Gorbachev's Rise Research Articles

The Future of EU-Russian Relations: a Common European Home?

The Cold War was a confrontation dominated by dogmatic ideology; the rise of Gorbachev and his attempts to inject new thinking into the Soviet Union were critical in ending that standoff. Generally, Gorbachev was successful in the field of foreign policy and many of his ideas and actions created lasting legacies which have shaped the world today. However, one idea which failed to gain much traction was his proposal regarding a Common European Home. The aim of this paper is to examine how this opportunity was missed or why hasn’t it been taken advantage of, before moving on to analyse whether shared aims, freedoms, values and responsibilities exist between Russia and the EU today. Opinion polling shows that Russian values and opinions are complex, but often similar to other post-communist countries that have successfully become European Union member states. The issue of NATO expansion stands out as more problematic than a lack of shared values between the EU and Russian citizens.

The Settlement of the Russian–Chinese Border Dispute

The establishment of the PRC opened the new chapter in the Sino–Soviet/Russian relations. For many years the existence of the problem of the common border was not openly expressed. In 1957 the first announcements about the territorial disputes between USSR and PRC were issued in China. And in 1960 Zhou Enlai stated that there were insignificant disrepancies in the Russian and Chinese maps, very easy to solve. Over the next nearly 30 years the problem of determination of the border has become a victim of tense and hostile Soviet-Chinese relations and unproductive talks. Gorbachev's rise to power in the Kremlin enabled to negotiate a solution to the Soviet–Chinese border problem. And consequently to sign “The agreement on the eastern section of the Sino-Soviet state border” on May 16, 1991. The agreement on the western section of the border was signed on September 3, 1994. The demarcation of the western section of the border was finished by Joint Russian–Chinese Demarcation Commission on September 10, 1998. After six years of negotiations on October 14, 2004 the Complementary Agreement on the Eastern Section of the China–Russia Boundary was signed in Beijing. On its basis the Russian side ceded the whole of Tarabarov island (ch. Yinlongdao), half of Bolshoy Ussuriyski (ch. Heixiazidao) and half of Bolshoy (ch. Abagaitu) island. Another halves of Bolshoy Ussuriyski and Bolshoy islands were kept by Russia. Both sides shared disputed territory almost equally. The ceremony of installation of the border landmarks between Russia and China on Bolshoy Ussuriyski island (on October 14, 2008) finished the long process of demarcation of the Russian–Chinese border.

An Environmental history of Russia

The former Soviet empire spanned eleven time zones and contained half the world's forests; vast deposits of oil, gas and coal; various ores; major rivers such as the Volga, Don and Angara; and extensive biodiversity. These resources and animals, as well as the people who lived in the former Soviet Union – Slavs, Armenians, Georgians, Azeris, Kazakhs and Tajiks, indigenous Nenets and Chukchi – were threatened by environmental degradation and extensive pollution. This environmental history of the former Soviet Union explores the impact that state economic development programs had on the environment. The authors consider the impact of Bolshevik ideology on the establishment of an extensive system of nature preserves, the effect of Stalinist practices of industrialization and collectivization on nature, and the rise of public involvement under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and changes to policies and practices with the rise of Gorbachev and the break-up of the USSR. (Less)

Gorbachev's Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War by Andrei Grachev (review)

