Repayment Incentives Research Articles

What If Borrowers Were Informed about Credit Reporting? Two Natural Field Experiments

ABSTRACT Using two natural field experiments, we examine how warning individual retail borrowers that their loan performance will be reported to a public credit registry before and after the loan take-up affects their borrowing behavior. We show that credit warnings reduce default rates by 3.7 to 7 percentage points and increase loan take-up rates by 4.1 percentage points, which suggests that credit warnings benefit both lenders and borrowers. The main drivers appear to be borrowers’ anticipation of a reduction in lenders’ informational rents and improved repayment incentives. Moreover, the reduction in default rates is comparable for borrowers who receive the credit warning before and after the loan take-up. As credit warnings received before but not after a loan take-up can affect the borrower pool, and thus the overall credit risk of the pool, the results suggest that credit warnings have little net effect on the pool’s credit risk due to selection. JEL Classifications: G10; G21; G23.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Three Players on Behavioural Strategy of P2P Lending Participants: A Sustainable Operations Perspective

In China, most of peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms do not possess operational sustainability due to excessive defaults. To address this problem, the conflict of interests among P2P lending participants is discussed using a stakeholder approach. An evolutionary game model (EGM) of three players is developed to analyse the interactions among regulatory authorities, P2P lending platforms, and borrowers. Then, the asymptotic of the equilibrium and evolutionary stability strategies of the EGM are analysed. Results indicate that either the P2P lending platforms or borrowers will choose “noncompliant operation” or “default” strategies from a short-term perspective, and the strict supervision of the P2P lending platform in the short term is necessary for the sustainable operation of the platform. When supervision is intensified in the early stage and regulatory pressure becomes a normal state, P2P lending platforms and borrowers will actively select “compliant operation” and “repayment” strategies even if there is a lack of regulation in the future. Meanwhile, the behavioural strategies of P2P lending participants can be changed to conform to the sustainability of P2P lending by reducing the costs of strict supervision and increasing the damage caused by general supervision, reward and punishment coefficient for P2P lending platforms, repayment incentives of borrowers, and defaulting opportunity costs. Finally, suggestions for regulating the behaviours of P2P lending participants and promoting sustainability of P2P lending industry are discussed.

Using Fintech in scaling up Islamic microfinance

Purpose This study aims to propose a hybrid microfinance model that integrates various Islamic commercial and social finance institutions through Fintech for efficient and impactful results. The microfinance model caters to the financial and social intermediation needs through a set of financial services and non-financial support. Design/methodology/approach The study uses both a mathematical model and an empirical estimation using micro panel data to establish the core problem in microfinance operations. Conclusions from the mathematical model and estimated results in the empirical analysis are used to suggest an institutional design which embeds technology in the delivery of Islamic microfinance in an integrated structure. For screening and incentive conditions, the study gives illustration through numerical examples. Findings The mathematical model highlights the need for financial sustainability, outreach, scale and complementariness of non-financial factors such as commitment, repayment incentives and skills enhancement multiplier. In light of this, the proposed Islamic microfinance model is outlined to create synergies by integrating a diversity of funding sources through social savings and impact investments. The programme also blends financial services with non-financial support to ensure engagement and commitment on a long-term basis. It uses Fintech in various demand and supply-side operations to show how technology embeddedness can help in achieving cost efficiencies and extend outreach. Originality/value It is the first study in integrated institutional design in Islamic microfinance literature that embeds Fintech in both demand side and supply side operations comprehensively. The proposed model is conducive for enhancing outreach, scale and impact in the Islamic microfinancial services.

