Representation Of Mental States Research Articles

Does matter mind content?

AbstractLet ‘semantic relevance’ be the thesis that the wide semantic properties of representational mental states (like beliefs and desires) are causally relevant to behavior. A popular way of arguing for semantic relevance runs as follows: start with a sufficient counterfactual condition for causal or explanatory relevance, and show that wide semantic properties meet it with respect to behavior (e.g., Loewer & Lepore (1987,1989), Rescorla (2014), Yablo (2003)).This paper discusses an in‐principle limitation of this strategy: even the most sophisticated counterfactual criteria systematically misclassify irrelevant properties as relevant when they stand in certain kinds of modal co‐variation or ‘entanglement’ relations to genuinely relevant properties. This entanglement problem, I argue, is more general and more serious than proponents of the counterfactual strategy have recognized: it threatens recent interventionist arguments for semantic relevance, and is not easily solved by appeal to proportionality or naturalness. I end by suggesting that proponents of semantic relevance may need to shift their attention from patterns of counterfactuals to the lawful psychological generalizations that explain them.

Patterns of executive functions and theory of mind in adults with a family history of alcohol use disorder: Combined group and single-case analyses.

Impairments in executive function and social cognition are highly prevalent in individuals with an alcohol use disorder (AUD). Some studies show that similar difficulties are displayed by individuals with a positive family history of AUD (FH+) compared with individuals with a negative family history (FH-). Yet, no studies have jointly investigated cognitive and affective theory of mind at the behavioral level. Moreover, some studies show preserved executive and socioemotional functioning in FH+ participants. One possible explanation for these divergent results is that FH+ individuals are cognitively heterogeneous. In this study, we examined the frequency and co-occurrence of difficulties in executive function and social cognition among FH+ individuals at the individual level. Sixty FH+ and 60 FH- participants matched on age, sex, and education level were included. They completed tasks assessing executive functions (Stroop, Trail Making Test) and affective and cognitive theory of mind (Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition). They also completed self-report questionnaires measuring impulsivity, alexithymia, and empathy. Single-case analyses assessed the proportion of FH+ participants with difficulties in executive function and/or theory of mind. FH+ individuals exhibited difficulties in response inhibition and made more errors during theory of mind processing, indicating an absence of mental state representation, compared with FH- individuals. In the FH+ sample, 53.33% had executive function and/or theory of mind difficulties. Those with lower theory of mind scores reported higher alexithymia and lower empathy on self-report measures. FH+ individuals display heterogeneous executive function and theory of mind abilities. Given that they mostly occur independently of one another, executive function and theory of mind difficulties may be distinct vulnerability markers in AUD.

Neural representations of situations and mental states are composed of sums of representations of the actions they afford

Human behavior depends on both internal and external factors. Internally, people’s mental states motivate and govern their behavior. Externally, one’s situation constrains which actions are appropriate or possible. To predict others’ behavior, one must understand the influences of mental states and situations on actions. On this basis, we hypothesize that people represent situations and states in terms of associated actions. To test this, we use functional neuroimaging to estimate neural activity patterns associated with situations, mental states, and actions. We compute sums of the action patterns, weighted by how often each action occurs in each situation and state. We find that these summed action patterns reconstructed the corresponding situation and state patterns. These results suggest that neural representations of situations and mental states are composed of sums of their action affordances. Summed action representations thus offer a biological mechanism by which people can predict actions given internal and external factors.

Do you believe in Deep Down? On two conceptions of valuing

In this paper, we explicate an underappreciated distinction between two conceptions of valuing. According to the first conception, which we call the surface-account, valuing something is exclusively a matter of having certain behavioral, cognitive, and emotional dispositions. In contrast, the second conception, which we call the layer-account, posits that valuing is constituted by the presence of certain representational mental states underlying those dispositions. In the first part of the paper, we introduce the distinction in proper detail and show that the accounts have different implications regarding the valuings of agents. In the second part, we situate the accounts within the extant philosophical literature. First, we relate them to the recent debate between so-called dispositionalists and representationalists about the nature of beliefs and point out that this debate can help anticipate some of the main dialectical fault lines to be expected between surface- and layer-theorists. Second, we examine the contemporary meta-ethical debate on conceptualizing valuing, indicate that scholars have largely ignored the distinction introduced here, and outline that this oversight has substantial theoretical costs: as we show, key arguments within the meta-ethical debate require thorough re-evaluation in light of the proposed distinction. The third part of the paper illustrates the theoretical leverage of the distinction for practical research by exploring its implications for behavioral welfare economics.

