Relevant Proposition Research Articles

Bare statistical evidence and the legitimacy of software-based judicial decisions

Can the evidence provided by software systems meet the standard of proof for civil or criminal cases, and is it individualized evidence? Or, to the contrary, do software systems exclusively provide bare statistical evidence? In this paper, we argue that there are cases in which evidence in the form of probabilities computed by software systems is not bare statistical evidence, and is thus able to meet the standard of proof. First, based on the case of State v. Loomis, we investigate recidivism predictions provided by software systems used in the courtroom. Here, we raise problems for software systems that provide predictions that are based on bare statistical evidence. Second, by examining the case of People v. Chubbs, we argue that the statistical evidence provided by software systems in cold hit DNA cases may in some cases suffice for individualized evidence, on a view on which individualized evidence is evidence that normically supports the relevant proposition (Smith, in Mind 127:1193–1218, 2018).

Excessive testimony: When less is more

AbstractThis paper identifies two distinct dimensions of what might be called testimonial strength: first, in the case of testimony from more than one speaker, testimony can be said to be stronger to the extent that a greater proportion of the speakers give identical testimony; second, in both single‐speaker and multi‐speaker testimony, testimony can be said to be stronger to the extent that each speaker expresses greater conviction in the relevant proposition. These two notions of testimonial strength have received scant attention in the philosophical literature so far, presumably because it has been thought that whatever lessons we learn from thinking about testimony as a binary phenomenon will apply mutatis mutandis to varying strengths of testimony. This paper shows that this will not work for either of the two aforementioned dimensions of testimonial strength, roughly because less testimony can provide more justification in a way that can only be explained by appealing to the (non‐binary) strength of the testimony itself. The paper also argues that this result undermines some influential versions of non‐reductionism about testimonial justification.

Saying, Commitment, and the Lying-Misleading Distinction

How can we capture the intuitive distinction between lying and misleading? According to a traditional view, the difference boils down to whether the speaker is saying (as opposed to implying) something that they believe to be false. This view is subject to known objections; to overcome them, an alternative view has emerged. For the alternative view, what matters is whether the speaker can consistently deny that they are committed to knowing the relevant proposition. We point out serious flaws for this alternative view, and sketch a simpler alternative that incorporates key insights of the traditional view.

Proper Social and Epistemic Expectations In Speech Exchange: Reply to Goldberg

I first list what I consider to be the main virtues of Goldberg’s novel and challenging account of epistemic pressure in speech exchange. I then zoom in on proper doxastic responses to assertions in conversations and argue that they comprise four things: (1) one believes the position that is testified to rather than just seeking, ensuring, trying, or aiming to believe the testifier on that proposition; (2) one believes the testifier; in other words, one wrongs the speaker not only if one disbelieves her but also when one simply fails to believe her; (3) one believes the relevant proposition rather than merely accepting, presuming, assuming, or displaying some positive propositional attitude that does not imply belief; (4) one believes the proposition in question to a sufficiently high degree. Finally, I explore how we should make sense of the epistemic partiality that friendship seems to come with. I argue that it is not merely that one seeks evidence in support of the assertion of one’s friend or an interpretation that affirms the testimony of one’s friend. It is also that one actually lowers the evidential bar for rationally or epistemically justifiedly believing their testimony.

How obligatory irrelevance, symmetric alternatives, and dense scales conspire: The case of modified numerals and ignorance

Buccola & Haida (2019) explore the consequences of a semantic-pragmatic theory in which relevance is closed under speaker belief. A primary consequence of this closure condition, they show, is that the Maxim of Quantity commits speakers to expressing their epistemic state about every relevant proposition. We argue that this commitment, dubbed Strong Epistemic Transparency, explains the contrast in ignorance inferences exhibited by non-strict comparative expressions like at least vs. strict ones like more than (hence the class A/B distinction of Nouwen 2010). We also discuss how our analysis might be extended to account for the observations of Cummins, Sauerland & Solt (2012) and Enguehard (2018) that the modifier more than does not block scalar inferences of round numerals.