A Dynamic Model of Optimal Creditor Dispersion

ABSTRACTBorrowing from multiple creditors exposes firms to rollover risk due to coordination problems among creditors, but it also improves firms' repayment incentives, thereby increasing pledgeability. Based on this trade‐off, I develop a dynamic debt rollover model to analyze the evolution of creditor dispersion. Consistent with empirical evidence, I find that firms optimally increase creditor dispersion after poor performance. In contrast, cross‐sectionally higher‐growth firms can support more dispersed creditors. Frequent debt renegotiation limits firms' ability to increase pledgeability by having more creditors. Finally, holding a cash balance while borrowing from multiple creditors improves firms' repayment incentives uniformly across all future states.

Gender differences in the repayment of microcredit: The mediating role of trustworthiness

Growing evidence suggests that women are more likely to repay collateral-free microloans than men. However, we know little about what explains such gender differences. We hypothesize that better repayment performance of women microcredit borrowers can largely be explained by gender differences in innate trustworthiness. We conduct a trust game and a microloan repayment game in rural Bangladesh. We find that women are more trustworthy than men and that they are more likely to repay their loans irrespective of any control mechanisms, such as joint liability or dynamic repayment incentives. The results of a mediation test suggest that the gender effect on loan repayment is significantly mediated by differences in innate trustworthiness. We conduct a sensitivity test to check the extent to which unobserved confounders might have influenced the mediation effect, and find no evidence of significant omitted variables bias.

Self-Enforced Debt and Rational Ponzi Games

We analyze repayment incentives in an infinite horizon competitive economy where agents cannot commit to financial contracts. We follow Bulow and Rogoff (1989) by assuming that a defaulting agent is excluded from borrowing forever but keeps the ability to save. Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) proved that self-enforcing and not-too-tight debt limits can form a bubble (or discounted martingale) at equilibrium. They also show that when debt limits form a bubble, then the equilibrium outcomes (prices and consumption) are the same as in a model without private debt but with unbacked public debt. The contribution of this paper is to show that bubbles are the only debt limits that are self-enforcing and not too tight. Our characterization is obtained without imposing any ad-hoc boundedness assumption on the endogenous debt limits.

Credit Information System in Albania

The booming lending period and many lenders (16 banks and 21 non-bank financial Institutions in Albania) brought about unprecedented competition in credit markets within Albania. Economists usually view lending and competition favorably, but in Albania resulted in a number of unforeseen non-performing loans. Findings report increased problems of borrower over-indebtedness, reduced loan repayment incentives, and growing debts for lenders1. The weakening performance of lenders is due in part to the absence of information sharing in these markets. Because growing numbers of lenders (banks and non-bank financial Institutions in Albania) increase the level of asymmetric information between lenders, credit information systems (often called credit reporting bureaus or credit bureaus) can play a crucial role towards improving credit market performance and, in turn, credit access for the poor. Increases in formal sector lending among the poor have created a need for credit information systems that provide potential lenders with borrower information. Improved screening affects from the system causes the level of non-performing loans to decline. In this paper we will present effects of a credit information system to be implemented in Albania. The weakening performance of lenders is due in part to the absence of information sharing in these markets. Because growing numbers of lenders (banks and non-bank financial Institutions in Albania) increase the level of asymmetric information between lenders, CISs can play a crucial role towards improving credit market performance and, in turn, credit access for the poor.

Bankruptcy law and bank financing

Exploiting the timing of the 2005–2006 Italian bankruptcy law reforms, we disentangle the effects of reorganization and liquidation in bankruptcy on bank financing and firm investment. A 2005 reform introduces reorganization procedures facilitating loan renegotiation. The 2006 reform subsequently strengthens creditor rights in liquidation. The first reform increases interest rates and reduces investment. The second reform reduces interest rates and spurs investment. Our results highlight the importance of identifying the distinct effects of liquidation and reorganization, as these procedures differently address the tension in bankruptcy law between the continuation of viable businesses and the preservation of repayment incentives.

