Regulation Of Reproductive Technologies Research Articles

Surrogacy Agreement in Russia and Foreign Countries

Based on the analysis of the norms of Russian and foreign legislation, the main issues of legal regulation of relations in the field of surrogate motherhood are identified. The questions of the theory and place of the surrogate motherhood agreement in the system of civil law obligations are considered. The author conducts an analysis of foreign experience in legal regulation in the studied area. The Belarusian experience in assisted reproductive technologies regulation, which is of interest to domestic legislation, is given particular attention. The paper provides concrete recommendations on improving Russian legislation in the field of surrogacy in order to prevent disputes regarding the origin of the child or children born to a woman who was bearing a fetus after transferring a donor embryo. The author concludes that it is necessary to establish, at the legislative level, non-medical restrictions for a surrogate mother. Recommendations on strengthening the mechanism for guaranteeing the rights of bona fide parties to a surrogate motherhood agreement are given. The expediency of establishing the maximum number of a woman to exercise the function of a surrogate mother is substantiated.

Social and philosophical background and legal mechanism of assisted reproductive technologies regulation (by example of surrogate maternity)

In many countries of the world, the practice of using assisted reproductive technologies faces a number of legal obstacles, from the introduction of restrictions to their complete prohibition. In most cases, these restrictions are due to public rejection of these methods and procedures for social, psychological and religious reasons. Indeed, these technologies add reissues of assess in galore of women in the society, its functions, problems of relationships with a surrogate mother or an egg donor, emergence and distribution of a surrogate mother's or donor's rights, as well as persons' who are beneficiaries of the results of these technologies. However, a solution of these problems cannot be achieved only by improving the legal mechanisms regulating the use of these technologies. In this situation, the solution is at the junction of the interests of the society (state) and personal interests of persons who need their use, while normative consolidation and enforcement is only a form of consolidating of the achieved balance.

The Impact of Biological Psychiatry on the Law: Evidence, Blame, and Social Solidarity

This article considers the history of biological understanding of mental disorder, and explores the impact of today’s dominant neuroscientific approach on the law. The author argues that this approach subtly affects legal rules and practices, and that these socio-legal effects will likely be enhanced by the increasingly sophisticated use of neuroscience in biological psychiatry. The author illustrates the impact of the neurobiological model using five areas of law: evidence of mental states, the definition of disability in human rights law, criminal responsibility, the regulation of brain interventions, and the regulation of reproductive technologies.

The Iranian Embryo Donation Law and Surrogacy Regulations: The Intersection of Religion, Law and Ethics

This article examines the Iranian approach to the regulation of reproductive technologies, through which medical, Islamic juridical and civil legal authorities come together in forming bioethical legislation and regulations in the national context. It focuses in particular on the legislation and regulations for embryo donation and surrogacy arrangements, both morally permissible according to the majority of Shiʿi religious authorities. It traces the development of these legislations and which institutions and actors were involved, and examines in particular the dynamics of religion, law, and medicine in the formation of these bioethical regulations. I argue that the Iranian approach towards bioethical issues involves all stakeholders – religious and secular, state and private – and reflects a combination of elements from both secular and religious principles. This approach (bottom-up rather than top-down), I conclude, reflects the efforts and ability of Iranian scholars to examine the impact and challenges of global modern biomedicine and thereby give internal answers within their own religious and cultural values and tradition.

Cloning Trojan Horses: Precautionary Regulation of Reproductive Technologies

This paper concerns the fundamental question whether we should allow human enhancement techniques in the pursuit of individual happiness and, more particularly, if the so-called 'precautionary principle' has a role to play in pointing us in the direction of answers to that question. On the basis of a case study focusing on modern reproductive technologies such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (pgd), the argument takes the form of a dual challenge to precautionary regulation of reproductive technologies.First, based on a theoretical analysis of the precautionary principle, it will be argued that most justifications for precautionary regulation of reproductive technologies are tenuous at best. This conclusion is reached on the basis of a distinction between 'fact-finding' precaution, 'deliberative' precaution, and 'enabling' precaution.Second, based on the normative assumption that employment of precaution in similar cases should at the very least give rise to similar impacts on regulatory tilt (i.e. towards permissiveness or rather towards restrictions), empirical evidence strongly suggests that the use of precaution is likely to give rise to the arbitrary exercise of regulatory powers.

