In today's growing data market, wireless service providers (WSPs) compete severely to attract users by announcing innovative data plans. Two of the most popular innovative data plans are rollover and shared data plans, where the former plan allows a user to keep his unused data quota to next month and the latter plan allows users in a family to share unused data. As a pioneer to provide such data plans, a WSP faces immediate revenue loss from existing users who pay less overage charges due to less data over-usage, but his market share increases gradually by attracting new users and those under the other WSPs. In some countries, WSPs have asymmetric timing for providing such innovative data plans, while some other markets' WSPs have symmetric timing or no planning. This raises the question of why and when the competitive WSPs should offer the new data plans. This paper provides game theoretic modelling and analysis of the WSPs' timing of offering innovative data plans, by considering new user arrival and dynamic user churn between WSPs. Our equilibrium analysis shows that the WSP with small market share prefers to announce the innovative data plan first to attract more users, while the WSP with large market share prefers to announce later to avoid the immediate revenue loss. In a market with many new users, WSPs with similar market shares will offer the data plans simultaneously, but these WSPs facing few new users may not offer any new plan. Perhaps surprisingly, WSPs' profits can decrease with new user number and they may not benefit from the option of innovative data plans. Finally, unlike rollover data plan, we show that the timing of shared data plan further depends on the composition of users.