In Africa, access to natural resources such as land, water, forest, and wildlife reserve areas is a key factor for socio-economic development. The scarcity and degradation of these resources in rural environments threaten human security, leading to conflicts. Conflicts between agropastoralists and farmers are increasing in Tanzania. This research deployed the Social Conflict Theory that embeds structural and process elements to address the question of why and how the conflict between farmers and agropastoralists has escalated into deadly violence in the Morogoro region, Tanzania. Qualitative and ethnographic research methods were used. Results demonstrate that the way farmers lose their land by illegal means (e.g., bribes, force and coercion, and deception and stealth) is a critical factor that contributes more to land resource conflicts. We argue that land resource-related conflicts in Tanzania cannot be explained solely by a single driver (e.g., limited land resources), but by a combination of drivers including the illegal mechanisms used to control access to land resources. Conflicts between farmers and agropastoralists in the Morogoro region escalated to violence following the general patterns and transformation dynamics (i.e., process variables) described in Social Conflict Theory. These process variables involve tactics shifting from light to heavy, goals shifting from specific to general, and involvement shifting from few to many. The analysis of conflicts by focusing on process variables (conflict dynamics) enabled the identification of new factors (culture and age of participant in the conflict) that helped explain why some conflicts between farmers and agropastoralists escalate to deadly violence. The study recommends the formation of a loose coalition (e.g., Elders’ Tribunal) which includes equal representation of members from the farmer and agropastoralist communities which may help solve the current conundrum caused by top-down administrative procedures and practices, which often leads to outcomes that are ineffective and unsatisfactory to all parties