Role Of Money In Elections Research Articles

Does Money Matter for Electability? Lesson Learned From the 2014 Legislative Election in Indonesia

Reform toward open-list elections in Indonesia has transformed the nature of campaigning to become more personalized. This has raised questions regarding the role of money in elections and calls for stricter campaign finance regulation. However, the merits of limits on campaign finance depend on whether and how campaign finance affects incumbents and challengers differently. Literature on this issue has produced ambiguous results, with only few studies conducted in a developing country democracy. This study estimates the effect of campaign money, along with other factors including list position and incumbency status, on the probability of a candidate being elected in the 2014 legislative election in Indonesia. Our econometric estimations confirm that campaign money effectively raises the probability of candidates being elected. The probability of getting elected will increase up to approximately 5 percentage points for each additional IDR 100 million of campaign money. Campaign money is positive and significant for both incumbents and challengers, with the magnitude being bigger for incumbents. However, the effect of diminishing returns of campaign money is slightly stronger for incumbents. Since raising additional campaign funding benefits incumbents more than it does for challengers, this study suggests the enforcement of campaign spending limits to create a more level playing field in Indonesia’s legislative elections.

The Financial Incumbency Advantage: Causes and Consequences

In this article, we use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of incumbency on campaign contributions in the U.S. House and state legislatures. In both settings, incumbency causes approximately a 20–25 percentage-point increase in the share of donations flowing to the incumbent’s party. The effect size does not vary with legislator experience and does not appear to depend on incumbent office-holder benefits. Instead, as we show, the effect is primarily the result of donations from access-oriented interest groups, especially donors from industries under heavy regulation and those with less ideological ties. Given the role of money in elections, the findings suggest that access-oriented interest groups are an important driver of the electoral security of incumbents.

What's Money Got to Do with It? Fostering Productive Discussions about Campaign Finance

Schools throughout the United States provide instruction on democracy, voting, and major institutions of government, but often excluded from the curriculum is a central reality of our political system: the role of money in elections. This article provides background information and pedagogical strategies to help teachers foster productive discussions on this issue. First, we summarize recent increases in U.S. election spending and five schools of thought on how to address this trend. Then we present various classroom discussion and assessment strategies for supporting students’ learning about our current campaign finance system and its potential alternatives. These processes can facilitate students’ development of important civic knowledge and skills and also fulfill a variety of state and national standards.

Towards the De-Criminalization of Elections and Politics

We study the role of crime and money in elections and politics in the context of several recent far reaching judgments of the Supreme Court and the Central Information Commission. Based on publicly available data of over 62,800 candidates who contested National and State Assembly elections from 2004 to 2013, we show that both crime and money play an important role in winning elections. Thus average assets go up from Rs.1.37 crore per candidate to Rs.2.03 crores for third place candidates, Rs.2.47 crores for runners up, Rs.3.8 crore for winners, Rs.4.27 crore for winners with some criminal record, and Rs.4.4 crore for winners with serious criminal records. About 30% of elected representatives in Lok Sabha and State Assemblies have criminal cases against them. Similarly, while only 12% of ‘clean’ candidates without any criminal record win, 23% of those with a criminal record, and again, 23% of those with serious criminal records win. Several candidates and winners have multiple cases, and on average there is 1 serious case for every 5 candidates and 1 for every 2 winners. Women candidates and representatives clearly show a much lower level of criminal records. With rising inequality, proliferation of political parties leading to winners with smaller percentages of the votes, and the role of big money in elections, votes can be easily ‘bought’. We end with some tentative recommendations for improving the situation. These include legal, and administrative changes, and the role that civil society and voters can play. We look at options of moving beyond the current first past the post ‘British’ system to other systems including the American Presidential system, the European proportional representation system, the French style run-off elections and the Japanese system of multi member constituencies. Immediate electoral political considerations might promote ad hoc changes that would lead us astray. A long public debate and discussion is needed to try and evolve a reasonable consensus.

Campaign Spending and Voter Participation in State Legislative Elections

ObjectivePrevious studies demonstrate that campaigns play an important role in mobilizing citizen participation in elections. The present analysis examines the effects of campaign spending on voter turnout in the state legislative setting where our knowledge of campaign effects is quite limited.MethodIn an examination of state legislative elections across 20 states over two election cycles, the analysis considers the influence of candidate spending on voter turnout.ResultsThe findings demonstrate that campaign spending has a strong influence on voter participation; however, this effect is mitigated by contextual features. Legislative professionalism reduces the influence of spending, while the presence of a high‐stimulus statewide election enhances it. In addition, challenger spending is more effective at stimulating participation than incumbent spending.ConclusionsHigher levels of campaign spending increase voter participation in state legislative elections; however, these effects vary according to context. These findings have important implications for theories of participation in American democracy as well for normative issues concerning the role of money in elections.

