Against the backdrop of an increasingly sound supply chain system and thriving e-commerce, it is becoming increasingly common for retailers to introduce their own brands of products and for manufacturers to open up direct online sales channels. The existence of these two supply chain decisions is complex and involves interactions. Moreover, the introduction of online direct sales channels will bring about differences in prices and service quality between channels, resulting in a free-riding effect on the internet. However, existing related research rarely considers the role of network free-riding effect in this supply chain system. This article integrates the network free-riding effect into the supply chain model by setting the network free-riding rate. According to whether retailers introduce their own brand products and manufacturers open up online direct sales channels, four supply chain scenarios are formed, and the reverse recursion method is used to obtain the profit functions for each of these four scenarios. Then, a Stackelberg game model is established to determine the response strategies of manufacturers and retailers based on the changes in profits of manufacturers caused by retailer decisions and the changes in profits of retailers caused by manufacturer decisions. Through analysis, it was discovered that a key factor affecting decision-making within the supply chain system is the retailer’s channel advantage. When the channel advantage of retailers is strong, manufacturers will open up online direct sales channels to weaken the channel advantage of retailers. Retailers will not introduce their own brand products but are more inclined to cooperate with manufacturers. When the channel advantage of retailers is weak, retailers will attract consumers and consolidate their channel advantage by introducing high-quality, low-priced private label products, while manufacturers will maintain cooperation with retailers and adopt a strategy of not opening up online direct sales channels. We also analyzed the Nash equilibrium state under different channel advantages of retailers.
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