putin, and in October Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov went to the DPRK. After the COVID-induced break, the two countries’ representatives met face to face to seek ways to develop bilateral relations in a new political reality. Moscow and Pyongyang are concerned about the US — South Korea — Japan trilateral alliance emerging in North East Asia. Besides, practical cooperation should reach a level worthy of neighbors who have converging foreign policy views. Also, the two parties are discussing how to organize their political cooperation in the future. Now, in a changed world, Russia promises to block all new sanctions against the DPRK in the UN Security Council, but it does not mean Moscow will neglect its duties as a permanent member or ignore sanctions that are already in effect. The quest for available profitable cooperation formats may prove arduous, and possible options might include projects in the areas of logistics, tourism, etc. Still, it is highly unlikely that Russia receives or seeks arms supplies from the DPRK, like the West claims. As the global confrontation intensifies, North Korea keeps close to traditionally like-minded actors, but Pyongyang may yet diversify their diplomatic options should the opportunity present itself. In the meantime, Russia should use this chance to flesh out our relations with the close neighbor.

Message From Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to International Affairs Readers on the 30th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan

Message From Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to International Affairs Readers on the 30th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan International Affairs No. 6, Vol. 68, 137-138

Http://philjournal.ru/en/issues/Current%20Issue/?ELEMENT_ID=2177

The article explores intertexts and precedent phenomena used in current political discourse as exemplified by the speeches of President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov. As globalization marches on, an increasing number of international conferences, summits, forums is held. Political speeches garner attention of both linguists and a wider audience, as it becomes apparent that political communication can affect people and the international political agenda. Particular attention should be paid to interpreting intertexts. A combination of these factors makes this research highly relevant. The paper focuses on intertexts in political discourse, their types, and how they are interpreted simultaneously from Russian into English. The case study includes videos and scripts of public speeches delivered by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov that can be found on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, on the official website of the President of Russia, and on a video sharing service YouTube. The case study is underpinned by analytical and comparative methods. Practical implications of the present research include ways of interpreting intertexts in the booth in order to ensure successful communication.

The Austrian-Hungarian Press Regarding the Tsar’s Visit to Constanţa in June 1914

The historical events in the first part of 1914 catalyzed an intense political discussion either for maintaining in or retreating Romania from the Triple Alliance. The appointment of I.I.C. Brătianu, known for his political orientation in favor of the Entente, as Prime Minister in the early 1914 created a favorable ground for Franco-Russian diplomatic actions. However, the event which produced the most hectic agitation in the German and Austro-Hungarian diplomatic circles regarding the progress the Entente powers were achieving in Romania was the visit of the Russian tsar to Constanța on June 14, 1914, continued by the talks between Brătianu and Sazonov in the coming days. Although the official circles justifiably maintained a reserved attitude, the press of the Great Powers in the Triple Alliance commented extensively and openly on the special significance of the visit made in Romania by Tsar Nicholas II and the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov.

Unchanging Priorities and New Challenges of Diplomacy

Russia strives to act as constructively as possible in the international arena--this is one of the most significant statements that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made at an annual press conference on the results of Russian diplomacy. And it is fundamentally important today, when major changes in the global situation, triggered this time by the coronavirus pandemic, have made it an urgent task for international actors to develop the most rational approaches to the new challenges and to ensure national interests in the new situation. A detailed assessment of the current international situation, new challenges, and a possible constructive global agenda was given in a number of speeches by Russian President Vladimir Putin--in particular, at a session of the Davos Agenda 2021 online forum organized by the World Economic Forum [4]. It encourages further serious reflection on the task currently before diplomats of uniting the efforts of the international community to solve problems that are crucial for humankind in the current conditions.

