Regulatory Choices Research Articles

Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices

This survey paper examines various information insufficiencies in biodiversity conservation and their impact of regulatory choices. We surveyed the literature in the field and identified four major types of informational insufficiencies in making efficient biodiversity conservation decisions: 1) biological uncertainty 2) natural uncertainty 3) individual information, and 4) monitoring problem. The consequences of these four types of information insufficiencies on the choice of regulatory tools are explored. We discuss in this context three types of regulatory tools: land takings, environmental fees/charges, and contracts. The efficiency of each type of regulatory tools is shown dependent on the specific informational constraints that the regulatory faces.

Dynamic regulation and entry in telecommunications markets: a policy framework

We analyze a repeated setting of an asymmetric, differentiated telecommunications market with an incumbent and an entrant. The entrant may roll out its own network or use parts of the incumbent's network. The incumbent is established in the market, while the entrant gradually builds up a track record for quality. We investigate different entry strategies and regulatory policies and discuss entrants' incentives to invest in network depending on regulatory choices.

Against 'Individual Risk': A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment

Individual currently plays a major role in risk assessment and in the regulatory practices of the health and safety agencies that employ risk assessment, such as EPA, FDA, OSHA, NRC, CPSC, and others. Risk assessors use the term to mean the number of deaths caused by some hazard. By contrast, is the incremental probability of death that the hazard imposes on some particular person. Regulatory decision procedures keyed to individual risk are widespread. This is true both for the regulation of toxic chemicals (the heartland of risk assessment), and for other health hazards, such as radiation and pathogens; and regulatory agencies are now beginning to employ individual risk criteria for evaluating safety threats, such as occupational injuries. Sometimes, agencies look to the risk imposed on the maximally exposed individual; in other contexts, the regulatory focus is on the average individual's risk, or perhaps the risk of a person incurring an above-average but nonmaximal exposure. Sometimes, agencies seek to regulate hazards so as to reduce the individual risk level (to the maximally exposed, high-end, or average individual) below 1 in 1 million. Sometimes, instead, a risk level of 1 in 100,000 or 1 in 10,000 or even 1 in 1000 is seen as de minimis. In short, the construct of individual risk plays a variety of decisional roles, but the construct itself is quite pervasive.This Article launches a systematic critique of agency decisionmaking keyed to individual risk. Part I unpacks the construct, and shows how it invokes a frequentist rather than Bayesian conception of probability. Part II surveys agency practice, describing the wide range of regulatory contexts where individual risk levels are wholly or partly determinative of agency choice: these include most of the EPA's major programs for regulating toxins (air pollutants under the Clean Air Act, water pollutants under the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act, toxic waste dumps under the Superfund statute, hazardous wastes under RCRA, and pesticides under FIFRA) as well as the FDA's regulation of food safety, OSHA regulation of workplace health and safety risks, NRC licensing of nuclear reactors, and the CPSC's regulation of risky consumer products.In the remainder of the Article, I demonstrate that frequentist individual risk is a problematic basis for regulatory choice, across a range of moral views. Part III focuses on welfare consequentialism: the moral view underlying welfare economics and cost-benefit analysis. I argue that the sort of risk relevant to welfare consequentialism is Bayesian, not frequentist. Part IV explores the subtle, but crucial difference between frequentist and Bayesian risk. Part V moves beyond cost-benefit analysis and examines nonwelfarist moral views: specifically, safety-focused, deontological, contractualist, and democratic views. Here too, I suggest, regulatory reliance on frequentist individual risk should be seen as problematic. Part VI argues that current practices (as described at length in Part II) are doubly misguided: not only do they focus on frequentist rather than Bayesian risk, but they are also insensitive to population size.In short, the Article provides a wide ranging, critical analysis of contemporary risk assessment and risk regulation. The perspective offered here is that of the sympathetic critic. Risk assessment itself - the enterprise of quantifying health and safety threats - represents a great leap forward for public rationality, and should not be abandoned. Rather, the current conception of risk assessment needs to be reworked. Risk needs to be seen in Bayesian rather than frequentist terms. And regulatory choice procedures must be driven by population risk or some other measure of the seriousness of health and safety hazards that is sensitive to the size of the exposed population - not the risk that some particular person (whatever her place in the exposure distribution) incurs.

