Readers should not be misled by the straightforward title of this book into expecting a broadly accessible discussion of problems of social support in aging, low-fertility societies. Some of those issues are taken up, but the treatment throughout is at a purely abstract level. Indeed, the book is remarkable in sustaining this high level of formality throughout. In this respect it is comparable to but even more purist than David de la Croix's Fertility, Education, Growth, and Sustainability (Cambridge, 2013—see PDR 39, no. 4). The starting point of most chapters is the classic Samuelson consumption–loan model formulation, a two-period, one-sex, overlapping-generations framework. In the first period, individuals work and have and bring up children; in the second, if they survive into it, they are retired. They choose a lifetime consumption profile and level of childbearing to maximize (expected) lifetime utility, subject to their budget constraint. A longer life expectancy induces them to save more for retirement and have fewer children, thus promoting economic growth and fertility transition. Introducing an unfunded PAYG pension scheme leads to lower savings. If age of retirement is left to individual choice, those with higher earning capacity tend to have more children and work further into old age. Other complications in the fertility calculus come from adding a market in childcare services. Individuals who have fewer children than are needed on average to support PAYG pensions can be seen as free-riders—and doubly benefit by forgoing less income in childcare time or expense. A fuller treatment of age structure and human capital requires expanding to a three-period model, the first period now devoted to education. Youth dependency is found mostly to be inversely related to growth in total factor productivity (the demographic dividend argument), but at very low incomes the returns to educational investment can be sufficiently high to crowd out investment in technological innovation, yielding falling productivity—a poverty trap, or even, in Yakita's term, a rat hole. Topics touched on in other chapters include the effects of population aging on public investment and on the sustainable stock of renewable resources. A concluding chapter restates the results seriatim. The analytical prowess on display is undeniable. Tractability imposes some limitations: most of the analysis is confined to steady states, leaving aside transitional situations, and the economies in all but one chapter are closed, abstracting from international factor and product flows; gender differences, ex hypothesi, are ruled out. What is most lacking, however, is any serious discussion of how the modeling relates to the real world—to what degree the particular features of the economy and demography captured in the successive model variants are those that are in fact salient in governing outcomes or that shed light on what is actually going on behind the scenes. The author is content to point out where his findings agree with or differ from those of other theorists (whose work is extensively cited), and to express satisfaction when he qualitatively reproduces an accepted empirical observation or stylized fact. The book exemplifies a well-established genre of formal economic demography and public economics familiar in the pages of the Journal of Population Economics and other theoretically inclined economics journals—where many of the chapters in fact originated. But in those journals there is more than a sprinkling of empirical material to balance the contents; here there is not. The author is an economist at Nanzan University, Nagoya. Chapter bibliographies.