Taking Back Control:The Role of the EU1 John O'Hagan (bio) It was noted by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929) that there are some issues whose influence permeates national boundaries and give rise to problems which individual states, or even limited coalitions of states, are no longer able to influence, let alone control (see Habermas, 2012). Habermas was writing shortly after the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Since then, of course, we have had the climate crisis issue, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The only way according to this view to exercise control of problems that do not recognise national boundaries is to pool decision-making with other sovereign2 countries, thereby protecting the interest of the citizens of the participating states. The corollary of this is that withdrawing participation in any such coalition of states is in fact ceding control of the problems, thereby worsening the well-being of the individuals of that member state. This paper has three objectives. First, to review the case in principle for binding international agreements to protect the interests of nation states and their citizens. Second, to address the critical issue of for which areas of activity should decision-making be shared and binding. On this there is considerable and understandable differences of opinion as the EU progresses further into the twenty-first century. Third, to discuss how decision-making might best operate in relation to such international agreements, again a subject of varying and legitimately differing views. In pursuit of these objectives, the paper is, for cohesiveness, divided into nine subsections. 1. The case for pooled decision-making at national and international levels Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) never used the term 'spill-over effect' used by economists, but in fact this is what he was implicitly referring to in his writings over two centuries ago. He held that the state, given these implicit spill-over effects, is not an impediment to freedom but is how freedom is [End Page 378] secured. State action that is a hindrance to freedom can, when properly directed, support and maintain freedom if the state action is aimed at hindering actions which themselves would hinder the freedom of others. He argued further that Given a subject's action that would limit the freedom of another subject, the state may hinder the first subject to defend the second by 'hindering a hindrance to freedom'. Such state coercion is compatible with the maximal freedom demanded in the principle of right because it does not reduce freedom but instead provides the necessary background conditions needed to secure freedom. (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, online) It has been clear for a long time that by co-operating individuals enhance not diminish their freedom of action and hence control of their destiny. Let us take one of the simplest examples of all: a stop sign or traffic light on our roads. As individuals we cannot drive as we wish, regulation free, without endangering the lives of others, and vice versa. As such we pool decision-making to avoid what economists call 'spill-over effects', namely the consequences for the individual of other people's actions and likewise the consequences of the individual's actions for other people. In these circumstances we do not cede individual freedom of action, as Kant states, because without this pooling of decision-making, we would not be able in the first place to risk driving on the roads, and hence the counterfactual to not pooling decision-making is in fact an almost total loss of individual freedom compared to what results from such sharing of common rules. And so it is with nations too.3 Our standard of living would plummet if we could not trade with other nations and import, for example, vital materials such as medical equipment, gas/oil, food, and steel, among countless examples. We cannot stop the wind blowing harmful particles or radioactive waste across the Irish sea; we cannot counteract the fact that rogue states, criminals, illegal immigrants, and terrorists do not respect national boundaries and hence that their activity is international in nature; we cannot prevent the adverse consequences of the...
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