Restatement Announcements Research Articles

Client restatement announcement, audit office human capital investment, and audit quality improvements

This paper examines audit offices’ human capital investment in response to client restatement announcements and the resulting effects on audit quality and audit office client base. We find that audit offices attempt to acquire human capital and talent by posting more audit-related job positions just after a client announces a restatement. The increase in job postings follows restatements with more negative announcement returns and restatements of annual financial statements, and is concentrated among more senior and experienced positions. Importantly, the increased job postings are not driven by replacement hiring due to individual auditor departures and reflect more auditors joining the office. These human capital investments reduce future client misstatements and losses in client portfolios, indicating improvements in actual and perceived audit quality. Audit offices are also more likely to replace audit managing partners and prevent the signing partners of the misstated financial statements from signing new audit reports after restatement announcements.

Impact of D&O Insurance on Shareholder Wealth During Financial Restatement Announcements: An Empirical Study in Taiwan

Impact of D&O Insurance on Shareholder Wealth During Financial Restatement Announcements: An Empirical Study in Taiwan

Payoffs to Aggressiveness

ABSTRACT For a broad sample of firms, we use structural equations modeling to construct latent variables for real-action aggressiveness and reporting policy aggressiveness. We estimate the association between the latent variables and the associations of each latent variable with shareholder payoffs (returns) and CEO payoffs (annual compensation to the CEO position). Results show the two types of aggressiveness are positively correlated but have different associations with the payoffs we consider. Greater policy-choice aggressiveness is associated with higher returns and compensation; the opposite is true for greater real-action aggressiveness. We find a positive association between policy-choice aggressiveness and restatement likelihood. Compared with nonrestatement firms, abnormal returns of restatement firms with aggressive policy choices are larger in the pre-restatement period and lower in the post-restatement period. Negative returns at the restatement announcement do not, on average, eliminate long-run (multi-year) positive returns of the pre-restatement period or of the period whose results are restated. JEL Classifications: M40; M41.

Boards’ Reactions to Problems in Accounting for Income Taxes

ABSTRACTAccounting for income tax (AFIT) problems are among the most common and persistent of accounting problems. We examine boards’ reactions to AFIT accounting problems compared to reactions to problems originating from other areas of accounting. Specifically, we investigate executive turnover decisions surrounding announcements of control weaknesses and restatements in AFIT compared to turnover decisions around announcements of control weaknesses and restatements in other accounts. We find that CFO and CEO turnover is not statistically different around AFIT control weaknesses compared to other control weaknesses. We also find that CFO and CEO turnover is higher around AFIT restatements compared to other restatements. We find no similar pattern with auditor turnover or around other types of control weaknesses or restatements. Overall, our study suggests that boards hold top executives accountable for problems occurring in AFIT differently than problems occurring in other areas of accounting.

Tax-Related Restatements and Tax Avoidance Behavior

Our research empirically examines the relationship between tax avoidance and the likelihood of incurring a tax-related restatement, as well as the effects tax restatements have on future tax avoidance behavior. We predict and find that the association between tax avoidance and the likelihood of a tax-related restatement is nonlinear. Specifically, both relatively high levels and relatively low levels of tax avoidance compared to peer firms increase the likelihood of incurring a tax-related restatement. We consider whether the increased likelihood for high avoiders is attributable to obfuscation necessary to escape detection of tax avoidance or weak corporate governance. For high avoiders, we find evidence that both obfuscation and weak corporate governance may contribute to the likelihood of a tax-related restatement. As low avoiders should not need to obfuscate, we focus on corporate governance and find an increased likelihood when governance is weak. In response to a tax-related restatement announcement, we document a decline in tax avoidance for firms that have relatively high tax avoidance prior to the restatement announcement. We attribute this to the increased level of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) monitoring and strengthening of corporate governance that we observe post-restatement announcement. In contrast, we do not find evidence that low avoidance firms alter their tax avoidance after a tax-related restatement announcement, consistent with our finding that corporate governance does not improve post-restatement for low avoiders.