Thinking about Past Minds: Cognitive Science as Philosophy of Historiography

Abstract This paper outlines the case for a future research program that uses the tools of experimental cognitive science to investigate questions that traditionally fall under the remit of the philosophy of historiography. The central idea is this – the epistemic profile of historians’ representations of the past is largely an empirical matter, determined in no small part by the cognitive processes that produce these representations. However, as the philosophy of historiography is not presently equipped to investigate such cognitive questions, legitimate concerns about evidential quality go largely overlooked. The case of mental state representation provides an excellent illustration of this. Representations of past mental states – the thoughts and fears and knowledge and desires of past agents – play much the same evidential role in historiography as in everyday life, serving in the causal explanation of agents’ behaviors and supporting normative evaluation of those behaviors. However, we have good reason to suspect that the theory of mind processes that support these representations may be more susceptible to error when deployed in the context of historiography than under everyday conditions. This raises worries about the quality of evidence that theory of mind can provide historiography, worries which require experimental cognitive science to properly address.

Digital twins and the future of precision mental health.

Science faces challenges in developing much-needed precision mental health treatments to accurately identify and diagnose mental health problems and the optimal treatment for each individual. Digital twins (DTs) promise to revolutionize the field of mental health, as they are doing in other fields of science, including oncology and cardiology, where they have been successfully deployed. The use of DTs in mental health is yet to be explored. In this Perspective, we lay the conceptual foundations for mental health DTs (MHDT). An MHDT is a virtual representation of an individual's mental states and processes. It is continually updated from data collected over the lifespan of the individual, and guides mental health professionals in diagnosing and treating patients based on mechanistic models and statistical and machine learning tools. The merits of MHDT are demonstrated through the example of the working alliance between the therapist and the patient, which is one of the most consistent mechanisms predicting treatment outcome.

The Euthyphro challenge in metasemantics

AbstractThis paper argues that functionalist metasemantic views, such as Conceptual Role Semantics and Interpretivism, face a Euthyphro challenge. The challenge, put roughly, is this: functionalist metasemantic views reverse the order of explanation. According to such views, representational mental states have the contents that they do partly because they play certain roles in our mental lives. According to an intuitive picture of the roles that representational mental states play in our mental lives, however, these states play the roles they do partly because they have the contents that they do. Since explanations—even partial ones—are asymmetric (call this principle ‘the Euthyphro Principle’), we can't accept both this intuitive picture and a functionalist metasemantics. Hence, we should reject all versions of the latter. This paper can be seen as an attempt to better articulate an intuition that has been suggested in various forms in the literature. The paper proceeds as follows. First, it shows that functionalist metasemantic views imply certain ‘partly because’ claims. Second, it argues for the Euthyphro Principle. Third, it defends the intuitive picture of representational mental states and shows that it implies ‘partly because’ claims that conflict with those made by functionalist metasemantic views. Finally, it considers ways of relaxing the intuitive picture and finds them all wanting.

Measuring Impairments of Mentalization with the 15-Item Mentalization Questionnaire (MZQ) and Introducing the MZQ-6 Short Scale: Reliability, Validity and Norm Values Based on a Representative Sample of the German Population.

Deficits in mentalization are indicated by impaired emotional awareness and self-reflectiveness, and are associated with various mental disorders. However, there is a lack of validated research instruments. In this study, the psychometric properties of the Mentalization Questionnaire (MZQ) were evaluated in a representative German population sample with n = 2487 participants. Analyses included evaluation of the MZQs acceptance, reliability, and validity. Factorial validity was established with exploratory (EFA) and confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) after the dataset was randomly split. Dimensionality was evaluated with a bi-factor model. For convergent validity, correlations with the OPD SQS, PHQ-4, and POMS were calculated. While acceptance was good, internal consistencies (ω = 0.65-0.79) and factor structure of the original four subscales were not acceptable (TLI = 0.87, CFI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.071). EFA indicated a 3-factor solution, which was not confirmed by CFA (TLI = 0.89, CFI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.073). Correlations between subscales and bi-factor analyses indicated an underlying general factor (TLI = 0.94, CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.053). A shortened 6-item version was comparable to the original scale. Age and sex-specific representative norm-values are presented. The MZQ is a feasible, reliable and valid self-report instrument to measure representations of inner mental states. However, when applied to non-clinical samples, the total score of the MZQ should be used.

