Rotation In Office Research Articles

The Personal and Operational Consequences of Global Forward Basing and Officer Rotation in the Interwar Royal Navy

Royal Navy officers appointed to command warships around the world played a key role in the maintenance of the British Empire and the implementation of its foreign policy. This study will demonstrate that the personal experiences and operational consequences of how those officers were managed has long been significantly underappreciated. While functional, the Admiralty’s system for selecting, preparing and managing its commanding officers struggled to keep up with the evolving requirements of modern peacetime naval operations. By exploring the experiences of over 500 officers posted around the world, 1919-35, this article will add a new human dimension to our understanding of how naval power functioned in interwar international relations.

Costs of Job Rotation: Evidence from Mandatory Loan Officer Rotation

Job rotation inside an organization creates two conflicting effects. It disciplines agents by creating the fear that their successors may discover and report their hidden information. Thus, the agent takes actions that align with the principal’s objective. However, job rotation can create a moral hazard problem. If information is soft and therefore, nonverifiable, the principal cannot attribute blame to the agent or the successor. Agents shirk, thereby hurting performance. Thus, the importance of disciplining versus moral hazard effects depends on the availability of hard information. Using unique loan-level data, we show that job rotation hinders performance when the information is soft. This paper was accepted by Giesecke Kay, finance.

The Political Theory of Parties and Partisanship: Catching Up

Despite their centrality to modern democracy, until recently political parties were relegated to the margins of normative democratic theory, taking a back seat to social movements, civil society associations, deliberative experiments, spaces for local participatory government, and direct popular participation. Yet, in the past 15 years, a burgeoning literature has emerged in democratic theory focused directly on parties and partisanship; that is our focus in this review. We locate three main normative defenses of parties: one centered in the special role parties can play in political justification as agents of public reason, a second that looks to the way parties contribute to deliberation, and a third that focuses on the partisan commitment to regulated political rivalry and peaceful rotation in office. In this last connection, we survey work on the constitutional status of parties and reasons for banning parties. We then consider the relation of partisanship to citizenship, and in a fourth section we turn to the ethics of partisanship. Parties and partisanship are interwoven but separable: If partisans are necessary to realize the value of parties, the reverse holds as well, and parties are necessary to realize the value of partisanship.

Теория и практика сменяемости власти: чьим традициям следует Россия?

Теория и практика сменяемости власти: чьим традициям следует Россия?

Loan officer rotation and credit access: evidence from Madagascar

PurposeWith exclusive data from a commercial microfinance institution (MFI) in Madagascar, the purpose of this paper is to investigate if loan officer rotation (change of loan officer) has an effect on credit access (loan approval) in rural and in urban areas. The authors further analyze how the frequency of loan officer rotation affects credit access in rural and in urban areas.Design/methodology/approachThe authors apply propensity score matching to compare credit access between loan applicants who experienced loan officer rotation and loan applicants who experienced no loan officer rotation in rural and in urban areas.FindingsResults show that loan officer rotation has a positive and statistically significant effect on credit access. The authors observe further that loan officer rotation has a different effect on credit access in rural and in urban areas. Whilst rural loan applicants who experienced loan officer rotation are more likely to have credit access, urban loan applicants show no statistically significant effect of loan officer rotation on credit access. For the frequency effect on credit access, the authors observe that one loan officer rotation has a positive and statistically significant effect on credit access whereas results are mixed for two loan officer rotations.Research limitations/implicationsEven though the authors can show that loan officer rotation can improve credit access to loan applicants, especially in rural areas, the conditions in Madagascar are unique. Therefore, results need to be verified in other countries and institutional contexts.Practical implicationsFrom the perspective of MFI, the authors recommend that the management of MFI needs to provide better tools to loan officers to improve on the evaluation of agricultural loan products or standardize the assessment of agricultural loan products to improve on lending decisions. Further, if applicable, the authors recommend that MFI should consider using credit worthiness assessment procedures which rely less on loan officer’s judgment for loan evaluation, such as automated systems. From the perspective of loan applicants, the authors recommend that loan applicants should request for a change of loan officer if they experience successive loan applications rejection.Originality/valueTo the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to provide empirical evidence on the effect and frequency of loan officer rotation on credit access in Sub-Sahara Africa, and Madagascar, in particular.