782 SEER, 88, 4, OCTOBER 2OIO hypotheses and concepts.What Ogushi omitsis the impactof the wider politicalchangesthatoccurredbetween1988and 1991.He mentions events suchas theelectionsof 1989and 1990but does notconsiderin any depth whatinfluence theyhad on theCPSU and itscadres,or try tomeasurewhat influence theyhad on the end of the USSR so as to estimatethe role of partycollapseindependently ofthem.It is clear thatinternal partyconflict and confusion werenecessary conditions forSovietsystemic failure but not thatthey weresufficient to cause thesystemic failure or eventhedispersal of powerthatprecededit.A knock-on effect ofthisisthatOgushidoesnotmake a completely convincingcase that lookingat the party'sorganizational problems helpsus to evaluateideas about Sovietcollapsesuchas mightbe derivedfrommodernization theoryor transitology. This latterproblemis exacerbated bythevery reductive approachthatOgushiuseswhensummarizingarguments made by institutionalists, modernization theorists and transitologists , and the simplification of conceptsused to supporthis argument. The hypotheses hededucesfrom themaintheoretical positions hetests against theparty's collapseareverycrudedistillations ofthearguments theseschools present. A similar problemariseswhennewconcepts areintroduced throughout thebook: generally theyare not well definedor thoroughly discussed. Ogushi'suseofpraetorianism inthechapter on theAugust coup,forexample, is a verysimplerendition of the originalHuntingtonian idea: Huntington talkedofat leastfourtypesofpraetorianism but Ogushiuses it straightforwardlyas beliefin theneed formilitary /policerule.In a shortbook (some 167pagesofactualtext)somemoretimespenton conceptualand hypothesis definition wouldnothave gone amissand mighthave helpedto strengthen thepurchaseoftheanalysis moregenerally. The theoretical partsof Ogushi'sbook are thusnot as successful as the empirical description ofpartyreorganization, elections to the28thCongress andfinancial decline.Stillhisbookisa detailedcontribution on thesefeatures oflateCommunist ruleand willbe ofgreatuse to specialists forthatreason and forthelight thatitthrows on thelaterstagesofGorbachev's reforms and thecentrality oftheCPSU to their failure. Department ofPolitics andPublicAdministration University ofLimerick Neil Robinson Grachev, Andrei. Gorbachev's Gamble:Soviet Foreign Policyand theEnd oftheCold War.PolityPress,Cambridgeand Maiden, MA, 2008. xiii + 271pp. Notes.Bibliography. Index.£20.00. Andrei Grachev, who workedon foreign policyin MikhailGorbachev's team,offers an insider's viewofthetwists and turns ofitsmaking. He setsout to contribute whathe dubs'a morestereoscopic image'(p. 8) bydrawing on thetestimonies ofotherinsiders, keyfunctionaries and politicalplayers.His bookis a hugely welcomeadditionto theliterature drawing on theviewsof thosein theparty, ministries, military, secret policeand academia,as wellas on theopinionsofforeign leaders. REVIEWS 783 His thesisis thatto graspthe development of the 'new thinking' it is essential to 'explorethepoliticaland intellectual "soil" from whichit arose' (p. 9). Advocating this, however, he seemsunawarethatmanyscholars inthe fieldsof international relationsand politicalsciencehave arguedforsome decadesthatitisvitaltoexaminetheperceptions andviewswithin theleadershipsofstatesforin -depth understandings offoreign and domesticpolicies. His advantagehereis thathe was closerto keyplayersthanmostWestern academicscouldget. Grachev understandsthe historyof Soviet foreignpolicy as one of 'innateduplicity' as itstruggled on a contradictory 'doubletrack' ofsupporting 'revolutionary forces', yetwitha 'questforstability' (p. 10).The Ministry of ForeignAffairs soughttheformer, whilsttheCentralCommittee's InternationalDepartmentwas supposedto seek the latter,thusoftencompeting witheach other.GrachevdepictsSovietleadersas the 'prisoners'of this 'dual track', (p. 12).He charges thatthe'1941syndrome' - an obsession with security - contributed to a 'paranoiepolicy'whichwrought havoc on the Sovieteconomy.He blamesthe'Gromyko-Ustinov alliance'fora 'hawkish' approach(p. 18). Grachev'soverview ofthe 'moles'in powerand the 'alternative political culture'(p. 25) makes compellingreading,althoughsome historians may questionquitehow apt is hiscomparison ofthereformers ofthe 1980swith theDecembrists of 1825.His coverageofthecracksin themonolith reveals muchabout therolesofkeydiplomatssuch as ValentinFalin and Anatoli Kovalev and indeed tales of Falin's rolesand his sidelining over German unity weave through thebook. Grachevalso exploresdifferent viewswithin themilitary concerning strategic nuclearbuild-upand negotiating positions withtheUSA and thecomplexities ofwithdrawal from Afghanistan. Gorbachev's rise,achievements and demisearetreated sympathetically and thesignificance ofhistrips to theWestcarefully analysedforthedifferences theymade to his leadershipand to the USSR. From 1983 Gorbachevis portrayed as a man obsessed,in the words of AleksandrIakovlev,with theneed for'necessary internal change' (p. 45). Grachevsketches theroles playedbyEnricoBerlinguer, MargaretThatcherand FrançoisMitterrand in Gorbachev'sforeign tripsin 1984and how theycontributed to his'preparation 'forthefield offoreign affairs. He insists thatGromyko's 'heavypresence' (p. 54)limited Gorbachev'searlyability to actdecisively and AnatoliiCherniaev (a regularsourceofquotation)initially feltthatGorbachevlacked'any clearidea' ofhowtheUSSR couldattain worldstandards (p.54).Gorbachev's important 'peace offensive' isgivenappropriate commendation as arehisdeft and often difficult manoeuvres to builda newteam. Grachevseesperestroika as a 'universal lever'oftransformation and notes thatIakovlevbelievedittobe a 'universal humanitarian ideology' or 'political religion' (pp.74-75).He takesus through successive summits and their failures and achievements fromReykjavikto Malta, looks at radical changes at homeand inEasternEurope,and discusses theendoftheCold War and the finalimplosion oftheUSSR. The sourcesare wideand thequotations vivid, addinga feeloftheperiodas wellas appreciation ofthevariedperceptions and interpretations thatcirculated amongreformers, conservatives and their 784 SEER, 88, 4, OCTOBER 2OIO changing positions. The fateof Eduard Shevardnadzeas ForeignMinister, forinstance, and thecomplications to hisrolecausedbyEvgeniiPrimakov's actions during Iraq'sattack onKuwaitandShevardnadze's belief that...