Voluntary Disclosure of Disaggregated Balance Sheet and Cash Flow Information around Restatements

SYNOPSIS We examine changes in voluntary disclosure of balance sheet and cash flow (BS/CF) information in earnings releases after restatement announcements. We consider these disclosures to be particularly relevant in the restatement context since they help investors interpret accruals and assess reporting quality at a time when information uncertainty is high. We find that BS/CF disclosures drop significantly for at least five quarters following restatement announcements, particularly for severe restatements and those restatements more likely to lead to litigation, and less for firms likely to benefit from reputation-repairing activities. We next consider the impact of BS/CF changes on earnings informativeness and find significantly lower post-restatement earnings response coefficients for firms ceasing BS/CF disclosure, but not otherwise. Overall, we argue that litigation concerns provide a strong disincentive for disclosure following restatement announcements. Our findings add to a growing literature on the importance of disaggregated BS/CF information in interpreting accruals.

Auditors' Responses to Classification Shifting: Evidence from U.S. Firms

SYNOPSIS This study examines how auditors react to clients' engagement in classification shifting which refers to the intentional misallocation of line items within the income statement. We find that classification shifting is positively associated with audit fees, audit report lags, the issuance of a modified audit opinion, and auditor resignations. Additional analyses show that auditors' responses to multiple-year classification shifting are similar to our main findings. We further find that classification shifting is associated with a higher likelihood of financial misstatements in the classification shifting year, and future announcements of financial restatements. We also find that the probability of future restatements is even higher when audit clients engage in both classification shifting and real earnings management. Overall, our results imply that auditors become more cautious in response to audit clients' classification shifting behavior. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M42.

Classifying Restatements: An Application of Machine Learning and Textual Analytics

ABSTRACTRestatements of audited financial statements are used for evaluating reporting quality and audit quality, and for other evaluative purposes. We constructed a machine learning algorithm to classify restatements by management intent based on the language in restatement announcements. Our machine learning classification is as reliable as other commonly used automated methods such as those based on market reaction, restatement direction, and magnitude. Our method does not require a dictionary of words and is applicable when other automated methods are not, for example, when restatements are announced contemporaneously with financial results and when net income is not restated. For large samples, the use of such a classification algorithm is less tedious and less time-consuming, and more consistent, replicable, and scalable than manual classification.Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.JEL Classifications: G38; M41; M42; M48.

An Analysis of the Sources of Value Loss Following Financial Restatements

We decompose the total value loss around firms’ announcements of financial restatements into components arising from investors’ revisions in cash flows and discount rates. First, relative to population benchmarks, restatements represent circumstances in which the cash flow component becomes more important in explaining valuations. While we find significant contributions from both sources, with the cash flow component explaining more than 33% of the variation in stock returns surrounding restatement announcements, this component explains only 13% to 22% in comparable non-restating firms. When restatements are caused by underlying financial fraud, the discount rate impact becomes more important, explaining about 88% of return variation. On the contrary, the cash flow impact is relatively larger for firms with higher earnings persistence or restatements associated with errors. Our decomposition of the value loss helps explain returns in the post-announcement period. Firms with a higher relative discount rate impact experience a significant downward stock price drift after the initial announcement-related price decline. For firms with a higher relative cash flow impact, the evidence suggests the initial impact of the restatement announcement is more complete with no subsequent drift pattern. Our findings close gaps in the evidence on financial restatements and extend the literature on the drivers of stock price movements.

Does the Disclosure of PCAOB Inspection Findings Increase Audit Firms' Litigation Exposure?

ABSTRACT We examine whether PCAOB inspection reports increase auditors' litigation risk. We find that inspection reports with audit deficiencies are positively associated with the number of lawsuits subsequently filed against the inspected auditor. These results are strongest when client-level lawsuit-triggering events have already occurred and when PCAOB inspection content is arguably more persuasive. Importantly, these results pertain exclusively to triennially inspected audit firms for which the set of other publicly available signals of audit quality is limited. Furthermore, we do not argue that inspection reports in isolation trigger lawsuits. Instead, once events such as restatement announcements or bankruptcies create the potential for legal action against the auditor, inspection reports provide a public signal about past noncompliance with auditing standards. This signal likely increases lawyers' perceived strength of case against the auditor before the lawsuit is filed and before lawyers have access to the audit workpapers.

