Petition For Review Research Articles

Analisis Hukum Islam terhadap Penetapan Hukum Hakim tentang Perkawinan Beda Agama di Indonesia dalam putusan Nomor: 12/Pdt.P/2022/PN. Ptk

This research focuses on analyzing the legal of islam basis of the judge's considerations in Court Determination Number: 12/Pdt.P/2022/Pn. Ptk, and the legality of interfaith marriages are reviewed from Law Number 1 of 1974 concerning marriage, as well as the law regarding court decisions regarding interfaith marriages. The type of research used is qualitative research. This research uses primary and secondary data. The data collection method in this research uses library research. Based on research conducted, it is known that the judge referred to Article 35 of Law number 23 of 2006 concerning Population Administration which states that marriage registration applies to marriages determined by the court, so that the judge interprets the meaning of the marriage determined by the court to be an interfaith marriage. Law Number 1 of 1974 concerning Marriage states that marriage is valid based on the rules of religious law, but if an interfaith marriage is carried out outside the jurisdiction of Indonesia and its registration is considered valid. The legal implications that arise as a result of this court decision are the status and position of children. It is recommended that judges in taking considerations not only refer to one interpretation, but also look at other legal considerations such as the Constitutional Court decision Number 68/PUU-XII/2014 in the petition for Review of Law Number 1 of 1974 concerning Marriage which clearly rejects be firm regarding interfaith marriages, and use considerations based on other laws. To the DPR and the Government to immediately revise the Marriage Law by strengthening the prohibition on interfaith marriages in order to eliminate the legal vacuum. To society, interfaith marriages should not be carried out.

Statistical Analysis of Petitions for Review at The Arizona Supreme Court

Statistical Analysis of Petitions for Review at The Arizona Supreme Court

Equal Legal Standing of Citizens in Judicial Review of Constitutional Court Law: A Multicultural Perspective to Achieve Legal Certainty

The phrase of Indonesian citizen that quotes in Article 51 Paragraph 1 of Law Number 8 of 2011 about the Constitutional Court provides the widest possible opportunity for the Indonesian people to contest their rights. A Constitutional Court’s judge as an Indonesian citizen has the same rights in filing a lawsuit regarding his legal interests related to the review of the Constitutional Court Law. This study contains two results. First, the right to file a petition is the right to file a lawsuit or petition to the Constitutional Court. However, in reviewing Legal Certainty in the second discussion, a Constitutional Court judge should be prohibited from reviewing the Constitutional Court Law as it violates Legal Principles, that a Judge cannot be a Judge for himself. From a multicultural perspective, every Indonesian citizen regardless of ethnic, religious or gender background has equal rights to file a judicial review petition to the Constitutional Court. This reflects the spirit of unity in diversity and equality contained in the 1945 Constitution. However, there still needs to be restrictions to avoid conflicts of interest. By upholding the principles of legal certainty and justice, the Indonesian judiciary system can realize the noble ideals of the nation..

The Dynamics of Constitutional Court Decisions on Open Proportional, Closed Proportional, And Limited Open Proportional Electoral Systems

This research discusses the electoral system as a way to regulate citizen participation in electing legislative and executive members. According to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia's (MK-RI) decision on Law No. 7/2017 on Elections made on 15 June 2023, the open proportional electoral system will still be applied in 2024. Legal experts gave their opinions on open proportional, closed proportional, and limited proportional systems during the MK's decision-making process. This research uses a normative juridical method by identifying issues related to the background of the judicial review petition, alternative electoral systems, and judges' considerations of the Constitutional Court's decision on the electoral system. It is expected that the results of this research will show that the Constitutional Court's decision on the electoral system will show the advantages and disadvantages of open and closed proportional systems, which reflect the relationship between the democratic aspirations of the Indonesian people and other democratic aspirations.

Petitions for review of the European Patent Office (EPO) appeal board decisions by the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal. Part V: ‘Confidence’ in the European Patent Office (EPO) Petition for Review procedure under Article 112a of the European Patent Convention (EPC)

A patent is a short-term monopoly granted in relation to an invention by (or for) a country to a patentee who may then ask the national courts of the country to order others to stop using the invention.1 They are applied for and, if accepted, are granted, whereafter, in certain jurisdictions, others may oppose their grant. If such an opposition is successful, the patent is revoked. In Europe, since the late 1970s, the dominant patent law has been the European Patent Convention (EPC), a treaty that is administered by an international organization, the European Patent Office (EPO), headquartered in Munich, Germany.2 Belgium, like most European countries, is party to the EPC. It should be noted that the EPC system is not a European Union system. When a European patent application is filed, it is first checked for formalities and, if it passes this test, it is subjected to...

