Regulation Of Industrial Pollution Research Articles

Informational Mechanism and the Future of Chinese Pollution Regulation

Just as China has emerged as the world's fourth largest economy, its environment is deteriorating at an increasing rate. The nation's environmental degradation-particularly its rapidly rising level of pollution-threatens to undermine the efficacy of environmental protection measures throughout the world and could have global effects extending beyond the environment. Commentators have attributed the deterioration of China's environment to the gap between the enactment of pollution regulation measures and their implementation. This gap is said to exist because of various institutional and financial constraints imposed upon regulators of industrial pollution.' Without challenging such lines of commentary, this Article argues that prior research has overlooked two critical and related information mechanism issues that may independently contribute to the existence of the gap: (1) the manner in which information about industrial pollution regulation is collected and disseminated through mechanisms designed by regulators; and (2) regulators' preferences for certain mechanisms. This Article focuses on China's environmental impact assessment system (EIAS) and scrutinizes two recently enacted measures that are intended to enhance the EIAS's efficacy but will likely fail to accomplish this objective, a conclusion that will become apparent through a revealing comparison with the regulatory regime governing securities in the US. In critiquing the current information mechanisms in China's EIAS, including the recently promulgated guidelines on public participation in the EIAS, this Article seeks to offer the following three preliminary observations: first, too many resources have been devoted to collecting speculative information for preventive measures that are often strategically produced by regulated subjects, thereby depriving all parties, especially regulators, of the opportunity to accumulate the appropriate type of human capital and efficiently allocate limited resources; second, ill-designed regulation of intermediaries and improper use of public participation requirements in China's EIAS together provide enterprises with incentives not to disclose quality information and may discourage some enterprises from entering the market; and third, for public participation purposes, using the same framework to evaluate decisions made by the government and by enterprises may be counterproductive. Such an approach may help the regulator as an institution without necessarily providing benefits to the public. In particular, shifting administrative costs and public pressure to enterprises may not advance the goal of effective pollution regulation. These three observations may also shed light on studies about the design of information mechanisms in other Chinese regulatory regimes.

Industrial Pollution Regulation in the EU and in Macedonia, Serbia And Croatia

Industrial pollution control has substantial impact in the protection of the environment. In the European Union, there’s vast legislation in this field consisting mainly of the Directive on industrial emissions of 2010 aimed at consolidating the so far existing legislation in this field. The new Directive on industrial emissions aims to establish an integrated prevention and control of the pollution arising from industrial activities and it lays down rules designed to prevent or, where that is not practicable, to reduce emissions into air, water and land and to prevent the generation of waste, in order to achieve a high level of protection of the environment taken as a whole. Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia have made significant progress in this field in the recent years as part of their obligations under the Stabilization and Association Process. The purpose of this particular article is to evaluate the degree of alignment and implementation of the environmental legislation in this particular area with the legislation of EU as well its practical application, and to identify the existing deficiencies and necessary steps for action

Mitigating Industrial Pollution Along the Atlantic Coast of Cameroon: An Overview of Government Efforts

This paper presents an overview of the initiatives that have been formulated by the government of Cameroon to address the problem of industrial pollution. It also prescribes robust recommendations that could be employed to save the Atlantic coast of Cameroon from industrial pollutants. After the participation of Cameroon in the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the government took a significant step to overhaul its institutional framework, legal framework and policy framework vis-a-vis the regulation of industrial pollution. Under the auspices of the United Nation Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), the Gulf of Guinea Large Marine Ecosystem Project aimed at sustaining the health of the Atlantic coast of Cameroon by ensuring treatment of industrial wastes, oil spills, sewage and heavy metals was implemented (1995–1999). Based upon careful analysis, however, the paper argues that these efforts have had little or no discernable impacts and that industrial activities along the Atlantic coast of Cameroon are still a major threat to safety, health and the environment. With a considerable number of hurdles that still persist, sufficient environmental improvement in industrial pollution along the Atlantic coast of Cameroon is far-fetched. Nevertheless, the paper concludes that marked environmental improvement can be obtained if: (i) competent personnel are appointed in ministries that play an active role in mitigating industrial pollution (ii) research partnerships are forged with local universities (iii) industrial machinery and equipment are improved (iv) inter institutional conflicts are addressed (v) a more collaborative forum between stakeholders is established (vi) adequate monitoring is instituted.

Monitoring and enforcement: Is two-tier regulation robust? — A case study of Ankleshwar, India

The regulation of industrial pollution is difficult in a rapidly industrialising, low-income setting. This study looks at the efforts to regulate chemical plants in Ankleshwar, the largest chemical estate in Asia. Pollution comes from many sources, the distribution of information is highly asymmetric and the authorities have meagre resources. The location of plants in an industrial estate does however provide interesting preconditions for a form of two-tier regulation, in which industry association becomes an intermediary between regulator and firms. The association is better informed and has an incentive to regulate its members to maintain a good reputation but doesn't possess much formal authority, and its voluntary monitoring and abatement program is akin to managing a common property resource. The analysis of four preconditions for the success of such management – suitable design principles, effective monitoring, objective implementation of rules, and enforcement – indicates that they are satisfied at least partially in Ankleshwar.

The meaning of BATNEEC: interpreting excessive costs in UK industrial pollution regulation

The paper examines how the concept of ‘excessive costs’ has been interpreted in the implementation of industrial pollution control in the UK. Since 1984, industrial air pollution regulation in the EU has been guided by the framework concept of Best Available Technology Not Entailing Excessive Costs (BATNEEC). With the introduction of the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive in 1996, this has been replaced by the concept of Best Available Techniques (BAT). Despite the absence of the NEEC qualification, IPPC BAT includes excessive costs in its definition of ‘available’. Both concepts require interpretation and both devolve potentially controversial decisions to the level of the individual site regulator. A central issue in interpreting ‘excessive costs’ is the relative importance of environmental cost–benefit analysis versus the ability of a sector to ‘afford’ environmental improvements. Also important is how such concepts can be operationalized by regulators who lack resources and depend upon industry for information. The paper provides a historical account of how these issues have been dealt with in the UK and argues that the key difficulties are far from being resolved. The paper concludes by assessing the implications for the future implementation of IPPC. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The meaning of BATNEEC: interpreting excessive costs in UK industrial pollution regulation

The meaning of BATNEEC: interpreting excessive costs in UK industrial pollution regulation

The role of cancer risk in the regulation of industrial pollution.

The extent of carcinogen regulation under existing U.S. environmental statutes is assessed by developing measures of the scope and stringency of regulation. While concern about cancer risk has played an important political role in obtaining support for pollution control programs, it has not provided the predominant rationale for most regulatory actions taken to date. Less than 20% of all standards established to limit concentrations of chemicals in various media address carcinogens. Restrictions on chemical use are more frequently based on concerns about noncancer human health or ecological effects. Of the chemicals in commercial use which have been identified as potential human carcinogens on the basis of rodent bioassays, only a small proportion are regulated. There is an inverse relationship between the scope of regulatory coverage and the stringency of regulatory requirements: the largest percentages of identified carcinogens are affected by the least stringent requirements, such as information disclosure. Standards based on de minimis cancer risk levels have been established for only 10% of identified carcinogens and are restricted to one medium: water. Complete bans on use have affected very few chemicals. The general role that carcinogenicity now plays in the regulatory process is not dramatically different from that of other adverse human health effects: if a substance is identified as a hazard, it may eventually be subject to economically achievable and technically feasible restrictions.