Reforms In Transition Economies Research Articles

Economic and Legal Mechanisms of Interstate Support for Agricultural Producers

The transitional stage in the agrarian economy requires an optimal combination of state protection and market levers. At present, the state regulatory influence on the development of agriculture remains, on the one hand, quite significant, and on the other, insufficiently effective. There is no systemic integrity in the practice of state regulation of the agricultural sector. The relevance of the study is that in transition economies, agrarian protectionism was initially caused by somewhat different circumstances, and the protectionist policy was formed in fundamentally different conditions. The authors demonstrate that protectionism in industrial-type transition economies inherited a huge mechanism of state support for the agro-industrial complex in the depths of a centrally planned economy. Everywhere this support constituted a heavy burden of national finances, and one of the primary tasks of reforms in transition economies, including agrarian reforms, was precisely the release from this burden. It causes sharp liberalization of agrarian policy in almost all countries. The method of analysis was used to investigate the main directions, methods, and mechanisms of state regulation of the economy in different countries; the priority areas of state regulation of prices in the agro-industrial complex industry were highlighted. The practical significance of the study is that macroeconomic reforms in countries with an industrial type of development led to a rapid deterioration in the financial situation of the agricultural sector.

Экономическая теория и формирование человеческих качеств

The article argues that economic theory not only takes into account human qualities as factors influencing the evolution and efficiency of economic mechanisms, but also indirectly impacts their formation. Scientific research generates an ideology which economic policies draw from to build economic institutions. Institutions determine the standards of behavior of individuals and consequently influence their qualities. Such a chain of determinants can be illustrated by the case of the Chicago School of Economics, which proclaimed competition as the main driving force for social and economic development. The recommendations of this school contributed to the formation of neoliberal ideology, which over the years has determined both the policy of Western countries and the nature of reforms in transition economies. Neoliberals argued that economic competition does not involve any violation of moral norms, since a perfect market means impersonal rivalry. There is ample evidence, however, that economic and political competition generates a hostile attitude toward rivals, pushing the participants to disregard the principles of morality. In conditions of tough confrontation, economic and political leaders are often willing to defeat their competitors by whatever means possible, while being unable or unwilling to make decisions to improve public welfare. The degradation of human qualities, in its turn, can lead to a decline in the quality of scientific research. These findings provide an insight into one of the causal chains leading to the crisis of competitive institutions observed in Western countries. To struggle with the crisis, they seek to constrain competition and increase the role of collaborative institutions.

Information asymmetry, regulatory inquiry, and company mergers and acquisitions: evidence from Shenzhen Stock Exchange comment letters

AbstractThis study investigates the governance effect of comment letters. Companies with severer information asymmetry are more likely to receive merger and acquisition (M&A) comment letters, which demonstrate a lower M&A success rate; however, such companies exhibit better long‐term M&A performance. Further analysis shows that the long‐term governance effects are stronger in cross‐industry and cross‐region samples and that the transmission channels are information disclosure and internal control quality of the inquired firms. This study enriches the literature on government regulation effectiveness, develops new evidence on the localisation of government regulation from developed economies, and provides policy implications for further regulation reform in transition economies.

Domestic elite support for reforms in transition economies: the case of North Macedonia

To what extent do domestic elites allow the intervention of international institutions to influence domestic economic reform? This question cannot be answered without considering the role of national elites in accepting international institutions as a means to advance their own interests. This article provides a critique of the neoliberal reform process in transition economies and examines how these policies found support among the people of North Macedonia. This is done by exploring the construct of neoliberal discourse during North Macedonia’s reform process through an analysis of policy documents, interviews with key actors and the country’s privatisation policy. The findings confirm that mass support for reform is influenced by the attitudes of the elite. The main implication for policy-makers is, above all, for client-countries and their policy-makers to be more critical of the agenda set by foreign experts for small economies. The article also highlights the need for IMF experts to recognise in full the nuances in targeted contexts and to ensure that policy programmes are relevant by being context-specific.

Compensation strategies to enact new governance frameworks for SDG transformations

There is an emerging consensus at international level that systemic transformations are needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Such transformations require paradigm shifts in policies, with appropriate governance frameworks to implement them. Fundamental transformations are likely to generate winners and losers; the latter may act strategically to deter transformation. Most governance literature points at mutual gains negotiation methods to prevent the emergence of losers and create ‘win-win’ package deals. In this article a different – and less researched – approach will be discussed: (economic) compensation strategies. Drawing on the political economy literature of reform in transition economies, I propose three compensation strategies to buy out or weaken the opposition of strategic losers – big bang, optimal sequencing and divide-and-rule governance reforms – that can help to frame discussions around the political feasibility of new governance frameworks for SDG transformations. The paper suggests that careful consideration needs to be given to the design of these compensation packages, since history tells us that buying acceptance for reform can involve not just variation in economic outcomes, it can also have long-term political implications and distributional effects.

Normal Value in Anti-Dumping Proceedings against China Post-2016: Are Some Animals Less Equal Than Others?