Repayment incentives and the distribution of gains from group lending

Group loans with joint liability are a distinguishing feature of many microfinance programs. While such lending benefits millions of borrowers, major lending institutions acknowledge its limited impact among the very poor and have shifted towards individual loans. This paper attempts to explain this trend by exploring the relationship between borrower wealth and the benefits from group lending when access to credit is limited by strategic default. In our model, individuals of heterogeneous wealth face a given investment opportunity so poor investors demand larger loans. We show that the largest loan offered as an individual contract cannot be supported as a group loan. Joint liability cannot therefore extend credit outreach in the absence of additional social sanctions within groups. We also find that the benefits from group loans are increasing in borrower wealth and that optimal group size depends on project characteristics. By allowing for multi-person groups and wealth heterogeneity in the population, the paper extends the standard framework to analyze joint liability and contributes to an understanding of the conditions under which microcredit can reduce poverty.

Credit and Self-Employment

Limited personal liability for debts has long been justified as a tool to promote entrepreneurial risk taking by providing insurance to the borrower in the event of low returns. Nonetheless, such limits erode repayment incentives, and so may increase unsecured borrowing costs. Our paper is the first to evaluate the tradeoff between credit costs and insurance against failure. We build a life-cycle model with risky, and repeated, occupational choice in the presence of defaultable debt contracts. We find that limits to liability can encourage self-employment, and alter the timing, size, and financing of self-employment projects. We also find that the positive relationship between wealth and self-employment rates may not be evidence for credit constraints: We show that such a relationship is present even when limited liability is eliminated.

Contract Pricing in Consumer Credit Markets

We analyze subprime consumer lending and the role played by down payment requirements in screening high-risk borrowers and limiting defaults. To do this, we develop an empirical model of the demand for financed purchases that incorporates both adverse selection and repayment incentives. We estimate the model using detailed transaction-level data on subprime auto loans. We show how different elements of loan contracts affect the quality of the borrower pool and subsequent loan performance. We also evaluate the returns to credit scoring that allows sellers to customize financing terms to individual applicants. Our approach shows how standard econometric tools for analyzing demand and supply under imperfect competition extend to settings in which firms care about the identity of their customers and their postpurchase behavior.

Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi

We implemented a randomized field experiment in Malawi examining borrower responses to being fingerprinted when applying for loans. This intervention improved the lender's ability to implement dynamic repayment incentives, allowing it to withhold future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. As predicted by a simple model, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. We provide unique evidence that this improvement in repayment rates is accompanied by behaviors consistent with less adverse selection and lower moral hazard. (JEL D14, D82, G21, O12, O16)

Are debt repayment incentives undermined by foreign aid?

Abstract This paper investigates the effects of inflows of foreign aid on the debt repayment behavior of developing countries. The paper first delineates the overall incentives to committing to timely debt repayment in a war of attrition-type model. A set of panel estimates including 93 developing countries shows that foreign aid is strongly negatively associated with repayment incentives. The findings pertain to both total debt service and service on publically guaranteed debt. A set of conditional estimates suggest that the main findings generalize to the majority of developing countries.

Credit and self-employment

Abstract The US personal bankruptcy system allows debtors to discharge uncollateralized debts if they give up assets in excess of a threshold known as an “exemption”. However, since exemptions erode repayment incentives, they may increase borrowing costs. Our paper evaluates the tradeoff between credit costs and the insurance against failure created by bankruptcy exemptions. We find that exemptions change self-employment rates and the timing, size, and financing of projects. We also find that the positive relationship between wealth and self-employment rates may not arise from credit constraints: such a relationship is present even when credit is plentiful at low interest rates.

Are Debt Repayment Incentives Undermined by Foreign Aid?

This paper investigates the effects of inflows of foreign aid on the debt repayment behaviour of developing countries. The paper first delineates the overall incentives to committing to timely repayment in a war of attrition-type model. A set of panel estimates including 93 developing countries shows that foreign aid is strongly negatively associated with repayment incentives. The findings pertain to both total debt service and service on publically guaranteed debt. Only countries that tend to vote predominantly with the US in the UN General Assembly are not significantly discouraged from servicing their debt by inflows of foreign aid.

