Cline in an NPR interview, cited in his contribution here, stated: “Every society in the history of the world has ultimately collapsed.” Every society? Does the “collapse” of a government (the fall of a dynasty) also mean the end of a cultural tradition? If the term “collapse” is not specifically clarified (see Middleton 2017), it is difficult to analyze different trajectories of change in social and political systems, which may be only loosely linked, and to evaluate changes or lack of changes in cultural institutions, the latter of which might lead to political regeneration (Schwartz and Nichols 2006).In order to consider the events and processes of the twelfth century BCE, which is what Cline studies, one must, of course, understand, or strive to understand, what “societies” were like, how they were governed, what local social organizations were in place, what kinds of economies, especially agricultural systems, existed and how they functioned under demands of rulers, what sorts of social and economic inequalities characterized these societies—in the centuries (few or many) before the twelfth century.In a recent volume I happened to edit (Yoffee 2019), the authors investigate the degrees of fragility in a variety of ancient states, that is, the lack of “integration” in ancient states; the structural complexity in these ancient states was far from being directed by beneficent rulers and their efficient administrations (see for more recent examples, Scott 1999). Toward the end of the second millennium BCE, there was hardly a degree of stability in the Middle Babylonian state and in the Middle Assyrian state, and there were major conflicts between the two states; political assassinations and contests over royal succession was the order of the time, and economic systems were disrupted; the Hittite state was battling for hegemony in Anatolia, and there was turmoil in later New Kingdom Egypt.Some studies of collapse simply assume that ancient states were stable until something bad happened, usually climate/environmental change (whether caused by humans or not) or because enemies overwhelmed them, or many things were happening at once (Cline’s “perfect storm” of processes). If states in ancient western Asia were highly unstable, composed of various social and ethnic groups and riven by rebellions and resistance, perhaps fragmentation was not an unexpected outcome. Indeed, the course of political fragmentation, social change, and demographic flux in earlier Mesopotamian history can be traced (Yoffee and Seri 2019).Of course, as Cline says, new or recurring factors of droughts, area-wide social unrest, piracy, and longer and shorter movements of people were historical factors that also led to the failure of cities and governments in the last centuries of the second millennium BCE. New constellations of power emerged in western Asia, and formerly small-scale confederations were able to establish their independence from the great powers, however fragile those had been. And in the aftermath of “collapse” new ideologies and belief-systems could be invented and take root.