Role Of Value Judgments Research Articles

A Study on Latrinalia and the Role of Value Judgements among Community People in Selected Community Area at Ahmedabad

A Study on Latrinalia and the Role of Value Judgements among Community People in Selected Community Area at Ahmedabad

Changing Debates and Shifting Landscapes in Science Studies: Exploring How Graduate Students with Varied Backgrounds Think About the Role of Value-Judgments in Science

Few studies consider how changes in science studies education might reduce barriers to fruitful engagement with scientific practices. This paper is co-authored by the participants and instructor of a small interdisciplinary graduate seminar at the University of British Columbia (UBC) in Vancouver, Canada. The seminar reflected on the role of value-judgments in science, considering the learning experiences of a science studies student (AR, first author) and four students (of a total of six students registered in the seminar) who have backgrounds in the sciences (JA, GG, BHW, SL), their responses to course materials, and outlines lessons learned with respect to interdisciplinary communication. AR was surprised to find that the science students enjoyed reading and engaging with science studies texts as she thought they would be apprehensive about the epistemic content, but they thought the texts effectively illustrated that science is influenced by social factors. Instead of expressing concerns about epistemic issues, the science students’ critiques pertained to the length of texts and writing style. They also felt that some texts “unfairly” attacked scientists, and could be “dry,” “abstract,” and overly “problem-focused” without offering concrete solutions. This study suggests that interventions which explicitly encourage conversation and collaboration between students in science studies and the sciences more broadly can play a crucial role in dismantling unknowingly held simplistic views of other disciplines. It also speaks to the critical necessity of broad interdisciplinary scholarship which explicitly includes both the natural sciences and humanities. AR noted she initially believed that science students would react negatively to outsiders’ critiques of the sciences and concluded that science studies education ought to include meaningful engagement with practicing scientists, which is rarely the case. This study illustrates the importance of using texts which have a style and vocabulary not felt as disparaging towards scientists when introducing science students or researchers to concepts in science studies. It also points to the need for studies investigating how students from different research backgrounds may learn to “see” their use of jargon and the implicit assumptions they make about their listeners’ familiarity or understanding of a specific idea.

Lessons from other disciplines for setting management thresholds for biodiversity conservation.

Successful, state-dependent management, in which the goal of management is to maintain a system in a desired state, involves defining the boundaries between different states. Once these boundaries have been defined, managers require a strategic action plan with thresholds that initiate management interventions to either maintain or return the system to a desired state. This approach to management is widely used across diverse industries from agriculture, to medicine, to information technology, but it has only been adopted in conservation management relatively recently. Conservation practitioners have expressed a willingness to integrate this structured approach in their management systems, but they have also voiced concerns, including lack of a robust process for doing so. Given the widespread use of state-dependent management in other fields, we conducted an extensive review of the literature on threshold-based management to gain insight into how and where it is applied and identify potential lessons for conservation management. We identified 22 industries using 75 different methods for setting management thresholds in 843 studies. Methods spanned six broad approaches, including expert driven, statistical, predictive, optimization, experimental, and artificial intelligence methods. The objectives of each of these studies influenced the approaches used, including the methods for setting thresholds and selecting actions, and the number of thresholds set. The role of value judgments in setting thresholds was clear; studies across all industries frequently involved experts in setting thresholds, often accompanied by computational tools to simulate the consequences of proposed thresholds under different conditions. Of the 30 conservation studies examined, two-thirds used expert-driven methods, consistent with prior evidence that experience-based information often drives conservation management decisions. The methods we identified from other disciplines could help conservation decision makers set thresholds for management interventions in different contexts, linking monitoring to management actions and ensuring that conservation interventions are timely and effective.

Eliciting Value-Judgments in Health Technology Assessment: An Applied Ethics Decision Making Paradigm

The worldwide COVID-19 pandemic has shed more light on the difficulty of making health care decisions integrating scientific knowledge and values associated to life and death issues, human suffering, quality of life, economic losses, liberty of movement, etc. But the difficulties related to health care decisions and the use of innovative drugs or technologies are not new, and many countries have created agencies that have the mandate to evaluate new technologies in health care. Health Technological Assessment (HTA) reports’ aim is to guide the decision makers in these difficult matters. There are two ethical components in HTA. The first is the report’s presentation of an ethical evaluation of the technology. The second is the value-ladenness of the HTA decision-making process itself. When implicit value judgments are not elicited, the justification of the final decision cannot be transparent. The present paper aims to identify and elicit the implicit value-judgments related to each step of the HTA process. This research is grounded on an applied ethics decision-making paradigm based on the role of value judgments in the decision-making process. The first part discusses two different approaches to values and value judgments in HTA. In the second part, citations mentioning value judgments extracted from a systematic review on the integration of ethics into HTA were categorized to elicit the value judgments and their criteria for each different HTA decision-making steps. The results show that there are 18 decision-making steps in the HTA process where 23 implicit value-judgments can be recognized. The range of these value judgments encompasses the whole HTA process: from the initial request, the presenting of the principal issues, to the final report’s dissemination. Since stakeholders need to understand which value judgments the conclusion of a report relies on, eliciting the implicit value judgments in the HTA decision-making process should yield more transparency.

