Repo Market Research Articles

Repo Market Effects of the Term Securities Lending Facility

The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) was introduced by the Federal Reserve to promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treasury and other collateral. We evaluate one aspect of the program - the extent to which it has narrowed repo spreads between Treasury collateral and less liquid collateral. We find that TSLF operations have precipitated a significant narrowing of repo spreads. More refined tests indicate the market conditions and types of operations associated with the program’s effectiveness. Various additional tests, including a split-sample test, suggest that our findings are robust.

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The Leverage Cycle

The Leverage Cycle

Crashes and Collateralized Lending

This paper develops a parsimonious static model for characterizing financing terms in collateralized lending markets. We characterize the systematic risk exposures for a variety of securities and develop a simple indifference-pricing framework to value the systematic crash risk exposure of the collateral. We then apply Modigliani and Miller's (1958) Proposition Two (MM) to split the cost of bearing this risk between the borrower and lender, resulting in a schedule of haircuts and financing rates. The model produces comparative statics and time-series dynamics that are consistent with the empirical features of repo market data, including the dramatic change in financing terms for structured products during the credit crisis of 2007-2008.

Uncollateralized overnight lending in Canada

Loan-level data on the uncollateralized overnight loan market is generated using payment data from Canada's Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) and a modified version of the methodology proposed in Furfine (1999). There were on average just under 100 loans extended in this market each day from March 2004 to March 2006 for a total daily value of about $5 billion. This makes the market slightly larger than the brokered repo market but only about one-tenth of the estimate for the direct trade repo market. The implied uncollateralized overnight rate was found to be remarkably stable relative to other measures of the overnight rate. Loan rates are found to vary with market conditions, the size of the loan, and the type (big versus small) of the borrower and lender.

Interest rate setting on the Swiss Franc repo market

Summary Repurchase agreements (repos) are secured money market transactions. The cash taker provides collateral in the form of securities and in return receives money from the cash provider. To ensure the continuous covering of the cash amount, the definition of eligible collateral, its handling and valuation play an important role. This is mainly because the collateral nearly eliminates credit risk. In Switzerland, Swiss franc repos are almost exclusively conducted via the highly standardized repo platform, with four different pre-defined collateral baskets. Each basket comprises different security categories, such as government bonds or covered bonds. This paper analyzes the interest rate setting on the repo market with data from June 1999 to June 2005. It evaluates if the securities provided as collateral influenced the repo rate or not. A price differentiation with respect to the collateral provided is found.

Information, Liquidity, and the (Ongoing) Panic of 2007

The credit crisis was sparked by a shock to fundamentals, housing prices failed to rise, which led to a collapse of trust in credit markets. In particular, the repurchase agreement market in the U.S., estimated to be about $12 trillion, larger than the total assets in the U.S. banking system ($10 trillion), became very illiquid during the crisis due to the fear of counterparty default, leaving lenders with illiquid bonds that they did not want, believing that they could not be sold. As a result, there was an increase in repo haircuts (the initial margin), causing massive deleveraging. I investigate this indirectly, by looking at the breakdown in the arbitrage foundation of the ABX.HE indices during the panic. The ABX.HE indices of subprime mortgage-backed securities are derivatives linked to the underlying subprime bonds. Introduced in 2006, the indices aggregated and revealed information about the value of the subprime mortgage-backed securities and allowed parties to buy protection against declines in subprime value via credit derivatives written on the index or tranches of the index. When the ABX prices plummeted, the arbitrage relationships linking the credit derivatives linked to the index and the underlying bonds broke down because liquidity evaporated in the repo market. This breakdown allows a glimpse of the information problems that led to illiquidity in the repo markets, and the extent of the demand for protection against subprime risk.

Information, Liquidity, and the (Ongoing) Panic of 2007

The credit crisis was sparked by a shock to fundamentals, housing prices failed to rise, which led to a collapse of trust in credit markets. In particular, the repurchase agreement market in the U.S., estimated to be about $12 trillion, larger than the total assets in the U.S. banking system ($10 trillion), became very illiquid during the crisis due to the fear of counterparty default, leaving lenders with illiquid bonds that they did not want, believing that they could not be sold. As a result, there was an increase in repo haircuts (the initial margin), causing massive deleveraging. I investigate this indirectly, by looking at the breakdown in the arbitrage foundation of the ABX.HE indices during the panic. The ABX.HE indices of subprime mortgage-backed securities are derivatives linked to the underlying subprime bonds. Introduced in 2006, the indices aggregated and revealed information about the value of the subprime mortgage-backed securities and allowed parties to buy protection against declines in subprime value via credit derivatives written on the index or tranches of the index. When the ABX prices plummeted, the arbitrage relationships linking the credit derivatives linked to the index and the underlying bonds broke down because liquidity evaporated in the repo market. This breakdown allows a glimpse of the information problems that led to illiquidity in the repo markets, and the extent of the demand for protection against subprime risk.