Controlling bureaucracies in weak institutional contexts: The politics of police autonomy

AbstractThis article argues that political competition determines how and when elected politicians can reduce police autonomy. While bureaucratic autonomy is generally lauded in developed democracies, it can result in serious malfeasance in contexts of institutional weakness. Political incumbents may reduce police autonomy through different means and for various purposes. While some politicians seek to professionalize police forces and align them with the rule of law, others aspire to politicize police to appropriate its rents from corruption. This article shows that lack of rotation in office (low political turnover) increases politicians' control of police, while under low turnover, fragmentation in cabinets and the legislature influences whether politicians seek to professionalize or politicize the force. The article illustrates this theory with a subnational comparison of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Santa Fe (Argentina), relying on 80 interviews with police and politicians.

Committee Election and Rotation

This paper provides a theoretical description for the adoption of turn-taking in office where two or more individuals are elected to a committee to serve individual terms for the same public office, with the exclusive right to exercise the public office rotating, exclusively, among the members of the committee at intervals shorter than the term length. Turn-taking would enable the benefits of shorter tenures to be realized without incurring, to the same extent, the costs associated with setting an equivalently shortened term and term limit regime. Turn-taking would be most likely to emerge among a factional electorate to increase rotation in office to generate support for shared governance institutions. A case study of three high-level public offices in the Republic of Venice, controlled by factional patricians, provides evidence of the emergence and operation of turn-taking. The tripartite presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is examined as a modern day application of turn-taking emerging among a factional electorate.

Democracy, Development, and Career Trajectories of Former Political Leaders

One of the obstacles to democratic development is the reluctance of political leaders to leave office. This article argues that alongside democratic constraints and accountability, leaders’ career concern—specifically, the possibility of post-tenure careers—is an important factor behind their rotation in office. While literature exists about leaders’ exit and fate, we lack a systematic understanding of their careers and whether former rulers retire, remain in politics, or pursue civil service, business, international, or non-profit careers after leaving office. Drawing on the new data on the prior- and post-tenure occupations of leaders from 1960 to 2010, the article explains how democracy, personal background, and the economy influence what ex-leaders can do, and why. In turn, over time the post-tenure careers of prior rulers may strengthen the precedent behind the institutional routinization of the rotation in office norm—an important component of democratic consolidation.

Implementing mobile devices to reduce non-rostered workload for junior doctors

There is a large body of evidence demonstrating the detrimental effect of long work hours on the performance, mood, and job satisfaction of junior doctors. By extension these effects carry...

Ansiedad de los estudiantes de una facultad de medicina mexicana, antes de iniciar el internado

IntroductionPre-registration medical graduates demonstrate their skills in a hospital as rotation house-officers, which can cause anxiety. The aim of this study is to quantify anxiety (state and trait) in students before starting their pre-registration posts in a public medical school in Mexico, and also to determine if their mean examination grades (GPA) are related to anxiety. MethodA descriptive, cross-sectional study was conducted using the IDARE questionnaire, which assesses Trait anxiety (STAI R) and state (STAI E). It was completed, before starting the pre-registration house officer rotation in 2014, by students of the Faculty of Medicine, UNAM, 2009 course. Statistical analysis was performed using Student t test for independent samples, and Pearson correlation index. ResultsOut of a total number of 1,023 students in 2014, the sampled population was 479 (46.82%), of whom 332 (32.45%) were women and 147 (14.36%) were men. There were 105 (21.82%) students with trait anxiety trait, with a GPA of 84.1, 132 (27.55%) with anxiety state, with a GPA of 84.0. There were 374 (78.07%) with no anxiety trait, and 347 (72.44%) with no state anxiety. On comparing state anxiety, the Student t-test p=.3 (95% CI -1474 to 0.494); the Pearson correlation index was -0.009, p=.043. On comparing anxiety state, the Student t-test p=.236 reported (95% CI -1.46 to 0.360); the Pearson correlation index was -0.08, with a p=.047. As for the GPA, there was no difference between the different levels of state and trait anxiety. ConclusionsThe trait anxiety level and state is often greater than that reported in the general population. There was no correlation between the presence of anxiety and mean examination grades (GPA).