Comparative Analysis of Rainfall Prediction Models Using Machine Learning in Islands with Complex Orography: Tenerife Island

We present a comparative study between predictive monthly rainfall models for islands of complex orography using machine learning techniques. The models have been developed for the island of Tenerife (Canary Islands). Weather forecasting is influenced both by the local geographic characteristics as well as by the time horizon comprised. Accuracy of mid-term rainfall prediction on islands with complex orography is generally low when carried out with atmospheric models. Predictive models based on algorithms such as Random Forest or Extreme Gradient Boosting among others were analyzed. The predictors used in the models include weather predictors measured in two main meteorological stations, reanalysis predictors from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the global predictor North Atlantic Oscillation, all of them obtained over a period of time of more than four decades. When comparing the proposed models, we evaluated accuracy, kappa and interpretability of the model obtained, as well as the relevance of the predictors used. The results show that global predictors such as the North Atlantic Oscillation Index (NAO) have a very low influence, while the local Geopotential Height (GPH) predictor is relatively more important. Machine learning prediction models are a relevant proposition for predicting medium-term precipitation in similar geographical regions.

Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?

AbstractIs knowledge consistent with literally any credence in the relevant proposition, including credence 0? Of course not. But is credence 0 the only credence in p that entails that you don't know that p? Knowledge entails belief (most epistemologists think), and it's impossible to believe that p while having credence 0 in p. Is it true that, for every value of ‘x,’ if it's impossible to know that p while having credence x in p, this is simply because it's impossible to believe that p while having credence x in p? If so, is it possible to believe that p while having (say) credence 0.4 in p? These questions aren't standard epistemological fare—at least in part because many epistemologists think their answers are obvious—but they have unanticipated consequences for epistemology. Let ‘improbabilism’ name the thesis that it's possible to know that p while having a credence in p below 0.5. Improbabilism will strike many epistemologists as absurd, but careful reflection on these questions reveals that, if improbabilism is false, then all of the most plausible theories of knowledge are also false. Or so I shall argue in this paper. Since improbabilism is widely rejected by epistemologists (at least implicitly), this paper reveals a tension between all of the most plausible theories of knowledge and a widespread assumption in epistemology.

How the UK´s Macmillan's “World's Biggest Coffee Morning” Has Raised £200 Million (US $282 Million) Since 1990

Amount raised: The World's Biggest Coffee Morning (WBCM) is Macmillan's flagship fundraising event raising £200 (US $282) million since its inception in the United Kingdom in 1990. Aim: Behind the success of WBCM, one of the UK's biggest fundraising events, lies a simple ask: get together with friends, colleagues and neighbors for a coffee morning and raise money for Macmillan Cancer Support. Strategy/Tactics: Our strategy focuses on marketing, both to existing and new hosts, and the development of a fully integrated, multichannel campaign. A collaborative approach is required to achieve growth across all areas of the organization, with celebrity endorsement, PR, and activity with corporate partners such as MandS helping to further drive awareness and income. Program process: Supporters register to receive their free Coffee Morning Kit and host a Coffee Morning at their chosen venue. While there are several weird and wonderful twists on the event, most hosts choose to serve coffee, cake and other treats in return for donations to Macmillan. Coffee Morning takes place on the last Friday in September each year (although supporters can host on any day that suits them) with the majority holding their event on this day. Costs and returns: The expenditure as a proportion of the amount we raise is roughly 30 p in the £1, the return on investment is £3.39 raised for every £1 invested. What was learned: Our experience shows that our key drivers to success are: Using research and insight to drive strategy: In 2011, we undertook a large research piece to understand who the audience were, their motivations for taking part and this was used to (a) develop a relevant proposition which met supporters' needs and (b) identify the key target market. Measurable, direct response activity across channels: using the right channels to reach the target market (e.g., direct mail to our existing hosts and an ATL campaign), including TV, to reach new hosts. Recognizing importance of retention and supporter experience: delivering a relevant, tailored experience to supporters that adds value. Ease of participation: no training over heavy commitment is needed - it can be as simple as buying a few cakes for neighbors to huge community events open to the public.

