Regional Rebellions Research Articles

THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND CHALLENGES OF MOHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ

Mohammad Bin Tughluq's reign in the 14th century Delhi Sultanate was marked by significant historical context and political challenges. Faced with economic issues, regional rebellions, and external pressures, Tughluq implemented ambitious administrative policies aimed at centralizing power and extending the Sultanate's authority. However, these policies often led to unintended consequences and widespread discontent. The introduction of token currency and the capital's relocation to Daulatabad caused economic turmoil and social upheaval, eroding public trust and stability. Additionally, Tughluq's administrative reforms faced challenges of corruption, mismanagement, and resistance, hindering effective governance. The consequences of his policies resulted in economic instability, displacement of populations, exploitation of farmers, and a decline in regional autonomy. Tughluq's reign serves as a cautionary tale, highlighting the intricate interplay between historical context, political ambitions, and decision-making consequences. It influenced subsequent rulers' strategies and shaped the historical development of the Delhi Sultanate, emphasizing the need for careful consideration of socio-economic implications and balancing central authority with regional cooperation for effective governance.

War Makes the Regime: Regional Rebellions and Political Militarization Worldwide

AbstractWar can make states, but can it also make regimes? This article brings the growing literatures on authoritarianism and coups into conversation with the older research tradition analyzing the interplay between war and state formation. The authors offer a global empirical test of the argument that regional rebellions are especially likely to give rise to militarized authoritarian regimes. While this argument was initially developed in the context of Southeast Asia, the article deepens the original theory by furnishing a deductively grounded framework embedded in rational actor approaches in the coup and civil–military literatures. In support of the argument, quantitative tests confirm that regional rebellions make political militarization more likely not simply in a single region, but more generally.

Violent Origins of Authoritarian Variation: Rebellion Type and Regime Type in Cold War Southeast Asia

AbstractDictatorships are every bit as institutionally diverse as democracies, but where does this variation come from? This article argues that different types of internal rebellion influence the emergence of different types of authoritarian regimes. The critical question is whether rebel forces primarily seek to seize state power or to escape it. Regional rebellions seeking toescapethe state raise the probability of a military-dominated authoritarian regime, since they are especially likely to unify the military while heightening friction between civilian and military elites. Leftist rebellions seeking toseizethe state are more likely to give rise to civilian-dominated dictatorships by inspiring ‘joint projects’ in which military elites willingly support party-led authoritarian rule. Historical case studies of Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam illustrate the theory, elaborating how different types of violent conflict helped produce different types of dictatorships across the breadth of mainland and island Southeast Asia during the Cold War era.

1950-60년대 인도네시아의 정치 변화와 수카르노의 “혁명”

In the mid-1950s, Indonesian society suffered from political conflicts and economic downfall in the context of regional rebellions and the Cold War. As a solution to these problems, Sukarno, the 1st president of Indonesia, suggested the return to the “Revolution (Revolusi).” In Indonesian history, Revolution refers to the anti-Dutch struggle for independence in 1945-49. Sukarno explicated that the Revolution was not over yet and the revolutionary spirit should be revived to accomplish the goal of Indonesian nation for an independent state, social justice, and a new international order. He suggested a new political system called “Guided Democracy” as an alternative to parliamentary democracy, which was often criticized as an western system unsuitable for Indonesian society. Under this system the political power was concentrated on the president, while political parties and parliaments were dissembles or transformed according to the governmental policy. Two political powers, the military forces and the communist party, grew rapidly in the absence of powerful parties, and the Guided Democracy was operated through the interplay between these two groups, while Sukarno working as an powerful arbiter between the two. However, increasing conflicts between the two archrivals eventually led to the collapse of the system and the emergence of Suharto’s “New Order.” The New Order abandoned the quest for Revolution, and was completely different from Sukarno’s government in its economic goals and international relations. Yet its basic political system - such as enormous power of the president and the role of functional groups – was inherited from Sukarno’s Guided Democracy. Ironically, the practices of a revolutionary political leader contributed to emergence of a most reactionary government.

Illegalising Licitness?

