Chances Of Re-election Research Articles

Forging support: when there is no alternative to ‘there is no alternative’

Abstract Whether fiscal austerity by governments is unpopular or not is much discussed in the literature. One line of research argues that consolidation has negative electoral effects, ranging from declines in politicians’ approval ratings to abstention by voters at elections. Another strand highlights that re-election chances are not harmed by the implementation of austerity and that some voters in fact support consolidation measures. Both sides are limited in at least two regards. First, they do not allow for the possibility that public opinion is shaped by the political discussion about government debts and budget deficits. Second, and relatedly, the literature is limited in its extent to which it considers heterogeneity in preference adaptation across income groups. This article contributes to these debates by bringing to bear insights from the literature on mass preference formation. In particular, I argue that a cross-party consensus on austerity leads voters to align their preferences with the consensus, increasingly demanding cuts to government spending. This adaptation is conditioned by income so that the preferences of those income groups that are the furthest away from the consensus adapt their fiscal preferences most. By including the discursive context of fiscal policy, this article helps explain how austerity can be made popular. Empirically, I test these expectations by matching citizen preferences with party positions on fiscal policy for 60 country years. The empirical results indeed demonstrate that even though low- and middle-income voters are least supportive of austerity, they adapt the most to the party consensus on austerity.

Democracy at the Limit: Does the U.S. Debt Ceiling Really Enhance Fiscal Accountability?

ABSTRACT Congressional control of the U.S. debt ceiling continues to prompt uncertainty among financial markets. Nevertheless, the standard defense of a statutory debt limit invokes the idea of accountability: oversight of the national debt by democratically elected policymakers precludes fiscal profligacy. For this argument to hold water, however, one should observe that lawmakers are indeed motivated and held accountable by voters on the debt ceiling. Do policymakers' positions toward the debt ceiling reflect the preferences of their constituents? And are policymakers punished or rewarded for their stances? Analyzing roll call votes on the debt ceiling in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1983 to 2014, I show that lawmakers' positions are driven predominantly by policymaker ideology and bank campaign contributions rather than the demographics or ideological makeup of their constituencies. Furthermore, I find no evidence that Republicans nor lawmakers from conservative-leaning districts are punished by their constituents when voting to raise the debt limit. Democratic lawmakers' reelection chances are affected by their voting behavior but in the form of rewards for approving debt ceiling increases. These findings suggest the U.S. debt ceiling – in addition to posing a high financial risk – contributes little to fiscal accountability.

European Elections and Financial Markets: Navigating Political Winds and Market Reactions

Abstract A new wave of extreme right-wing political parties entered the European political scene both on the national levels and the European supra-governmental level sparking fears about the rule of law among investors and policymakers. The European Parliament’s elections scheduled for June 2024 are seen as a crucial turning point in the continent's political landscape. Using a mix of OLS regressions and event study, this paper analyzed how stock markets and bond markets reacted to European elections. The results show that the incumbent government's fiscal record appears to influence its re-election chances in developing countries and markets price weak fiscal balances around elections. The paper assessed how government bond markets reacted to the EP’s elections rounds of 2014 and 2019. These rounds of elections have been dominated by the political parties with cantered-orientated ideologies which may not be the case for the next round of elections in 2024. The results show how EP’s elections stabilized bond markets, especially in countries with weak macroeconomic fundamentals. The results emphasize the intricate relationship between fiscal policies, political events, and financial market behaviour. Investors, policymakers, and governments should consider these findings when assessing electoral and market dynamics, particularly in the context of the upcoming 2024 European Parliament elections.

The effects of fiscal policy management, candidacy of previous mayors, and illiteracy on mayoral reelection in Brazil

AbstractThis study investigates factors influencing the reelection prospects of Brazilian mayors. Analyzing a comprehensive data set spanning 5114 municipalities across four elections reveals that increases in investment and current expenditures before elections pay off at the polls. Moreover, higher average investment expenditures throughout the term enhance reelection chances. The results also indicate that when former term‐limited mayors run against the incumbent, reelection probability diminishes, particularly with higher average investment by the previous mayor. Finally, the level of literacy shapes voter attitudes towards opportunistic fiscal strategies: voters with limited literacy are inclined to reward increases in current expenditures, whereas more educated populations prefer increasing investment.

