Role In Global Economic Governance Research Articles

China’s Insertion in the International Patent Regime: Shaking the Rules Widens the Development Policy Space

Much has been written about the effects of China’s rising role in global economic governance, but the consequences for the development policy space have received little attention. This article examines whether China’s mode of insertion in the international patent regime widens the restricted policy space of its developing country partners to shape their national patent system in a way that facilitates technical progress. Results show that China adopts a minimalist interpretation of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement as it incorporates its flexibilities at the bilateral and national levels, thus preserving and potentially widening its partners’ development policy space.

Holes in the Silk: Investor Protection under China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Aiming to improve connectivity by building ‘roads’ that will channel economic development and achieve certain geopolitical and strategic objectives, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a critical element in China’s more comprehensive strategic play for a new and enhanced role in global economic governance. While often hyped by some as a modern form of the Marshall Plan, the BRI has been built on a weak foundation which threatens the economic and geopolitical objectives of the Initiative. This article focuses on the security of the Chinese international investment regime for private and state-owned investors confronting political and legal risks in BRI projects in various countries. Perhaps the greatest legal risk to Chinese investors is that China’s network of international investment treaties is insufficient to deal with the risks that Chinese investors face. After reviewing specific provisions and jurisprudence stemming from China’s treaties, the article provides possible mitigation strategies and solutions which China and investors can use to mitigate such risks.

China’s Role in Global Economic Governance Revisited: Evidence from a Comparative Analysis of Chinese and Japanese BITs

Abstract A large proportion of debates about China’s impacts on global economic governance lack systematic empirical analysis. We engage the debate about if China is a revolutionary, revisionist, or status quo state through a deep dive into China’s behaviors with respect to Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). This research strategy is à propos because BITs represent the de facto regime governing foreign direct investment (FDI) globally, and China is the world’s second largest signatory of BITs. Drawing upon a database that we created using material on BITs available from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, we systematically examine the substantive and procedural provisions of China’s BITs from 2000 onward. Using a qualitative methodology discussed in-depth in our article, we also put China’s BIT practices in comparative perspective by comparing them against the BIT practices of Japan, a leading developed economy with BIT practices reflecting those of other established economies. Our multivariate analysis demonstrates China is not a revolutionary or dramatically revisionist player with respect to BITs. It champions positions that are neither hyper-conservative (state friendly) nor hyper-liberal (FDI friendly). To be more precise, China’s policies, especially with respect to substantive provisions, tend to be conservative, with, to some extent, some liberal aspects. Our analysis, then, indicates that commentators, businesspeople, and policymakers should be cautious about proffering claims that China is dramatically reshaping global economic governance. Aside from this important contribution to the debate, our work also expands knowledge about China’s BITs specifically and BITs generally, which does not reflect adequate attention to BITs from East Asian countries.

Explaining Brazil’s inconsistent engagement in global economic governance: neither accommodation or contestation, but both

ABSTRACT The growing significance of rising powers has led to debates about their role in global economic governance, with expectations they will either challenge its neoliberal agenda or become ‘responsible stakeholders’. However, the reality is that the role of rising powers is inconsistent: in some areas they accept the neoliberal consensus, while in others they contest it. This article utilises the State Transformation Approach to explain the inconsistent positions of Brazil: its support for free trade at the WTO, and its contestation of capital account liberalisation at the IMF, followed by a reversal and acceptance of it after 2014. The article argues this inconsistency can only be understood by analysing the domestic context of foreign policymaking, particularly the fragmentation of its state and the balance of forces in its political economy. In relation to trade, the fragmentation of the state enabled the agro-export sector to dominate formulation of policy. In finance, on the other hand, the greater autonomy of policymakers, and a balance of forces favouring intervention enabled the promotion of capital controls. However, this was a contingent outcome of socio-political struggles, and once the balance of forces shifted from 2014, financial forces reasserted themselves provoking a return to the orthodoxy.

China's Role in Global Development Finance: China Challenge or Business as Usual?

AbstractChina's economic success has prompted both academic political economists and applied policy analysts to speculate about the implications of a new ‘China model’ of economic development and global economic governance. A particular issue is the degree to which the China model involves developing in opposition to or in cooperation with the pre‐existing norms of global economic governance. Recognizing the ambiguity of the China model, we consider two alternative interpretations of China's role in global economic governance: China Challenge (CC) and Business as Usual (BaU). We flesh out these contrasting interpretations using evidence from the lending behavior of four major development finance institutions in which China plays a leading or determinative role: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (NDB), the Silk Road Fund (SRF), and the China‐Africa Development Fund (CADF) of the China Development Bank. We find that (at least in the restricted domain of international development finance) China's role in global economic governance is largely characterized by BaU behavior, and although on a regional level this does represent a challenge to the historical role of Japan, it nonetheless suggests that the China model is not so revolutionary as many analysts suppose.

