Responsibility Gap Research Articles

Reactive Attitudes and AI-Agents – Making Sense of Responsibility and Control Gaps

Responsibility gaps occur when autonomous machines cause harms for which nobody can be justifiably held morally responsible. The debate around responsibility gaps has focused primarily on the question of responsibility, but other approaches focus on the victims of the associated harms. In this paper I consider how the victims of ‘AI-harm’—by which I mean harms implicated in responsibility gap cases and caused by AI-agents—can make sense of what has happened to them. The reactive attitudes have an important role here. I argue that regulating our reactive attitudes—withdrawing or sustaining them as our understanding of the actions, motives, status, and character of others develops—is an important part of the way in which we make sense of the harms we suffer. But, I argue, AI-agents can disrupt standard practices of regulating the reactive attitudes. This can lead victims of AI-harm to suffer a secondary hermeneutic harm (in addition to the primary AI-harm). This harm, which the responsibility gap and AI ethics literatures have neglected, can occur whether responsibility gaps are real or not.

Air Canada’s chatbot illustrates persistent agency and responsibility gap problems for AI

Air Canada’s chatbot illustrates persistent agency and responsibility gap problems for AI

Responsibility Gaps and Retributive Dispositions: Evidence from the US, Japan and Germany

Danaher (2016) has argued that increasing robotization can lead to retribution gaps: Situations in which the normative fact that nobody can be justly held responsible for a harmful outcome stands in conflict with our retributivist moral dispositions. In this paper, we report a cross-cultural empirical study based on Sparrow’s (2007) famous example of an autonomous weapon system committing a war crime, which was conducted with participants from the US, Japan and Germany. We find that (1) people manifest a considerable willingness to hold autonomous systems morally responsible, (2) partially exculpate human agents when interacting with such systems, and that more generally (3) the possibility of normative responsibility gaps is indeed at odds with people’s pronounced retributivist inclinations. We discuss what these results mean for potential implications of the retribution gap and other positions in the responsibility gap literature.

Assigning Moral Responsibility for AI-Derived Errors in Healthcare: Shared Responsibilization Without Responsibility Gaps

Assigning Moral Responsibility for AI-Derived Errors in Healthcare: Shared Responsibilization Without Responsibility Gaps

When to Fill Responsibility Gaps: A Proposal

When to Fill Responsibility Gaps: A Proposal

The future of medicine or a threat? Artificial intelligence representation in Chicago Med

The eighth season of the American medical drama series Chicago Med (2015–) represented the application of artificial intelligence (AI) in a hospital environment with multiple storylines. Born in the 1950s, medical dramas are among the most popular forms of serial television. Traditionally, the genre aims for a certain amount of accuracy and has educational goals. Former studies investigated the entertainment education and cultivation effects of these series, concluding that these dramas have the potential to contribute information and shape viewers’ opinions on various health-related topics. Chicago Med is a long-running broadcast production with a worldwide audience and considerable viewership. This paper analyzes the series’ representation of medical AI and discusses how this portrayal potentially shapes the audience’s opinion. The research started by identifying artificial intelligence-related storylines in the 22 episodes of the season. The analysis focused on the reasons and outcomes of AI applications, the character’s attitudes, and the ethical issues, including transparency, selective adherence, automation bias, responsibility gap, hallucination, unequal access, and political dimensions. The storyline analysis concluded that Chicago Med provided thought-provoking positive and negative scenarios about applying different types of AI in the surgical and emergency departments. The complex portrayal included groundbreaking opportunities, challenges, dangers, and ethical considerations. The main characters’ attitudes varied, from strong support or opposition to more nuanced, shifting opinions. The educative and engaging content has a potential for knowledge transfer and encourages critical thinking about medical AI.

Artificial agents: responsibility & control gaps

ABSTRACT Artificial agents create significant moral opportunities and challenges. Over the last two decades, discourse has largely focused on the concept of a ‘responsibility gap.’ We argue that this concept is incoherent, misguided, and diverts attention from the core issue of ‘control gaps.’ Control gaps arise when there is a discrepancy between the causal control an agent exercises and the moral control it should possess or emulate. Such gaps present moral risks, often leading to harm or ethical violations. We propose a second-order ‘duty of moral control’ that mandates closing these gaps to reduce risks within acceptable moral limits. Our analysis encompasses both autonomous machines and collective agents, acknowledging their similarities and key differences in constitution and moral status. We suggest four methods to close control gaps: ensuring artificial agents attain moral agency, providing meaningful human control, implementing safety engineering, and employing social control. These methods aim to responsibly integrate artificial agents into society. We conclude that a realistic approach, which addresses the practical problems posed by control gaps, is essential. This approach provides solutions to manage the risks posed by artificial agents while maintaining acceptable moral standards, ensuring we responsibly harness their potential and address the ethical challenges they present.