Aggregate Effects of Campaign Spending

Perhaps no other issue surrounding the health of our democracy worries American voters more than the role of money in elections, and campaign finance reform is a salient topic as a result. Academic studies of campaign finance, however, have focused their analyses at the level of the individual campaign -- relevant for a variety of important questions but not calibrated for studying the impact of policy instruments that affect the entire legislature at once. I offer a new focus on the systemic effects of campaign spending. Using a natural experiment in U.S. state legislatures, I find that a ten percentage point increase in the Democratic (or Republican) share of total campaign contributions causes a five percentage point increase in the Democratic (or Republican) share of the legislature. Campaign spending has a large effect on electoral outcomes, and regulations on which groups are permitted to donate are a potent policy lever.

Money and votes: a New Zealand example

The role of money in elections is attracting considerable contemporary attention, because of the potential for corruption of electoral and political systems. In part, this concern is based on a belief that money matters in those elections, that how much parties and candidates spend on their campaigns can influence how many votes they win. Tests of this belief suggest that this is indeed so, especially in the case of challengers' spending. The New Zealand electoral system offers an excellent arena in which to test these ideas further, because its adoption of MMP allows examination not only of the impact of spending on changing patterns of party support over time but also of patterns of switching between parties in the two components of each election. Analyses of the 2005 general election there provide substantial support for the argument that money matters, especially for the country's smaller political parties.

A RE‐EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: OPEN SEAT ELECTIONS FROM 1982–1992

This essay analyzes the applicability of the conventional understanding of the role of money in elections for the House of Representatives. While the conventional wisdom is not incorrect, it is better viewed as incomplete. A substantial body of literature exists investigating the role of challenger's, incumbent's and open seat candidate's campaign expenditures on the probability of electoral success. The thrust of the research has been on incumbent/challenger races for the House of Representatives. The research presented here focuses on open seat races to avoid the cumbersome, albeit interesting and substantial, impact of incumbency. Money is an important factor, here the conventional wisdom is correct, but its effect is neither all‐encompassing nor static; the impact varies with differing situations. In addition, relative campaign expenditures are more significant than the literature would lead one to believe. Individual campaign expenditures are consequential but of more importance is relative campaign expenditure. The levels of aggregate spending are meaningful, but of more importance are differentials in expenditures. One must comprehend that the impact of campaign expenditures varies with district‐specific factors and that disparities in campaign expenditures are substantial in understanding the role of money in congressional elections.