In the mid-20th Century, the practice of bartering was one of the most prevalent forms of economic transaction around the Indonesian Archipelago. The most prevalent and crucial for Indonesian society was the trade conducted along the border between Singapore and Sumatra. The government centred in Jakarta often approved and even encouraged barter with Singapore at the regional and national level. In many cases, however, bartering along the borders was done autonomously by the regional government and traders, and often out of state control. In these circumstances, the central government sometimes “illegalised” barter trade, while the regional government and societies, arguing that their barter transactions were “licit”, issued a challenge to the government’s order. Such tension and conflict over barter in the region was exacerbated by political upheavals such as regional rebellions in the 1950s and the Konfrontasi in the 1960s. This article traces changing policies and discourses regarding “barter” between Singapore and the Indonesian islands (mostly Sumatra) in the mid-20th Century, and highlight how an economic transaction was politicised, and how the ideas of licitness and legality were in confrontation in certain political backgrounds.

Wenkai He. Paths toward the Modern Fiscal State: England, Japan, and China.

Wenkai He. Paths toward the Modern Fiscal State: England, Japan, and China.

Cross‐class Coalitions and the Making of the Arab Revolts of 2011

Theorists of social movements and revolutions have given great attention to the factors creating vulnerability for the state – including elite divisions, loss of foreign support, and economic problems. Substantial attention has also been given to factors facilitating the mobilization of protest actors, including framing, prior network ties, social and public media, and political openings. Somewhat less evident has been the role of cross-class coalitions, which play a vital role in affecting both the strength of the state and mobilization, and in shaping the outcomes of protest and revolutionary change. If a protest draws support mainly from just one class or group (peasants, workers, students, urban shopkeepers, professionals), the state can confront that group as a disruptive force, and seek to unify elites from other sectors against that threat. However, if protestors represent many different groups, it is much harder for the state to find allies against them. Moreover, while a state can claim to be preserving society by acting against isolated disruptive elements, it is far more difficult to maintain legitimacy when acting against a broad cross-class coalition. Elites are more likely to desert the state, creating crippling elite divisions, if protestors represent a broad spectrum of society. In addition, a broad cross-class coalition facilitates further mobilization by creating ‘meganetworks’ linking prior, tightly-linked within-group networks to each other. The impact of public media in favor of the protestors is also greater if media representation shows protestors as representative of the whole society, rather than as one particular group seeking partisan advantages for itself. For these reasons, virtually all successful revolutions were forged by cross-class coalitions that bridged the diverse goals and interests of different groups, thus pitting society as a whole against the regime and its loyalist supporters. Conversely, revolts rooted in the needs and organization of one particular class or group – peasant revolts, urban uprisings, student protests, regional rebellions – have usually been effectively repressed by regimes able to draw on other groups for support. The three successful revolutions in the Arab world in 2011, in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, all demonstrate the crucial role of cross-class coalitions.

Malay identity work

In an intriguing essay, published a few years ago, Anne Booth discusses Indonesia's chances to survive as a unitary state. Obviously, this question is posed against the background of the composite nature of this enormous country, which has a multitude of islands, ethnic groups, traditions, reli gions, languages and dialects within its borders. Booth tries to assess the possibilities of a future disintegration of this indeed hybrid amalgam called Indonesia that is held together by strong central control. Although her general conclusion is that up until today there has really never been a region or an ethnic group actively trying to secede including the regional rebellions in the late 1950s but with the exception of East Timor she sees enough latent sources of discontent, social unrest and resistance to make her speculate that this situation might well change drastically in the near future. In the present context it is important that, since her point of view is predominantly economic, she focuses mainly on a few resource-rich regions, among them Riau. Interestingly, with respect to this province she states: Tt is perhaps surprising that the oil boom of the late 1970s did not bring with it any demand on the part of the producing provinces to retain a large share of the profits. In fact most of the oil came from two provinces, Riau in central Sumatra and East Kalimantan. Both were small [sic] and isolated, conspicuously lacking in strong regional identities or in much tradition of regional nationalism' (Booth 1992:39). Booth may well be right in supposing that until some ten to fifteen years ago there was as yet no sign of a strong regional identity in Riau, which, because Riau is the Malay heartland of Indonesia, must necessarily mean a Malay identity. However, I shall try to show that meanwhile an increas ingly strong, collective effort is being made especially by certain indi viduals, groups and institutions in and around the provincial capital Pekan baru to define what it means to be Malay in this particular world and at this particular juncture. I shall focus on the 'how' of this Malay identity work, on the tools of identity which, when taken together, might be called an identikit, that is, 'an inventory of elements that one might use in putting together an identity of one's own' (Hannerz 1983:355). Of course, 'identity' is a troublesome term that today seems to be used in ways that are reminiscent of the use of the term 'culture' in former days, in spite (or because) of an intense debate that has been going on in recent years.1 For clarity's sake we can preliminarily adopt Hannerz's definition

Village Revolts: Social Protest and Popular Disturbances in England, 1509-1640.