Identification Strategy: A Field Experiment on Dynamic Incentives in Rural Credit Markets

How do borrowers respond to improvements in a lender's ability to punish defaulters? This paper reports the results of a randomized field experiment in rural Malawi that examines the impact of fingerprinting borrowers in a context where a unique identification system is absent. Fingerprinting allows the lender to more effectively use dynamic repayment incentives: withholding future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. Consistent with a simple model of borrower heterogeneity and information asymmetries, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. The change in repayment rates is driven by reductions in adverse selection (smaller loan sizes) and lower moral hazard (for example, less diversion of loan-financed fertilizer from its intended use on the cash crop).

Dollarization and Financial Integration

How does a country’s choice of exchange rate regime impact its ability to borrow from abroad? We build a small open economy model in which the government can potentially respond to shocks via domestic monetary policy and by international borrowing. We assume that debt repayment must be incentive compatible when the default punishment is equivalent to permanent exclusion from debt markets. We compare a floating regime to full dollarization. We find that dollarization is potentially beneficial, even though it means the loss of the monetary instrument, precisely because this loss can strengthen incentives to maintain access to debt markets. Given stronger repayment incentives, more borrowing can be supported, and thus dollarization can increase international financial integration. This prediction of theory is consistent with the experiences of El Salvador and Ecuador, which recently dollarized, as well as with that of highly-indebted countries like Italy which adopted the Euro as part of Economic and Monetary Union: in each case, around the time of regime change, spreads on foreign currency government debt declined substantially.

Bubbles and Self-Enforcing Debt

We characterize equilibria with endogenous debt constraints for a general equilibrium economy with limited commitment in which the only consequence of default is losing the ability to borrow in future periods. First, we show that equilibrium debt limits must satisfy a simple condition that allows agents to exactly roll over existing debt period by period. Second, we provide an equivalence result, whereby the resulting set of equilibrium allocations with self-enforcing private debt is equivalent to the allocations that are sustained with unbacked public debt or rational bubbles. In contrast to the classic result by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), positive levels of debt are sustainable in our environment because the interest rate is sufficiently low to provide repayment incentives.

Collective Strategic Defaults: Bailouts and Repayment Incentives

This paper shows that under a global games approach banks may be subject to risk of failure even when fundamentals are strong due to a coordination problem among debtors. As a result of collective strategic default a fi?nancially sound firm may claim inability to repay if it expects a sufficient number of other firms to do so as well, thus reducing bank's enforcement ability. This occurs in particular when financial environment is characterized by inadequate bankruptcy laws and poor quality of corporate sector. The paper provides a model in which participants take simultaneous actions on the basis of imprecise private signals about the ratio of bad loans in bank portfolio. The model has a unique equilibrium in which an attack against the bank occurs when its fundamentals are above some threshold level. The model also helps us understand the role of the Central Bank as a Lender of Last Resort under opportunistic behavior from borrowers. While an ex-post bailout policy is often believed to reduce bank incentives, in this case it induces commercial banks to affect loan quality, which indirectly reduces incentives for strategic default. Within this framework we argue that the marginal cost of intervention incurred by Central Bank has a double-edge effect. While a higher cost helps to mitigate the moral hazard problem at the bank level by determining it to exert maximum of effort even when fundamentals are strong, it also increase the probability of bank failure by lowering the threshold in fundamentals that triggers collective strategic default. We also find that high bank expected profitability reduces the likelihood of collective strategic default.

Trading Constraints Penalizing Default: A Recursive Approach

This paper presents trading constraints as an intertemporal penalty for default. It models an infinite-horizon economy with incomplete markets, where agents are allowed to not pay their liabilities and have financial trades restricted according to their history of default. Those constraints balance the economy's risk-sharing possibilities and repayment incentives. The equilibrium presents stationary properties, such as an invariant distribution for assets' solvency rates.