The Effects of Accounting Expertise of Board Committees on the Short- and Long-Term Consequences of Financial Restatements

Using financial restatements as the contextual setting, we examine whether the accounting expertise of board committees affects the consequences of financial reporting quality. We analyze both short-term consequences—stock market reactions surrounding restatement announcements, and long-term consequences—the incidence of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Actions (AAERs), and CEO and CFO turnover after restatements. Our results show that the presence of audit committee members with accounting expertise moderates the consequences of restatements, resulting in less negative stock market reactions and a lower probability of CEO turnover. In contrast, the audit committee’s nonaccounting financial expertise increases the likelihood of AAERs. For the compensation committee, we find that accounting expertise reduces the probability of CEO turnover, while nonaccounting financial expertise exacerbates the negative stock returns around restatement announcements and increases the probability of AAER. In the post–Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) period, restatements have resulted in less severe consequences as companies have increased their propensity to hire accounting experts on the board. Correspondingly, we document that the moderating effects of accounting expertise become less significant, in part because the moderating effects are offset by the changed investor expectations. Overall, our results suggest that accounting expertise of board committees helps mitigate the negative consequences of restatements.

The impact of financial restatements on financial markets: a systematic review of the literature

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss the most relevant issues related to the impact of financial restatements in the dynamics of financial markets and identify several research gaps to be investigated in future research. Design/methodology/approach The methodology is based on a systematic review of the literature described by Tranfield et al. (2003). The final sample includes 47 academic papers published from 1996 to 2019. Findings Papers in this domain discuss three main topics: how the market prices the announcement of a financial restatement; how financial restatements affect the announcing firm’s cost of capital and how financial restatements affect firms’ reputation. There are several issues to explore in future research, including whether financial restatements affect the dynamics of financial markets in Europe, whether the market fully and promptly assimilates the information content of a restatement, the role of financial analysts’ information disclosures in this process or how regulators may improve the way they provide investors with timely information about firms’ restating problems. Research limitations/implications There is always some degree of subjectivity in the definition of the keywords, search strings and selection criteria in a systematic review. These are all important aspects, as they delimitate the scope of the study and define the sample of papers to be reviewed. Practical implications The answers to the research questions identified in this paper may provide regulators with information to improve financial accounting and reporting standards and strengthen investors’ confidence in accounting information and the dynamics of financial markets. Originality/value This paper systematically reviews the relevant literature exploring the connection between financial restatements and the dynamics of financial markets. It contributes to the academic community by identifying several research questions that may impact the theory and practice related to accounting quality and capital markets.

Corporate Social Responsibility and the Market Reaction to Negative Events: Evidence from Inadvertent and Fraudulent Restatement Announcements

ABSTRACT We advance a theory asserting that CSR performance may exacerbate, not necessarily moderate, a company's negative stock price response to negative events. In testing this theory, we hypothesize and find that CSR performance alleviates (magnifies) the immediate negative stock price response to inadvertent (fraudulent) restatement announcements, and that these findings are robust to specifications that consider alternative CSR measures and a multitude of control variables shown by prior research to have explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation in stock returns. Overall, using restatement announcements as a channel through which CSR performance may affect company value, we show, in contrast to prior research, that depending on management conduct leading to the restatement, a company's CSR performance may destroy, not necessarily enhance, firm value. Our findings may, thus, inform researchers, market participants, and regulators. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from sources indicated in the text.

The Effects of Accounting Expertise of Board Committees on the Short- and Long-term Consequences of Financial Restatements

Using financial restatements as the contextual setting, we examine whether the accounting expertise of board committees affects the consequences of financial reporting quality. We analyze both short-term consequences—stock market reactions surrounding restatement announcements, and long-term consequences—the incidence of SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Actions (AAERs), and CEO and CFO turnover after restatements. Our results show that the presence of audit committee members with accounting expertise moderates the consequences of restatements, resulting in less negative stock market reactions and a lower probability of CEO turnover. In contrast, the audit committee’s non-accounting financial expertise increases the likelihood of AAERs. For the compensation committee, we find that accounting expertise reduces the probability of CEO turnover, while non-accounting financial expertise exacerbates the negative stock returns around restatement announcements and increases the probability of AAER. In the post Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) period, restatements have resulted in less severe consequences while companies have increased their propensity to hire accounting experts. on the board. Correspondingly, we document that the moderating effects of accounting expertise become less significant, in part because the moderating effects are offset by the changed investor expectations. Overall, our results suggest that accounting expertise of board committees helps mitigate the negative consequences of restatements.