Dynamic Regulation and Entry in Telecommunications Markets: A Policy Framework

We analyze a repeated setting of an asymmetric, differentiated telecommunications market with an incumbent and an entrant. The entrant may roll out its own network or use parts of the incumbent's network. The incumbent is established in the market, while the entrant gradually builds up a track record for quality. We investigate different entry strategies and regulatory policies and discuss entrants' incentives to invest in network depending on regulatory choices.

Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety

Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety

The Political Economy of Partisan Regimes: Lessons from Two Republican ErasThe Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900. By Richard Franklin Bensel Presidents, Parties, and the State: A Party System Perspective on Democratic Regulatory Choice, 1884-1936. By Scott C. James Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre. By David R. Mayhew

The Political Economy of Partisan Regimes: Lessons from Two Republican Eras<i>The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900</i>. By Richard Franklin Bensel <i>Presidents, Parties, and the State: A Party System Perspective on Democratic Regulatory Choice, 1884-1936</i>. By Scott C. James <i>Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre</i>. By David R. Mayhew

Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation

Is death a harm? Is the of death a harm? These questions lie at the foundations of regulation. Agencies that regulate threats to human life, such as the EPA, OSHA, the FDA, the CPSC, or NHTSA, invariably assume that premature death is a first-party harm - a welfare setback to the person who dies - and often assume that being at of death is a distinct and additional first-party harm. If these assumptions are untrue, the myriad statutes and regulations that govern risky activities should be radically overhauled, since the third-party benefits of preventing premature death and the of premature death are often too small to justify the large compliance costs that these laws create. In this Article, I consider the harmfulness of death, and of the of death, in a philosophically rigorous way. The analysis is complicated, since a variety of plausible theories of welfare have been proposed, and since too is a multifaceted concept. A given person P's risk of death might be in a Bayesian sense (some person's subjective probability that P will die), or in the frequentist sense (the objective frequency with which persons like P die prematurely as a result of the kind of threat to which P is exposed). These two conceptions of are very different, yet too often are not distinguished in legal or policy-analytic writing about risk. As for the harmfulness of death: this raises knotty philosophical problems, problems that have prompted some contemporary philosophers to deny that the dying person is worse off than she would have been had she continued to live. I ultimately conclude that death is a first-person welfare setback - common sense is vindicated here, I argue - as is in the Bayesian sense, but that in the frequentist sense is not. This conclusion has implications for a range of regulatory practices - specifically, for cost-benefit analysis, risk-risk analysis, the interpretation of statutes that create health or safety thresholds, environmental justice policy, and comparative analysis - and also for tort and criminal law. These implications are explored, at length, in the final section of the Article. In particular: the widespread use of frequentist measures as a determinant of regulatory choice is misguided. EPA, OSHA, FDA and other federal and state agencies typically determine how stringently to regulate some toxin by looking (at least in part) to the frequentist imposed by the toxin on the maximally exposed, highly exposed, or representative individual. Similarly, environmental justice analysis is often keyed to the distribution of frequentist risks. And some propose that regulatory priority-setting (so-called comparative assessment) also take into consideration frequentist risk. This regulatory focus on frequentist was encouraged by the Supreme Court's seminal decision in the Benzene case (Industrial Union Dept v. American Petroleum Institute, 1980), and is endorsed by the assessment community. But the practice has no normative basis, and should be abandoned. Similarly, risk-imposition in the frequentist sense should be neither tortious nor criminal - at least if harmfulness is a precondition for liability in these domains, as it may well be.

Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment

This paper analyzes the relevance and the scope of price squeeze tests in a regulatory environment. We distinguish between three types of ex ante regulation (full, partial or no regulation) to identify regulatory squeezes, predatory squeezes, and squeezes as foreclosure. We argue that policy makers should (i) use price squeeze tests as an ex post instrument, compatible with the ex ante regulatory environment, and (ii) focus on predatory price squeezes. We propose a predatory squeeze test that respects regulatory choices that have been made previously, in contrast with the earlier proposed tests. We extend our framework to ask at which aggregation level predatory price squeeze tests ought to be applied, a much-debated issue in telecommunications.

Regulatory Choices and Commitment: Challenges for Electricity Market Regulation in Kosovo

This article describes choices to be made in selecting and implementing a reform model for the electricity industry and derives some implications for the situation in Kosovo. The article argues that the appropriate reform model depends on the circumstances in the jurisdiction being considered. Especially in small and less developed electricity systems, a dilemma may emerge: the technical circumstances suggest the implementation of a model with few competitive elements, whereas political circumstances urge a competition-oriented model. Hence, especially in small systems, a delicate trade-off emerges that significantly complicates the decisions to be made. This is obviously relevant for Kosovo. International opening of Kosovo's electricity market may provide a solution to the dilemma. This would encompass a reduction of state sovereignty for electricity regulation and wide-reaching market opening for private investors and electricity traders.