A Measure of Judgments – Wilhelm Röpke’s Methodological Heresy

Abstract As early as 1932, Wilhelm Röpke’s social diagnosis of historical liberalism was coupled with a methodological critique of his own discipline, one in which he sought to revisit what seemed to have become settled business: the role of value judgments in social science. His interpretation of the collapse of cultural liberalism included a sense of culpability on the part of social scientists who had not been, in his view, strong enough in their defense of a moral framework within which cultural liberalism could survive. Yet the positivist movement in social science, because of its interpretation of Max Weber’s proscription, had consciously treated value statements as unscientific. Röpke’s arguments regarding the need to “re-orient” the social sciences were anti-positivist, and his correspondence with colleagues reflects that. They were views that he held to the end of his career and are an important part of our understanding of what came to be known as Röpke’s economic humanism.

Criminal but Beautiful: A Study on Graffiti and the Role of Value Judgments and Context in Perceiving Disorder

The citation above, of a participant in our study who describes his first image of graffiti that comes to mind, summarizes our argument: public opinions on disorder (graffiti, in this case) may vary considerably, not only between people but people themselves make different judgments, depending on what they see in which context. Indeed, studies prove that ‘graffiti has been called everything from urban blight to artistic expression’ (Gomez 1993: 634). Lombard (2012) calls graffiti ‘art crimes’ because it is criminal and artistic at the same time, which makes it also difficult to distinguish ‘artists’ from ‘criminals’. Even graffiti writers recognize that graffiti, while for them in the first place art, in some contexts is damaging or inappropriate (Rowe and Hutton 2012). According to Brighenti, graffiti is an ‘interstitial practice’: a practice about which different actors hold different conceptions, depending on Eur J Crim Policy Res (2016) 22:107–125 DOI 10.1007/s10610-015-9288-4

Solomon's Empirical/Non-Empirical Distinction and the Proper Place of Values in Science

In assessing the appropriateness of a scientific community's research effort, Solomon considers a number of “decision vectors,” divided into the empirical and non-empirical. Value judgments get sorted as non-empirical vectors. By way of contrast, I introduce Anderson's discussion of the evidential role of value judgments. Like Anderson, I argue that value judgments are empirical in the relevant sense. I argue further that Solomon's decision matrix needs to be reconceptualized: the distinction should not be between the empirical vs. non-empirical, but between the relevant vs. irrelevant. Whether particular value judgments are relevant or not is an empirical question, to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Use of risk assessment and life cycle assessment in decision making: a common policy research agenda.

Quantitative risk assessment (RA) and life cycle assessment (LCA) are both analytical tools used to support decision making in environmental management. They have been developed and used by largely separate groups of specialists, and it is worth considering whether there is a common research agenda that may increase the relevance of these tools in decision-making processes. The validity of drawing comparisons between use of the tools is established through examining key aspects of the two approaches for their similarities and differences, including the nature of each approach and contextual and methodological aspects. Six case studies involving use of each approach in public decision making are described and used to draw out concerns about using RA and LCA in this context. The following categories of concern can be distinguished: philosophical approach of the tools; quantitative versus qualitative assessment; stakeholder participation; the nature of the results; and the usefulness of the results in relation to time and financial resource requirements. These can be distilled into a common policy research agenda focusing on: the legitimacy of using tools built on a particular perspective in decision making; recognition and role of value judgments in RA and LCA; treatment of uncertainty and variability; the influence of analytical tools in focusing attention on particular aspects of a decision-making situation; and understandability of the results for nonspecialists. It is concluded that it is time to bring together the experiences of RA and LCA specialists and benefit from cross-fertilization of ideas.

Editorial: The Role of Value Judgements in Performance-Based Fire Safety

Editorial: The Role of Value Judgements in Performance-Based Fire Safety

Statics and Dynamics of Income Distribution: An Introductory Survey

Abstract This article discusses some of the issues involved in making comparisons of income distributions using cross‐sectional data and in examining the dynamics of income distribution using longitudinal data. Any study of income distribution must consider the unit of analysis, the time period and the measure of income, and these are the focus of the article. Section 2, on annual incomes, begins with problems of intra‐household income sharing and the measure of income used, including household production. Comparisons among households of different size are discussed, involving the choice of equivalence scales, the use of decomposition analysis and more general dominance conditions. The role of value judgments in the use of equivalence scales is stressed. Section 3 is concerned with dynamic aspects of income distribution. It discusses methods of constructing synthetic cohorts for use in simulation exercises, the varieties of longitudinal data available, sample attrition and the unit of analysis. An appendix provides further references to the literature and data sources.