This article attempts to show that from 12 December 2016, WTO Members can no longer use the analogue country or similar methodologies as the basis for normal value calculations in anti-dumping proceedings targeting China and should rather use Chinese domestic prices or costs. However, contrary to what some would like decision-makers to believe, this does not mean that the EU or other WTO Members will have no defence against genuine Chinese dumping practices. Other provisions in either the ADA or the SCM Agreement offer sufficient guarantees against that. Furthermore, our assessment of the manner in which the Commission has conducted MES reviews casts doubt on the quality of the evidentiary base used, on the apparent willingness to give some trading partners the benefit of the doubt but not to others, and on the utility of the review process as a lever to encourage reforms in transition economies, such as China.

Institutional development and bank stability: Evidence from transition countries

This paper takes advantage of the dynamic nature of institutional reforms in transition economies and explores the causal effects of those reforms on bank risk. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we show that banks’ financial stability increases substantially after these countries reform their legal institutions, liberalize banking, and restructure corporate governance. We also find that the effects of legal and governance reforms on bank risk may critically depend on the progress of banking reforms. A further examination of alternative risk measures reveals that the increases in financial stability among banks mainly come from the reduction of asset risk. Banks tend to have lower ROA volatility and fewer nonperforming loans after reforming the institutional environment. Finally, we split our sample into foreign and domestic banks and find that the enhancement of financial stability is more pronounced for domestic banks.

Bank valuation in new EU member countries

This paper studies the role of institutional reforms in affecting bank valuation in new European Union (EU) member countries. It takes advantage of the dynamic nature of institutional reforms in transition economies and explores the causal effects of those reforms on banks’ Tobin's Q over the period of 1997–2008. Using a difference-in-difference approach, the paper shows that Tobin's Q increases substantially after these countries reform their legal institutions and liberalize banking. However, it decreases after stock market reforms. After further examination of the interactive relationships between different reforms and bank valuation, it is observed that when the banking reform is well implemented, legal reform can have a stronger impact on banks’ Tobin's Q. On the other hand, banking reform and security market reform has a substitutive relationship. The analysis also suggests that foreign ownership, market power, and asset diversification significantly affect Tobin's Q. These results are robust even after simultaneously controlling for equity risk.

Popular Attitudes Toward Market Economic Principles and Institutional Reform in Transition Economies

Transition countries display generally low levels of public support for market economic principles during the 1990s—but more successful countries display more support than less successful countries. The attitude difference is not just the result of transition speed or success. Rather, the data suggest that the varying levels of public support toward market economic principles existed initially and are a cause of the distinct transition trajectories. Different historical legacies affected popular attitudes long before the watershed moment of 1990.

Grey-Correlative-Degree Analysis of Influencing Factors of Women's Employment in China

Since the reform in transitional economies, the status of women has deteriorated relative to that of men, both in terms of income and employment. Many social and economic factors influence women’s employment. Based on gray system theory, this paper makes grey-correlative-degree analysis of influencing factors of women’s employment in order to reveal the main influencing factors. According to the grey-correlative-degree, factors influencing women employment during transition ranks as following: human capital investment, average size of household, wage level, development of tertiary industry and state of matrimony. This paper gives some policy advices based on the result, such as raising the level of women human capital investment, promoting housework socialization, protecting labor income right of women by legal means, and developing the tertiary industry to supply more jobs for women.

Market Reforms, Legal Changes and Bank Risk-Taking – Evidence from Transition Economies

The policy changes and structural reforms in transition economies over the past two decades have created exogenous variations in institutional development, which offers us an ideal natural experiment to analyse the causal effects of institutions on bank risk-taking behaviour. This paper examines a wide array of institutional reforms in respect of law and legal institutions, banking liberalization, and enterprise restructuring in privatization and corporate governance. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find that banks’ financial stability has increased substantially subsequent to the institutional reforms. Further analysis suggests that the enhancement of financial stability mostly comes from the reduction of asset risk. Moreover, the effects of institutional reforms on bank risk are more pronounced for domestic banks than foreign banks. From the policy consideration, our study sheds light on the risk implications of different institutional reforms that have been characterizing transition countries.

Social security reform in transition economies: Lessons from Kazakhstan – By Charles M. Becker et al

Social security reform in transition economies: Lessons from Kazakhstan – By Charles M. Becker et al

Social security reform in transition economies: Lessons from Kazakhstan – By Charles M. Becker et al

Internationale Revue für Soziale SicherheitVolume 63, Issue 3-4 p. 254-256 Social security reform in transition economies: Lessons from Kazakhstan – By Charles M. Becker et al Elaine Fultz, Elaine Fultz JMF Research AssociatesVereinigte StaatenSearch for more papers by this author Elaine Fultz, Elaine Fultz JMF Research AssociatesVereinigte StaatenSearch for more papers by this author First published: 24 November 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1752-1726.2010.01377.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume63, Issue3-4August 2010Pages 254-256 RelatedInformation

Social security reform in transition economies: Lessons from Kazakhstan – By Charles M. Becker et al.