The Perestroika of Demokratizatsiya

The twentieth anniversary of Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power approaches and Demokratizatsiya prepares two issues that will reflect on this topic. Behind the scenes, Demokratizatsiya has decided to carry out a little perestroika of its own. To better carry out its mission and serve its constituency of scholars and policymakers, Demokratizatsiya is enhancing its editorial structure and board, and also increasing its Internet presence to make it more interactive and accessible. The journal's merger with the East European Constitutional Review has further enhanced these changes. These changes cannot be understood in isolation, which makes for a good opportunity to remind our readers of Demokratizatsiya's unique editorial heritage. Our Editorial Heritage Demokratizatsiya was the first journal of its kind dedicated exclusively to the study of the sociopolitical transformation in the newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. The journal is readily identified as distinct for many reasons and retains the aura of policy-relevant scholarship and of the fresh (and ultimately very successful) crowd of specialists--both Western and post-Soviet--that formed it. It was meant as a service to both the Sovietologists as well as to policymakers, both of whom lacked fora for discussing the issues underway in the new states. At that time, there was no Internet, the long-running journal Problems of Communism had ceased publication, and other journals were dedicated mostly to the study of the Soviet economy, ancient history, or literature. Although famously (or perhaps infamously) founded not in the hallowed halls of academe but in the undergraduate dormitories of American University between 1990 and 1992, five groups shaped the editorial style of Demokratizatsiya: (1) emerging Western Sovietologists, (2) scholars from the NIS, (3) architects of reforms, (4) scholars from other fields coming in contact with the NIS, and (5) Western policymakers and analysts. To avoid being identified with any one person or ideology, Demokratizatsiya's editorial structure ensured diversity, balance, and excellence. The journal has traditionally been led by three or four executive editors who agree only on their commitment to study the transitions in the NIS in depth. The original executive editors-Louise Shelley, Nikolai Zlobin, and J. Michael Waller--nonetheless left their indelible mark on the journal, which has proved to be fortuitious since these original editors and other scholars invited by the founding students to run the journal turned out to be such an unusually remarkable group. Demokratizatsiya also aligns with the mission of Heldref Publications, the publishing arm of the nonprofit Helen Dwight Reid Educational Foundation, which became the journal's publisher in 1994. Founded in the 1970s under the leadership of Evron M. Kirkpatrick to assist respected publications achieve financial and organizational viability, Heldref and its forty-seven publications provide new ideas, information, and means of communication to scholars, teachers, students, and interested readers. Heldref achieves this with the cooperation of hundreds of scholars and teachers who contribute their time and expertise as editors and advisors. Demokratizatsiya's editorial restructuring, inviting new and leading experts, and its merger with another leading journal, further position it as a centrepiece in this turbulent yet key field. Compared to its peers, Demokratizatsiya is unique in additional ways: mainly in the way that it took the independence of the new republics seriously from the beginning, engaged scholars from the region as a fundamental part of its mission, and fostered a genuine democracy inside the journal--which sometimes makes its management more challenging than in other journals. Additionally, Demokratizatsiya explored, from the beginning, controversial issues that others shunned, namely organized crime, corruption, and the lingering power of the KGB. …

Chernobyl and Its Political Fallout: A Reassessment

Two technological disasters stunned the world in 1986. On January 28, the U.S. Challenger spacecraft blew up minutes after launch as the nation watched in horror. Three months later on April 26, a nuclear reactor at the power plant in Soviet Ukraine exploded, spewing radiation across Belorussia, Poland, the Baltic states, and northern Europe.Responding to the Challenger catastrophe, President Reagan cancelled plans for the State of the Union speech that had been scheduled for the same night of the explosion. Within hours, he addressed the nation on television with a message of condolence and determination that U.S. space exploration would continue. In the Soviet Union, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who for months had been preaching openness in his nation's affairs, lapsed into an eighteen-day silence before addressing the nation about the disaster.What accounts for this silence from the father of glasnost'? Was fear of creating a panic the main factor that restrained the Soviet leadership and Gorbachev, or were there other considerations? Was the machinery of government so ineffectual that it could not act and needed to cover up this failure? Within governmental circles, was the flow of information adequate? In the end, did the catastrophe bolster or hinder glasnost'?Insights into these questions may be gleaned from declassified Politburo documents,1 memoirs of key participants, and a plethora of books on Gorbachev's glasnosi' and perestroika. The glasnost' literature can be conveniently divided into two groups: works that deal with the challenge that posed to Gorbachev's new openness policies and those that examine what went wrong technologically.Dr. Joseph Gibbs, a journalist and associate of the Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard University, assesses Soviet transparency in his volume Gorbachev's Glasnost': The Soviet Media in the First Phase of Perestroika.2 Gibbs draws on memoirs and interviews he conducted with former Soviet editors. He devotes a section to the handling of the crisis. Unfortunately, he has not studied the Politburo documents on Chernobyl, which were declassified in 1994 in connection with the trial of the Communist Party.In The Gorbachev Factor,3 Professor Archie Brown paints a thorough picture of Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power and his thinking as secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party. This well-known British scholar makes use of memoir material available in the mid-1990s, as well as transcripts of interviews with major actors in the crisis. Although he gives a critical account of glasnost', he does not delve into the handling of in as much detail as Gibbs.A very valuable source is the television series The Second Russian Revolution: The Battle for Glasnost', produced for the BBC, the Discovery Channel, and NHK by Brian Lapping Associates. Angus Roxburgh, a former University of Glasgow scholar on Soviet subjects, conducted interviews with key players such as Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Dolgikh, and Ryzhkov for the series. The unedited transcripts, which contain useful comments (not all of which were used in the TV series), are held in the 2RR Collection of the archives of the London School of Economics. The TV series inspired Rosburgh's book The Second Russian Revolution: The Struggle for Power in the Kremlin?Dr. Yevgeny Velikhov, a top nuclear scientist who participated in the clean-up operations, submitted to an interview for Stephen Cohen and Katrina vander Heuvel's volume Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers.6 However, his views in Chernobyl Remains on Our Minds are disappointingly uninformative on the Kremlin's reaction.Several books written in the early years of glasnost' gwe a good description of the limits of the new transparency, but provide only modest insight into the catastrophe. Among those are Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union,7 by Scott Shane, a Moscow correspondent for The Baltimore Sun; Uncovering Soviet Disasters: Exploring the Limits of Glasnost',8 by James Oberg, a space scientist; and The Awakening of the Soviet Union,9 by Geoffrey Hosking. …

Bo Petersson, National Self-Images and Regional Identities in Russia. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001, x, 220 pp. + interviewee profiles, appendix.

In the period after Gorbachev's rise to power and later after the Soviet Union's collapse, the measurement and presentation of Russia's political culture and national identity were the province of practitioners of the mass survey. Over the past several years, however, a number of excellent qualitative studies involving extended field work and open-ended questions have added significant depth of understanding generally missing from these mass survey findings. Bo Petersson's National Self-Images and Regional Identities in Russia is an excellent example of this relatively new wave of qualitative studies.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders

1. Leadership strategies after Stalin 2. Gorbachev and Yeltsin: personalities and beliefs 3. The rise of Gorbachev 4. Gorbachev ascendant 5. Gorbachev on the political defensive 6. Yeltsin versus Gorbachev 7. Yeltsin ascendant 8. Yeltsin on the political defensive 9. Yeltsin lashes out: the invasion of Chechnya (December, 1994) 10. Yeltsin's many last hurrahs 11. Explaining leaders' choices, 1985-99 12. Criteria for the evaluation of transformational leaders 13. Evaluating Gorbachev as leader 14. Evaluating Yeltsin as leader.

Reciprocity and Norms in U.S.-Soviet Foreign Policy

This study examines the nature of U.S.-Soviet relations over the past 4 decades. The authors focus especially on the 1980s. There has been a marked shift in U.S.-Soviet conflictual and cooperative foreign policy behavior subsequent to Gorbachev's rise to power. The authors explore quantitatively the changes in conflictual and cooperative behavior in the context of reciprocity and evolving norms. Using event data from 1948 through 1988, they analyze the role of reciprocity in U.S.-Soviet relations as well as the nature of underlying norms that set broad parameters for U.S.-Soviet foreign policy behavior. Time-varying parameter estimates of memory and reactivity for both countries, as well as the interaction propensities of successive heads of state, suggest an increase in cooperation and a leveling off of hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union since 1985.

Economic reform and product quality improvement efforts in the Soviet Union

FOUR YEARS after Gorbachev's rise to power, and after countless articles and debates which have made perestroika a household word, the USSR introduced a draft of a proposed law 'On the Quality of Products and the Protection of Consumer Rights'.1 Placed in the context of some of the more radical reforms that have been discussed, the draft is most striking in its adherence to past attempts to address the problem of poor product quality. At the same time, the proposal does contain some new ideas and variations on old approaches which could turn out to be of considerable practical value in the struggle to move away from the traditional Soviet centrally planned economy. To understand the law and the role it may play during the transition period, as well as other programmes currently in effect such as Gospriemka and KSUKP (the Russian abbreviation for 'Complex System of Management of Output Quality'), it is first necessary to review briefly previous Soviet quality programmes. At the outset a distinction should be made between two different aspects of quality improvement. In designing products engineers set standards and design requirements for all sorts of characteristics such as weights, sizes, material structure, durability and reliability. If a product does not meet the level specified it is said to be defective, and should be either reworked or scrapped. In this context, if the number of defective items is reduced, there has been an improvement in quality. Although it would probably be more appropriate to refer to this as quality of production or stabilisation of product quality, the above usage of quality improvement is quite common. Improvements in product quality also refer to either increases in the level of standards or closer conformance with standards. To quote Golosovsky & Grinchel, 'the improvement in the quality of equipment is viewed as the excess of its parameters over those of conventional aggregate equipment in social production in a given year'.2 Most of the programmes discussed in this article, as well as a large part of Soviet work in this area, deal with the first aspect of quality improvement. One of the first systematic undertakings to improve quality was a programme introduced in 1955 in an aviation plant located in the Saratov region referred to as the method of defect-free product fabrication. Within a short period of time this experiment became known as the 'Saratov system' and Soviet officials claimed that it brought about a significant improvement in product quality. The system consisted of a complex of economic, organisational, educational and engineering measures designed to bring about the production of defect-free output. The

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Ending Stalinism and Ending the Cold War

collapse of the post-World War II international order. One is that the Soviet Union is a formidable power in the international system. At first glance, this would appear to be a rather peculiar assertion. After all, there are ample grounds for arguing that the Soviet Union is quite weak abroad and at home. Since Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 the Soviet Union has admitted that state socialism is bankrupt and has declared the West to be the winner of the Cold War. Moreover, the Soviet Union today is in disarray. Its economy has been 'de-planned,' but not yet marketized. Its political system has managed to marry dictatorship and democracy through an unfortunate mix of angry publics who hold the state accountable for their problems (the legacy of dictatorship) and a significant expansion of political participation (the contribution of democratization). And the federal structure of the state is under attack from republics demanding independence from Moscow and from various nationalities demanding in turn their independence from these republics. However, to judge the Soviet Union to be weak is to miss the point that international influence has many sources beyond economic might or the capacity to win wars. In particular, we must remember that the revolutionary reforms now under way

The soviet crisis of the early 1980s and Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power

(1990). The soviet crisis of the early 1980s and Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power. Socialism and Democracy: Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 1-15.

The propaganda campaign for a new orthodoxy in soviet social science

Abstract Very soon after Mikhail S. Gorbachev's rise to the top of the Soviet leadership, increased emphasis was placed on harnessing Soviet social science to the reform effort in the Soviet economy. Pressure was applied from above to party organizations and the USSR Academy of Sciences to become self‐critical and adopt accepted social science techniques in place of Marxist‐Leninist slogans and formulas. This article discusses the most important developments in the Gorbachev regime's campaign to institute a “new orthodoxy” in social science research, one whose litmus test was “results.”

Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 241 tactical mistakes once in the European Community than he is of its decision to stay aloof from Europe for so long. Tugendhat believes that despite many failures the European Community has been a success, and he describes it as "one of the most important and hopeful political experiments to have been undertaken in this part of the world in modern times." He argues that it is not generally perceived as a success in Europe because of the large discrepancy between the lofty rhetoric of politicians and the reality of a complex community of twelve discrete member states. One limitation of Making Sense ofEurope is that the author's story ends in 1985, just as the European Community begins a new and important phase in its evolution. The book's apparent "datedness," if nothing else, demonstrates how quickly events in Europe are moving. The Europe with which Tugendhat leaves the reader has accomplished a great deal but is languishing, beset by problems, badly in need of institutional repair, and bereft of a vision. Although this may have been the prevailing mood in 1985, it is clearly not so at this time. One senses that Tugendhat would be pleasantly surprised by recent developments : the dynamism and vision of the Delors Commission, the excitement generated by the 1992 program, and the passage of the Single European Act, which makes modest yet important institutional reforms. Even with its limitations, Making Sense of Europe is an excellent book that is well worth reading. Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics ofReform. ByJerry Hough. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. 301 pp. $19.95/cloth. Reviewed byfennifer Varrell, M.A. candidate, SAIS. In Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform Jerry Hough presents a new approach to understanding Gorbachev's succession and the problems the general secretary faces in dealing with the Soviet system. Hough portrays Gorbachev as a twentieth-century Peter the Great, striving to open Soviet society to the economic and social forces of the West. Unlike many other contemporary Sovietologists, Hough sees the Bolshevik revolution as an aberration in the flow of Russian history: fearing the developmental course of Western capitalistic forces, the Bolsheviks gave in to xenophobia and lowered the curtain on Western influence in the country. While Hough reviews the historical, political, and economic developments that took place between the revolution and Gorbachev's rise to power, more interesting is his analysis of the current situation in the Soviet Union. He portrays a society in which there are enormous pressures for change and where, after almost seventy years of rulers who did not respond to these pressures, there is finally a leader calling for radical transformation of the economy and society. Gorbachev's priorities reflect his understanding that, in this era of geopolitical stalemate, security rests on an efficient and technologically advanced society. Backing Gorbachev in his efforts is the educated middle class, which, despite the efforts of the party, is strongly oriented to the West. 242 SAIS REVIEW Gorbachev clearly stands apart from the standard party apparatchik. Unlike his predecessors, he grew up as part of a generation that rejoiced in the denunciation of Stalin, he holds a degree in law (as opposed to science or engineering ), he consolidated his power position rapidly, and, as Hough points out, he was groomed for the position of party secretary from an early point in his career. The skill with which Gorbachev has established his power base demonstrates his astuteness as a politician, and, according to Hough, he has many factors on his side in attempting to make changes never before accomplished. According to Hough, one of the reasons for the Soviet Union's economic weakness is that it has shut itself off from the West, refusing to participate in the exchange of ideas and dooming itself to backwardness. Because Gorbachev sees foreign policy as an extension of domestic policy, he perceives this technological weakness to be a distinct disadvantage in the international arena. Yet Hough frequently points out that, despite the revolutionary language that has accompanied his reforms, Gorbachev is striving for political liberalization within a one-party system and for economic reform within a...

The Prague Spring: A Mixed Legacy

This is a collection of original essays by Czechs, most of whom were chief players in Czechoslovakia's 1969 drama. That brief spring still lives as the drama of the most extensive liberalization of any Communist system and of its crushing defeat in a Soviet-led invasion. Twenty years later, the reflections of the writers gathered in this book assume a special meaning in light of Soviet events, for the Soviet Union is now being invaded by the very same ideas that moved it to invade Czechoslovakia. As at several times in their history, the Czechs-overpowered and on the brink of a seeming assimilation by a powerful neighbor-watch their ideas at work. Though the final results of the reform process in the Soviet Union cannot be predicted, it is certain that the USSR, and with it Eastern Europe, will be different from what they were before Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power. The tremors of that change are the aftershocks of Czechoslovakia's Prague Spring.

The U.S.S.R.: Don't expect wheeling and dealing

President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's rise to power in the U.S.S.R. represents a transition from the old guard to the younger party leaders. However, his regime is based on a collective leadership that will undertake only modest reforms. There is little likelihood that either a more reformist or a more hard‐line regime will come to power in the next five years. No major opening to international business is likely, but some liberalization of imports may occur if domestic economic conditions improve.