This is a study of some of the hundreds of revolts which occurred between the accession of Henry VIII and the meeting of the Short Parliament in 1640. Expressions of social protest by village and manorial communities centred around resistance to the extinction of common rights, alterations in land use and the degradation of peasant status. They were more localized in extent and more limited in their aims than the regional rebellions of the period, but they were also more widespread and persistent. Basing his work on research in the records of the Court of Star Chamber and other equity courts, the author reconstructs case studies of the various kinds of dispute: anti-enclosure riots, tenurials and rent protests, game poaching. The work offers insights into the impact of demographic expansion, technological innovation and the claims to absolute rights over agrarian society of those owning private property. It also covers early developments in the law of public order.

Class conflict and class collaboration in regional rebellions, 1500 to 1700

I argue that distinctive regional modes of production entailed divergent configurations of interests and differing degrees of mutual dependence between peasants and landlords. Class-collaborative rebellions correlate highly with a mode of production that makes for cooperative interests and interclass dependence, while class-conflict rebellions correlate highly with a mode of production that makes for antagonistic interests and interclass independence. But class-collaboration was unlikely without a target, which the state provided. Yet the state became the target in subsistence regions where the lack of markets made the raising of tax revenues particularly difficult and where subsistence classes were not dependent on the state for markets and, therefore, had little incentive to cooperate with the state. On the other hand, in regions with a commercial mode of production, raising tax revenues was less burdensome and classes tended to be dependent on the state for markets and, therefore, less likely to engage in antistate collective action.

The Spatial Pattern of National Integration in Indonesia

Indonesia has frequently been referred to in the literature as a good example of a core-periphery model, with Java the nuclear, congested heartland and the Outer Islands the less integrated, underdeveloped hinterlands. Yet while true in certain ways, in other significant respects this model is inaccurate. Factor and canonical correlation analysis of provincial per capita characteristics indicate that Jave does not exhibit many of the socio-cultural, interactional, and economically dynamic features expected on a national core: only Jakarta demonstrates overwhelming core characteristics. Contrasts among Outer Islands provinces are greater than those between the Java 'core' and the periphery. Through analysis of the factor scores, the spatial pattern of integration reveals that the most integrated and/or highly economically developed provinces on a per capita basis are separated both from each other and from Jakarta by less integrated and developed provinces. The implications of these findings for the continued integration of Indonesia and the direction of its economic development are discussed. National integration is a vast, multidimensional, dynamic, and highly complex concept, which is of vital importance in every nation-state. Integration, in the sense of a cohesive force which binds the various regions and diverse peoples of a country together into a functioning and mutually interdependent whole, is essential both for the continued existence of a state as a political entity, and for development. For without some degree of integration within a country, economic development in the sense of structural transformation of the system cannot take place.1 And the success of economic development depends to a considerable extent on the strength of those integrative, cohesive bonds, to ensure that the almost inevitably uneven spatial impact of development does not unduly exacerbate regional differences and tensions, and cause the breakup of the country. Hence an understanding of patterns of national integration is vital in economic development planning. Of the many historical, political, social, cultural, interactional, and economic elements that contribute to the idea of national integration, a substantial number can be studied only subjectively-aspects such as shared historical experiences, the role of national leaders, the value of symbols, and the perceptions and attitudes of the inhabitants toward the state.2 However, it is possible to quantify and analyse statistically three of the major dimensions of integration (the socio-cultural, interaction, and economic components), to consider their interrelationships, and to ascertain the degree to which each region or province is integrated into the national whole on each of these dimensions. This paper sets out to analyse the spatial patterns of national integration in Indonesia in the early 1970s. It is a topic of particular relevance because of the tremendous variety and uneven distribution of peoples, cultures, and levels of development in this archipelagic nation which extends over 3300 miles from west to east and consists of over 13 000 islands. Indeed Indonesia's need for greater integration is demonstrated in the twenty-one uprisings or regional rebellions it experienced in the first twenty years of its existence as an independent nation-state (from 1945-65).3 Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. N.S. 6, 471-90 (1981) Printed in Great Britain This content downloaded from 157.55.39.161 on Mon, 23 May 2016 05:51:26 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms