Exit Rights Research Articles

Consent, Multiculturalism, and Exit: A Contemporary Critique of Religious Accommodation and the Right to Sex Equality

ABSTRACT As liberal legal systems worldwide develop new forms of multicultural accommodation, this article identifies a noteworthy shift. Democracies have been moving from non-interference in internal illiberal community norms to a growing readiness to allow inegalitarian norms, especially norms discriminating against women, into general societal spheres, as a means for minority integration. Religious women’s consent to modesty and segregation norms has been central in legitimating these novel modes of accommodation. Relying on feminist critiques of consent and using Israeli law as its case study, the article demonstrates how the liberal discourse readily embraces women’s consent to sidestep difficult questions concerning harm to gender equality. Consent serves to sustain normative ambiguity about sex segregation and about the boundaries between public and private. Finally, the expansion of inegalitarian practices from the community onto the larger society further problematizes the idea of the right of exit, a core component of liberal multiculturalism theory.

Granting leaders priority exit options promotes and jeopardizes cooperation in social dilemmas

Cooperation in human interactions often involves voluntary participation rather than obligatory requirements. This paper investigates the impact of voluntary exit strategies on cooperation within scale-free networks, employing spatial prisoner’s dilemma games as the framework. We analyze three distinct exit strategies: leader priority exit, fringe priority exit, and random exit, across varying dilemma strengths. Our findings reveal that in scenarios of weak dilemma strength, leader priority exit significantly diminishes cooperation, particularly when only a small subset of players is granted exit rights. In contrast, under strong dilemma strength conditions, both leader priority and random exits serve to unexpectedly bolster cooperation. This enhancement is primarily facilitated by high-degree nodes opting out, thereby enabling low-degree nodes to establish stable cooperation. Furthermore, our study underscores the pivotal role of network structure. In assortative networks, random exit emerges as the most effective strategy in promoting cooperation. On the other hand, disassortative networks exhibit a substantial increase in cooperation levels when employing leader priority exit. These results highlight the intricate interplay between exit strategies, dilemma strength, and network topology, offering critical insights for promoting cooperation in varied social contexts.

Exchanges with and without the sword: slavery, politics-as-exchange and freedom in James M. Buchanan's institutional economics

AbstractJames M. Buchanan's politics-as-exchange retrospectively conceptualized formal institutions emerging from bilateral agreements to establish reciprocal rights and prospectively guided constitutional entrepreneurs to broker Pareto-superior reforms that had unanimous consent. Buchanan believed this conceptualization of politics-as-exchange was necessitated by his ontological–methodological individualism and would initiate a new era of consensual politics, but it is argued it led to illiberal conclusions that reflected dissonance between his Kantian individualism and Humean subjectivism. It meant, for example, that slavery was characterized as a bilateral agreement between very unequal parties and it is argued it logically implied abolition required the consent of slaveowners. But Buchanan's ontology was compatible with the introduction into his framework of a right of exit that would have differentiated between exchanges with and without the sword to produce a consistent liberal constitutionalism.

Muslim Family Law Reform: Understanding the Difference between Muslim-Majority and Muslim-Minority Jurisdictions

Abstract 35 Muslim-majority and 18 Muslim-minority countries formally integrate Muslim Family Laws (mfl s) into their legal systems. Both groups of governments have undertaken legislative reforms to improve the status of women/children under mfl s and strengthen the rule of law within their mfl systems. The existing scholarship does not address whether mfl s are more reformed or human/women’s rights friendlier in Muslim-majority or Muslim-minority countries. Employing an innovative methodological tool, the Muslim Family Law Index, this exploratory article surveys cross-national and historical trends in mfl reform (1946–2016). It shows that although Muslim-minority countries appear to have more “reformed” mfl systems than their Muslim counterparts, a closer analysis reveals that they have prioritized different types of legislative reform. The former favored exit rights, while the latter prioritized substantive reforms. The type and extent of interventions were strongly associated with colonial heritage, state-religion relations, international norm diffusion, women’s activism, and ethnoreligious diversity/tolerance. These findings have implications for studying multicultural theory, human/women’s rights, and democratization in the mfl-applying world.