Responsibility Gaps

AbstractResponsibility gaps arise when there is a mismatch between the amount of responsibility that can be attributed to any person or collection of persons on leading accounts of moral responsibility and the amount that robust intuitions suggest should be allocated to someone in a case. Claimed responsibility gaps arise in numerous philosophical debates, including those concerning government, corporate, and other forms of group agency and new technologies and those concerning theoretical issues in the philosophy of responsibility. This work is an opinionated introduction to and overview of recent work on responsibility gaps. It outlines and evaluates paradigmatic responsibility gap cases and ways of understanding the phenomenon as well as the existence conditions and moral status of and possible responses to responsibility gaps. It thereby contributes to ongoing work in the philosophy of responsibility and several applied domains.

A Study of Administrative Regulations on Real Estate Project Finance and Recent PF Market Issues

Real estate project financing is the process by which real estate developers secure funding. This study categorizes the types of real estate finance and analyzes investment types based on the degree of financial companies’ participation. Financial companies invest in real estate development projects either through direct financing, using PF loans, or through indirect financing via mechanisms such as collective investment schemes. However, if a financial company is not merely a financial investor but also acts directly as a developing entity, appropriate regulation is required. From an investor protection perspective, the Financial Act aims to alleviate information asymmetry and enhance the financial soundness of financial companies. An important issue is the regulation of financial companies directly implementing real estate development projects. In particular, if a real estate development project fails, the implementer bears primary responsibility. Therefore, granting enforcement authority to a financial company that controls the funding mechanism may pose a risk to financial companies. Real estate financing suggests that administrative regulations should be organized in a way that facilitates collaboration among multiple administrative agencies. The regulatory frameworks of both the Construction Act and the Financial Act should govern financial companies’ participation in real estate development projects, necessitating close cooperation among different administrative agencies. In the complex and specialized administrative legislative process, overlapping responsibilities among multiple administrative agencies, such as those under the Real Estate Investment Company Act, may occur; conversely, gaps in responsibilities may also arise. With this in mind, it is necessary to acknowledge the role of financial companies beyond their fundraising function in real estate finance and to investigate the complex and diverse legal relationships that may arise as a result. In particular, given the current situation—marked by the downturn in the real estate PF market that began last year, the subsequent workout of Taeyoung Construction, and concerns about the deterioration of savings banks’ soundness—, it is crucial to explore an effective regulatory system for real estate development finance by integrating the Construction Act and the Financial Act.

Responsibility Gaps and Technology: Old Wine in New Bottles?

Responsibility Gaps and Technology: Old Wine in New Bottles?

Decolonizing Sustainability through Co-responsibility

ABSTRACT: In this study, we focus on a key concept of sustainability: co-responsibility. To date, the traditional discussion of responsibility in sustainable development has failed to address the world's inequality, particularly the inequality in the Global South resulting from colonization. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates a considerable gap between the Global South and the Global North, both before the start of vaccination and the continuing gap resulting from vaccine distribution. We argue that the responsibility gap exists because of the lack of co-responsibility. Co-responsibility is not shared responsibility in which every individual, institution, or government takes part on the basis of a written document, such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but rather is an infinite responsibility divided between several institutions or people and not bound by location. This article contributes to the discussion of sustainability's transformation from colonized to decolonized and highlights the co-responsibility approach to the idea of the development in the sustainable development discussion.

Responsibility Gap(s) Due to the Introduction of AI in Healthcare: An Ubuntu-Inspired Approach

Due to its enormous potential, artificial intelligence (AI) can transform healthcare on a seemingly infinite scale. However, as we continue to explore the immense potential of AI, it is vital to consider the ethical concerns associated with its development and deployment. One specific concern that has been flagged in the literature is the responsibility gap (RG) due to the introduction of AI in healthcare. When the use of an AI algorithm or system results in a negative outcome for a patient(s), to whom can or should responsibility for that outcome be assigned? Although the concept of the RG was introduced in Anglo-American and European philosophy, this paper aims to broaden the debate by providing an Ubuntu-inspired perspective on the RG. Ubuntu, deeply rooted in African philosophy, calls for collective responsibility, and offers a uniquely forward-looking approach to address the alleged RG caused by AI in healthcare. An Ubuntu-inspired perspective can serve as a valuable guide and tool when addressing the alleged RG. Incorporating Ubuntu into the AI ethics discourse can contribute to a more ethical and responsible integration of AI in healthcare.