The Structure of Social Stratification in the United States

Preface. 1.Sociology and Stratification. Theoretical Perspectives on Stratification. Karl Marx. Max Weber. Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore. Ralf Dahrendorf. Gerhard Lenski. A Strategy for the Study of Stratification. Historical and International Dimensions of Stratification. Levels of Analysis and Stratification. Power and Stratification. 2.Social Class and Stratification: Occupational Prestige and Class Identification. Occupational Prestige. Occupational Prestige in the United States. The Meaning of Occupational Prestige. Racial/Ethnic and Gender Differences in Occupational Prestige. The Stability of Occupational Prestige over Time. The Stability of Occupational Prestige across Societies? Class Identification. Patterns of Class Identification. The Meaning of Class Identification. A Note on Employed Married Women. 3.Social Class and Stratification: Mobility and Status Attainment. Social Mobility. Social Mobility in the United States. Social Mobility in Other Nations. Social Structure and Mobility. The Reproduction of the Class Structure. International Variations in Mobility. Status Attainment. Status Attainment in the United States. Status Attainment in Other Nations. The Individual and Status Attainment. A Vignette. Socialization and Status Attainment. 4.Gender and Stratification. Dimensions of Gender Stratification. Gender Stratification in the United States. Gender Stratification in Other Nations. Some Consequences of Gender Stratification. Authority and Gender. Victimization and Gender. The Individual and Gender Stratification. Women's Choices. Discrimination against Women. Social Structure and Gender Stratification. The Decline of Gender Stratification. The Continuation of Gender Stratification. 5.Race/Ethnicity and Stratification. Dimensions of Racial and Ethnic Stratification. Racial and Ethnic Stratification in the United States. Racial and Ethnic Stratification in Other Nations. Some Consequences of Racial and Ethnic Inequality. The Individual and Racial and Ethnic Stratification. Public Place Discrimination. Discrimination by Organizations. Social Structure and Racial and Ethnic Stratification. Historical Variations in Racial and Ethnic Group Mobility. Racial and Ethnic Stratification Today. 6.Political Participation and Power. Types of Political Participation. Voting. Partisanship. Unruliness. The Rate of Voting. Voting in the United States. Voting in Other Nations. The Role of Money in Elections. The Cost of Winning. Money, Winning, and Reelection. Where Does the Money Come From? Two Examples. Social Structure and Political Participation. The Structure of Voting. The Sources of Partisanship. Money and Anomie. 7.The Rich. The Characteristics of the Rich. Counting the Rich. The Basis of Great Wealth. Top Wealthholders. The Historical Trend in the Distribution of Wealth. The Kuznets Hypothesis. The Colonial Era. The Nineteenth Century. The Twentieth Century. The Trend Since 1980. The Origin and Expansion of Wealth. Power and Wealth Inequality. Social Class and Lifestyle. 8.The Middle Class. Social Class and Job Perquisites. Private Pensions. Medical Insurance. Sick Leave. Disability Insurance. Vacation and Personal Leave Time. Top Level Perquisites. Power and Job Perquisites. Social Class, Income Inequality, and Income Transfers. Social Class and Income. Trends in Income Inequality. Tax Expenditures and Income Inequality. Power and Income Inequality. Social Class and Lifestyle. 9.The Working Class. Social Class and Occupation. Working-Class and Middle-Class Occupations. Social Class and Job Setting. Social Class and Job Security. The Human Consequences of Unemployment. A Note on the Meaning of Work. Economic Deprivation. Psychological Stress. Familial Disruption. Social Class and Lifestyle. On the Working Class. 10.The Poor. Dimensions of Poverty. Poverty in the United States. Poverty in Other Nations. The Measurement of Poverty. Are the Poor Really Poor? Public Assistance and Poverty. Characteristics of Public Assistance Programs. The Paradox of Public Assistance. The Benefits of Poverty. The Individual and Poverty. Age. Race and Ethnicity. Family Characteristics. Low-Wage Job Skills. Work Experience. Social Structure and Poverty. The Long-Term Fall in the Poverty Rate. The U.S. Poverty Rate Today. Concluding Comments. 11.The United States in Global Context. Poverty and Inequality in the United States and Developing Nations. Inequality in the United States and Western Nations. Some Practical Strategies for Reducing Inequality. 12.Reflections on the Study of Stratification. Objectivity in the Study of Stratification. Research Methods in the Study of Stratification. Paradox in the Study of Stratification. Appendix: Hypothesis Discussed in The Structure of Social Stratification in the United States. References. Index.

Penny for Your Thoughts? Campaign Spending in California Trial Court Elections, 1976-1982

S INCE Alexander Heard (1960) published his seminal work on political finance, scholars have been interested in understanding more about the role of money in election campaigns. As with other kinds of electoral research, attention focused initially upon the costs of presidential campaigns (Alexander 1962, 1966, 1971), followed thereafter by analyses of spending in U.S. senatorial and congressional elections and state gubernatorial and legislative elections (Adamany 1969, 1972; Owens 1973). To date, however, there has been almost no research on the amounts of money spent by candidates seeking elective judicial positions (see Berg 1980; Slead 1981; Schotland 1985). Although there is now a fairly substantial body of literature on various other aspects of judicial elections (see Volcansek 1982), very little systematic evidence has been collected on how much judicial candidates spend and even less is known about what factors influence those spending levels.1 Although knowing how much and why campaigns cost what they do has been important for understanding the role of money in elections generally, this knowledge is especially critical for an assessment of the role of money in judicial elections. In the first place, in states where recent judicial campaigns have been hotly contested, such as California, it is widely believed that judicial campaign costs have become prohibitively high for most candidates and growing higher with each year. Such reports naturally limit electoral competition by discouraging prospective candidates even if campaign finance levels have not in fact escalated sharply. As Adamany (1972) has noted, campaign fundraising for many candidates becomes a barrier to office expectations are pegged to the highest expenditures in previous campaigns and because the information about such expenditures is elusive and often inflated (p. 34). Another aspect of the role of money that has drawn recent attention has been the reported heavy reliance upon lawyers for the contributions required to finance judicial campaigns. This reliance troubles many observers who foresee the potential for a real or perceived conflict of interest (see Schotland 1985: 61-65, 90-96). As one California judge put it, What would you think if you were a litigant in my court and you knew the op-