Federal Shar¯ıah Court’s Judgment for Riba¯ Free Pakistan

The controversy of whether modern-day commercial interest falls under the purview of riba¯ and, therefore, prohibited or not was resolved globally by the end of the 1980s by resolutions, fatawa, and reports of various forums and committees. Accordingly, Islamic banking started evolving, and Pakistan was the pioneer in this regard. Yet, as the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan required elimination of riba¯ from the entire economy, certainly a difficult task, the controversy was re-initiated when an appeal was preferred by the government against the judgment of the Federal Shar¯ıat Court (FSC) of Pakistan declared in its of 14th November 1991. The FSC (1991) declared that the Non-Interest Based (NIB) system introduced by the SBP in 1985 was un-Islamic mainly due to the involvement of ‘Sell and Buy-Back’ and sale of debts/receivables and ordered that the whole system be Islamised in its true sense by the end of June 1992. The Shar¯ıat Appellate Bench (SAB) of the Supreme Court of Pakistan rejected the appeal against the FSC judgment (1991) in its verdict given on 23rd December 1999 and ordered that the laws involving interest Laws would cease to have effect finally by 30th June 2001. The government first got an extension of one year but then filed a review petition, and the newly constituted SAB remanded both earlier judgments back to the FSC in June 2002. In the FSC, the case remained pending for 2 decades till it was decided on 28th April 2022. The FSC (2022) again declared that all types of interest on loans and debts (either for commercial, production-related, or personal purposes) fall under the definition of riba¯. The FSC directed the government to complete the necessary legislative amendments by 31st December 2022 to replace the laws declared void due to involvement of interest and that the interest must be eliminated from the economy by the end of 2027.

Personal Liability: Forging New Tools of Accountability in Public Law

In 1991, two decisions passed by benches headed by Kuldip Singh J. marked an unprecedented shift to holding public officers personally liable to pay damages for arbitrary orders. The Supreme Court of India imposed damages to the quantum of fifty lakh rupees on Captain Satish Sharma, the former Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, for arbitrarily allotting fifteen petrol outlets out of his discretionary quota to allottees related to him or his officials. Similarly, Sheila Kaul, the former Minister of Urban Development, was ordered to pay damages of sixty lakh rupees for illegal allotment of shops from her discretionary quota to her associates. While the two decisions ushered in a revolution of personal liability in the arena of public law, one was overturned by a review judgement, and the other has been simply forgotten despite being upheld in the review petition. In light of the growing number and prominence of misfeasance by public officers, this article considers the need for rethinking the theory of personal liability to compensate the public or individual loss adequately, deter the officials and assess it as an alternative to traditional mechanisms of public accountability.

Anomalies in Implementation of the ‘Creamy Layer’ Segment in the Realisation of Benefits under Reservation Policies in India

The term ‘creamy layer’ comprises of socially advanced persons amongst the socially and educationally backward classes in India, for purposes of exclusion from reservation in the public services and education sectors. The Office Memorandum of 1993 classifies backward classes into two groups - Group A and B, for the purpose of identifying the creamy layer in the government sector, while those in other sectors are subject to a ceiling of wealth and annual income. This paper analyses two discriminatory practices relating to the implementation of the creamy layer in India. Firstly, the inequities between posts in public sector undertakings (PSU), banks, etc. visa-vis the government posts embedded in the creamy layer criteria. This has resulted in a denial of jobs in the civil services to candidates from Other Backward Classes, whose parents are employed in public sector undertakings. This anomaly needs to be rectified by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment. Secondly, the non-application of the creamy layer to the affluent SC and STs while giving them reservation in promotions as corrected by the Supreme Court in the M. Nagaraj judgment. This has set right the existing anomaly and the government needs to retract its review petition in the Supreme Court

Survey of Selected 2019 Texas Oil and Gas Cases and Statutes

Texas courts and the legislature were quite active in 2019 concerning oil and gas issues. Texas courts decided many cases involving everything from deed interpretation to lease repudiation to farmout interpretation. The Texas Supreme Court has granted several petitions for review from the courts of appeal. The legislature enacted or amended statutes concerning so called “royalty leases,” the Mineral Interest Pooling Act, and others. The following are summaries of some selected cases and statutes that will be of interest to those involved with Texas oil and gas law.

