Although much time has elapsed since the voters of went to the polls in Quebec's second modern referendum, a visitor to Canada who had not been there since October of 1995 might be surprised to find the social and political situation of the question very much the same fifteen months later. On one hand the volume of the discussion taking place today is frequently lower than it was immediately before the Referendum in 1995, but on the other hand virtually all of the issues being argued and discussed at that time are still being argued and discussed today: plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose. Supporters of the idea of an independent are still crying for cultural sovereignty, bemoaning the status of in Confederation, arguing for Quebec's right to secede, and suggesting that even international law supports Quebec's right to secede. Opponents of independence for are still responding that is better off in Confederation, that if it left Confederation it would have to assume its share of the national debt, and that if it withdrew from Confederation everything would be open to negotiation, including such issues the borders of an independent and its status in defense alliances and the North American Free Trade Agreement. What has happened in the last year to explain this phenomenon? How is it possible that in over a year so little progress has been made on such important issues? To a substantial degree this situation can be explained by noting that both of the debate (and, given the Canadian political framework, it may be too simplistic to suggest that there are only two sides to the issue) have been fairly rigid in maintaining their positions, convinced that they are morally right. Beyond this, both have substantial political support, and there has been little political incentive for either side to initiate compromise with the other. This brief essay will examine the Referendum issue and the problem with a focus upon Canada outside of Quebec, the same perspective my article in these pages about a year ago. At that time I suggested that Quebec's psychological secession from Canada occurred in several stages, that the October 1995 Referendum should be seen simply another stage in this long process, and that the reaction of the Rest of Canada should be examined from that same perspective. Focusing on the political stage outside of I wrote that There was no doubt about the views of non-Quebec Canadians leading up to the Referendum vote. In a public opinion study undertaken several months before the Referendum, an overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that they were sure that when it came to the time of the vote a majority of Quebeckers would not vote for some form of sovereignty-association. Only 28 percent of Quebeckers, and only 18 percent of voters in the rest of Canada, believed that Quebeckers would vote for sovereignty association. (461) It was noted, however, that as the Referendum day approached and the polls seemed to show a remarkable change in the percent of Quebeckers supporting the Yes side, Canadians nationwide seemed to show increasing exasperation with Quebec (463), with strong messages of affection for being articulated at the same time messages of irritation, sadness, and outright anger, the latter suggesting that despite the current reaching out toward Quebeckers by westerners, a Yes vote would immediately create a bitter divide. In western hearts... there also lurks a deep regional nationalism, not dissimilar to Quebec's, that would fuel an immediate and emotional backlash. (1) Following the extremely close Referendum vote, there was much discussion of what the federal government could do, well what the other provincial governments could do, to defuse the separatist movement in Quebec. Some unilateral actions were proposed, and undertaken, by the government in Ottawa, but the base of support for sovereignty in did not disappear. …
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Oct 8, 2024
Scott Wich 
Open Access