AGAINST THE ITERATED KNOWLEDGE ACCOUNT OF HIGH-STAKES CASES

ABSTRACTOne challenge for moderate invariantists is to explain why we tend to deny knowledge to subjects in high stakes when the target propositions seem to be inappropriate premises for practical reasoning. According to an account suggested by Williamson, our intuitive judgments are erroneous due to an alleged failure to acknowledge the distinction between first-order and higher-order knowledge: the high-stakes subject lacks the latter but possesses the former. In this paper, I provide three objections to Williamson's account: (i) his account delivers counterintuitive verdicts about what it is appropriate for a high-stakes subject to do; (ii) the high-stakes subject doesn't need iterated knowledge in order to be regarded as appropriately relying on the relevant proposition in practical reasoning; (iii) Williamson's account doesn't provide a good explanation of why the high-stakes subject would be blameworthy if she were relying on the relevant proposition in her practical reasoning.

Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts

This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition and proposes an explanation of why we have a faulty intuition. The second response, which we favor, accommodates all three intuitions; it reconciles the first and the third intuition by the dual component model of justification, and defends the second intuition by distinguishing two principles of epistemic closure.

Fubini’s Theorem on Measure

Summary The purpose of this article is to show Fubini’s theorem on measure [16], [4], [7], [15], [18]. Some theorems have the possibility of slight generalization, but we have priority to avoid the complexity of the description. First of all, for the product measure constructed in [14], we show some theorems. Then we introduce the section which plays an important role in Fubini’s theorem, and prove the relevant proposition. Finally we show Fubini’s theorem on measure.

Revelation as Testimony: A Philosophical-Theological Study by Mats Wahlberg

Reviewed by: Revelation as Testimony: A Philosophical-Theological Study by Mats Wahlberg Matthew Levering Revelation as Testimony: A Philosophical-Theological Study by Mats Wahlberg (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), x + 246 pp. This book makes two interrelated arguments: divine revelation involves propositional knowledge, and faith on the basis of testimony is rationally warranted. In his introduction, Wahlberg notes that it is now commonplace to emphasize that "revelation" occurs in historical events, not in the words or propositions that mediate revelation. Wahlberg grants that revelation involves an encounter with a person, Jesus Christ, but he makes clear that the propositional element cannot be excised. He also notes that the act of faith, by which we believe on the authority of the divine revealer, is now often set in opposition to reason, which proceeds largely without appeals to authority. This way of differentiating faith and reason is a mistake, since it is reasonable to believe things on the basis of testimony, as faith does. After this introduction, the second chapter focuses on revelation and propositional knowledge. Wahlberg begins by pointing out that a non-propositional revelation would have difficulty in defending the claim that the revelation comes from "God." Since non-propositional revelation could give no propositional knowledge about God, believers could suppose that the revelation comes from "God" only on the basis of an incommunicable personal experience or intuition, or on the basis of a strong natural theology, which those who deny propositional revelation are unlikely to affirm. Christian belief in the self-revealing God would thus be a pure fideism, impossible to defend rationally. [End Page 334] Furthermore, how could a personal relationship with God be established unless one knows something (inevitably as expressed in a proposition) about God? Wahlberg astutely observes that "the object of knowledge always includes some proposition; it is never merely, say, a physical object" (27). Propositions involve concepts, and we cannot think without concepts. It follows that, in order to know God personally, we must have some true propositional or conceptual knowledge about him. As Wahlberg states, "if there are no true propositions about God that we can grasp, then God cannot have personal communion with us" (28). These propositions must be ones that uniquely specify God, who is the transcendent source of all creatures. What about "manifestational" revelation, in which something is revealed without words? Even in such a case, says Wahlberg, propositions are involved because "God, or any agent, cannot make knowledge of some reality available to a subject except by making knowledge of some proposition available" (30). When God manifests himself without words, we cannot know that God is doing so or has done so without propositional knowledge. Wahlberg gives the following example: "if God manifestationally reveals that he loves a certain person—for instance, by making her feel his love in a mystical experience—then it is the receiver of that revelation who must conceptualize the relevant proposition (that God loves her) herself" (32). For this reason, even a "manifestational" revelation is in a certain sense propositional, although, in propositional revelation that involves words, the revealer is more fully in charge of the meaning of the revelation. Wahlberg also notes that the symbolic language of prophecy and parable should not be contrasted with propositional revelation, since metaphors and symbols in fact have a central role in propositional communication. Nor should the information provided by propositional revelation be thought to be opposed to spiritual transformation. On the contrary, the latter requires some propositional knowledge. In the case of the self-revelation of God, since "it is highly doubtful that infinity (and other theistic properties) can be represented in experiences" (45), God's own propositional testimony is needed for us to know that it is God who is revealing himself. To buttress this case, the third chapter reviews various ways of understanding revelation, following Avery Dulles's fivefold typology in his Models of Revelation: doctrine, history, inner experience, dialectical presence, and new awareness. Doctrine is obviously propositional. Regarding history, we can know that something is an act [End Page 335] of God only if God tells us so; otherwise, the most we would be warranted in affirming is that a very powerful...