Russia – EU: Dialogue without Dialogue

The article deals with the problems of political and diplomatic relations between Russia and the European Union. The key event was the meeting of Josep Borrel as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow in February 2021. The Russian side considered it as an opportunity to outline the prospect of resuming the political dialogue interrupted by the European Union in 2014, notably in the context of the reviewing a strategy on Russia initiated by the EU. The author analyzes the differences in the approaches of European countries and institutions in the context of the ongoing aggravation of Russia – EU relations. The main result of the meeting was not its «ineffectiveness», but, on the contrary, its obvious counterproductive effect. The EU has even more consolidated its policy of deterring Russia and increasing sanctions pressure, which actually closes the prospect for systemic dialogue. In this context, the political and diplomatic conflict in connection with the mass expulsion of Russian diplomats by the Czech Republic (the «Czech case») and the narrowing of opportunities to compensate for the EU-Russia dialogue shortcomings by bilateral tracks are also considered. In conclusion, some finding are presented regarding the perspective Russian reaction.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Message of Greetings on Diplomats' Day

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Message of Greetings on Diplomats' Day

Analysis of Securitization of the Baltic States in the Rhetoric of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov

Analysis of Securitization of the Baltic States in the Rhetoric of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov

How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate inside the Clinton Administration, 1993–95

Abstract Newly available sources show how the 1993–95 debate over the best means of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization unfolded inside the Clinton administration. This evidence comes from documents recently declassified by the Clinton Presidential Library, the Defense Department, and the State Department because of appeals by the author. As President Bill Clinton repeatedly remarked, the two key questions about enlargement were when and how. The sources make apparent that, during a critical decisionmaking period twenty-five years ago, supporters of a relatively swift conferral of full membership to a narrow range of countries outmaneuvered proponents of a slower, phased conferral of limited membership to a wide range of states. Pleas from Central and Eastern European leaders, missteps by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and victory by the pro-expansion Republican Party in the 1994 U.S. congressional election all helped advocates of full-membership enlargement to win. The documents also reveal the surprising impact of Ukrainian politics on this debate and the complex roles played by both Strobe Talbott, a U.S. ambassador and later deputy secretary of state, and Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister. Finally, the sources suggest ways in which the debate's outcome remains significant for transatlantic and U.S.-Russian relations today.

Two Chancellors: Metternich and Nesselrode

The article is devoted to the relations of two distinguished statesmen of the Vienna System period – Austrian Chancellor Metternich and Russian Chancellor Nesselrode. They took the helm of the foreign affairs of the allied states for a long period of time – their cooperation lasted almost 40 years. Russian-Austrian union was based on concurrence in their political views regarding the Concert of Europe, adherence to the principles of legitimacy, conservatism and hostility to revolution and remained until the Crimean War. According to estimates of historians, Nesselrode was just an obedient apprentice of the Austrian Chancellor who orchestrated the whole European policy. Adherence to the principles of conservatism and The Holy Alliance resulted in nothing but misfortunes of Russian foreign policy and its submission to the «European Idea». Austria benefited from this and therefore Nesselrode was called «Russian foreign minister in the service of Austria». However documents witness that Nesselrode being an adept of Metternich’s doctrine wasn’t just a blindfolded follower of all Austrian initiatives. He could stand his ground in face of difficult European politics. In his way he faithfully served Russia and Nicolas the I.

“Neither Peace nor War”: the Strategy of the German Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference

This article examines the strategy of the German diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference 1919, with new, unpublished sources, including the personal papers of German Minister of Foreign Affairs Count U. von Brockdorff-Rantzau. The author concludes that the strategy of German diplomacy in Versailles resembled the politics of Russian Foreign Minister (Narkom) Leo Trotsky during Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, like Trotsky, was not going to sign a peace treaty with the Allies, hoping to use the platform of the Paris Peace Conference to promote his ideas, in particular, to deny the thesis of Germany's primary responsibility for the outbreak of World War I. In addition, the leader of the German delegation placed great hopes on U.S. mediation and manipulation of the so called “Russian (Bolshevik) threat”. This strategy did not bring the desired results. Germany was forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles. As an ambassador of Weimar Germany in Soviet Russia, Brockdorff-Rantzau believed that the recovery of Germany lies in cooperation with Russia, considering this rapprochement with Moscow necessary to counteract the pressure on Germany by the Entente powers.

Kosowo - koniec Europy?

Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, once said that Kosovo’s independence could be the beginning of the end for Europe, and that official recognition of its sovereignty would threaten global security. It was feared that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, and its recognition by European countries in particular, would open up a Pandora’s Box. In fact, as it is claimed in this article, Kosovo may be treated a precedent by other separatist republics and autonomous regions, which might one day demand similar recognition and the same rights that the Kosovars can now possibly enjoy

Russian-African relations and the US factor in 2015–2018

This article is an attempt to trace the impact of the US factor on the Russian African relations during the last years of B. Obama’s administration rule and at the initial stage of D. Trump presidency (2015–2018). The comparative assessment of Moscow and Washington African policy is made. The author demonstrates distinctions and continuity in the activities of the two US administrations in Africa. D. Trump has not included Africa in the list of his foreign policy priorities. Washington however has no intention to withdraw from the Black continent. There, as everywhere, “the American leadership” remains the invariable aim. In the 21th century, the Russia Federation policy in Africa has become much more active. Guided by the concept of multipolar world and in view of its current potential, economic in particular, Moscow has no intention to compete with the USA and other foreign actors for the overwhelming influence in Africa. Its tasks are pragmatic and realistic. In Africa, as globally, the US policy towards Russia is hostile. However the author is of the opinion that Washington does not consider Russia as a serious threaten for its positions and plans in Africa. The new National security strategy of the United States of America approved in December 2018 is full of antirussian outbursts, but in a section, dealing with the US priorities in Africa, Russia is not mentioned. The main American enemies there are international terrorists and China. Hence, no tough confrontation between the two parties – so far. Therefore rivalry there is confined to competition. The article is focused on visits in March 2018 of the Russian foreign minister S. Lavrov to Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia and of then US Secretary of State R.Tillerson to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad and Nigeria. The situation around some most sensitive US-Russia points of intersection in Africa – such as Egypt, Libya and South Africa Republic – is analyzed. The development of Cairo’s bilateral relations with Washington and Moscow is reviewed. It is noted that cooperation between Russia and Egypt is of mutual benefit and that the two countries need each other. But of this cooperation has its limits as the USA remains the main foreign partner of Egypt. The conclusion is that Russia has taken a course for a gradual restoration of its positions in Libya after the overthrow of M. Kaddafi. Moscow’s contribution to the settlement of the political crisis in the country is explored. Constructive contacts have been established with all major participants of this process. Special attention is paid to the National Libyan Army Commander, Field-Marshal H. Haftar. The United States preferences the head of the Government of national accord F. Sarraj. The attempts to interfere into Russia – South Africa using the resignation of president J. Zuma who firmly stood for friendship with Moscow have failed. The new president S. Ramaphosa has confirmed the policy of strong bilateral cooperation.

Why the EU and NATO have failed to manage the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

The world observed a well-developed Russian strategy and military model have had destabilizing consequences and wide-ranging implications for international security, in particular for Europe, and global stability since the Ukraine crisis. Needless to say, most European countries and notably NATO conclude that Russian policy, military strategy, and military practice in the Ukraine crisis challenge the European security and carry significant implications for NATO, therefore the Ukraine crisis force the EU and NATO to concentrate on measures against Russian strategy.[1] In reality, Russia has already given the signals of its intentions via the Military Doctrine 2010 and Defense Strategy 2013 that list destabilization of the near abroad, in other words buffer zone, and NATO or the EU expansion, including deployment of military forces, as most relevant military threats. Both documents highlight that “Russia faced the very real threat of being side-lined in international affairs.” [2] Furthermore MacKinnon suggests that in line with its new regime change strategy, the United States forced the former Soviet Union’s member states to establish their political institutions, provided funds for the opposition, and supported revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the revolutions added to the Kremlin’s perception that “Washington’s chief objective might have been to change the regime in Russia as well.”[3] Likewise, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said “NATO’s expansion by pulling more Russia’s neighboring countries into the alliance is unacceptable”.[4] Therefore it could be concluded from Russian point of view that everything should be done to prevent NATO and the EU expansion which can be characterized as the greatest threat to Russian security, and that’s why Russia must restore its status as a great power inside its own sphere of influence. It is the aim of this analytic paper to search why the EU and NATO have failed to manage the crisis emanating from Russian aggression and expansion in Ukraine, and to address the current strategic environment as well. I shall try to analyze the drivers and the reasons of NATO and the EU’s poor reaction against Russia, and finally I will emphasize why and how the roles of NATO and the European Security Strategy should be reconsidered in the light of energy security policy of the EU, and why NATO and the EU needs to improve their responsiveness rather than readiness.