Mental Illness Without Dangerousness in Conditional Release

In the case of In re Capser , 448 P.3d 1084 (Mont. 2019), the Supreme Court of Montana reversed the judgment of a Montana district court that denied a petition for review of sentence for a person with schizophrenia who had been committed to the state hospital 15 years earlier when there was

How Super PACs Have Transformed the Federal Campaign Finance System: A Political Scientists' Amicus Brief to the Supreme Court.

This paper served as an amicus brief to the Supreme Court concerning Representative Ted Lieu et. al vs. Federal Election Commission, a petition for review of the 2010 D.C. Circuit Court decision that legalized Super PACs. The brief finds that Super PACs accepting unlimited contributions spend nearly one in every four federal election campaign dollars, concentrated on the most competitive races. They enable million-dollar donors to support organizations marketing and conducting themselves as extensions of candidates’ and parties’ campaigns — regardless of federal contribution limits applying to those campaigns. Thus Super PACs undermine the contribution limits that are the very basis of the federal campaign finance system.

Petitions for review of the EPO Appeal Board decisions by the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal: part IV

... In three earlier articles in this journal, and a post in its blog,1 I have commented on the Petition for review procedure2 established by the 2000 revision of the European Patent Convention (EPC). My interest in the procedure arose as I hoped it might be a way of delaying a final decision against my clients in one of my cases. Reviewing the early cases decided by the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBoA) of the European Patent Office (EPO) made it clear that I should choose an alternative strategy, which I did, ultimately successfully. Nonetheless, I remained interested in what appeared to be a pale imitation of a legitimate appeal procedure in the European (but not European Union) structure of the EPO. With the possible arrival of the Unified Patent Court (UPC)3 within the next year or so, there seems to be a possibility that the EPO Petition procedure will lose what little popularity it has, at least with patent opponents. Therefore, it is time to review what has been happening with the EPO Petitions over the last few years.

Medicolegal Sidebar: Peer Review of Professional Competence.

Medicolegal Sidebar: Peer Review of Professional Competence.

U.S. Supreme Court Amicus Brief of Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, Graviss v. Department of Defense Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools, No. 18-1061

This brief was filed by law professors and legal scholars with expertise in civil procedure, federal jurisdiction, and related subjects. In recent years, Supreme Court has frequently addressed whether treat certain litigation requirements as jurisdictional conditions or as nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules. It has laudably strived to bring some discipline over-classification of litigation requirements as It has justifiably criticized drive-by jurisdictional rulings that have mischaracterized claim-processing rules or elements of a cause of action as jurisdictional limitations. The Federal Circuit's decision below exemplifies problem. Disregarding letter and spirit of Supreme Court's precedent, Federal Circuit mistakenly treated as jurisdictional 60-day deadline for filing a petition for review of decisions by Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A). That Karen Graviss may have filed her petition one day beyond 60-day window was not raised for nearly three years after her petition was filed. She and government had litigated her due process claim on merits in Federal Circuit, and neither government nor initial panel asserted a failure comply with 60-day deadline. The panel ruled in Ms. Graviss's favor on merits, and government sought en banc rehearing in Federal Circuit - -again without asserting that petition was time-barred. It was en banc Federal Circuit that raised issue for first time, eventually concluding that difference between 61 days and 60 days deprived it of subject-matter jurisdiction. This result confounds Supreme Court's recent guidance on the critical differences between true jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional limitations on causes of action. The Court has appropriately acknowledged that deeming a requirement be jurisdictional can thwart fair and efficient adjudication of disputes in federal system. And Court has clarified that time requirements like one at issue in this case -- which does not involve the transfer of adjudicatory authority from one Article III court another -- can be jurisdictional only if Congress clearly states that [it] shall count as jurisdictional. Because there is no such clear statement by Congress that § 7703(b)(1)'s 60-day deadline is jurisdictional, Supreme Court should grant certiorari and reverse Federal Circuit's decision below.

