Revenue-maximizing Tax Rate Research Articles

The State Capacity Ceiling on Tax Rates: Evidence From Randomized Tax Abatements in the DRC

This paper investigates how tax rates and tax enforcement jointly impact fiscal capacity in low‐income countries. We study a policy experiment in the D.R. Congo that randomly assigned 38,028 property owners to the status quo tax rate or to a rate reduction. This variation in tax liabilities reveals that the status quo rate lies above the revenue‐maximizing tax rate (RMTR). Reducing rates by about one‐third would maximize government revenue by increasing tax compliance. We then exploit two sources of variation in enforcement—randomized enforcement letters and random assignment of tax collectors—to show that the RMTR increases with enforcement. Including an enforcement message on tax letters or replacing tax collectors in the bottom quartile of enforcement capacity with average collectors would raise the RMTR by about 40%. Tax rates and enforcement are thus complementary levers. Jointly optimizing tax rates and enforcement would lead to 10% higher revenue gains than optimizing them independently. These findings provide experimental evidence that low government enforcement capacity sets a binding ceiling on the revenue‐maximizing tax rate in some developing countries, thereby demonstrating the value of increasing tax rates in tandem with enforcement to expand fiscal capacity.

Tax avoidance and evasion in a dynamic setting

We study an intertemporal utility maximization problem where taxpayers can engage in both tax avoidance and tax evasion. Evasion is costless but is fined if discovered, while avoidance is costly but might be successful (i.e. deemed legitimate) with a given probability (β) upon audit. We find that traditional deterrence instruments (fine and frequency of audit) reduce optimal evasion but, in contrast with results in a static framework, they have no impact on optimal avoidance. In fact, tax avoidance depends negatively on its marginal cost and positively on both its probability of success (β) and the tax rate. We show that non-compliance behavior may result in a Laffer curve for fiscal revenues and that the revenue maximizing tax rate is lower the higher β. We characterize the optimal level of β by taking into account different government objectives: minimizing evasion, minimizing non-compliance (evasion plus avoidance), or maximizing revenues. Our results suggest that specific policies (e.g., tax simplification) need to be implemented to deter avoidance and we illustrate their impact on evasion.

Contextualizing Elasticities for Policymaking: Capital Gains and Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rates

Capital gains revenue estimates rely on a long history of research empirically estimating the tax elasticity of capital gains realizations. These elasticity estimates have varied from zero to well over 3 in absolute value depending on numerous factors, such as the time frame studied, the type of capital asset, and the estimation strategy employed. Often, the headline elasticity from a study of this nature is used to calculate the implied revenue-maximizing capital gains tax rate. Unfortunately, this last, policy-relevant step has received insufficient scrutiny. The standard approach fails to sufficiently acknowledge that the estimates of the revenue-maximizing rate are a product of the estimation procedure used and the context of the tax system from which the data were generated. Such an approach yields a single capital gains tax rate which applies to all realized gains and mechanically overstates the resulting revenue-maximizing rate.

The Substitutability of Recreational Substances: Marijuana, Alcohol, and Tobacco

Cannabis advocates argue legalization will increase tax revenues. However, if legal substances are substitutes, cannabis revenues may crowd out other taxes. We document substitution between legal cannabis products and alcohol and tobacco products using detailed administrative and scanner data from Washington state. We estimate a flexible demand system for legal substances and find legalizing cannabis leads to a 9% decrease in alcohol and a 12% decrease in tobacco demand. We find the revenue-maximizing tax rates for cannabis products are above the current rates. Without considering substitution between substances the government would lose 33% of available revenue.

Book Reviews

Karine Van der Straeten of the Toulouse School of Economics and Institute for Advanced Study reviews “The Economics of Voting: Studies of Self-Interest, Bargaining, Duty and Rights,” by Dan Usher. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Examines four key terms in the economics of voting--self-interest, bargaining, duty, and rights--and presents the case that they are indispensable requirements for the maintenance of government by majority-rule voting. Discusses voting patterns; voting about the redistribution of income; determining how high the revenue-maximizing tax rate might be; bargaining and voting; bargaining unexplained; what a duty to vote is, exactly; an alternative explanation of the chance of casting a pivotal vote; the problem of equity; voting rights, property rights, and civil rights; assessing the citizen-candidate model; and the significance of the probabilistic voting theorem.”