Neither Nature nor Contract: Toward an Institutional Perspective on Parenthood Essay

Abstract The official narrative of parental laws in Israel describes biological parenthood as the natural legal basis for determining parenthood, while recognizing legal adoption and surrogacy, in specific circumstances, as the sole official exception to the rule (and even then with some remnants of the biological connection). However, closer examination of parental laws in Israel, as well as in other countries, reveals that biological parenthood has in fact never served as the sole basis for recognizing parental status. Familial status, explicit and implicit agreements, and functional parenthood have all served, and continue to serve in many cases, albeit not always officially, as key parameters in determining the parental relationship and its consequences. The objection against the exclusivity of natural, biological parenthood has seemingly been strengthened in light of the challenge facing lawmakers through technological reproduction advances such as sperm donations, egg donations, and surrogacy. As a result of these recent developments, prominent scholars have begun to seek alternative definitions for the biological definition. One such approach, which was influenced by cultural feminism, attempts to determine the identity of the parent based on a concrete psychological relationship between the parent and the child. Another, more radical approach, views individual autonomy and the voluntary contract as the new basis for legal parenthood. In this essay, I argue that both alternatives – natural-biological and voluntary contract – do not sufficiently narrate the story behind determination of parenthood in Israeli law nor do they supply a sound normative basis for proper regulation of parental determination. In addition, I argue that while these approaches, which focus on the concrete psychological relationship between parent and child, add an important element to the discussion of parental determination, they are too focused on the private aspects of specific parent–child relationships and in doing so, these approaches overlook important elements of the proper legal regulation of parenthood. In light of this insufficiency, I suggest a social-institutional perspective of parenthood, one emphasizing that parenthood is not merely a matter of nature, but instead an artificial construct structured and designed by society. In addition, this approach rejects the current dissonance that exists between (1) the legal determination of parenthood; (2) the regulation of reproductive technologies, on the one hand, and the regulation of parenthood’s content in the sense of regulating parental status vs. state and vs. children, on the other hand. This approach maintains that the legal and social definition of parenthood will inevitably affect the content of parenthood. Therefore, I argue that on a normative level, various decisions regarding regulation of reproductive technologies and the determination of parenthood must take into account not only the involved parties but also the manner the decision can affect the conception “who is a parent” and more importantly, the ethos of parenthood that the law should encourage.

Unexpected Links between Baby Markets and Intergenerational Justice

Abstract Intergenerational justice does not require increased government regulation of reproductive technologies in the United States. Arguments tarring reproductive technologies as unnatural or immoral fail to withstand close scrutiny, and moreover ignore competing moral concerns like the liberty and equality of people to form families in different ways, as well as the interests of children born via assisted reproduction in having their families recognized just as coitally conceived children’s families are recognized. Embryo markets, in contrast, might present different challenges, requiring a separate analysis of their potential impact on intergenerational justice.

Eloquent (In)action: Enforcement and Prosecutorial Restraint in the Transnational Trade in Human Eggs As Deep Ambivalence about the Law

This article approaches a piece of Canadian criminal legislation by analyzing the law’s extraterritorial effect and putting the law’s practical import within a mobile and global context—and from that perspective concludes that the domestic law is practically and morally impoverished. The law in question is section 7 of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA), which criminally prohibits the purchase, offer to purchase, and advertising for purchase of gametes from a donor or from a person acting on behalf of a donor. While large swathes of the AHRA were held to violate the division of powers in a 2010 Supreme Court reference, section 7 remains standing as valid federal legislation, though effectively almost never enforced. Some scholars, notably Francoise Baylis and Jocelyn Downie, urge more rigorous enforcement both within Canada and extraterritorially, drawing on common law principles that stretch the long law of Canadian penal statutes across national borders. Sara Cohen and Susan Drummond argue that not only is the extraterritorial reach of the Canadian executive drastically shorter than Baylis and Downie might wish, a growing and elite transnational reproductive traffic has outpaced and undermined the moral legitimacy of the law domestically. They argue that any well-founded policy aspirations behind section 7 are far more likely to be met with the repeal of section 7 in favour of an administrative regime for the regulation of reproductive technologies. The result would be less hypocritical and more democratic.

To know or not to know?

A new era of reproductive medicine dawned on 25 July 1978 with the birth of Louise Brown, the first 'test-tube baby' conceived by IVF (in vitro fertilization). Ruth Deech, former head of the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, reflects on how the UK's early regulation of reproductive technologies smoothed the way towards stem cell research — and how techniques developed to counter infertility are now saving lives. In a special report, we ask experts in reproductive medicine what developments in the next 30 years could have as much impact as Brown's birth. In Blood Matters, reviewed in Books & Arts, Masha Gessen explores the dilemmas of 'genetic decision making' that gene testing and modern reproductive technologies have brought with them from the perspective of someone carrying the BRCA1 gene. See also Editorial and download the podcast at http://www.nature.com/podcast.

