Religious Fertility Differentials Research Articles

Denomination and fertility decline: the Catholics and Protestants of Gillespie County, Texas

This article is a study of religious fertility differentials in Gillespie County Texas between 1850 and 1910....The results show that Protestants (Lutherans and Methodists) had significantly lower fertility than Catholics and began to limit their fertility earlier....The results also show that the convergence of Protestant and Catholic fertility in the United States often seen in twentieth-century data had begun much earlier. The conclusions of the article suggest that the long process of convergence of Protestant and Catholic fertility which was not complete until the 1970s had more to do with the appearance of regular waves of mostly Catholic immigrants than to a long process by which Catholics very gradually came to have fertility like that of Protestants. (SUMMARY IN FRE AND GER) (EXCERPT)

Religion and Fertility: Arab Christian-Muslim Differentials.

1. Theoretical framework 2. Data and methodology Data 3. Lebanese religious groups 4. Religious fertility differentials 5. Religious differentials in family size preferences 6. Religious differentials in fertility control knowledge, attitudes and practices 7. Summary and conclusions.

Religious Fertility Differentials Among the Yoruba of Western Nigeria

SummaryThis study examines the influence of religion on fertility among the Yoruba of Western Nigeria. There is a distinct differential in fertility by religion. Fertility is lower for Moslems than for Christians. The difference is attributed to the traditional characteristics of Moslems as opposed to the relatively modern characteristics of Christians. For example, Moslems have low education and low occupational status. Consequently, Moslems rather than Christians are more likely to observe longer periods of post-natal abstinence, and to experience higher pregnancy wastage and sterility rates.

Religious fertility differentials among the Yoruba of Western Nigeria.

This study examines the influence of religion on fertility among the Yoruba of Western Nigeria. There is a distinct differential in fertility by religion. Fertility is lower for Moslems than for Christians. The difference is attributed to the traditional characteristics of Moslems as opposed to the relatively modern characteristics of the Christians. For example Moslems have low education and occupational status. Consequently Moslems rather than Christians are more likely to observe longer periods of postnatal abstinence and to experience higher pregnancy wastage and sterility rates. (Authors)

Religious differentials in fertility: Lebanon, 1971.

Summary The principal objects of this study are the description and explanation of the effects of religious affiliation on fertility in the multi-religious society of Lebanon. The data are derived from the 1971 National Fertility and Family Planning Survey which is the first probability sample ever taken of Lebanese couples with wives aged 15-49 years. The present inquiry yields two major results. First, significant fertility differences do exist among Muslims and among Christians. To speak of Muslim-Christian fertility differences is, therefore, misleading. Secondly, religious fertility differentials, based on cumulative fertility, are dependent on the level of wife's education. At low levels of wife's education, differentials are great; at high levels, religious differentials in fertility are insignificant. These findings are believed to be of importance not only to researchers concerned with religious fertility differentials, but also to those concerned with framing population policies in countries where religious composition is a sensitive matter.

Religious Differentials in Fertility: Lebanon, 1971

Research has been conduted to determine define and explain the effects of religious affiliation on fertility with specific reference to a multireligious society. Data from the 1971 National Fertility and Family Planning Survey conducted by the Lebanon Family Planning Association have been evaluated and 2 major results have been found i.e. significant fertility differences do exist among Muslim and Christian sects and religious fertility differentials based on cumulative fertility are dependent on the level of socioeconomic status as measured by the wifes education. When education levels are low differentials are great; when education levels are high religious fertility differentials are negligible. These results suggest that religion may be an important characteristic in differentiating fertility behavior but only at certain socioeconomic levels. In countries where religious composition is a sensitive issue these results may have significant implications on population policymakers.

Comment on J. Blake’s “Can we Believe Recent Data on Birth Expectations in the United States?”

In her recent article on the family size values of U. S. women, Blake repeats the warning that current low fertility may be transitory. Her caution is appropriate, and her data document some interesting aspects of pronatalist values. Nevertheless, there are several points in Blake's interpretation of these data that warrant comment. These will be considered, following the outline of her article. 1. Blake proposes that the increase in the two-child has been too rapid to represent real change in values and consequently attributes this increase to the effects of propaganda. Yet, as she acknowledges subsequently, the proportion favoring would be expected to increase rapidly with decreases in ideal family size, given the value that families should have at least children. Furthermore, the thesis that a sudden wave of propaganda has caused the declines in family size ideals seems plausible only when ideals are considered in isolation. Behavior patterns have been harbinger of this concentration at two for several decades. Parity progression ratios at the higher orders have declined rather consistently, even over the baby-boom cohorts. This seems to be an example of changes in vague cultural values lagging behind pragmatic adaptations in behavior. 2. Attention is called to remarkable for large families. Measurement problems aside, this discussion treats tolerance as if it were the primary force affecting fert-ility. This is curious perspective from one of the authors of the classic Social Structure and Fertility (Davis and Blake, 1956). It is easy to envision society in which virtually no one has more than children, and yet most would tolerate considerably larger families or even consider them ideal for others. In what way is tolerance for families of more than five children any less consistent with two-child than with three-child average family size preference? If normative constraint were the primary force, then we should have to explain why we see so little of the five-child family; and for that we would have to look beyond the ZPG movement of the last several years. 3. Further evidence is offered concerning the aversion to childlessness and the only child. This is, indeed, an important issue among factors relevant to future fertility trends, and the evidence for such norm is impressive. It seems unnecessary to imply further that those who said childless family was too small also meant that the one-child family was too small (p. 34), or to assume that since there was no religious differential, the Catholic responses to this question were more biased than the nonCatholic responses (p. 35). Some couples do, in fact, intentionally remain childless or have an only child, and there is strong evidence as well for the convergence of religious differentials in fertility (Westoff and Bumpass, 1973; Ryder, 1973). The complex issue at hand is whether, in spite of strong normative