‘Guaranteed Rotation in Office’: A Comment

The Political QuarterlyVolume 86, Issue 3 p. 376-379 Debate: Rotation in Office ‘Guaranteed Rotation in Office’: A Comment Ben Saunders, Ben SaundersSearch for more papers by this author Ben Saunders, Ben SaundersSearch for more papers by this author First published: 30 June 2015 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12183Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Volume86, Issue3July–September 2015Pages 376-379 RelatedInformation

‘Guaranteed Rotation in Office’: A Comment

The Political QuarterlyVolume 86, Issue 3 p. 380-384 Debate: Rotation in Office ‘Guaranteed Rotation in Office’: A Comment Peter Stone, Peter StoneSearch for more papers by this author Peter Stone, Peter StoneSearch for more papers by this author First published: 30 June 2015 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12182Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume86, Issue3July–September 2015Pages 380-384 RelatedInformation

Guaranteed Rotation in Office: A ‘New’ Model Of Democracy

AbstractAlthough once a classic democratic ideal, rotation in office is nowadays seen more as a natural consequence of competitive elections than a goal in its own right. But this article proposes that a strict rota, with each group taking a turn in office, might be preferable to ordinary electoral democracy in certain sorts of countries: nascent democracies, divided societies with persistent minorities and failed one‐party democracies. Ways are suggested of combining intraparty democracy with interparty rotation.

Can Mandatory Rotation Policy Distort Incentives? Evidence from Loan O fficer Rotation

Job rotation, where a principal routinely rotates agents among tasks, is argued to be a powerful antidote for agency problems inside an organization. However, when soft information dominates transactions inside a firm, verifying the information set that led to a particular decision becomes difficult. This difficulty imposes costs on job rotation since an incoming agent cannot verify the information set that the outgoing agent utilized when arriving at a key decision. This lack of verifiability distorts incentives for effort when a decision straddles two agents since neither agent receives the entire marginal cost/benefit of her effort. In this study, we highlight this cost of rotation policies. We use unique data on over 50,000 loans sanctioned by 51 loan officers of a large public sector bank in India, which follows a fixed-tenure-based policy of loan officer rotation. We find default probabilities to be about 8% higher for loans that are likely to straddle an incoming and an outgoing loan officer when compared to other loans. This difference does not stem from any differences in hard information captured in borrowers' credit histories or from loan officer rotation destroying lending relationships. Finally, we find evidence of credit rationing as well as the new loan officer rejects 7% more loans for borrowers who have borrowed during the straddling period.

“A Genuine Republican”:

“A Genuine Republican”:

Brian John Chapman

Born in Edinburgh, Brian John Chapman attended Daniel Stewart’s School, where he was Dux. He then entered medical school at the University of Edinburgh, where he met his wife Dorothy....

Mushtaq Abdul Rasool

After completing undergraduate training and house officer jobs in Karachi, Mushtaq Abdul Rasool came to England. He secured a place on the ophthalmic senior house officer rotation in Yorkshire, working...

Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

ABSTRACTWe present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self‐reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.

Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self-reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.

Administration and "The Democracy": Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861

Jacksonian America was a country in rapid transition. Intensified sectional divisions, exponential increases in urbanization and immigration, the rise of factory production, and repeated cycles of economic boom and bust helped to fuel an anxious desire for political reform. For Jacksonian Democrats the answer to this popular yearning was the reconstruction of American democracy—including a broadened electorate, offices open to all, and the elimination of monopoly and other special privileges. Government at the national level was to be kept small and returned to the people. But as is often the case, the institutionalization of democracy demanded a corresponding increase in governmental capacities. Destroying the power of the “Monster Bank” gave new powers and capacities to the Treasury for the management of monetary policy and fiscal transfers. Offices open to all through the new system of “rotation in office” created the need for bureaucratic systems of control that replaced status-based restraints and personal loyalties. And the side effects of technological development, in particular the human carnage that accompanied the rapid expansion of steamboat travel, generated public demand for protection that prompted the creation of a recognizably modern system of health and safety regulation. “The Democracy” established by the Jacksonians both furthered the building of an American administrative state and solidified an emerging nineteenth-century model of American administration law. In that model administrative accountability was preeminently a matter of (1) political oversight and direction and (2) internal hierarchical control. Judicial control of administration featured a cramped vision of mandamus review combined with almost unlimited personal liability of officials for erroneous action. Although administrative law structured in this fashion seems peculiar, indeed almost invisible, to the twenty-first-century legal imagination, it fit comfortably within Jacksonian democratic ideology. author. Sterling Professor of Law and Management, Yale University. My thanks to Josh Berman and Ethan Davis for splendid and cheerful research assistance, to colleagues far and wide who commented on earlier drafts, to Patricia Page for her usual excellent manuscript preparation, to the Yale Law School for financial support, to Theresa Cullen for marvelously efficient bibliographic assistance, and to Anne MacClintock for saving me from excessive use of the passive voice and for much else. 1568.MASHAW.1693.DOC 9/21/2008 10:27 PM ADMINISTRATION AND “THE DEMOCRACY” 1569 article contents