Economic Cooperation of Russia and Greece during the Sanction Restrictions period and the Policies to Strengthen the Integration Process

1. Introduction The economic cooperation between Russia and European Union Member States is characterized not only by a close interdependence due to their history and geographical proximity, but also by opposition of their international positions, impeding implementation of mutual economic interests because of a tense political situation in recent years. Intensive integration processes in Europe, observed since establishment of European Union, are displaced by centrifugal processes in recent years. Though, European Union is still most successful monetary integration with population of about 510 million people (as for January 2016) (5). The Russian Federation, in its turn, carries out international integration policy through implementation of Eurasian Economic Community and creation of initiatives to strengthen cooperation with Asian countries and Arab States. However, mutual sanctions, operating more than two years, are not conducive to mutual beneficial cooperation and set a negative vector of development. The Hellenic Republic, as a member of EU, has to adhere to a common foreign policy of association. Despite fact that Greece is a sovereign country (Thalassinos et cd., 2006; Thalassinos et cd., 2015a; Thalassinos et ed., 2015b; Thalassinos and Stamatopoulos 2015; Thalassinos, 2008) right to conduct a multifaceted foreign policy and to play a geopolitical role is restricted by a huge debt to external creditors. But, realizing lack of prospects for further trade and economic confrontation, its leaders are increasingly in favor of stopping sanctions and cooperation with Russian state. This fundamental position of Greek government on issue of cooperation with Russia is due to inextricable links of two countries in historical, spiritual, economic and social spheres over centuries. Relations between Russia and Greece have always been friendly and mutually beneficial; this is primarily due to lack of fundamental differences between two countries. They were united and are still united by common historical memory and cultural heritage, which stimulates initiatives both from Russian and from Greece. Special role in Russian-Greek relations have played development of direct links with Black Sea regions of Russia -these are places of residence of representatives of Greek Diaspora. Greece occupies a special position in Russian foreign policy and according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in world, as he says, there are few other countries, that are so closely related as Russia and Greece, with such a long history of sincere friendship (6). In addition Greece is only NATO country to actively develop military-technical cooperation with Russia. Year 2016 is a cross-year for Russian-Hellenic culture and heritage and as Prime Minister of Greece A. Tsipras characterized his visit to Russia as the beginning of a new spring in relations between Athens and Moscow. In May 2016 a joint declaration for an effective Government Partnership between two countries was signed. It declares modernization, according to which willingness to contribute to creation and promotion on market of modern competitive products and encouraging mutual investments in innovative technologies, elimination of barriers and constraints to free and cost-effective sharing of results with activities, improving business environment in a fair, prompt and constructive dialogue between business communities and public authorities of two countries. Also a memorandum of understanding on inter-regional cooperation between Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece was adopted. The parties signed a road map of Russian-Greek relations in field of agriculture, adopting a tourism program of mutual actions for next three years, including contributing to speedy changes from agreement signed in May 25, 2006 between Russian Federation and European Community on facilitation of visas issuance to citizens of these countries, promoting dialogue on establishing visa-free travel for them. …

The Ukraine Crisis Reflections in the Speeches of USA and Russian Political Leaders

Abstract This paper focuses on the rhetoric of USA and Russian political leaders during the Ukraine crisis by analyzing changes appearing in their speeches during the different stages of the crisis. The goal of the analysis is to investigate the speeches delivered by political leaders of the United States and Russia, being important actors in the Ukraine crisis, by identifying both countries’ attitudes to one another, further intentions regarding the management of the crisis and changes of topics in each stage. The speeches of the following most influential politicians in foreign policy formation in the USA and Russia are analyzed: President Barack Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry and Vice President Joe Biden, President Vladimir Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Medvedev. The speeches were collected from the official websites of U.S. and Russian government institutions. The analysis revealed that from the beginning of the crisis the main tool in the Ukraine crisis was rhetoric. Western parties began to take real actions only later: sanctions on Russia were imposed, international organizations started to play more active role, ceasefire agreements were signed. In terms of communications strategies used by both countries, the USA rhetoric and its communication strategy as well as Russian leaders were using a combination of proactive and reactive strategies.