The determinants of political selection: a citizen-candidate model with valence signaling and incumbency advantage

AbstractWe expand the theory of politician quality in electoral democracies with citizen candidates by supposing that performance while in office sends a signal to the voters about the politician’s valence. Individuals live two periods and decide to become candidates when young, trading off against type-specific private wages. The valence signal increases the reelection chances of high valence incumbents (screening mechanism of reelection), and thus their expected gain from running for office (self-selection mechanism). Since self-selection improves the average quality of challengers, voters become more demanding when evaluating the incumbent’s performance. This complementarity between the self-selection and the screening mechanisms may lead to multiple equilibria. We show that more difficult and/or less variable political jobs increase the politicians’ quality. Conversely, societies with more wage inequality have lower quality polities. We also show that incumbency advantage blurs the screening mechanism by giving incumbents an upper-hand in electoral competition and may wipe out the positive effect of the screening mechanism on the quality of the polity.

Fixing things from the outside? Diaspora politicians and transnational political engagement

ABSTRACT Scholarship on diaspora political engagement is unfolding in novel ways exploring the participation of second-generation diaspora individuals and engagement patters of authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Focusing on the unique role of diaspora politicians, I contend that these individuals adeptly leverage their identity to impact politics and advocate for change. The article demonstrates their adaptability in different settings and evolving advocacy strategies. The article employs a multilingual analysis of social media, public interviews, and public appearances in Germany and Bosnia and Herzegovina using an exploratory case study of a German-Bosnian politician. This exploration underscores their flexibility and evolving advocacy dynamics. Furthermore, it illustrates the way these politicians enhance their profiles within the countries where they’ve been elected and in countries of their descent. This serves to strengthen their chances of re-election on one hand while also drawing attention to authoritarian tendencies, potentially clearing a path for democratic advancement on the other.

Can resource windfalls reduce corruption? The role of term limits

Can resource windfalls reduce corruption? We find that, in democratic regimes with unlimited reelection, the answer is in the affirmative, contrasting a widely held view. The reason is that resource windfalls increase future graft prospects, motivating opportunistic incumbents to postpone their planned embezzlement, which in turn requires them to seek reelection and behave well in order to increase the reelection chances. Term limits mitigate, and may even reverse, this effect by inducing opportunistic incumbents that otherwise would seek reelection to step down. We test the model’s predictions using a panel of U.S. states over the period 1976–2007. Our identification strategy rests on constitutionally-entrenched differences in gubernatorial term limits, and geographically-based cross-state differences in natural resource endowments. Our baseline estimates point at a sizeable impact. We find that a one standard deviation increase in resource windfalls decreases the average corruption level in states with no term limits by 20%, but increases average corruption in states with term limits by 10%. These results suggest that the nature of political institutions is important for understanding the nexus between resource windfalls and corruption.

행동과학의 렌즈로 재조명한 정치적 경기순환론

The political business cycle theory demonstrates that incumbent politicians opportunistically manipulate macroeconomic business cycles such as inflation or unemployment to further their chances of re-election. Since Nordhaus’s (1975) pioneering model on the topic, both economists and political sciences have long examined the interdependence of political and macroeconomic outcomes within various contexts. Notwithstanding the promise of the theory of political business cycle, less attention has been paid to its theoretical assumptions—voters’ formation of the image for the incumbent and the durational effect of political manipulation of macroeconomic variables. Drawing insights from behavioral science, this study examines how macroeconomic outcomes in the election year affect the percentage of votes in the next election year in the Korean local government contexts. Findings suggest that the assumptions of political business cycle theory need to be expanded to enhance its theoretical development and practical applications.

Saving lives or saving the economy? Support for the incumbent during the COVID-19 pandemic in Russia

ABSTRACT The spread of COVID-19 sparked debates about whether incumbents should focus on saving lives or the economy. Politicians’ decisions in this dilemma could determine whether they remain in office. “Saving the economy” is predicted to affect re-election chances positively in economic voting theory. However, a public health crisis can shift the electorate’s preferences in favor of expanding healthcare support at the cost of the economy. We examine whether there is a trade-off between “saving lives” and “saving the economy” for the incumbent in receiving higher political support. Based on two experiments conducted in Russia, we measure if individuals are more likely to support, vote for, and extend the power of the incumbent based on their policies. Although both experimental factors encouraged support, the economy-driven policy had a larger effect on voting than the healthcare-driven one.