Les Américains ont-ils accepté les OGM ? Analyse comparée de la construction des OGM comme problème public en France et aux États-Unis

Have the Americans accepted GMOs ? A comparative analysis of the construction of GMOs as a public problem in France and the USA How can one explain that the use of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) in food and agriculture poses a problem in France, where they are hardly used, yet seems to be taken for granted in the US, where their use is widespread ? Many observers see this as a sign that American consumers have accepted transgenic foods, due to a different attitude to risks, food and nature. The present article rejects that explanation. It presents a comparative analysis of the trajectory of GMOs as a public problem in France and the US, showing that very similar arguments were put forward by opponents to GMOs on both sides of the Atlantic, and that conflicts between opponents and defenders have focussed on the same issues : (i) food labeling ; (ii) the link between the choice of a technique (GMOs) and that of an economic system (intensive agriculture, capitalism) ; and (iii) the appropriate framework for evaluating risks. But whereas in France (and more generally in Europe), opponents' arguments crystallized during specific key controversies, and contributed towards the definition of the cognitive and normative dimensions of GMOs as a public problem, this did not occur in the US. Three factors seem to explain this difference : (i) very different regulatory choices made in the late 1980s (based on processes in Europe and on products in the US) ; (ii) the fact that the usefulness of transgenic plants is perceived negatively in France whereas their association with the intensive export agriculture project is perceived positively in the US ; and (iii) the growing influence of a broader, "constructive" framework for risk analysis in Europe, whereas in the US regulatory authorities continue to base their legitimacy on the ideology of "sound science".

The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation

This article seeks to ground financial regulatory choices in domestic politics. Based on evidence from twenty-two industrialized countries, we argue that electoral rules—specifically, the extent to which they are centrifugal or centripetal—have a significant effect on whether the banks or their consumers pay for the security of the banking system. Moreover, despite the homogenizing effects of global financial integration, the political dynamics generated by these electoral rules continue to shape the nature and extent of prudential regulations that countries adopt in the place of banking cartels.

Institutional Dynamics in Environmental Corporatism. The Impact of Market and Technological Change on the Dutch Polder Model

This paper describes how market and technological change can be conceived to affect corporatist politics in the area of waste management. The paper adopts a political economy approach to institutional change which seeks to trace the impact of market and technological change on established political and regulatory institutions. The paper demonstrates that the main impact of marketization of waste services and the introduction of ISO 14001 environmental management systems was to expand the range of choices for companies and regulators to engage in regulatory interaction concerning environmental waste management practices. The main purpose of the paper is to demonstrate exactly how the emergence of regulatory choices for both companies and regulators is likely to open up new avenues for regulation in the environmental field that, once pursued, systematically reduce incentives for corporate and regulatory actors to engage in associational politics.

Regulatory Choices and Commitment: Challenges for Electricity Market Regulation in Kosovo

This paper aims at describing the choices to be made in selecting and implementing a reform model for the electricity industry and to derive some implications for the situation in Kosovo. The paper argues that the appropriate reform model depends on the circumstances in the considered jurisdiction. Especially in small and less developed electricity systems a dilemma may emerge: the technical circumstances suggest the implementation of a model with few competitive elements, whereas political circumstances urge for a competition-oriented model. Hence, especially in small systems, a delicate trade-off emerges that significantly complicates the decisions to be made. This is obviously relevant for Kosovo. An international opening of Kosovo's electricity market may provide a solution to the dilemma. This international opening encompasses a reduction of state sovereignty for electricity regulation and a wide-reaching market opening for private investors and electricity traders.

Presidents, Parties, and the State: A Party System Perspective on Democratic Regulatory Choice, 1884–1936. By Scott C. James. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 318p. $59.95.

Presidents, Parties, and the State: A Party System Perspective on Democratic Regulatory Choice, 1884–1936. By Scott C. James. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 318p. $59.95.