Super-rational aspiration promotes cooperation in the asymmetric game with peer exit punishment and reward

Super-rational aspiration induced strategy updating with exit rights has been considered in some previous studies, in which the players adjust strategies in line with their payoffs and aspirations, and they have access to exit the game. However, exit payoffs for exiting players are automatically allocated, which is clearly contrary to reality. In this study, evolutionary cooperation dynamics with super-rational aspiration and asymmetry in the Prisoner's Dilemma game is investigated, where exit payoffs are implemented by local peers. The results show that for different population structures, the asymmetry of the system is always contributive to the participation of the players. Furthermore, we show that under different exit payoffs, super-rationality and asymmetry are conductive to the evolution of cooperation.

The right to a fair exit

This paper introduces a novel account of freedom of dissociation, construed as the “right to a fair exit.” It defines freedom of dissociation as the right to end an association without excessive and undue costs. This novel account contrasts with the classic right of exit that some liberal philosophers have theorized as the bedrock of associational freedom. The original right of exit is first and foremost concerned with the protection against excessive exit costs, while the right to a fair exit broadens its scope to include undue costs as well. State policy should aim at monitoring and resourcing exit not only to ensure that leavers have adequate exit options, but also that the costs of exit are fairly divided between parties. This account illuminates a range of cases, such as divorce, dissolution of employment contracts, and contested exits from religious associations.

Benefit Legal Entities in Italy: An Overview

Benefit legal entities combine the normal logic of profit-making with corporate sustainability. They pursue, in addition to the profit purpose, one or more aims of common benefit to be indicated in the articles of association relating to the corporate activity. An initial question is whether the pursuit of these joint objectives (i.e., profit and social responsibility) is reserved solely to benefit corporations and whether (and to which extent) non-benefit legal entities are excluded from pursuing these dual aims. As regards the notion of common benefit, its specification in the articles of association raises some significant legal issues. Firstly, it affects the assessment of the directors’ duty of care; they are required to balance the interests of the shareholders with those other interests provided for in the by-laws, and consequently such balance has potential implications on directors’ liability. Secondly, stakeholders adversely affected by the entity’s failure to achieve those common benefit aims must be protected, but it is difficult to assess how. Finally, setting out a corporation’s common benefit could trigger, under certain conditions, the exit right of dissenting shareholders following the acquisition or loss of the «benefit status». benefit legal entities, directors’ duties, exit right, legal entities pursuing common benefit purposes

Super-rational aspiration induced strategy updating helps resolve the tragedy of the commons in a cooperation system with exit rights

Avoiding the tragedy of the commons requires altruists to incur some losses to benefit the group. Although specific rules and self-enforcing agreements could help maintain the cooperation system stable, the costly recognition and free-rider problem are still questioned these two cooperation maintenance mechanisms. We here considered the situation of both exit costs and exit benefits in the asymmetric prisoner's dilemma game and introduced a super-rational aspiration induced strategy updating, where players adjust strategies in line with their payoffs and aspirations. If their payoffs reach or exceed the aspiration levels, which may be rational or super-rational, they keep their strategies. Otherwise, they imitate a local neighbor's strategy. We explored this rule in the structured and well-mixed population. The results show that super-rationality and asymmetry could together promote cooperation when exit costs exist. With exit benefit, super-rationality promotes cooperation in both structures and asymmetry only works in the well-mixed population. This suggests that the introduced strategy updating rule could sustain cooperation among egoists with exit rights.

Conscientious objection in firms

AbstractThis article asks whether firms should exempt employees when they object to elements of their work that go against their conscience. Fairness requires that we follow the rules of an organization we have joined voluntarily only if these rules express mutual advantage. In corporations, I argue that subordination and exemption provides for mutual advantage better than subordination plus right of exit. This is because agents want to protect their conscientious convictions, even in hierarchical organizations geared towards efficient preference satisfaction. Thus exemptions should be granted in unforeseeable circumstances, provided the costs are limited.

The relevance of investor rights in crowdinvesting

A common assumption is that entrepreneurs retain more control of their venture when opting for crowdinvesting rather than venture capital. In this article, we investigate the relevance of cash-flow, control, and exit rights awarded to crowd investors in Germany, where more flexible contracts are offered than in many other jurisdictions. In Germany, many of the rights used in venture capital investment contracts are also prevalent in crowdinvesting contracts. We find that crowd investors are asked to pay higher prices if they receive more cash-flow and exit rights, consistent with the view that these rights are valuable to the crowd. However, we find no evidence that these rights affect campaign outcome, the likelihood of securing follow-on funding, or the insolvency likelihood of the venture. We interpret this as evidence that the redemption rights stipulated in the contract make other types of control rights less relevant or investors' actions are ineffective. Furthermore, crowd investors neither trigger insolvency proceedings nor mention the enforcement of their contractual rights in investor communication blogs or popular media.