Does the TPJ fit it all? Representational similarity analysis of different forms of mentalizing

ABSTRACT Mentalizing is the key socio-cognitive ability. Its heterogeneous structure may result from a variety of forms of mental state inference, which may be based on lower-level processing of cues encoded in the observable behavior of others, or rather involve higher-level computations aimed at understanding another person’s perspective. Here we aimed to investigate the representational content of the brain regions engaged in mentalizing. To this end, 61 healthy adults took part in an fMRI study. We explored ROI activity patterns associated with five well-recognized ToM tasks that induce either decoding of mental states from motion kinematics or belief-reasoning. By using multivariate representational similarity analysis, we examined whether these examples of lower- and higher-level forms of social inference induced common or distinct patterns of brain activity. Distinct patterns of brain activity related to decoding of mental states from motion kinematics and belief-reasoning were found in lTPJp and the left IFG, but not the rTPJp. This may indicate that rTPJp supports a general mechanism for the representation of mental states. The divergent patterns of activation in lTPJp and frontal areas likely reflect differences in the degree of involvement of cognitive functions which support the basic mentalizing processes engaged by the two task groups.

Introducing tomsup: Theory of mind simulations using Python.

Theory of mind (ToM) is considered crucial for understanding social-cognitive abilities and impairments. However, verbal theories of the mechanisms underlying ToM are often criticized as under-specified and mutually incompatible. This leads to measures of ToM being unreliable, to the extent that even canonical experimental tasks do not require representation of others' mental states. There have been attempts at making computational models of ToM, but these are not easily available for broad research application. In order to help meet these challenges, we here introduce the Python package tomsup: Theory of mind simulations using Python. The package provides a computational eco-system for investigating and comparing computational models of hypothesized ToM mechanisms and for using them as experimental stimuli. The package notably includes an easy-to-use implementation of the variational recursive Bayesian k-ToM model developed by (Devaine, Hollard, & Daunizeau, 2014b) and of simpler non-recursive decision models, for comparison. We provide a series of tutorials on how to: (i) simulate agents relying on the k-ToM model and on a range of simpler types of mechanisms; (ii) employ those agents to generate online experimental stimuli; (iii) analyze the data generated in such experimental setup, and (iv) specify new custom ToM and heuristic cognitive models.

Metacognition and mentalizing are associated with distinct neural representations of decision uncertainty.

Metacognition and mentalizing are both associated with meta-level mental state representations. Conventionally, metacognition refers to monitoring one’s own cognitive processes, while mentalizing refers to monitoring others’ cognitive processes. However, this self-other dichotomy is insufficient to delineate the 2 high-level mental processes. We here used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to systematically investigate the neural representations of different levels of decision uncertainty in monitoring different targets (the current self, the past self [PS], and others) performing a perceptual decision-making task. Our results reveal diverse formats of internal mental state representations of decision uncertainty in mentalizing, separate from the associations with external cue information. External cue information was commonly represented in the right inferior parietal lobe (IPL) across the mentalizing tasks. However, the internal mental states of decision uncertainty attributed to others were uniquely represented in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), rather than the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) that also represented the object-level mental states of decision inaccuracy attributed to others. Further, the object-level and meta-level mental states of decision uncertainty, when attributed to the PS, were represented in the precuneus and the lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC), respectively. In contrast, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) represented currently experienced decision uncertainty in metacognition, and also uncertainty about the estimated decision uncertainty (estimate uncertainty), but not the estimated decision uncertainty per se in mentalizing. Hence, our findings identify neural signatures to clearly delineate metacognition and mentalizing and further imply distinct neural computations on internal mental states of decision uncertainty during metacognition and mentalizing.

The representation of mental states in young children’s writings: the role of early narratives in supporting theory of mind

ABSTRACT Learning to write is a complex process involving linguistic, cognitive, and socio-emotional factors. From a developmental perspective, little research has explored the content of young children’s writings in terms of specific cognitive skills such as Theory of Mind (TOM). This study explores how young children’s writing may foster representations of inner life, their own and others, through the characters created and through an awareness of the reader’s perspective. A total of 204 written compositions were gathered throughout one school year from 24 6-to-7-year-olds. The results indicate that while tackling the complexity of word and sentence composition, significant cognitive resources are allocated to the content of the stories, the characters’ experiences but also the reader’s understanding of the plots created. The findings offer important implications for supporting children’s TOM through early fiction writing and highlight the importance of naturalistic data in uncovering young children’s growing insights about others’ thoughts and emotions.

The 3d Mind Model characterizes how people understand mental states across modern and historical cultures.