Command responsibility in military AI contexts: balancing theory and practicality

AbstractArtificial intelligence (AI) has found extensive applications to varying degrees across diverse domains, including the possibility of using it within military contexts for making decisions that can have moral consequences. A recurring challenge in this area concerns the allocation of moral responsibility in the case of negative AI-induced outcomes. Some scholars posit the existence of an insurmountable “responsibility gap”, wherein neither the AI system nor the human agents involved can or should be held responsible. Conversely, other scholars dispute the presence of such gaps or propose potential solutions. One solution that frequently emerges in the literature on AI ethics is the concept of command responsibility, wherein human agents may be held responsible because they perform a supervisory role over the (subordinate) AI. In the article we examine the compatibility of command responsibility in light of recent empirical studies and psychological evidence, aiming to anchor discussions in empirical realities rather than relying exclusively on normative arguments. Our argument can be succinctly summarized as follows: (1) while the theoretical foundation of command responsibility appears robust (2) its practical implementation raises significant concerns, (3) yet these concerns alone should not entirely preclude its application (4) they underscore the importance of considering and integrating empirical evidence into ethical discussions.

Prospects for the Convergence of the Legislation of the EAEU Countries Regarding the Legal Regulation of Artificial Intelligence

This study is devoted to the analysis of the prospects for the convergence of the legislation of the EAEU countries regarding the legal regulation of artificial intelligence (AI).Aim. To identify the need and identify the prerequisites for supranational legal regulation of AI in the EAEU. Tasks. To list the features of AI that necessitate supranational legal regulation in the context of analyzing the consequences for the purposes of the EAEU. To make a classification and analyze the prerequisites for the formation of the will of the EAEU member states to bring together the legislation of the EAEU countries in terms of legal regulation of AI.Methods. The problem-theoretical, formal-legal, logical, system-structural method and the method of comparison are used.Results. The study showed that such features of AI technologies as the ability to cause cross-border harm and the ability to autonomous processes require: a) the establishment of legal limits for delegating human authority to a machine that are uniform for the EAEU states, which is achieved by establishing administrative responsibilities for participants in the life cycle of AI systems and applications; b) developing a unified approach to eliminating the “responsibility gap” for the harm caused by AI and its legal consolidation in the law of the EAEU, which is achieved through supranational regulation of AI on these issues. The lack of “uniform norms” regarding the distribution of responsibility for harm produces legal conflicts that contribute to the creation of obstacles to the functioning of internal markets and asymmetries in the development of AI within the EAEU. The results of the analysis of the prerequisites for the formation of the will of the EAEU member states to bring together the legislation of the EAEU countries in terms of legal regulation of AI allow us to state the absence of prerequisites for a unified policy of the EAEU countries in the creation and use of AI, and consequently, the prospects for the convergence of legislation in the field of public relations through the formation of supranational legal regulation. However, the EAEU law does not contain obstacles to the implementation of a unified AI policy in the future.Conclusions. The specifics of AI technologies require supranational legal regulation of AI, at least in matters of allocation of responsibility for harm caused by AI in order to avoid legal conflicts that contribute to the creation of obstacles to the functioning of internal markets and asymmetries in the development of AI within the EAEU. Despite the current lack of prerequisites, the EAEU law does not contain obstacles to the convergence of the legislation of the EAEU countries in terms of legal regulation of AI in the event of such a decision.

Responsibility before freedom: closing the responsibility gaps for autonomous machines

AbstractThe introduction of autonomous machines (AMs) in human domains has raised challenging questions about the attribution of responsibility; referred to as the responsibility gap. In this paper, we address the gap by arguing that entities should not be granted the freedom of action unless they can also recognise the same right for others—and be subject to blame or punishment in cases of undermining the rights of others. Since AMs fail to meet this criterion, we argue that the users who utilize an AM to pursue their goals can instead grant the machine their (the user’s) right to act autonomously on their behalf. In this way, an AM’s right to act freely hinges on the user’s duty to recognise others’ right to be free. Since responsibility should be attributed before an entity is given the freedom to act, the responsibility gap only arises when we ignore the fact that AMs have no right of acting freely on their own. We also discuss some attractive features of the approach, address some potential objections, and compare our theory to existing proposals. We conclude by arguing that holding users responsible for the behaviour of AMs promotes a responsible use of AI while it indirectly motivates companies to make safer machines.

Find the Gap: AI, Responsible Agency and Vulnerability

The responsibility gap, commonly described as a core challenge for the effective governance of, and trust in, AI and autonomous systems (AI/AS), is traditionally associated with a failure of the epistemic and/or the control condition of moral responsibility: the ability to know what we are doing and exercise competent control over this doing. Yet these two conditions are a red herring when it comes to understanding the responsibility challenges presented by AI/AS, since evidence from the cognitive sciences shows that individual humans face very similar responsibility challenges with regard to these two conditions. While the problems of epistemic opacity and attenuated behaviour control are not unique to AI/AS technologies (though they can be exacerbated by them), we show that we can learn important lessons for AI/AS development and governance from how philosophers have recently revised the traditional concept of moral responsibility in response to these challenges to responsible human agency from the cognitive sciences. The resulting instrumentalist views of responsibility, which emphasize the forward-looking and flexible role of agency cultivation, hold considerable promise for integrating AI/AS into a healthy moral ecology. We note that there nevertheless is a gap in AI/AS responsibility that has yet to be extensively studied and addressed, one grounded in a relational asymmetry of vulnerability between human agents and sociotechnical systems like AI/AS. In the conclusion of this paper we note that attention to this vulnerability gap must inform and enable future attempts to construct trustworthy AI/AS systems and preserve the conditions for responsible human agency.