Functional Approach to Data Mining, Forecasting, and Uncertainty Quantification

This article, written by Special Publications Editor Adam Wilson, contains highlights of paper SPE 174849, “Functional Approach to Data Mining, Forecasting, and Uncertainty Quantification in Unconventional Reservoirs,” by Ognjen Grujic, Stanford University; Carla Da Silva, Anadarko Petroleum; and Jef Caers, Stanford University, prepared for the 2015 SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition, Houston, 28–30 September. The paper has not been peer reviewed. The difficulty in applying traditional reservoir-simulation and -modeling techniques for unconventional-reservoir forecasting makes the use of statistical and modern machine-learning techniques a relevant proposition. However, the most current applications of these techniques often ignore the systematic time variations in production-decline rates. This paper proposes a nonparametric statistical approach, using a modern technique termed functional data analysis (FDA). In FDA, production data are modeled as a time series composed of a sum of weighted smooth analytical basis functions. Introduction Many companies have adopted a so-called “data-centric process” for understanding and forecasting in unconventional reservoirs. This datacentric process comes as a consequence of the shortcomings of conventional reservoir-data-analysis and -modeling approaches, which mostly belong to the preshale era. Either the huge quantity of data collected in shales cannot be used fully with conventional modeling techniques or the rapid nature of shale development simply does not allow for lengthy reservoir-modeling and -simulation studies. Decision variables in shales are rates or volumes of produced hydrocarbons. Therefore, understanding shales and identifying value-creating practices by use of data-driven techniques require proper handling of production-time series. This is often challenging because production time series come as noisy, discrete observations of production rates over time. Conventional approaches to this problem rely on parameterizing the system with decline curves and work in the parameter space of the assumed decline model, or, even simpler, work with the raw data. This paper takes an alternative nonparametric approach wherein the data are used to find the most-appropriate smooth and continuous representation of declining production time series. The approach for this nonparametric form relies on the statistical discipline termed FDA. FDA allows for the exploration of stochastic variation in functional data and construction of low-dimensional representations of time series. In the context of shale production, these low-dimensional representations will enable a better understanding of relationships between the wells and, in conjunction with a distance-based generalized sensitivity analysis (DGSA), identification of the most-influential completion and reservoir parameters. Additionally, FDA enables formulation of a forecasting framework with high-dimensional Kriging-based regression, to produce best-guess estimates of the entire production profiles for new well locations.

PRECLINICAL EVALUATION OF CELASTROL AS A PHARMACOLOGICAL DRUG CANDIDATE FOR INFARCT SIZE REDUCTION

Following myocardial infarction (MI), reperfusion of the culprit coronary contributes to infarct expansion by inducing ischemia-reperfusion (I/R) injury. The perspective of a potent pharmacological treatment that reduces the deleterious impact of I/R represents a clinically relevant proposition for MI patients. Our group discovered the potent infarct-sparing effects of the natural compound Celastrol. We showed that Celastrol improves survival of cardiomyocytes exposed to hypoxic and oxidative stresses replicating ischemic myocardium and reduces infarct size in the rat heart (permanent coronary occlusion). The objective here is to evaluate Celastrol’s potency to reduce I/R damage at the whole heart level in ex vivo Langendorff with precise hemodynamic measurements.

An Improved Product Theorem for Fractional Fourier Transform

The paper suggests a better product theorem for fractional Fourier transform (FrFt), which is more precise and relevant proposition than existing models.

Neo-Paganism, Animism, and Kinship with Nature

‘Love for and kinship with nature’ is the first principle of the Pagan Federation and putatively provides the foundation for contemporary Western Pagans’ relationships with the natural environment and other-than-human beings. This article explores the meanings of kinship with nature and animism for neo-Pagans and asks whether expressions of such a worldview are more than metaphorical, rhetorical or simply wishful. The meanings for some indigenous animist peoples are discussed and compared with neo-Pagan understandings. The article concludes that kinship with nature is meaningful for most neo-Pagans largely within the domains of religious belief, ritual, and recreational activity; it does not usually determine the rules of everyday life in the ways it does, or traditionally did, for indigenous animist peoples. This is not to say that it is not a relevant or useful proposition in the modern or postmodern world. A neo-Pagan worldview provides a model of social relations among ‘people’ of all kinds, along with an ideological and motivational charter for human action which has urgent, contemporary ecological relevance.

Sympathy and Insight in Aristotle'sPoetics

Usually when we feel we have learned something from a novel or play, it is the story itself that strikes us as illuminating, and in a direct way that needs no help from an outside authority. Anna Karenina does not offer a mere conjecture about how dangerous it can be to fall in love, so that we now need to verify that suggestion by asking an expert. Nor do we feel we are relying on Leo Tolstoy as our authority on love, in the way you might rely on a doctor's authority on a question of health. It is the story itself that seems to teach us something. It draws us in, and by the time we get to the end of it, it is as though what we have been through is not just a reading experience but a series of events encountered at first hand, from which we have emerged wiser than we were before. This is philosophically puzzling, because it suggests that we learn from fiction in something like the way we learn directly from life. In the latter case the learning experience is perceptual: things happen to us and we take them in, thereby discovering what the world is like. But in the fictional case the sequence of events we encounter as we read has been invented by the writer, so even if we feel as though we are experiencing these events at first hand, we are not really perceiving them and therefore not acquiring perceptual knowledge. A natural response to this is to say that we learn from fiction only insofar as it serves as a vehicle by which writers pass on what they have learned through experience or some other means. But then we are confronted by a dilemma. For either we already know, as we read, that what is being conveyed in the writing is true, in which case it teaches us nothing, or we do not know it is true, in which case we have no way of identifying it as the truth, so we still learn nothing.1 It appears that the only way past this problemcall it the problem of verificationis either to say that we accept what the writing conveys on trust or else treat it as conjectural, hence something that remains in need of confirmation. But on neither of these options does the writing stand by itself as a source of knowledge, so accepting either option means abandoning our original intuition that fiction can be a self-sufficient source of knowledge. There are those who will simply accept this consequence. According to them, when we learn from fiction it must be either because we have picked up knowledge which the writer has, intentionally or otherwise, transferred into his writing or because we have formed a conjecture from the writing and gone on to confirm it via a further source.2 In the latter case, however, we have not really learned from the writing itself but from that further source. So if we follow this line of thinking, then whenever we genuinely learn from fiction, it must happen according to the first route: we acquire knowledge from fiction when it serves as a conduit for what the writer already knows. I will call this the conduit view. A defender of the conduit view does not have to say that when we learn from a piece of fiction by accepting a propositional truth implicit in the work or by taking to heart an accurate description of some aspect of the real world that the writer implicitly asserted the proposition in question or presented the description as accurately illustrating an aspect of the real world. The conduit view only requires that in learning from the work we treat the relevant proposition or description as if the writer were asserting something true or illustrating an actual feature of the world. We learn from the writing, on this view, when the proposition or description

On the production of hydrogen via alkaline electrolysis during off-peak periods

This article studies the opportunity for producing hydrogen via alkaline electrolysis from electricity consumption during off-peak periods. Two aspects will be discussed: electricity spot markets and nuclear electricity production in France. From a market point of view, when there is a significant fluctuation in electricity prices, the use of an electrolysis installation during off-peak periods makes it possible to make quite considerable savings in production costs. Savings vary enormously from one market to the next; some highly fluctuating markets offer very low off-peak prices and allow for viable hydrogen production, even if average electricity prices first appear to be quite high. Very fluctuating spot prices market may be difficult to predict and makes operations of an electrolysis installation more complicated and risky. For other more stable markets, the use of an electrolysis installation during off-peak periods does not appear to be a relevant proposition. From the point of view of French electricity production, the availability of current nuclear power plants and the estimation of available energy for mass production of hydrogen show that the installations studied would not be viable. For “peak period” use, it would certainly be more useful to have electrolysers with a lower investment proportion, even if this means slightly higher operating costs. Research into large-capacity electrolysers should, therefore, both develop low-production-cost electrolysers, for use in base load mode where dedicated production means are concerned, and highly flexible electrolysers, with low investment costs, which could easily be viable with low rates of use.

Due Process Traditionalism

In important cases, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of "substantive due process" by reference to tradition, but it has yet to explain why it has done so. Due process traditionalism might be defended in several distinctive ways. The most ambitious defense draws on a set of ideas associated with Edmund Burke and Friedrich Hayek, who suggested that traditions have special credentials by virtue of their acceptance by many minds. But this defense runs into three problems. Those who have participated in a tradition may not have accepted any relevant proposition; they might suffer from a systematic bias; and they might have joined a cascade. An alternative defense sees due process traditionalism as a second-best substitute for two preferable alternatives: a purely procedural approach to the Due Process Clause, and an approach that gives legislatures the benefit of every reasonable doubt. But it is not clear that in these domains, the first-best approaches are especially attractive; and even if they are, the second-best may be an unacceptably crude substitute. The most plausible defense of due process traditionalism operates on rule-consequentialist grounds, with the suggestion that even if traditions are not great, they are often good, and judges do best if they defer to traditions rather than attempting to specify the content of "liberty" on their own. But the rule-consequentialist defense depends on controversial and probably false assumptions about the likely goodness of traditions and the institutional incapacities of judges.

Hepatocyte transplantation: State of the art

Advances in biotechnology have allowed hepatocyte transplantation as a relevant proposition to treat liver disease. This procedure may change the crescent mortality in liver transplantation waiting lists due global organ shortage. Recent clinical trials have described promising results of hepatocyte transplantation for acute, acute-on-chronic and metabolic liver disease. In this report, we discuss progresses regarding hepatocyte culture, cryopreservation systems, hepatocyte immortalization, suitable recipient site for hepatocyte engraftment, cell differentiation and fusion into hepatocytes, current clinical trials, and summarize the bioartificial liver systems. These progressions motivate expectation concerning hepatocyte transplantation as a consistent therapy for liver disease.