Humans rely on social interaction to achieve many important goals. These interactions rely in turn on people's capacity to understand others' mental states: their thoughts and feelings. Do different cultures understand minds in different ways, or do widely shared principles describe how different cultures understand mental states? Extensive data suggest that the mind organizes mental state concepts using the 3d Mind Model, composed of the psychological dimensions: rationality (vs. emotionality), social impact (states which affect others more vs. less), and valence (positive vs. negative states). However, this evidence comes primarily from English-speaking individuals in the United States. Here we investigated mental state representation in 57 contemporary countries, using 163 million English language tweets; in 17 languages, using billions of words of text from internet webpages; and across more than 2000 years of history, using curated texts from four historical societies. We quantified mental state meaning by analyzing the text produced by each culture using word embeddings. We then tested whether the 3d Mind Model could explain which mental states were similar in meaning within each culture. We found that the 3d Mind Model significantly explained mental state meaning in every country, language, and historical society that we examined. These results suggest that rationality, social impact, and valence form a generalizable conceptual backbone for mental state representation.

Dogs re-engage human partners when joint social play is interrupted: a behavioural signature of shared intentionality?

Hypotheses regarding the evolution of uniquely human social cognition often emphasize not only mental state representation, but also mental state sharing. Mental state sharing is evident in instances of joint intentionality – mutual understanding between individuals of each other's simultaneous and interdependent commitment to a shared activity or goal. Comparative studies supporting the human uniqueness of joint intentionality show that, as compared to human children, chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes , who engage with humans as cooperative partners do not altruistically help others achieve their goals across the same range of contexts, do not attempt to re-engage cooperative partners in problem-solving or social games at the same rate and do not show spontaneous role reversal. Although recent work supports the possibility that bonobos, Pan paniscus , may re-engage conspecific partners after interrupted social grooming, the extent to which other animals show similar behaviour across more diverse contexts remains largely unexplored. Domestic dogs', Canis familiaris , propensity to interact with humans in cooperative contexts makes them a potentially promising comparative model of prosocial mental state sharing. Here, we investigated a behavioural signature of joint intentionality during social play between humans and dogs ( N = 82). Our results present the first experimental evidence of re-engagement behaviour in dogs, as dogs preferentially attempted to reinitiate an interrupted social game with their previous partner relative to a passive bystander. These findings suggest that dogs exhibit a key marker of joint intentionality and open the door for future research on the cognitive mechanisms supporting this behaviour. • Scholars have hypothesized that shared intentionality aids human ultrasociality. • We assessed whether dogs also show behavioural signatures of shared intentionality. • Dogs reliably re-engaged human partners after interrupted joint social play. • These findings suggest that dogs may form joint commitments in some contexts. • Dogs present a uniquely powerful comparative model for studying joint activities.

Measuring Emotional Awareness in Patients With Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective Disorders.

The ability to mentalize (i.e., to form representations of mental states and processes of oneself and others) is often impaired in people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Emotional awareness (EA) represents one aspect of affective mentalizing and can be assessed with the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS), but findings regarding individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorders are inconsistent. The present study aimed at examining the usability and convergent validity of the LEAS in a sample of N = 130 stabilized outpatients with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorders. An adequacy rating was added to the conventional LEAS rating to account for distortions of content due to, for example, delusional thinking. Scores of the patient group were compared with those of a matched healthy control sample. Correlation with symptom clusters, a self-report measure of EA, a measure of synthetic metacognition (MAS-A-G), and an expert rating capturing EA from the psychodynamic perspective of psychic structure (OPD-LSIA) were examined. Regarding self-related emotional awareness, patients did not score lower than controls neither in terms of conventional LEAS nor in terms of adequacy. Regarding other-related emotional awareness, however, patients showed a reduced level of adequacy compared to controls whereas no such difference was found for conventional LEAS scores. Higher conventional LEAS scores were associated with fewer negative symptoms, and higher structural integration of self-perceptions measured by the OPD-LSIA. Higher adequacy of responses correlated with fewer symptoms of disorganization as well as excitement, higher scores of self-reflection on the MAS-A-G as well as self- and object-perception and internal and external communication as measured by the subscales of the OPD-LSIA. Findings suggest that the LEAS might not be sensitive enough to detect differences between mildly symptomatic patients with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorders and healthy controls. However, LEAS ratings are still suitable to track intraindividual changes in EA over time. Observing the adequacy of patients’ responses when using the LEAS may be a promising way to increase diagnostical utility and to identify patterns of formal and content-related alterations of mentalizing in this patient group. Methodological indications for future studies are discussed.