Institutions, Contracts and Regulation of Infrastructure in Argentina

Massive privatization in the Argentine infrastructure and public service sectors gave an opportunity to explore why we observe notorious differences in regulatory design choices and performance outcomes across sectors, under the umbrella of similar nation-specific institutional characteristics -same federal government producing reform during a short period of time (: 1990–95)-. Following the Levy and Spiller (1996) conceptual framework, we propose that some institutional characteristics (namely the nature of conflicts among groups affected by reform and administrative capabilities) determined a wide variety of government choices for regulatory incentives, producing different outcomes across sectors. Despite the will of the executive power to respect stable “rules of the game”, episodes of government opportunism appeared in most sectors. Poor regulatory incentive design and weak agencies, on the other hand, prompted ex-post opportunistic behavior from regulated firms, which renegotiated contractual conditions to their favor.

Presidents, Parties, and the State: A Party System Perspective on Democratic Regulatory Choice, 1884-1936. By Scott C. James (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000) 307 pp. $59.95

<i>Presidents, Parties, and the State: A Party System Perspective on Democratic Regulatory Choice, 1884-1936</i>. By Scott C. James (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000) 307 pp. $59.95

The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation

This paper seeks to ground financial regulatory choices in domestic politics. Based on evidence from 23 industrialized countries, we argue that electoral rules-specifically, the extent to which they are centrifugal or centripetal-have a significant effect on whether the banks or their consumers pay for the security of the banking system. Despite the homogenizing effects of global financial integration, moreover, the political dynamics generated by these electoral rules continue to shape the nature and extent of prudential regulations that countries adopt in the place of banking cartels.We would like to thank Stephan Bub, Tim Clark, Geoff Garrett, Akinari Horii, Takeo Hoshi, Banri Kaeda, Susanne Luetz, Rieko McCarthy, Yoshimasa Nishimura, Thomas Oatley, Frank Packer, Marc Saidenberg, Michael Thies, Sei Nakai, and a number of other bankers and officials for helpful suggestions and comments. We are also grateful to Yoshiko Inoue, Jana Kunicova, Yuka Sumiya, and Mark Zimny for exceptional research assistance. Frances Rosenbluth thanks the Council on Foreign Relations for a fellowship to spend a year at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1999-2000). There were many people in the Bank whose help, of one kind or another, was indispensable.

Presidents, parties, and the state: a party system perspective on Democratic regulatory choice, 1884-1936

Acknowledgments 1. Introduction: parties, presidential elections, and regulatory choice - a party system perspective 2. Swing states, business Mugwumps, and the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 3. The Progressive party vote and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 4. Progressive Republicans and the 'Death Sentence' for public utility holding companies during America's second New Deal 5. Conclusion: parties and the American regulatory state Bibliography Index.

Regulatory System State Versus Choices in a Stochastic Environment by Firefighters

Medical Academy, Arkhangelsk, Russia; E-mail: info@asma.ru According to the International Association of Firefighters, firefighters are one of the least healthy professional groups [14]. The adverse factors associated with fire are extreme emotional tension, intense physical load, high temperature and humidity, noise, contact with toxic combustion products, etc. [6]. In addition, firefighters are exposed to professional psychological and emotional stress caused by life-threatening conditions, regular contacts with fire victims, and high responsibility. These extreme factors may cause significant changes in the functional activities of the human body: from activation to extreme stress reactions. The circulatory system can be regarded as an indicator of biosocial adaptation. The adaptive interaction of the circulatory system with cortical processes may be a mechanism of optimization of neuropsychical activity [4]. The goal of this work was to study the adaptation and compensation reactions of regulatory systems during professional activity in firefighters.

Regulatory interdependence and international governance

The objective of this paper is threefold: First is to produce a broad framework of the ways that state regulatory policies are interdependent. Second is to examine the factors that determine the nature of that interdependence. Third is to discuss the governance implications of different types of regulatory interdependencies. This analysis is applied to the spread of a new international fish inspection regulatory regime. I propose three modes of regulatory interdependence: competitive, coordinative, and informational. The key assumption in the competitive mode of regulatory interdependence is that states are caught in a prisoner's dilemma - either because states use social regulation as a protectionist tool or because states undercut each other's regulations in a race to the bottom. In the coordinative mode of interdependence it is assumed that there are certain benefits to having regulations that are compatible with those of other states – sometimes resulting in a race together, or a race to the top. Finally,in the informational mode of interdependence, it is assumed that states are coping with massive uncertainty as to their best policy options. The regulatory choices of other states provide signals (and often much data) to good policy options.