How do corporate tax bases change when corporate tax rates change? With implications for the tax rate elasticity of corporate tax revenues

We construct a new database of extensive margin changes to multiple aspects of corporate tax bases for OECD countries between 1980 and 2004. We use our data to systematically document the tendency of countries to implement policies that both lower the corporate tax rate and broaden the corporate tax base. This correlation informs our interpretation of previous estimates of the relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues, which typically do not include comprehensive measures of the corporate tax base definition. We then re-examine the relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues. We find that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity attenuates the relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues, and increases the implied revenue-maximizing tax rate. Controlling for our new tax base measures does not substantively impact the magnitude of this relationship.

Revenue-maximizing tax rates in personal income taxation in the presence of consumption taxes: a note

ABSTRACTThis article computes revenue-maximizing tax rates in personal income taxes in the presence of consumption taxes. It finds that the traditional Laffer analysis, which neglects the effects of marginal tax rates on consumption, overestimates the magnitude of revenue-maximizing tax rates. The bias caused by this oversight is computed.

Fiscal limits and sovereign default risk in Japan

It is widely known that Japan has the highest debt-to-GDP ratio among OECD countries. If Japan’s national debt continues to balloon, fiscal crisis may occur in the future. This paper develops a closed economy model with defaultable government debt and conducts a simulation to investigate future sovereign debt risk.First, we estimate the fiscal limit which is defined as the sum of the discounted maximum fiscal surplus in all future periods. It is assumed that a partial default occurs when the amount of government debt exceeds the fiscal limit. We calculate the revenue-maximizing tax rate at the peak of the Laffer curve to derive the fiscal limit. As a result, the estimated average fiscal limit in Japan is much higher than that in Greece. In the Japanese economy, households are more patient and desire greater savings from greater discount factor derived from a lower real interest rate. Household saving habits support government bonds. This is the main reason why the Japanese government could have had a massive debt in addition to some room to raise the tax rate. Second, we simulate the model, using the estimated fiscal limit and non-linear computational methods. If the government debt-to-GDP ratio continues to increase for the next 20years, the default probability will be over 10% and the sovereign risk premium will be approximately 2%. Furthermore, the default probability will reach approximately 80% and the sovereign risk premium will be 10% 30years later.

Implications of productive government spending for fiscal policy

The standard assumption in macroeconomics that government spending is unproductive can have substantive implications for tax and spending policy. Productive government spending introduces a positive feedback between the tax rate, the productive capacity of the economy, and tax revenue. We allow marginal tax revenue to be optimally allocated between productive subsidies to human capital and utility-enhancing government consumption and calculate Laffer Curves for the US. Productive government spending yields higher revenue-maximizing tax rates, steeper slopes at low tax rates and higher peaks. The differences are particularly pronounced for the labor-tax Laffer curve. The use of tax revenue is an important determinant of the actual revenue that a tax rate increase generates.

How Do Corporate Tax Bases Changes When Corporate Tax Rates Change? With Implications for the Tax Rate Elasticity of Corporate Revenues

We construct a new database of extensive margin changes to multiple aspects of corporate tax bases for OECD countries between 1980 and 2004. We use our data to systematically document the tendency of countries to implement policies that both lower the corporate tax rate and broaden the corporate tax base. This correlation informs our interpretation of previous estimates of the relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues, which typically do not include comprehensive measures of the corporate tax base definition. We then re-examine the relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues. We find that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity attenuates the relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues, and increases the implied revenue-maximizing tax rate. Controlling for our new tax base measures does not substantively impact the magnitude of this relationship.

What Is the Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate?

Barack Obama has proposed raising taxes on the well-to-do, both for revenue and distributional reasons. This raises, anew, the question of what the revenue-maximizing top rate is. Conservatives continually assert that the United States is always on the wrong side of the Laffer Curve, such that a tax rate reduction will increase revenues. A review of recent literature on this subject, however, indicates that the top tax rate could rise very substantially before a further increase would lead to lower revenues. Estimates suggest that this rate is at least 63 percent and probably much higher.