The Exact Role of Value Judgments in Science

If there is one set of arguments worse than those put forward for ‘value-free science’, it is those put forward against it. Both sets have one common characteristic, besides a high frequency of invalidity, and that is the failure to make any serious effort at a plausible analysis of the concept of ‘value judgment’, one that will apply to some of the difficult cases, and not just to one paradigm. Although the problem of definition is in this case extremely difficult, one can attain quite useful results even from a first step. The analysis proposed here, which goes somewhat beyond that first step, is still some distance from being satisfactory. Nevertheless, we must begin with such an attempt since any other way to start would be laying foundations on sand. And we'll use plenty of prescientific examples, too, to avoid any difficulties with irrelevant technicalities.

Some Facts About Values

Leading articles in both the current issue ofAPSR(Winter 1969–70) and ofPS(Fall 1969) attack an identical quotation from my chapter in “The Public and the Polity” inContemporary Political Science. In reply to Professor Sheldon Wolin's article in APSR, I wrote a short reply for he clearly misinterpreted the quotation in an otherwise serious article. Professor Surkin's piece, “Sense and Non-sense in Politics” inPSfrustrates all my attempts at a short reply, for the issue is not the text of a particular quotation that has become a minor cause célebre, but rather the central thesis of his article that is in error. His is an error that has become sufficiently widely diffused these days that it needs a serious reply.The issue is the role of value judgments in political science. The common error is the assertion that modern political science has been non-normative and value-free, or at least has aimed at being so. The statement is usually made in criticism of so-called behavioral political science and in favor of a supposed post-behavioral revolution, which is alleged to be seeking a new concern for relevance. Professor Surkin's article is a particular variant on that theme. He states that his purpose is to show that a particular social science methodology, namely, “claimed objectivity and value neutrality” leads to a “non-objective role for social science knowledge in the service of the dominant institutions in American society”. Here is an important set of allegations.

Some Facts About Values

Leading articles in both the current issue of APSR (Winter 1969–70) and of PS (Fall 1969) attack an identical quotation from my chapter in “The Public and the Polity” in Contemporary Political Science. In reply to Professor Sheldon Wolin's article in APSR, I wrote a short reply for he clearly misinterpreted the quotation in an otherwise serious article. Professor Surkin's piece, “Sense and Non-sense in Politics” in PS frustrates all my attempts at a short reply, for the issue is not the text of a particular quotation that has become a minor cause célebre, but rather the central thesis of his article that is in error. His is an error that has become sufficiently widely diffused these days that it needs a serious reply.The issue is the role of value judgments in political science. The common error is the assertion that modern political science has been non-normative and value-free, or at least has aimed at being so. The statement is usually made in criticism of so-called behavioral political science and in favor of a supposed post-behavioral revolution, which is alleged to be seeking a new concern for relevance. Professor Surkin's article is a particular variant on that theme. He states that his purpose is to show that a particular social science methodology, namely, “claimed objectivity and value neutrality” leads to a “non-objective role for social science knowledge in the service of the dominant institutions in American society”. Here is an important set of allegations.

Some Facts About Values

Leading articles in both the current issue of APSR (Winter 1969–70) and of PS (Fall 1969) attack an identical quotation from my chapter in “The Public and the Polity” in Contemporary Political Science. In reply to Professor Sheldon Wolin's article in APSR, I wrote a short reply for he clearly misinterpreted the quotation in an otherwise serious article. Professor Surkin's piece, “Sense and Non-sense in Politics” in PS frustrates all my attempts at a short reply, for the issue is not the text of a particular quotation that has become a minor cause célebre, but rather the central thesis of his article that is in error. His is an error that has become sufficiently widely diffused these days that it needs a serious reply.The issue is the role of value judgments in political science. The common error is the assertion that modern political science has been non-normative and value-free, or at least has aimed at being so. The statement is usually made in criticism of so-called behavioral political science and in favor of a supposed post-behavioral revolution, which is alleged to be seeking a new concern for relevance. Professor Surkin's article is a particular variant on that theme. He states that his purpose is to show that a particular social science methodology, namely, “claimed objectivity and value neutrality” leads to a “non-objective role for social science knowledge in the service of the dominant institutions in American society”. Here is an important set of allegations.

Administrative Science and the Role of Value Judgments

Provides a setting for the development of administrative science. Controversy on administration as a science; Role of administration in society; Attributes which characterize administration as a so...

Administrative Science and the Role of Value Judgments.

Provides a setting for the development of administrative science. Controversy on administration as a science; Role of administration in society; Attributes which characterize administration as a so...