Don't blame me: A theory of politicians choosing policy advisors

We present a model in which an imperfectly informed politician chooses between appointing an independent expert, whose advice is revealed to voters, and a loyal expert whose advice can be concealed from voters and who can therefore be blamed for a bad outcome. The politician is privately informed about which expert is more competent while Bayesian voters update beliefs about the expert's competence based on which expert is chosen and the outcome of the policy chosen by the politician. Voters are distributed such that some are biased toward a certain policy while others are not. We show that, under a majority voting rule, in equilibrium, the politician is unable to increase his chances of reelection by choosing the loyal expert and trying to shift the blame for a bad outcome on him.

Time to resolve insolvency and political elections

Theories on electoral accountability argue that politicians have strong incentives to avoid punishment from voters for poor administrative abilities. As their chances of reelection can be harmed by failure of businesses, politicians may encourage the speed up of insolvency proceedings to mitigate the voters’ punishment before the elections. Using a sample of 82 countries covering the period 2005–2017, we examined how legislative and presidential elections affect the time required to resolve corporate insolvency. Surprisingly, panel estimates reveal that the length of time to resolve insolvency tends to actually increase during periods of legislative elections and one year prior to such elections in the case of rehabilitation procedures. As the political agenda of the new government can affect the efficiency of restructuring plans, the uncertainty of legislative election outcomes can incentivize debtor and creditors to prolong the resolution of a firm’s reorganization to adjust the plan and/or adopt the most suitable plan. Additionally, our econometric approach reports no significant association between the duration of insolvency procedures and the cycle of presidential elections.

When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?

We model the political manipulation of deficits in a political budget cycle model. Assuming that a share of voters suffers from debt illusion the incumbent can increase her re-election chances by expanding government spending. However, the optimal manipulation may exceed the amount necessary to maximize re-election chances (over-manipulation) if the deficit is not very costly (low repayment obligation). Then, more selfish politicians (higher ego rents and, therefore, increased re-election motivation) reduce the over-manipulation. Conversely, “excessive” spending may wrongly be interpreted as opportunistic government manipulation. Theoretical results are supported empirically, with very robust evidence in a sample of 87 democracies.

Opportunism and MPs’ chances of re-election: an analysis of political transformism in the Italian parliament

We identify as political transformists the Italian members of parliament (MPs) who cross the aisle and vote for legislation opposed by their own political group—i.e., MPs who transform from the political opposition to the ruling parties (or from government supporters) into a force supporting the government (or opposition)—thus representing sources of party and governmental instability. Transformism, which characterized 471 MPs over the period considered, does not coincide with the broader phenomena of party switching already studied in political science. Once we disentangle the distinct behaviors, we study whether transformism helps extend the tenures of all 7128 MPs observed from 1946 to 2013. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to consider the role of transformism in the survival of politicians. Our results suggest that transforming MPs suffer marked reductions in their survival probabilities, especially when compared with their fellow parliamentarians. However, transformist MPs, immediately after coming out as such, are more likely to survive than MPs remaining reliably loyal to their parties. That is, over time, transformists are punished by the electorate, but newly transformed politicians enjoy short-term comparative electoral advantages, thus shedding light on the relevance of a long-standing Italian political phenomenon.

Incumbency and expectations of fiscal rule compliance: Evidence from surveys of German policy makers

We analyze politicians’ expectations about future compliance with a fiscal rule, and in particular the dependence of the expectations on their role in parliament (opposition vs. incumbent government coalition). We study this in the context of the German debt brake, which became a constitutional provision in 2009 but is binding for the sub-national states from 2020 onwards only. Via a unique survey, we analyze compliance expectations of parliamentarians of all 16 German state parliaments. A strong incumbency effect is identified from parliamentarians who move in and out of government, showing that politicians from the governing coalition are more optimistic than those from the opposition. A negative fiscal shock has little effects on the former, but a strongly negative one on the latter. We offer a theoretical model that is consistent with an increasing incumbency effect over time, as the result of wishful thinking by politicians concerning their reelection chances and a dynamic reputation effect for policymakers when compliance with the fiscal rule is achieved. • Analyze politicians' expectations about compliance with the German debt brake. • Use customized survey of parliamentarians of all 16 German state parliaments. • Identify an incumbency effect: government politicians are more optimistic than from opposition. • Theoretical model builds on wishful thinking by politicians concerning their reelection chances.

The Dynamic Electoral Returns of a Large Antipoverty Program

Abstract Governments around the world use short-term reelection strategies. This is problematic if governments can maximize their reelection chances by prioritizing short-term spending before an election over long-term reforms. This paper tests whether longer program exposure has a causal effect on election outcomes in the context of a large antipoverty program in India. Using a regression-discontinuity framework, the results show that length of program exposure lowers electoral support for the government. The paper discusses a couple of potential explanations, finding that the most plausible mechanism is that voters hold the government accountable for the program's implementation quality.