Playing With Fire: Cigarettes, Taxes, and Competition from the Internet

This paper documents the rise of the Internet as a source of state tax-free cigarettes and its impact on taxed sales elasticities. Using data on cigarette tax rates, taxable cigarette sales and individual smoking rates by state from 1980 to 2005 merged with data on Internet penetration, this paper documents that there has been a substantial increase in the sensitivity of taxable cigarette sales to state tax rates that is correlated with the rise of Internet usage within states. The estimates imply that the increased sensitivity from cigarette smuggling over the Internet has lessened the revenue generating potential of cigarette tax increases significantly, although states are still far from the revenue-maximizing tax rates. (JEL D12, H25, H31, H71, L66)

Closer Economic Integration and Corporate Tax Systems

This article investigates two aspects of corporate income taxation: the determinants of corporate tax rates and the determinants of corporate tax revenues. In the context of theoretically informed empirical models, the analysis examines the influence of increasing economic integration on corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues, focusing in particular on the case of European Union member and applicant countries. The investigation utilizes a data set of 36 OECD and European countries over the period from 1979 to 2002. Findings are consistent with theoretical expectations: more integrated countries chose lower corporate tax rates, while larger countries, those with bigger governments, and those with higher individual income tax rates chose higher rates. Corporate tax revenues are found to be parabolically related to tax rates. Further, this parabolic relationship is steeper as economies are more integrated, implying a lower revenue-maximizing tax rate for such countries.

Joint-Product Export Smuggling and Export Tax Policy

The effect of smuggling on tax revenue collection and the revenue-maximizing tax rate is an unresolved issue in the smuggling literature. Clandestine and joint-product smuggling models arrive at different conclusions concerning smuggling's effect on tax revenue collection and the revenue-maximizing tax rate. Clandestine (joint-product) smuggling is consistent with the assumption that legal and illegal trade are substitutable (complementary) activities for the exporting firm. The effect of smuggling on the tax rate and tax revenue is shown to be dependent on whether smuggling and legal trade are assumed to be complementary or substitutable activities.

Estimating the laffer curve and policy implications

This paper re-examines the Laffer curve for the U.S. based on time-series data during 1959–1991. Total personal income tax revenue is specified as a quadratic function of the income tax rate. Different functional forms such as the linear, the log-log, and the semi-log forms are considered. Major findings show that the bellshaped Laffer curve is statistically significant and that the revenue-maximizing tax rate is between 32.67% and 35.21%. The increase in the maximum personal income tax rate from 31% to 36% in the Budget Reconciliation Bill recently passed by the Congress is expected to push the U.S. position on the Laffer curve toward the maximum point and may reduce income tax revenue collected from the highest income group.

A comparison of Ad valorem and per unit taxes in regulated monopolies

This paper compares the output and revenue effects in the rate-of-return regulated monopoly model. Both the ad valorem and the unit tax generally decrease the use of capital, and as such, reduce the output and raise the price. In addition, it is shown that Suits and Musgrave's conclusion of higher revenue of an ad valorem tax at a given output can apply to a regulated monopolist if the marginal product of labor under the ad valorem tax is greater than or equal to that under the unit tax. Similarly, their second conclusion, that for a given tax revenue an ad valorem tax has a larger output than a unit tax rate before the revenue-maximizing tax rate, can also apply to the regulated monopolist.

Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business

The tax haven affiliates of American corporations account for more than 20 percent of U. S. foreign direct investment, and nearly a third of the foreign profits of U. S. firms. American companies report extraordinarily high profit rates on their tax haven investments in 1982. This behavior implies that the revenue-maximizing tax rate for a typical haven is around 5–8 percent. American (and foreign) investment in tax havens has an uncertain effect on U. S. tax revenue, but since low tax rates encourage American companies to shift profits out of high-tax foreign countries, it is possible that low foreign tax rates ultimately enhance U. S. tax collections.

Specific Taxes, Product Quality, and Rate-Revenue Analysis

The effect that specific taxes have on product quality has been a question of interest to economists over the last few years. The problem arises because while goods and services are multidimensional in terms of utility generating characteristics, specific taxes are almost always levied on just one of the characteristics. The effect of quality adjustment on tax revenue has not yet been examined in any detail. Quality adjustment is no doubt a change that occurs over a longer-run time frame. Heretofore, the only attempts at adding a temporal dimension to rate-revenue analysis distinguish between the short run and long run in terms of supply and demand elasticities. In the previous analysis the tax rate at which revenue is maximized and the tax rate at which revenue reaches zero are both lower in the long run. What makes the analysis presented here interesting is that when product quality accounts for the intertemporal distinction, the revenue maximizing tax rate and the tax rate that yields zero revenue are both higher in the long run.