Does financial distress suppress CSR gap? The moderating effect of state ownership and market competition

AbstractCompanies will prioritize external corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices over internal ones, a phenomenon known as the corporate social responsibility gap (CSR gap). Previous studies have mostly focused on its consequences, little is known about its antecedents. We argue that such practice is illegitimate because it goes against stakeholder expectation that primary stakeholders' interests should be prioritized, but it also has potential to gain differentiation benefit for intense investment on external CSR. Drawing on compensatory orchestration logic and the three types of firm legitimacy, we argue that firms that have gained high pragmatic legitimacy are more likely to engage in morally illegitimate but differentiation gaining activities such as CSR gap. Using financial distress to indicate low pragmatic legitimacy, we predict that distressed firms are inclined to practice low CSR gap. Considering the competing logics in China, we further argue that this negative relationship will be less pronounced if firms are state‐owned or operating in a competitive industry. Using Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2019 as an empirical sample, the results provide support for our arguments.

'Hard AI Crime': The Deterrence Turn.

Machines powered by artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly taking over tasks previously performed by humans alone. In accomplishing such tasks, they may intentionally commit 'AI crimes', ie engage in behaviour which would be considered a crime if it were accomplished by humans. For instance, an advanced AI trading agent may-despite its designer's best efforts-autonomously manipulate markets while lacking the properties for being held criminally responsible. In such cases (hard AI crimes) a criminal responsibility gap emerges since no agent (human or artificial) can be legitimately punished for this outcome. We aim to shift the 'hard AI crime' discussion from blame to deterrence and design an 'AI deterrence paradigm', separate from criminal law and inspired by the economic theory of crime. The homo economicus has come to life as a machina economica, which, even if cannot be meaningfully blamed, can nevertheless be effectively deterred since it internalises criminal sanctions as costs.

The impact of intelligent decision-support systems on humans' ethical decision-making: A systematic literature review and an integrated framework

With the rise and public accessibility of AI-enabled decision-support systems, individuals outsource increasingly more of their decisions, even those that carry ethical dimensions. Considering this trend, scholars have highlighted that uncritical deference to these systems would be problematic and consequently called for investigations of the impact of pertinent technology on humans' ethical decision-making. To this end, this article conducts a systematic review of existing scholarship and derives an integrated framework that demonstrates how intelligent decision-support systems (IDSSs) shape humans' ethical decision-making. In particular, we identify resulting consequences on an individual level (i.e., deliberation enhancement, motivation enhancement, autonomy enhancement and action enhancement) and on a societal level (i.e., moral deskilling, restricted moral progress and moral responsibility gaps). We carve out two distinct methods/operation types (i.e., process-oriented and outcome-oriented navigation) that decision-support systems can deploy and postulate that these determine to what extent the previously stated consequences materialize. Overall, this study holds important theoretical and practical implications by establishing clarity in the conceptions, underlying mechanisms and (directions of) influences that can be expected when using particular IDSSs for ethical decisions.

Gamification, Side Effects, and Praise and Blame for Outcomes

“Gamification” refers to adding game-like elements to non-game activities so as to encourage participation. Gamification is used in various contexts: apps on phones motivating people to exercise, employers trying to encourage their employees to work harder, social media companies trying to stimulate user engagement, and so on and so forth. Here, I focus on gamification with this property: the game-designer (a company or other organization) creates a “game” in order to encourage the players (the users) to bring about certain outcomes as a side effect of playing the game. The side effect might be good for the user (e.g., improving her health) and/or good for the company or organization behind the game (e.g., advertising their products, increasing their profits, etc.). The “players” of the game may or may not be aware of creating these side effects; and they may or may not approve of/endorse the creation of those side effects. The organizations behind the games, in contrast, are typically directly aiming to create games that have the side effects in question. These aspects of gamification are puzzling and interesting from the point of view of philosophical analyses of agency and responsibility for outcomes. In this paper, I relate these just-mentioned aspects of gamification to some philosophical discussions of responsibility gaps, the ethics of side effects (including the Knobe effect and the doctrine of double effect), and ideas about the relations among different parties’ agency.