A Search‐Based Theory of the On‐the‐Run Phenomenon

ABSTRACTWe propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices. Infinitely lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market, or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market. We show that short‐sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed. That asset enjoys greater liquidity, a higher lending fee (“specialness”), and trades at a premium consistent with no‐arbitrage. We derive closed‐form solutions for small frictions, and provide a calibration generating realistic on‐the‐run premia.

The expectation hypothesis of the term structure of very short-term rates: Statistical tests and economic value

This paper reexamines the validity of the expectation hypothesis (EH) of the term structure of US repo rates ranging in maturity from overnight to 3 months. We extend the work of Longstaff [2000b. The term structure of very short term rates: new evidence for the expectations hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 397–415] in two directions: (1) we implement statistical tests designed to increase test power in this context; (2) more important, we assess the economic value of departures from the EH based on criteria of profitability and economic significance in the context of a simple trading strategy. The EH is rejected throughout the term structure examined on the basis of the statistical tests. However, the results of our economic analysis are favorable to the EH, suggesting that the statistical rejections of the EH in the repo market are economically insignificant.

Uncertainty and the yield curve

This paper proposes a logistic model for the pricing of future receipts due from government bonds. The model is derived from the assumption that uncertainty about valuations increases the further forward the receipt is scheduled. The entropy of a probability distribution is used as the measure of uncertainty. The model leads to yield curves typically within 5 basis points of the Bank of England's at the long end. At the short end, the results suggest that REPO market data is inconsistent gilts market data.

The characteristics and development of the Swiss franc repurchase agreement market

With the reinterpretation of repurchase agreements (repos) by the tax authority and the revision of the national bank law in 1997, allowing the Swiss national bank (SNB) to use repos as monetary policy instrument, the prerequisites for the development of a Swiss franc repo market were given. The development of the repo market in Switzerland only came up in 1999 with the provision of an integrated trading and settlement system provided by SegaInterSettle AG (SIS), Eurex and Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) in collaboration with the SNB. The following paper provides an overview of the basic characteristics and structure of the Swiss franc repo market as well as of the development it has undergone since 1999. It also discusses what motives and reasons the banks possess to actively participate in the Swiss franc repo market.

Bond Liquidity Premia

Asset pricing models of limits to arbitrage emphasize the role of funding conditions faced by financial intermediaries. In the US, the Treasury repo market is the key funding market and, hence, theory predicts that the liquidity premium of Treasury bonds share a funding liquidity component with risk premia in other markets. We identify and measure the value of funding liquidity from the cross-section of bonds by adding a liquidity factor correlated with age to an arbitrage-free term structure model. We validate our interpretation of this funding liquidity factor by establishing its linkages with other measures of funding conditions at three different levels of aggregation. Looking at asset pricing implications, we find that an increase in the value of liquidity predicts lower risk premia for on-the-run and off-the-run bonds but higher risk premia on LIBOR loans, swap contracts and corporate bonds. The impact is large and pervasive through crisis and normal times. Conditions on funding markets have a first-order impact on interest rates.

Mexico: Financial Sector Assessment Program Update: Detailed Assessment on the Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation

The Detailed Assessment report on Mexico’s implementation of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation is analyzed. The Mexican securities market is dominated by daily trading in short-term government debt securities, primarily through repo transactions among banks, brokers, institutions, and private investors. The 2001 Financial Sector Assessment Program noted significant structural issues in the Mexican repo market, and recommended government action to create a standard master agreement for repo transactions.

Beyond segmentation: The case of China’s repo markets

This paper explores the reasons behind the discrepancy between interest rates in China’s two repurchase agreement (repo) markets, the interbank repo market and the exchange-traded repo market. The repo rates in the exchange market are at times, significantly higher than those in the interbank market, especially in the first three years of the 2000–2005 sample period. While market segmentation clearly hinders arbitrage, the causes of the repo rate discrepancy are related to the alternative investment opportunities available to market participants and to the volatility differences in the repo rates.