Holes in the Silk: Investor Protection under China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Aiming to improve connectivity by building ‘roads’ that will channel economic development and achieve certain geopolitical and strategic objectives, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a critical element in China’s more comprehensive strategic play for a new and enhanced role in global economic governance. While often hyped by some as a modern form of the Marshall Plan, the BRI has been built on a weak foundation which threatens the economic and geopolitical objectives of the Initiative. This article focuses on the security of the Chinese international investment regime for private and state-owned investors confronting political and legal risks in BRI projects in various countries. Perhaps the greatest legal risk to Chinese investors is that China’s network of international investment treaties is insufficient to deal with the risks that Chinese investors face. After reviewing specific provisions and jurisprudence stemming from China’s treaties, the article provides possible mitigation strategies and solutions which China and investors can use to mitigate such risks

The Subjects of Transnational Business and the Processes of Global Economic Governance

In recent decades, transnational business actors have substantially strengthened their role in global economic governance. Although this trend became less pronounced after the global crisis of 2008–2009, it was by no means reversed. With multinational companies (including those from developing markets) increasing scale and scope of their operation and national governments competing for foreign direct investment (FDI) as a development resource, both official and public-private economic governance mechanisms shape their agenda with a reference to transnational business interests. As a result, FDI promotion policies prevailed in post-crisis years, in contrast with a remarkable growth of protectionism in international trade. At the same time, as the case of economic sanctions shows, with increased tensions in international relations business interests are readily sacrificed, and thus far transnational business actors have no reliable tools to change the situation.

China's economic slowdown: implications for Beijing's institutional power and global governance role

ABSTRACTChina's spectacular economic growth over the past decades has given rise to a more confident and proactive China in global governance. China is now an institution-builder, with new Chinese-led institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank designed to cement Beijing's central role in global economic governance. What, then, are the potential implications of a slowing economy for China's institutional power and global governance role? This article locates China's economic growth and slowdown in broader discussions about China's global position and questions about responsibility, order and governance. It argues that China's economic slowdown will not result in a drastic impact on Beijing's institutional power as there are key material, historical and ideational drivers at play here. Unless China is confronted with the prospect of an economic collapse, it will continue to pursue an active institutional role, speak the rhetoric of South–South solidarity with emerging economies and seek a leadership role in reforming global economic governance, even with a slowing economy, because this is intrinsically tied to its identity and how China now positions itself in an evolving global order.

Repositioning South Africa in global economic governance: a perspective from Nigeria

This paper adopts a Nigerian perspective to South Africa's position in global economic governance, particularly in relation to its role in the BRICS and G20. It is informed by the challenge of transforming Africa's current marginal role in global economic governance, and the kind(s) of regional partnerships that Africa's largest economies can strategically develop and use to place the continent on a higher economic pedestal globally. The paper places challenges confronting Africa in context, exploring how South Africa, by negotiating a strategic partnership with other continental economic powers outside of the BRICS, such as Nigeria, stands to leverage Africa's role and global position on a ‘win–win’ basis. It concludes by noting the costs and potential benefits of such a partnership, and offers some suggestions on the way forward.

Asia's role in twenty-first-century global economic governance

The basic foundations of today's framework for global economic governance were laid in the years following the Second World War. Reflecting the balance of economic power at the time, Asia did not play a major role in either designing the institutional architecture or setting the agenda for global economic governance. In more recent decades the centre of gravity of the global economy has shifted towards Asia, and this trend is likely to continue in the decades to come. Asia's growing economic weight enhances its potential to play a much stronger role in shaping twenty-first-century global economic governance. Realization of that potential will, however, depend upon how successfully Asia addresses five key challenges: rebalancing sources of growth; strengthening national governance; institutionalizing regional integration; providing political leadership; and adopting the global lingua franca—English. While the Asian policy-makers' ambition to play a bigger role in global economic governance is growing, their appetite for addressing the necessary policy challenges is not necessarily keeping pace with that growing ambition. This gap between ambition and action will need to be gradually closed—only then can Asia help itself in playing a bigger role in global economic governance.

Global Economic Governance Reform and the Role of Asia: Opportunities Offered by the G20

Global Economic Governance Reform and the Role of Asia: Opportunities Offered by the G20-Asia’s role in global economic governance, The G20 and global economic governance, International monetary system reform