Residency differentials in Mormon fertility

Abstract Although one of the most consistent findings of recent fertility studies is the convergence of the religious differentials in fertility, few data have been analysed to discover Mormon fertility trends and differentials. This paper, based on data obtained on 1,001 Mormon couples, is concerned with describing the effects that the dispersion of Mormon families from the Mormon centre in Utah to surrounding areas with various social conditions is having on the fertility of the re-located Mormon families. Data presented clearly show that such families do, on the average, have a lower fertility than do their Mormon contemporaries residing in the homogeneous Mormon society in Utah. They probably compromise their religious obligations to have children with the contradicting demands of their new environment. Their loyalty to these religious beliefs, however, is confirmed by data which show that they tend to have larger families in their new environments than do their non-Mormon neighbours.

Religious Fertility Differentials in Thailand, 1960

Religious Fertility Differentials in Thailand, 1960

A further look at catholic fertility

The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which suburbanization has influenced the traditional fertility differences observed between Catholics and Protestants. It is hypothesized that suburbanization has served to decrease religious differences in fertility, since in the more advanced stages of urbanism, that is, suburbanization, the Catholic population is likely to adopt the fertility patterns of the larger and more secularized society. Attention is focused on two objectives: (1) to examine selected aspects of fertility for Catholic8 and Protestants living in metropolitan areas and (2) to analyze religious differentials in fertility among residents in different parts of the metropolitan community.The data, consisting of a sample of households in six metropolitan areas in three population size classes, supported the general findings pertaining to religious differences in fertility that have been reported in the literature. Catholics had larger families, shorter average spacing between children, and longer fertility spans when compared to Protestants, even when a number of control variables were employed. Examining fertility differences between Catholics and Protestants in central city and suburban segments of large and small metropolitan areas, we found that the data indicated that marked Catholic-Protestant differences are still found in central cities. However, fertility differences between the two religious groups tended largely to disappear among suburban residents. The convergence in the fertility patterns of suburbanites is due to combined effects of higher fertility among Protestant suburban residents when compared to central city Protestants and the tendency of suburban Catholics to have fewer children than those who live in the city. The net result is convergence in suburban fertility.

Socio-Economic Factors in Religious Differentials in Fertility

Precision matching is used to test whether religious differences in fertility behavior result from socio-economic differences between the major religious groups. The 66 Jewish couples from a national sample survey of fertility are matched with Catholic and Protestant couples on duration of marriage and five socio-economic characteristics. These socio-economic controls eliminate most of the Protestant-Jewish differences for the fertility variables. However the Catholic-Jewish differentials are not reduced. Apparently the distinctive Catholic fertility pattern cannot be explained by the combination of socio-economic characteristics considered. The significance of these results is discussed. (authors)

Religious Differentials in the Net Reproduction Rate

C ONSIDERABLE information is available about differentials in the fertility rate in the United States and in numerous foreign countries.' Nevertheless, in two respects the field of fertility differentials in the United States needs further study: (a) in regard to possible religious differentials at any given time, and (b) in regard to possible trends in these religious differentials. It is the purpose here to attempt to study the net reproduction rates of Roman Catholic and Jewish stocks in this country, and trends in these rates. Several studies have been made in an attempt to measure religious differentials in fertility,2 and all of them have shown the Catholics to have higher fertility than the non-Catholics. However, of all these studies, only one, Stouffer's, made any attempt to hold constant the factors of age, urbanism, and economic status, three factors which are known to influence fertility greatly. With these three factors held constant, Stouffer found the Catholic birth rate to be higher than that of comparable non-Catholics, but he also found that the former fell much faster than the non-Catholic rate during the 1920's, and gave every evidence of soon overtaking the latter. The results of this present study corroborate, in general, Stouffer's findings. Prior to 1930, Catholicism may have been a factor tending to raise the birth rate. The fertility of the Roman Catholics, however, appears to be decreasing rapidly, so that by 1930 their fertility appears to have closely approached that of the non-Catholics.