Brief of the R Street Institute as Amicus Curiae: Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service

In Return Mail v. U.S. Postal Service, the Supreme Court will consider whether the United States government is a qualified to petition for post-issuance review of a patent before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, under the provisions of the America Invents Act. This brief makes two primary arguments in support of treating the government as a person. First, treating the government as a person best effectuates the intent of Congress as expressed in the America Invents Act. Congress created the post-issuance review proceedings to combat the well-known problem of erroneously granted patents, and intended to permit as many interested parties as possible to take advantage of those proceedings, thereby promoting a public good of correctness in existing patent grants. Since the government's petitioning for review of a patent grant brings about that public good no less than any other private entity's petitioning for the same, it follows that permitting the government to file such petitions is consistent with the intent of Congress. Second, permitting the government to initiate post-issuance review serves important interests of good governance. As the patent-owner petitioner argues, the government does have an alternative avenue for having a patent cancelled: persuading or ordering the director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to initiate a sua sponte reexamination. But between that procedure and having the government petition for post-issuance review under the AIA, the latter is superior insofar as it provides greater transparency into the government's arguments, it offers stronger due process to patent owners whose patents are challenged, and it implements separation of administrative functions to a clearer degree.

Amicus Brief of ICLE and Participating Scholars, Mozilla v. FCC

ICLE filed a brief in support of Petitioners in the D.C. Circuit case, Mozilla v. FCC, a case that challenged the FCC’s authority to issue the Restoring Internet Freedom Order (“RIFO”). In RIFO, the FCC repealed the Title II classification on ISPs, preempted conflicting state laws, and applied a transparency rule against ISPs, among other provisions. In our brief, we argue that: Contrary to the claims of Petitioners, the Commission acted well within its authority in adopting the Order. The Commission developed a comprehensive regulatory scheme for ISPs that includes both obligations imposed under the Communications Act, as well as complementary regulation and potential enforcement under antitrust law by the Commission’s sister agencies. As we show below, this competition-oriented, light touch regulatory regime comports with the relevant provisions and stated goals of the Communications Act far better than the ex ante rules adopted in the Title II Order. In adopting this competition-oriented regulatory regime, the Commission also acted within its authority to preempt contradictory state laws under well- established precedent. The Commission did so while properly allowing for states to continue to regulate under other laws of general applicability that do not conflict with or frustrate the federal policies underlying the Order. Accordingly, the Order should be upheld and the petitions for review should be denied.

Recovery of Attorney's Fees in the Absence of a Contract in Texas: Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Public in Hill v. Shamoun (Tex 2018)

In Shamoun & Norman, LLP v. Hill, 483 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2016, pet. granted), the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a law firm could recover attorney’s fees from a former client in the absence of a contract that complied with the statute of frauds based on the common-law theory of quantum meruit as an alternative, and reversed a trial court that had denied such recovery, reinstating a jury verdict for $7,250,000 in fees for the attorney, the equivalent of $48,000 per hour. The Texas Supreme Court granted the former client’s petition for review and held oral arguments on October 10, 2017. Cause No. 16-0107, styled ALBERT G. HILL, JR. v. SHAMOUN & NORMAN, LLP. This amicus curiae brief urges the Texas High Court to consider the implications of the legal questions presented in Hill v. Shamoun for the general public (rather than merely the well-heeled parties before the court), and to address the broader issue of how the reasonableness of attorney’s fees is to be determined in the absence of a contract and in the absence of market-place price setting. This includes court-ordered fees in the fee-shifting context in addition to lawsuits by attorneys against their former clients seeking additional fees that were not incurred under a traditional attorney-client retainer agreement. It is argued that neither the lodestar method used by federal courts, nor the fee factors articulated in Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997), are adequate to address the matter of fee awards in computer-driven mass litigation that requires little attorney time per case.

