Reputation Acquisition Research Articles

Regulatory agency reputation acquisition: A Q Methodology analysis of the views of agency employees

AbstractThis article reports findings of a Q Methodology study in which we explored the opinions of employees from eight Dutch regulatory agencies on how agencies gain their reputation. This is the largest study to date examining employee's views on the relative importance of different factors in reputation acquisition by public organizations, and the first analyzing employees in regulatory agencies. Results reveal five distinct “profiles” of opinion among employees about the factors most important in reputation acquisition. Regression analysis, further, supports that different regulatory agencies are dominated by employees with different opinions on how reputation is formed. These findings contribute to the growing empirical literature on how regulatory agencies, and their various employees, understand and approach reputation management.

Prediction of Sports Performance Combined with Deep Learning Model and Analysis of Influencing Factors

Physical education class helps students develop whole-body and fine motor skills and improve their strength, balance, and cardiovascular health. Sports also provide students with numerous social, psychological, and emotional benefits, which in turn improve their learning status and academic achievements. Nowadays, sports achievements are becoming more and more important, and many schools pay more and more attention to the development of sports. In order to improve sports achievements and predict sports achievements, we can combine them with relevant deep learning models to analyze sports achievements from multiple angles and factors, so as to improve sports achievements and predict sports achievements according to relevant influencing factors. Combined with the experimental part in this paper, the gradient compression algorithms under the deep learning model are compared. According to the data, the compression ratio of the AdaComp algorithm model is 1%, the training time is 5839 s, the average accuracy rate is about 90.9%, and the average loss value is 0.324. The compression ratio of the ProbComm-LPAC algorithm model is 1%, the training time is 5505 s, the average accuracy rate is about 91.8%, and the average loss value is 0.271. The compression ratio of the LAQ algorithm model is approximately 1%, the training time is 5467 s, the average accuracy rate is about 90.8%, and the average loss value is 0.554. When the number of training rounds increases from 20 to 5000, the accuracy of the three algorithm models is on the rise, but the accuracy of ProbComp-LPAC model is higher among the three models. When the number of training rounds increases, the data set loss rate of the three models is declining, indicating that the more the training times, the higher the correct rate, the smaller the loss value, and the higher the efficiency. Through four dimensions related to the influence of sports achievements-interest in seeking knowledge, ability pursuit, altruistic orientation, and reputation acquisition, this paper studies the influencing factors of sports achievements. According to the research data, most people think that the interest in seeking knowledge accounts for a large proportion of the factors affecting sports performance, with an average of 38.6709, accounting for 32% in the four dimensions. Through the study of students' gender and origin, this paper explores the analysis of the four dimensions of sports performance. It is believed that interest in knowledge is the most important factor. The average values of the four dimensions are 48.98, 52.37, 48.12, and 51.34, respectively. In order to accurately predict sports achievements, the characteristics of sports achievements prediction are sorted, among which the maximum number of action exercises is 0.24, the average score of sports action tests is 0.16, the video viewing time is 0.13, the sign-in rate is 0.09, and the minimum homework completion rate is 0.03. Predicting sports achievements through these characteristics can improve the accuracy of prediction. When the number of features in sports performance prediction gradually increases, the accuracy of sports performance prediction is also increasing. When the number of features is 8 and 9, the prediction accuracy is about 0.64.

Capital formation and financial intermediation: The role of entrepreneur reputation formation

Recently a new type of institution has emerged, crowd funders. These entities: 1) channel capital to create intellectual property; 2) gather information on project and entrepreneur quality; and 3) gauge demand information directly from individuals to improve the efficiency of capital allocation. Data from crowd funder Kickstarter allows new insights on capital formation and the role of entrepreneurial reputation formation in the venture funding process. This funding method includes all cases where entrepreneurs try yet fail to raise funds, a feature heretofore unavailable to researchers. We find that both positive and negative reputation acquisition significantly change measures of capital raising success.

Crowd Sourcing in Capital Formation: An Empirical Investigation

Recently a new type of institution has emerged, crowd funders. These entities: 1) channel capital to create intellectual property; 2) gather information on project and entrepreneur quality; and 3) gauge demand information directly from individuals to improve the efficiency of capital allocation. Data from crowd funder Kickstarter allows new insights on capital formation and the role of entrepreneurial reputation formation in the venture funding process. This funding method includes all cases where entrepreneurs try yet fail to raise funds, a feature heretofore unavailable to researchers. We find that both positive and negative reputation acquisition significantly change measures of capital raising success.

Reputation acquisition in imperfect financial markets

This paper incorporates financial market imperfections into the Diamond (1989) model where reputation concerns limit managers’ excessive risk-taking. We show that the reputational discipline collapses because of an increase in pledgeability and a decline in interest rates over time.

