This study is aimed to study a key element of the activity of any international organization — the problem of consensus decision-making and the corresponding practice of solving it both in integration bodies (Eurasian Economic Union, European Union) and in interstate organizations devoid of a supranational component (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization treaty, Collective Security Treaty Organization).Aim. Identify current approaches to improving the application of the rule of consensus in interstate (intergovernmental) structures and their bodies.Tasks. Investigate and generalize the practice of consensus decision-making within the international regional organizations, highlight actual ways to increase the efficiency of their decision-making mechanisms.Methods. The study used general scientific methodology. The comparative analysis method is used to compare existing decision-making practices. Analysis, synthesis, generalization, as well as the formal logical method were used to formulate the conclusions of the work.Results. The collective decision-making based on consensus follows from the international legal principle par in parem non habet imperium. It emphasizes the equality of all participants in an international organization and excludes the imposition of obligations non-approved by a sovereign state. From this point of view, consensus is a way to strengthen unity and achieve organizational stability. Simultaneously the practice of using this form in various international organizations gives evidence to its low efficiency in decision-making. Achieving consensus requires intensive efforts to coordinate the positions of the parties, and the emergence of “one-vote veto” situations cannot be ruled out. A possible way to increase the efficiency of decision-making within the framework of integration processes (EU, EAEU) lies through the development of supranational mechanisms.Conclusions. Analysis of the practice of functioning of international regional organizations (SCO, NATO, CSTO) allows to identify two approaches aimed at overcoming the negative features of consensus decision-making. The first involves the development of an international organization with formal obligations of members into a community associated with the establishment of a set of shared values among its participants. The second presumes the creation of mechanisms that allow interested states to use the institutions of such a structure to make collective decisions without a not-participating state. Both approaches do not exclude but complement each other.
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