Degrees of Specialness: An Empirical Analysis of the Italian BTP Repo Market

We explain the variation in the degree of specialness for bonds used as collateral in the Italian Government BTP repo market. Some of our results are similar to the findings in the US repo market even though the underlying Italian BTP bond market is structurally different than the US Treasury market. Specifically liquidity, supply and demand are significant factors that help determine the degree of specialness. Unlike US repo studies however, we find that credit risk and information uncertainty also affect the degree of repo specialness.

The Chinese interbank repo market: An analysis of term premiums

AbstractBecause of the lack of short‐term government bonds, the interbank repo market in China has been providing the best information about market‐driven short‐term interest rates since its inception. This article examines the behavior of the repo rates of various terms and their term premiums. The work in this article supplements the study by F. Longstaff (2000), which reports supportive evidence for the pure expectations hypothesis over the short range of the term structure with the use of repo data from the United States. It is found that the pure expectations hypothesis is statistically rejected, although the term premiums are economically small. It is shown that the short‐term repo rate, repo rate volatility, repo market liquidity, and repo rate spreads are all important in determining the term premiums. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:153–167, 2006

Who Makes On-The-Run Treasuries Special?

In this paper, we identify and empirically evaluate an alternative explanation for the liquidity premiums observed for on-the-run Treasuries. Existing theoretical and empirical analyses argue these premiums are driven by buy-and-hold investors who directly value the additional liquidity that these extremely liquid securities provide. We contrast this cash market explanation with a somewhat counter-intuitive alternative, rooted in the repo markets. According to the alternative explanation we propose, short-sellers rather than buy-and-hold investors value the superior liquidity of on-the-run Treasuries. In constructing their positions, they drive up repo market specials and indirectly generate the cash market premiums we observe. To evaluate these alternative hypotheses, we run a series of regressions with the overnight repo special for on-the-run Treasuries as the dependent variable. For demand from buy-and-hold investors to own liquid securities, we include two basic proxies in our panel regressions: the CP/Tbill spread that Krishnamurthy (2002) investigates and the REFCORP/Treasury examined by Longstaff (2004). We also include two proxies to capture intermediaries' need to hedge the interest rate risk of their inventories of securities. We assume hedging activity increases with their issuance of underwritten fixed-rate debt, and with overall interest rate volatility. We find strong and consistent evidence that these proxies for hedging activity are both economically and statistically significant determinants of overnight repo specials. However, we find much weaker evidence that that our proxies for investors' demand to own liquid securities explains the observed premiums. These results cast into doubt previous assertions that simple investor-driven liquidity premiums explain the higher repo specials and lower yields observed for on-the-run Treasuries. The yield spread between on-the-run and off-the-run Treasuries is often believed to reflect investors' demand to own these liquid securities. However, our results suggest that one must exercise caution when interpeting changes in the on-/off-the-run yield spread since we find that they are often driven by an increase in demand to short-sell the on-the-run Treasury, rather than demand to own it.

A Search-Based Theory of the On-the-Run Phenomenon

We propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices. Infinitely-lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market, or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market. We show that short-sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed. That asset enjoys greater liquidity, measured by search times, and a higher lending fee (specialness). Liquidity and specialness translate into price premia that are consistent with no-arbitrage. We derive closed-form solutions for small frictions, and can generate price differentials in line with observed on-the-run premia.

The Lender of Last Resort: A Twenty-First Century Approach

The classical Bagehot conception of a Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) that lends to illiquid banks has been criticized on two grounds: On the one hand, the distinction between insolvency and illiquidity is not clear-cut; on the other, a fully collateralized repo market allows central banks to provide the adequate aggregate amount of liquidity and leave to the banks the responsibility of lending uncollateralized. The object of this paper is to analyze these issues rigorously by providing a framework in which liquidity shocks cannot be distinguished from solvency ones and then asking whether there is a need for a LOLR and how it should operate in the absence of systemic threats. Determining the optimal LOLR policy requires a careful modeling of the structure of the interbank market and of the closure policy. In our setup, the results depend upon the existence of moral hazard. If the main source of moral hazard is the banks' lack of incentives to screen loans, then the LOLR may have to intervene to improve the efficiency of an unsecured interbank market in crisis periods; if instead the main source of moral hazard is loan monitoring, then the interbank market should be secured and the LOLR should never intervene.