The Scope of IPR Estoppel: A Statutory, Historical, and Policy Approach

When Congress implemented inter partes review (IPR) and other patent post-grant proceedings through the passage of the America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011, it provided that petitioners would be estopped in later proceedings from raising grounds for invalidity that they “raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2). However, substantial uncertainty in courts’ interpretation of this provision causes an enormous impact on an accused patent infringer’s decision of whether and on what grounds to petition for review. One reading of the statutory estoppel provision suggests that “during that inter partes review” refers to the time period after institution of the IPR and before a final decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). However, although the Federal Circuit has generally favored a textualist reading of this statute, it has yet to address how the estoppel standard would apply to grounds that the petitioner chose not to include in the petition for IPR. Lower courts have taken widely divergent approaches in this and various other factual scenarios where estoppel might apply, with some courts assessing legislative history to determine that Congress intended estoppel to apply broadly to any grounds that could have been raised in the petition. These courts often engage in complex assessments of what prior art the petitioner should have known about and added to the petition, which adds unnecessary complexity and cost to their determinations. This Article will explain that a narrow, textualist reading of the IPR estoppel provision is consistent with Supreme Court precedent on statutory interpretation and is justified in light of the strict limits on IPR petitions adopted by the PTAB—limits that Congress did not foresee and which effectively restrict the grounds for invalidity that a petitioner may raise during the IPR. When the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court next has occasion to consider this issue, it should hold that IPR estoppel applies narrowly only to grounds actually raised and instituted.

التعويض عن أعمال القضاء : دراسة مقارنة = Compensation for Judicial Proceedings : A Comparative Study

أعمال القضاء | مسؤولية الدولة | مسؤولية القضاة | مخاصمة القضاة | التماس إعادة النظر | الخطأ | تحمل التبعة | التعويض النقدي | التعويض العيني | Judicial Proceedings | State’s Liability | Litigation against Judges | Petition for Review | Fault | Liability | Monetary | Monetary Compensation | Compensation in Kind

ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION AT THE FTC: EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR DEVELOPING THE LAW OR RUBBER STAMP?

This article provides the most comprehensive study to date of the Federal Trade Commission's Part 3 process. A unique and defining tool, Part 3 allows the FTC to challenge alleged section 5 violations in-house through administrative litigation. Highlighting the agency's expertise, Congress gave the FTC that authority in 1914 to develop antitrust and later consumer-protection law. Although the Commission has used its Part 3 authority to good effect, especially in some recent competition matters, the process is controversial on due-process grounds. After it finds “reason to believe” that a violation exists and authorizes staff to litigate before an independent Administrative Law Judge, the Commission reviews the ALJ's decision de novo. The result, some critics argue, is a foregone conclusion. Rather than advance the law, they contend, Part 3 frees the Commission to reach its favored result. Maligned in some quarters as a “kangaroo court” in which the FTC alleges and later summarily confirms section 5 violations, the key question is whether administrative litigation effectively fulfills the role Congress set out for it. To resolve the debate, we need a clearer picture of how Part 3 operates. Does the FTC rubber stamp its prior determinations, invariably siding with complaint counsel? Or does it change course at the appeal stage and, if so, how often? And, when it does find a section 5 violation on appeal, how often does the FTC nevertheless prune counts and allegations, suggesting that it scrutinizes the factual and legal record before it? Do the answers change with the political constitution of the Commission, such as when a Democratic majority votes out a Part 3 complaint, but a Republican Commission hears the appeal? How often does the Commission's composition change between voting out and later deciding a Part 3 matter, and might the answer resolve the due-process issue? And does the FTC fare better at the U.S. Courts of Appeal if it affirmed or reversed the ALJ? Until now, relatively little empirical work has scrutinized administrative litigation at the FTC. This study tracks every Part 3 case that produced a Commission Decision on or after January 20, 1977. It captures all 145 antitrust and consumer-protection matters falling within that period, tracking their development through initial vote at the “reason to believe” stage, disposition before the ALJ, appeal before the Commission, and petition for review at the U.S. Court of Appeals and beyond. The emerging statistics are illuminative. In hearing an appeal in the last 10 years, the FTC has never rejected an action that it had previously authorized complaint counsel to bring in Part 3. At first blush, that fact might suggest a preordained appellate process. But that phenomenon dissipates when one looks at a larger time horizon, suggesting that uniformity from initial vote to appeal is neither inevitable nor systemic. Indeed, it is possible that recent consistency may be a function of improved case selection, aided by effective factual, economic, and legal analysis by staff and the Commissioners before they authorize a complaint. Evaluating the ten matters voted out and affirmed by the Commission in the last decade lends some support to that proposition. Indeed, Part 3 has been an effective tool in developing complex antitrust questions. This article provides a host of new evidence with which to evaluate administrative litigation at the FTC. The article concludes by exploring some initial teaching points from the data.