Reputation Acquisition of Underwriter Analysts — Theory and Evidence

I examine the role of reputation in a multi-stage strategic information transmission game between an analyst and an investor. While reputation mitigates the conflict of interest in a repeated game, it may induce the biased analyst to elevate potential underperformers to the highest rating category, thus undermining the information quality of the highest message. Uncertainty about firm value helps the unbiased analyst to communicate better information in a single stage game. However, in a multi-stage game, uncertainty increases misrepresentation by the biased analyst. Empirical implications are tested. I document that 1) affiliated and unaffiliated analysts recommendations differ only in the “Strong Buy” category; 2) the underperformance of underwriter analysts' recommendations increases with the underlying uncertainty.

Issue Frequency and Corporate Bond Yields

This paper finds that frequent bond issuers get significantly better pricing than infrequent issuers, with yield spread discounts of up to 117 basispoints. We document firms' bond issue frequencies for windows from one week to six years before the current issue and relate them to yield spreads. For very large firms, issue frequency in windows up to one year matters most, which is consistent with benefits through increasing market literacy. Reputation acquisition seems more relevant for regular firms, as it is beneficial for them to be a recent issuer. The results suggest there is a firm-specific optimal issue frequency.

A Theory of Reputation Acquisition of Stock Analysts

I study the role of reputation in a multi-stage strategic information transmission game between an analyst and an investor. Absent reputation concerns, a biased analyst does not communicate any information in equilibrium. The unbiased analyst can credibly reveal all but sufficiently good information. In the multi-stage game, (i) when a biased analyst misrepresents her information, she will elevate a set of the worst stocks to the strongest recommendation; (ii) both types of analysts will misrepresent less frequently when they have a higher reputation; and (iii) misrepresentation happens more frequently when there is more market uncertainty.

Underpricing and Reputation Acquisition in the Corporate Bond Market

This paper examines the role of reputation in the corporate bond market as a substitute for underpricing. We find that underpricing occurs with seasoned debt issuers as well as debt IPOs and it is highest among riskier, unknown firms. In addition, firms with no prior banking elationship have more underpricing, while firms that have been in the bond market for many years have less. These results suggest that reputation acquisition is an important feature of corporate debt markets. For firms that are not well known in the bond market, our results indicate that underpricing arises as part of the bookbuilding process, when investment banks gather information about the bond offering.

Predation and reputation acquisition in debt markets

This paper presents a model of predation based on reputational differences between the entrant and an incumbent. While the incumbent has an established reputation in the debt market, the entrants’s quality is not yet known in the debt market. We show that the incumbent may have incentives to prey in order to interfere with the “reputation acquisition” of the entrant.

A Model of Reputation Acquisition in Real Estate Brokerage

This paper investigates the role of reputation in the context of the real estate brokerage market. We develop a dynamic partial-equilibrium model of the brokerage firm in which we are able to characterize how the reputation and market value of a brokerage firm evolve over time. Our model highlights the incentives for acquiring reputation and shows how reputation affects the market value of the brokerage firm. We use this model to study the dynamic response of a brokerage firm to changes in commission rates, external costs, interest rates, and the persistence of reputation.

The Rationality of Honesty in Debt Markets

The Rationality of Honesty in Debt Markets

Investment Bank Reputation, Information Production, and Financial Intermediation

ABSTRACTWe model reputation acquisition by investment banks in the equity market. Entrepreneurs sell shares in an asymmetrically informed equity market, either directly, or using an investment bank. Investment banks, who interact repeatedly with the equity market, evaluate entrepreneurs' projects and report to investors, in return for a fee. Setting strict evaluation standards (unobservable to investors) is costly for investment banks, inducing moral hazard. Investment banks' credibility therefore depends on their equity‐marketing history. Investment banks' evaluation standards, their reputations, underwriter compensation, the market value of equity sold, and entrepreneurs' choice between underwritten and nonunderwritten equity issues emerge endogenously.

Investment Bank Reputation, Information Production, and Financial Intermediation

We model reputation acquisition by investment banks in the equity market. Entrepreneurs sell shares in an asymmetrically informed equity market, either directly, or using an investment bank. Investment banks, who interact repeatedly with the equity market, evaluate entrepreneurs' projects and report to investors, in return for a fee. Setting strict evaluation standards (unobservable to investors) is costly for investment banks, inducing moral hazard. Investment banks' credibility therefore depends on their equity-marketing history. Investment banks' evaluation standards, their reputations, underwriter compensation, the market value of equity sold, and entrepreneurs' choice between underwritten and nonunderwritten equity issues emerge endogenously.

Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets

This paper studies reputation formation and the evolution over time of the incentive effects of reputation to mitigate conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. Borrowers use the proceeds of their loans to fund projects. In the absence of reputation effects, borrowers have incentives to select excessively risky projects. If there is sufficient adverse selection, reputation will not initially provide improved incentives to borrowers with short credit histories. Over time, if a good reputation is acquired, reputation will provide improved incentives. General characteristics of markets in which reputation takes time to work are identified.