Marginalising ‘eugenic anxiety’ through a rhetoric of ‘liberal choice’: a critique of the House of Commons Select Committee Report on reproductive technologies

In light of a recent House of Commons Select Committee investigation into the regulation of human reproductive technologies, this article critically evaluates the Committee's case for a devolved, libertarian-inspired framework for the regulation of reproductive technologies. In assessing the appropriate balance between legislation, regulation and reproductive freedom, the Committee rightly challenged those who exhibit a myopic history of eugenics to justify restricting reproductive choice. However, by uncritically embracing the tropes of procreative liberty and genetic progress, and defining eugenics in terms of intention rather than consequence, the Committee appeared to ignore or marginalise a number of sociological challenges to the presumptions couched within the doctrine of ‘liberal choice’. This article suggests that failure to consider the cultural and political context within which new technologies are shaped and social needs constructed might undermine any ostensible virtues of a devolved system of governance for reproductive medicine.

Fragmenting Fatherhood: The Regulation of Reproductive Technologies

Reproductive technologies offer the potential to break down parenthood into a number of constituent parts. These disruptive possibilities mean that the regulation of reproductive technologies holds important potential for study, providing a significant resource that has been little analysed with regard to fatherhood. This study attempts to remedy that lacuna through consideration of a range of recent developments in this area of English law. It reaches two general conclusions. First, while the law regulating reproductive technologies attributes great importance to fatherhood, this is rooted primarily (though not exclusively) in concerns for the symbolic importance of fathers, rather than in more practical considerations such as ensuring financial provision or a second hands-on carer for a child. Secondly, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990) contains a clear attempt to protect and entrench the role of the father as completing the nuclear family. However, recent developments suggest that this legal preference for the nuclear family is subject to clear emerging cracks.

Britain's HFEA Is Caught in the Middle

The publication in March of this year of Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, a report by the House of Commons' Science and Technology Committee, provoked a powerful reaction in the British press. More extreme reactions described it as a Frankenstein report, while less violent comments saw it as excessively libertarian, or simply as lacking any substantial ethical basis for its conclusions. The reactions stemmed from three of the report's conclusions: that a total prohibition on reproductive cloning has not been justified by ethical arguments (although the current concerns about welfare and safety warrant a temporary ban), that the welfare of the child provision in the current Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act is discriminatory against the infertile and should be dropped, and that sex selection of embryos should be considered for social, not only for medical, reasons. The report also recommends that a recent ruling on removing the anonymity of gamete donors should be revisited and that the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, which oversees all reproductive technology and embryo research in the United Kingdom, should be reduced to a technical regulatory authority. Ethical policy issues would become the domain of a new parliamentary ethics committee. These are certainly radical suggestions, most of them echoing the well-publicized views of some British bioethicists, notably John Harris and Julian Savulescu. But a closer look at the report suggests that any fears that the parliament has turned radically libertarian are premature. House of Commons select committees, such as the Science and Technology Committee, are made up of representatives of the main parties in the House, with the majority on the committee (and the chair) drawn from the party in power. The Science and Technology Committee has eleven members--seven Labour, three Conservative, and one Liberal Democrat. Of these, one Labour member took no part in the proceedings because of government duties, and five of the remaining ten members (four of whom were Labour) dissented from the report. In any case, select committee reports do not define government policy (though they may help to inform it), and the Labour Government has made it clear that this report does not reflect its views. So what is the report's significance? Paradoxically, it poses a threat, not to conservative, but to moderate and liberal opinion. Britain has been a pioneer in the careful regulation of reproductive technology, following the early identification of the ethical issues by the Warnock Report in 1984. It still holds a unique place in Europe, providing a template for many other regulatory regimes and yet representing a liberal position on key issues, such as the creation of embryos for research and the use of embryonic stem cells, including those coming from cloned embryos. …

Regulation of reproductive technologies is long overdue

Regulation of reproductive technologies is long overdue

'Not so wrong that we are prepared to threaten the entire service': the regulation of reproductive technologies in the UK.

In the UK human embryo research and infertility treatments are regulated by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), a national statutory body set up in 1991. Clinics are required by law to be licensed by the HFEA and open to inspection. In 1999 there were 107 clinics licensed to carry out IVF and/or donor insemination. There are regional variations in National Health Service funding and seventy-five percent of those treated pay for most of their treatment, usually to avoid long waiting lists or because they do not meet the eligibility criteria set by their local health authority. Having described the code of practice laid down by the HFEA the paper discusses the implications of new reproductive technologies from a social science perspective, focusing on three topics which continue to be debated by the media, the regulatory authorities, health professionals and 'lay' people. First, age limits and other criteria for assisted reproduction which raise the question 'who should be allowed to reproduce?' Second, donor anonymity and the question of payment for donors. Finally, the screening and selection of embryos for implantation and the recurring theme in the media of 'designer babies'. The HFEA can be seen to fulfill its intended role, mediating between the infertility professionals, patients and the wider general public. It seeks to allay public fears while supporting professionals by avoiding restrictions on research and treatment and by consulting with the public as to when extensions to research will be acceptable.