The Covid-19 Pandemic and the Political Situation in France before 2022 Elections

The article explores the political situation in modern France the year before the next presidential election. It is revealed that during Emmanuel Macron’s presidency, a social divide between wealthy and poor social groups has taken root in the country manifested in the “yellow vests” movement and a wide-range public disagreement with the reforms proposed by the government. The negative impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, which overlapped with the previous contradictions and aggravated them, is discussed. The article also shows that, apart from the “National Rally”, no other political forces now represent a real opposition to Macron’s policy, thus helping him to keep relatively high chances for re-election. This is especially true in case of two traditional parties – the Republicans and the Socialists – which have suffered from a profound internal crisis. In conclusion, regarding a likely contest between Macron and Le Pen in 2022, prospects of changes in domestic and foreign policy of France after the election are formulated. The author concludes that even in the “Le Pen wins” scenario, any innovations will have a limited impact, taking into account the role of continuity in the French state policy and the growing moderation of the far right platform.

The public purse as a reelection lever: does it work in a corrupt political environment? The case of Honduras

ABSTRACT Using a sample composed of the 298 Honduran municipalities for the period 2006–2014, we evaluate the impact of budgetary, political and socioeconomic factors on the probability of mayors’ re-election. The findings show that mayors who have initiated greater municipal spending are more likely to be re-elected (a $100 increase in real per capita expenditure increases re-election chances by 19.01%). This finding partially supports both public choice theory and the theory of political budget cycles: voters prefer increased spending. Furthermore, mayors with greater transfers from higher levels of government have more chance of being re-elected. When it comes to political factors, progressive parties and mayors with a majority have more chance of being re-elected.

The politics of budgetary capture in rentier states: who gets what, when and how in Afghanistan

ABSTRACT The literature of fiscal federalism suggests two approaches to explaining the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. First, a normative approach that considers governments as benevolent social planners pursuing normative criteria of efficiency and equity; and second, a public choice approach assuming governments as self-maximizing actors who use intergovernmental transfers to purchase political capital, enhancing their chances of re-election. This paper seeks to test the hypotheses of these two approaches to explain the allocation of discretionary development budget among Afghan provinces during three fiscal years of 2016–17, 2017–18 and 2018–19. Findings indicate Afghanistan’s central government’s approach does not focus to achieve normative criteria of improved participation, predictability, transparency, and equity. Instead, Its central government considers certain political criteria such as political affiliation – ethnic affiliation and alignment with central government policies – political importance, and strength and weakness of local actors. This paper relies on both quantitative and qualitative data to support its arguments.

Walking a Thin Line of Representation: Analyzing the Behavior of Egyptian MPs

Abstract This article is part of the Special Issue “Parliaments in the Middle East and North Africa: A Struggle for Relevance.” While legislators in democratic settings have the electorate as their main principal, mps in semi- and nondemocratic settings need to serve two principals to remain in office: the regime and the active segment of the electorate. This dichotymy sometimes requires particular skills in parliamentary behavior. For the case of Egypt, we investigate how mps strike a balance between regime support and representing their constituents up to an extent that does not endanger their chances for re-election. A content analysis of session scripts of the Egyptian parliament in 2016 was conducted to examine how mps walk this – traditionally understudied – thin line. Our findings indicate that representation gets reduced to “descriptive representation,” i.e. a representation that puts more emphasis on representing local constituents and demographic segments, like Copts and women, that mps are presumably elected to represent. We therefore show that mps fulfill the important tasks of citizens representation even in semi- and nondemocratic settings.

Battling Procedural Windmills: Introductions of Proposals to Change U.S. Senate Procedure

Procedural change in Congress, especially in the United States Senate, has been studied quite extensively over the last thirty years. One of the most remarkable aspects of Senate procedural change is the extremely low likelihood that any proposals to change the way the Senate conducts its business will actually pass the relevant procedures and become part of either the Standing Rules of the Senate, or other sources of the procedural outlay. Being fully aware of this, however, senators continue to introduce scores of proposals that deal with many different aspects of the procedural environment, despite the negligible chance of any of them being accepted or even gaining attention from fellow lawmakers or the public. This paper looks at these ‘dead on arrival’ proposals, and tries to provide an explanation for the proposals, grounded in theories that deal with legislators’ building of their personal brands, aimed at helping their chances of re-election.