Corporate Social Responsibility and the Market Reaction to Negative Events: Evidence from Inadvertent and Fraudulent Restatement Announcements

We advance a theory asserting that CSR performance may exacerbate, not necessarily moderate, a company’s negative stock-price response to negative events. In testing this theory, we hypothesize and find that CSR performance alleviates (magnifies) the immediate negative market response to inadvertent (fraudulent) restatement announcements, and that these findings are robust to specifications that consider alternative CSR measures and a multitude of control variables shown by prior research to have explanatory power for the cross sectional variation in stock returns. Overall, using restatement announcements as a channel through which CSR performance may affect company value, we show, in contrast to prior research, that depending on management conduct leading to the restatement, a company’s CSR performance may destroy, not necessarily enhance, firm value. Our findings may, thus, inform researchers, market participants, and regulators.

THE VALUE OF RESTATEMENT TO FRAUD PREDICTION

A financial report restatement reflects errors in the previous financial statement, and thus it increases investors’ doubt about the credibility of the financial statement. The primary objective of this paper is to examine whether restatement announcements imply increased fraud risks in Chinese firms in the context that up to one quarter of listed companies have restated their financial reports in China, and explore the implications of the content, severity and reasons for restatements with respect to fraud. In this paper, firms with financial restatements prove to be more likely to be labeled as fraudulent by regulators in China. Second, the following results also are revealed: (1) financial statements, except balance sheet restatements, provide insights into the revelation of fraudulent behaviors, (2) the severity of restatements is positively correlated with future fraud disclosures, and (3) restatements due to negligence are positively correlated with future fraud occurrences. These results imply that restatement announcements and their different characteristics provide important information for detecting financial statement fraud.

Equal opportunity market

PurposeThis paper aims to compare US market reactions to the restatement announcements of foreign firms listed in the USA and those of US firms by applying the Capital Market Liability of Foreignness (CMLOF) concept. It further investigates the incremental effect of an improved information environment, proxied by analyst following, on mitigating the negative market reaction to a restatement for foreign vs domestic firms.Design/methodology/approachRegression tests are performed on a matched-sample, which matches foreign and domestic firms based on industry and firm size. Market reaction is defined as three-day abnormal stock returns calculated using a market model. The sources of CMLOF are defined as institutional distance, information costs, unfamiliarity costs and cultural distance.FindingsResults suggest that, on average, the magnitude of the market reaction to a restatement is 1.8 per cent lower for foreign firms than for domestic firms. Information and unfamiliarity costs contribute to the differing market reactions. In addition, it appears that the improved information environment created by a higher analyst following is more important for foreign firms who face CMLOF than for domestic firms.Originality/valueWhile prior research establishes a negative market reaction to restatement announcements, comparing the market reactions for foreign and domestic firms provides evidence regarding whether US investors treat foreign and domestic firms differently. Additionally, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that examines CMLOF using restatement announcements.

Fair value and economic consequences of financial restatements

This study finds that negative market reactions to restatement announcements are more severe when firms disclose higher ratios of Level 3 fair values. In addition, this negative association is stronger during financial crisis periods, showing that market investors prefer conservative fair values.

Non-GAAP Reporting and Investor Attention: Are Investors Misled by Exclusions of Recurring Expenses from Non-GAAP Earnings before Restatement Announcements?

Material financial restatements reveal GAAP-based misreporting and thus are a strong signal of low GAAP reporting quality. We explore these reporting shocks and investigate whether heightened investor scrutiny of GAAP reporting quality after material restatements has a spillover effect on investors’ perceptions of aggressive non-GAAP reporting choices. We find that investors reward aggressive non-GAAP reporting choices before material restatements (i.e., ERC premium) but penalize the same reporting choices after material restatements (i.e., ERC discount). Furthermore, we document that short- and long-term market reactions to material restatements are more negative for firms that aggressively reported non-GAAP earnings before the announcement of material restatements. We provide evidence that heightened investor scrutiny of GAAP reporting quality affects investors’ perceptions of aggressive non-GAAP reporting choices. Finally, our findings are consistent with the idea that aggressive non-GAAP reporting choices misled investors before material restatement announcements.

Risk dynamics around restatement announcements

We investigate the dynamic nature and temporal daily changes in systematic (beta), as well as idiosyncratic and total risk around restatement announcements. We find that beta increases by 51% at restatement announcement but it reverts to the pre-restatement level within one month. However, idiosyncratic risk experiences a longer-term increase of approximately 20% following a restatement. Cross-sectional analysis shows that the results are more pronounced for restatements associated with irregularity. Overall, our findings suggest that risk components are time-varying with the systematic component rapidly mean-reverting but the idiosyncratic component experiencing a longer-term increase.