Turning It Up to Eleven: Belligerent Rhetoric in North Korea's Propaganda

ABSTRACT: After contextualizing North Korea's capacity for belligerent rhetoric directed toward the United States and its northeast Asian allies, the author examines the contention that rhetoric from Pyongyang represents a conflict escalation risk or even a casus belli. The results of statistical tests indicate a negative correlation between Pyongyang's rhetoric and international diplomatic initiatives, but no correlation between North Korea's verbal hostility and its provocations. Advances in North Korea's nuclear weapon and missile programs mark a qualitative change in the threat to the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Pyongyang's ability to fit a miniaturized nuclear warhead on a missile or rocket and deliver the payload is unproven, but many analysts argue that the capability is highly likely. (1) This capability alone represents a risk to geopolitical stability in northeast Asia as the region's powers, including the United States, will struggle to calibrate their responses to North Korea's provocations. Additionally, before, during, and after missile and nuclear tests in 2016, North Korea employed belligerent rhetoric--in English for international influence--that increased tension on the Korean peninsula particularly and in northeast Asia generally. These locutions--threats to annihilate American bases overseas, turn Seoul into a sea of fire, and execute preemptive nuclear attacks against perceived adversaries--are well-known. Bellicose rhetoric has long been part of North Korea's international communication, but the combination of menacing words and capabilities to actuate the corresponding threats is new for long-range or nuclear attacks. In this vein, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov remarked after the first set of nuclear and missile tests in 2016 that Pyongyang's bellicose rhetoric creates a legitimate casus belli for threatened states. (2) The same week, American intelligence agencies issued an assessment: Threatening rhetoric from Pyongyang... suggests North Korea is preparing for a surprise military strike. (3) This statement acknowledges a connection between North Korea's hostile rhetoric and the country's actions. These interpretations of North Korean statements may appear alarmist, but they are simply variations of analyses that Pyongyang's rhetoric could lead to miscalculation by actors on and around the Korean peninsula and consequently escalation to war. Such claims appear frequently in media reports, government declarations, and messages from the international community, especially during and after periods of North Korean provocation. These statements assume North Korea's inflammatory rhetoric means something; however, if the rhetoric fits no behavioral pattern, then other countries' populations, media, and governments should discount the insults, threats, and crisis-mongering emanating from Pyongyang. Consequently, these aggressive locutions would not function as sources for miscalculation and even less as a casus belli. In short, is North Korea's belligerent rhetoric cheap talk or a meaningful signal of tangible events affecting tension on the Korean peninsula and in northeast Asia? After examining the background of North Korea's recent progress toward capabilities threatening the United States, South Korea, and Japan, this article describes the mixed results of a study comparing Pyongyang's belligerent rhetoric to events involving North Korea and major actors in northeast Asia and discusses the policy implications of these findings. (4) North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs North Korea's conventional arms are inferior to those of its adversaries--the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The consensus is North Korea would rapidly lose a conventional war against any combination of these alliance partners, and consequently, the Pyongyang regime would fall quickly. Traditionally, North Korea has relied on two strategic asymmetries to reduce this gap: a garrison-state sociopolitical organization, with an armed force disproportionately large in comparison to the state population and constructed to endure major attrition and therefore dissuade attack and artillery deployed along the demilitarized zone allowing for quick, widespread, economically devastating destruction of Seoul and environs. …

Media construction of Russia’s international relations: specifics of representations

ABSTRACTThis paper discusses the mechanisms of discursive construction of Russia’s international relations and intends to identify such mechanisms in the media. Using the framework that is informed by social constructionism and Critical Discourse Analysis, the authors view international relations as a discursive phenomenon, which is constructed through a specific repertoire of pragmalinguistic means. Drawing on the Russian foreign minister’s speech and its representations in Russian newspapers, the authors conduct a case study analysis and reveal that the representations of international relations undergo recontextualisation in the media as compared to the representations in proper diplomatic discourse. The newspapers offer avenues for ideologically charged interpretations through chronotope representations and the strategy of emotionalisation. The media also widen the discursive context of international relations by way of the inclusion of heterogeneous social actors, which are grouped in a way that discloses a conflict potential in their relations.