In the situation of transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world, the tasks of developing a dialogue with the Arab world are set out in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation for 2023. In contrast to the “senior-junior” concept developed by the West, in which the allegedly “natural” leading role is unfairly assigned to Western powers and which causes growing resistance from the states of the Global South, Russia proposes that its Arab partners form relations based on a fair consideration of each other’s interests. The Arab ruling circles, experts, and the “Arab street” increasingly perceive Russia as a statecivilization that is not only located in Eurasia, but is also a driving force for the integration of the Non-West. Of particular interest is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a platform for generating ideas and coordinating between the emerging centers of power represented by India, China, and Russia, especially after Iran, a regional rival of Saudi Arabia, became a member of the SCO in 2023. Is the Arab interest in the Eurasian NonWest strategic or tactical, being in the second case aimed solely at exerting pressure on the West to obtain maximum concessions? This is a difficult, but key question that requires an answer from experts, which explains the relevance of this article. In his study, the author uses situational analysis tools, including content analysis methods, force field analysis and data visualization. The author concludes that the interest of Arab countries in integration in Eurasia, including cooperation with Russia, is predominantly strategic.