International Social Security ReviewVolume 63, Issue 3-4 p. 235-237 Social security reform in transition economies: Lessons from Kazakhstan – By Charles M. Becker et al. Elaine Fultz, Elaine Fultz JMF Research AssociatesUnited StatesSearch for more papers by this author Elaine Fultz, Elaine Fultz JMF Research AssociatesUnited StatesSearch for more papers by this author First published: 27 September 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-246X.2010.01377.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume63, Issue3-4Special Issue: Social security and the challenge of demographic changeJuly 2010Pages 235-237 RelatedInformation

Social security reform in transition economies: Lessons from Kazakhstan – By Charles M. Becker et al.

Social security reform in transition economies: Lessons from Kazakhstan – By Charles M. Becker et al.

Tax Reforms in Transition Economies – A Mixed Record and Complex Future Agenda

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the diversified picture of the tax systems and tax reforms in the former communist countries after the first decade of their transition from a centrally planned to a market economy system. While CEB countries are seriously advanced in synchronization of their tax systems with those of the EU, the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) suffer a lot of instability and distortions in this sphere (and Balkan countries staying in the middle between both groups). Thus, the CIS countries, including Russia and Ukraine, face a challenge of further substantial tax reforms related to list of existing taxes and quasi-tax obligations, construction of basic taxes, tax administration and procedures, issue of fiscal federalism (particularly in Russia), and many others. The authors' intention is to give the overall characteristics of the tax systems in two broad groups of countries (i.e. the EU candidates, and the CIS+ countries) with a special emphasis devoted to principal shortcomings of tax regulations, and remaining challenges of tax reform.

The Strategic Interdependence of Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Reform in Transition Economies: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach

Since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the success of the former Soviet Bloc countries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) has been mixed. The objective of this paper is to capture the strategic interdependence between investment decisions by foreign firms and reform decisions by host governments in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework. The static game has two equilibria. In one, a government is committed to rapid reform through implementation of market-oriented policies. Here FDI through acquisitions actively contributes to economic restructuring. In the second equilibrium, the government adopts a more gradual approach to reform. Here firms seek to minimize exposure to operational uncertainties by choosing new plant investments and FDI results in only an indirect transfer of technical and managerial know-how. In a dynamic setting, the two equilibria take on the interpretation of conventions about how to invest in countries that are at different stages of transition. Evidence drawn from acquisitions and new-plant investments in transition economies is also provided in relation to the model's equilibria.

Politics, public opinion and privatization: Assessing the “calculus of consent” for market reforms in transition economies

This article supports a growing body of comparative public policy literature on assessing citizen attitudes to privatization efforts around the world. Given the normative and political overtones associated with the privatization of state-owned enterprises, relatively little is known empirically about how citizens of different nationalities evaluate market reforms. Using the 1996 International Social Survey Programme, the method of analysis utilized in this article will provide researchers with a more precise analytical framework for evaluating citizen attitudes, and for anticipating and dealing strategically with the perceived political consequences of denationalization efforts in transition economies. Conclusions reached here link attitudes toward privatization with the implementation of ongoing market reforms. Consequently, assessing citizen attitudes serves as an important heuristic for practitioners and researchers to contemplate in their evaluation of privatization efforts.

Political Competition and Financial Reform in Transition Economies

In recent years, a ‘consensus’ explanation of policy reform in the transition economies has emerged, according to which, greater political partisanship and intra-government division promotes progress in reform. Using panel data from 24 post-Communist countries between 1991 and 1998, we find that increasing the number of veto players faced by the executive branch promotes financial reform. However, countries where ruling parties controlled both executive and legislative branches of governments – as long as those governments were constitutionally constrained – were more likely to dismantle preferential credit programmes and implement banking and securities’ market reforms. Meanwhile, communist party strength and limited partisanship increase the likelihood that governments will remove financial restrictions but do not have clear effects on the adoption of subsequent financial-regulatory reforms. These findings suggest several modifications to the consensus explanation of economic reform in the transition.

The Law Reform Olympics: Measuring the Effects of Law Reform in Transition Economies

Part 1: Theoretical Approaches. Legal Infrastructure and Governance Reform in Post-Crisis Asia: The Case of Indonesia. Why Law Reform Fails: Indonesia's Anti-Corruption Reforms. What Kind of Legal System is Necessary for Economic Development? The China Puzzle. The Law Reform Olympics: Measuring the Effects of Law Reform in Transitional Economies (Central Asia, former Soviet Union). Law Reform in Developing Countries Part 2: Case Studies. Comparative Law and Legal Transplants Between Socialist States: An Historical Perspective (Vietnam, Soviet Union). The Collapse of the World Bank's Judicial Reform Project in Peru. Legal Education Reform: The Forgotten Intervention? Assessing the Legal Retraining Model in Transitional Economies (Mongolia). The Dynamics and Politics of Legal Reform in China: Induction, Deduction and, above all, Pragmatism. State and Law Reform in Indonesia. Like a Fish Needs a Bicycle: Public Law Theory, Civil Society and Governance Reform in Indonesia. Competition Laws for Asian Transnational Economies: Adaption to Local Legal Cultures in Vietnam and Indonesia. Labour Law Reform in Namibia: Transplant or Implant? Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries. Intellectual Property, Civil Law and the Failure of Law in Indonesia: Can Criminal Enforcement of Economic Law Work in Developing Countries?