Market socialism, labour market domination, and the state as employer of last resort

ABSTRACT This paper assesses the claim that to avoid labour market domination we must be market socialists committed to an extensive sector of worker-owned firms. The labour republican tradition offers three perspectives on this argument: Ellerman argues that non-domination demands that all workplaces be worker owned. Hockett has argued that it demands a policy that the state function as the employer of last resort. Taylor argues that all that republicanism requires is a strengthened exit right for workers. This paper develops the claim that mandatory market socialism would be illiberal by thinning the market for labour and removing the fair value of exit rights. The most reasonable view, overall, accepts that the state must be the employer of last resort so as to eliminate labour market domination, but this is a macro-level commitment that does not place any meso-level restrictions on the nature of the firm.

Exit Rights, Seamless Borders and the New Nation-State Container

Enlisting states of origin or transit to prevent exit from their own territory has become a tool of extraterritorial migration control for states of the global North. Violeta Moreno-Lax and Mariagiulia Giuffre (2019) dub this trend ‘consensual containment.’ I view it as the harbinger of a loosely networked global migration regime for governing the circulation of people. This article first explores the practical erosion of the right of exit since the demise of communism. Next, I turn to the legitimating function performed by anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling campaigns in reframing breaches of exit rights as an exercise of the cynical practice now dubbed ‘penal humanitarianism’. I conclude by querying whether a paradigm of mobility organized around entry and exit is veering toward obsolescence. Current trends, particularly in relation to securitization of migration, push the logic of migration governance beyond obstructing exit and preventing entry as ends in themselves. I suggest that the logic is increasingly directed more at assuming control over movement as such. Against the contemporary claim of increased global mobility for some and decreased mobility for others, I contend that mobility - understood as the capacity for 'free movement' - is on the decline for everyone, even if actual movement by some is on the increase.

The Exit Theory of Judicial Appraisal

For many years, we and other commentators have observed the problem with allowing judges wide discretion to fashion appraisal awards to dissenting shareholders on the basis of widely divergent, expert valuation evidence submitted by the litigating parties. The results of this discretionary approach to valuation have been to make appraisal litigation less predictable and therefore more costly and likely. While this has been beneficial to professionals who profit from corporate valuation litigation, it has been harmful to shareholders, making deals costlier and less likely to complete. In this Article, we propose to end the problem of discretionary judicial valuation by tracing the origins of the appraisal remedy and demonstrate that its true purpose has always been to protect the exit rights of minority shareholders when a cash exit is otherwise unavailable, and not to judge the value of the deal. While such reform would be costly to valuation litigation professionals, their loss would be more than offset by the benefit of such reforms to shareholders involved in future corporate transactions. Shareholders presently have adequate protections, both from private arrangements and legal doctrines involving fiduciary duties.

Enabling Exit: Religious Association and Membership Contract

This paper investigates the right of exit from religious associations. The liberal state has a compelling interest in overseeing exit, even if it implies some loss in religious group autonomy. Members should not be bound by rules they find unconscionable. They should be free to leave and able to do so. To enable exit, the paper advocates the use of membership contracts. Religious associations should issue a contract for members working for, residing in, or donating money to the association under a regime of legal exemptions. The membership contract publicises the right of exit and offers a basis for negotiating and contesting its terms. It makes exit less “unthinkable” to members and helps tackle unreasonable economic costs to exit.

Enlargement and exit: The origins of Article 50

Many international organizations and the vast majority of federations lack exit clauses. Existing theoretical explanations of this stylized fact focus on issues of credible commitment, signaling, and the risk of strategic exploitation. However, such accounts are unable to explain the adoption of Article 50 by the European Union, which allows unilateral withdrawal. I theorize and demonstrate empirically that in the case of the European Union, an exit-voice logic lies at its origin during the 2002–2003 European Convention. As a protection to undesired policy changes post entry, countries of the 2004 Eastern accession demanded an exit right. Underlying the fear for policy changes was their much lower level of economic development and corresponding differences in policy preferences. As a mirror image, rich outliers like the United Kingdom and Denmark also supported Article 50, which likely contributed to its final adoption through the Treaty of Lisbon.

Are Equity Crowdfunding Investors Active Investors?

A common assumption is that entrepreneurs retain more control of their venture when opting for equity crowdfunding (ECF) rather than venture capital. In this article, we investigate the relevance of cash-flow, control, and exit rights awarded to crowd investors in Germany, where more flexible ECF contracts are offered than in many other countries. In Germany, many of the rights used in venture capital investment contracts are also prevalent in ECF contracts. We find that crowd investors are asked to pay higher prices if they receive more cash-flow and exit rights, consistent with the view that these rights are valuable to the crowd. However, we find no evidence that these rights affect campaign outcome, the likelihood of securing follow-on funding, or the insolvency likelihood of the venture. We interpret this as indirect evidence that crowd investors are passive. Furthermore, crowd investors neither actively trigger insolvency proceedings nor mention the enforcement of their contractual rights in investor communication blogs or popular media. These results are in contrast with control rights theory and the results documented for venture capital contracts. Our research thus suggests that crowd investors are rather passive investors whose control rights are either ineffective or not exercised.

El “Derecho de Salida” por razones culturales y las mujeres indígenas

Este artículo examina críticamente el principio de salida simple que plantea Kukathas como el mejor sistema para conciliar las exigencias de pertenencia a una cultura indígena y el derecho a disentir de sus miembros mujeres. Para ello, en primer lugar, se revisa la tensión entre el feminismo de la igualdad y la situación de las mujeres indígenas con sus culturas internas. En segundo lugar, se analiza la tesis de Kukathas para concluir que por sí sola no es suficiente. Y, finalmente, se presenta una solución alternativa que superpone el “derecho de salida”, un modelo de jurisdicciones multiculturales y una adecuada concepción de la democracia deliberativa.

New Zealand’s Mandatory Bid Provisions: Fit for Purpose?

Takeovers aimed at obtaining control of listed companies are subject to regulation across the world. A cornerstone of many takeover regulatory regimes is the mandatory bid rule, which obligates the offeror to extend a takeover offer to all shareholders in the target company once control is obtained. Mandatory bid rules are controversial. Arguments for mandatory bid rules suggest they deter exploitative takeovers and guarantee exit rights for shareholders and so incentivise investment in the first place. Arguments against mandatory bid rules suggest they increase the cost of takeovers, deterring value or efficiency increasing takeovers. Ultimately, the question of whether a mandatory bid rule is beneficial is seen as an empirical one. This paper argues that the empirical question cannot be divorced from the particular characteristics of the capital market in which a mandatory bid rule is imposed. New Zealand’s capital markets are small by international standards, are relatively dependent on foreign investment and characterised by concentrated ownership. These characteristics suggest the incidence of takeovers in general may be lower, which in turn suggests that its takeover regime should be wary of increasing the costs of takeovers, notwithstanding the benefits a mandatory bid rule may provide. This paper finds that New Zealand’s mandatory bid rules, owing to the allowance of partial bids, largely responds to this concern and appears to be appropriate given the characteristics of New Zealand’s capital markets.

10 Years Cross-Border Mergers Directive: Some Observations About EU Border Protection and Minority Exit Rights

10 Years Cross-Border Mergers Directive: Some Observations About EU Border Protection and Minority Exit Rights

The challenge of cultural diversity: the limited value of the right of exit

This article traces recent trends in British politics, liberal political theory and human rights law in order to demonstrate why the right of exit – made famous in the political theory of multiculturalism by Chandran Kukathas – may be able to mediate tensions between them. I argue that the right of exit is an insufficient test for consent because some cultures may render some members incapable of effectively exercising their autonomy. I use empirical evidence drawn from legal cases and social science in conjunction with a philosophical account of agency as fundamentally ‘relational’ to unpack and defend this controversial claim. Understanding agency in relational terms sheds light on precisely how oppressive culturally permitted relationships can simultaneously constitute some individuals’ primary identities while serving to harm those very same individuals in the process. This account of agency and culture also avoids both the liberal assumption of a sovereign self and also any essentialism or reification of culture. I suggest that for an individual to have the capacity to effectively use of the right of exit, they must be able to conceive of themselves as an agent, which includes having a sense of their own moral worth and the ability to imagine the possibility of living a different kind of life.