Communication before communicative intentions

AbstractThis paper explores the significance of intelligent social behavior among non‐human animals for philosophical theories of communication. Using the alarm call system of vervet monkeys as a case study, I argue that interpersonal communication (or what I call “minded communication”) can and does take place in the absence of the production and recognition of communicative intentions. More generally, I argue that evolutionary theory provides good reasons for maintaining that minded communication is both temporally and explanatorily prior to the use of communicative intentions. After developing these negative points about the place of communicative intentions in detail, I provide a novel alternative account according to which minded communication is characterized in terms of patterns of action and response that function to coordinate the representational mental states of agents. I show that an account which centers on patterns of representational coordination of this sort is well suited to capture the theoretical roles associated with minded communication and that it does so in a way that provides a good fit with comparative facts about the presence of minded communication among non‐human animals.

Modeling Descriptive and Deontic Cognition as Two Modes of Relation Between Mind and World

AbstractI use a distinction betweensingle‐mindedandindifferentchoice attitudes, modeled across maximally determinate plans of action, as a basis for interpreting deontic claims – about what ought, ought not, and may be done – as expressing a mode of relation between mind and world that gives voice to the exercise of practical rationality. At the same time, I use maximally determinate possible worlds to model descriptive claims in order to understand them as involving a mode of relation between mind and world that manifests our theoretical rationality. The result is of interest to both linguists looking for a formal treatment of deontic modality that captures the role prescriptive mental states play in our lives, and philosophers interested in substantive questions about action‐guiding and representational mental states as exercises of practical and theoretical rationality.

Mentalization-Based Treatment in Groups for Adults With Autism Spectrum Disorder.

In order to successfully interact with others in social encounters, we have to be attentive to their mental states. This means, we have to implicitly and explicitly interpret our own actions as well as the actions of others as meaningful on the basis of the ascription of intentional mental states. However, this ability, often referred to as mentalizing, seems to be impaired in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Individuals with ADS show specific deficits relating to the representation of mental states of others. Especially, the spontaneous, intuitive attribution of and reaction to others' mental states seem to be impaired. Mentalization-Based Treatment (MBT) is a form of psychotherapy in individual and group settings that focuses on the education and enhancement of mentalizing. Although the scope of MBT is broad and MBT has been already proven to be useful in a variety of mental disorders, no attempt has been made to apply MBT in patients with ASD. In our study, we adapted MBT for adults with ASD in a therapeutic group setting to examine the feasibility as well as the effectiveness of the treatment in this patient group. During 15–20 weeks of weekly group therapy, we surveyed the patients' acceptability of the intervention. Additionally, changes in mentalizing difficulties were measured before and after treatment. Results show a high acceptance of the treatment and an improvement in the patients' mentalizing abilities, presenting MBT as a promising treatment option for ASD.

Overlapping and specific neural correlates for empathizing, affective mentalizing, and cognitive mentalizing: A coordinate-based meta-analytic study.

While the discussion on the foundations of social understanding mainly revolves around the notions of empathy, affective mentalizing, and cognitive mentalizing, their degree of overlap versus specificity is still unclear. We took a meta‐analytic approach to unveil the neural bases of cognitive mentalizing, affective mentalizing, and empathy, both in healthy individuals and pathological conditions characterized by social deficits such as schizophrenia and autism. We observed partially overlapping networks for cognitive and affective mentalizing in the medial prefrontal, posterior cingulate, and lateral temporal cortex, while empathy mainly engaged fronto‐insular, somatosensory, and anterior cingulate cortex. Adjacent process‐specific regions in the posterior lateral temporal, ventrolateral, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex might underpin a transition from abstract representations of cognitive mental states detached from sensory facets to emotionally‐charged representations of affective mental states. Altered mentalizing‐related activity involved distinct sectors of the posterior lateral temporal cortex in schizophrenia and autism, while only the latter group displayed abnormal empathy related activity in the amygdala. These data might inform the design of rehabilitative treatments for social cognitive deficits.

The representational structure of mental states generalizes across target people and stimulus modalities

Each individual experiences mental states in their own idiosyncratic way, yet perceivers can accurately understand a huge variety of states across unique individuals. How do they accomplish this feat? Do people think about their own anger in the same ways as another person's anger? Is reading about someone's anxiety the same as seeing it? Here, we test the hypothesis that a common conceptual core unites mental state representations across contexts. Across three studies, participants judged the mental states of multiple targets, including a generic other, the self, a socially close other, and a socially distant other. Participants viewed mental state stimuli in multiple modalities, including written scenarios and images. Using representational similarity analysis, we found that brain regions associated with social cognition expressed stable neural representations of mental states across both targets and modalities. Together, these results suggest that people use stable models of mental states across different people and contexts.