Reduce Trading Volume Research Articles

Improving the Efficiency of Hedge Trading Using Higher-Order Standardized Weather Derivatives for Wind Power

Since the future output of wind power generation is uncertain due to weather conditions, there is an increasing need to manage the risks associated with wind power businesses, which have been increasingly implemented in recent years. This study introduces multiple weather derivatives of wind speed and temperature and examines their effectiveness in reducing (hedging) the fluctuation risk of future cash flows attributed to wind power generation. Given the diversification of hedgers and hedging needs, we propose new standardized derivatives with higher-order monomial payoff functions, such as “wind speed cubic derivatives” and “wind speed and temperature cross-derivatives,” to minimize the cash flow variance and develop a market-trading scheme to practically use these derivatives in wind power businesses. In particular, while demonstrating the importance of standardizing weather derivatives regarding market liquidity and efficiency, we propose a strategy to narrow down the required number (or volume) of traded instruments and improve trading efficiency by utilizing the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) regression. Empirical analysis reveals that higher-order, multivariate standardized derivatives can not only enhance the out-of-sample hedge effect but also help reduce trading volume. The results suggest that diversification of hedging instruments increases transaction flexibility and helps wind power generators find more efficient portfolios, which can be generalized to risk management practices in other businesses.

Оценка влияния маржинальных требований на ликвидность российского рынка фьючерсов

The implementation of a margin system in derivatives markets has a positive effect on market liquidity and market pricing efficiency. At the same time, portfolio diversification and hedging are not fully taken into account when assessing margin requirements. Therefore, in order to comply with regulatory requirements, the exchange sets excessive margins. IAs Charoula Daskalaki and George Skiadopoulos have shown, overestimation of margin requirements reduces the positive effect of the existence of a margin system. However, quantification of this observation has not been presented in studies before. This paper quantifies the dependence of market liquidity on the level of margin. The study is conducted on data from futures contracts for 19 underlying assets traded on the Moscow Exchange between 2014 and 2021, using an autoregressive moving average model with exogenous factors (ARMAX). The stability of the obtained results is determined by comparing different model specifications with different sliding window sizes. The analysis not only confirmed the fact that margin requirements, which protect the exchange's capital, reduce the positive effect of implementing a margin system but also allowed to evaluate it quantitatively: a 1% increase in margin requirements in relative terms reduces trading volume from 2.5 to 7% and the volume of open positions from 0.2 to 0.9%, depending on the type of position and trader. The impact on trading volume is on average stable over time, and there are local trends and tipping points for the volume of open positions.

Should retail investors’ leverage be limited?

Does the provision of leverage to retail traders improve market quality or facilitate socially inefficient speculation that enriches financial intermediaries? We evaluate the effects of 2010 regulations that cap leverage in the U.S. retail foreign exchange market. Using three unique data sets and a difference-in-differences approach, we document that the leverage-constraint reduces trading volume by 23%, alleviates high-leverage traders’ losses by 40%, and reduces brokerages’ operating capital by 25%. Yet, the policy does not affect the relative bid-ask prices charged by the brokerages. These results suggest the policy improves belief-neutral social welfare without reducing market liquidity.

Tobin tax and trading volume tightening: a reassessment

This article extends the previous literature on the Tobin tax. We find that very roughly, a doubling in transaction costs would reduce trading volume by 25% to 40% in the Forex. Most importantly, this article is the first contribution to specify the trading volume of the Forex through different (low and high volatility) regimes. Our results show evidence of nonlinear patterns for trading volumes and transaction costs on the Forex. Thus, the Tobin tax would not have a monotonic impact on trading activity across market conditions. The change in elasticity between low and high volatility regimes would be slight but significantly different. We may suggest that the high-variance regime might be the fundamentalist regime and the low-variance regime might be the chartist regime. It is a first step towards understanding which categories of agents would react to the introduction of a tax. Our results seem consistent with Tobin’s underlying thinking; since a tax would penalize chartists more than fundamentalists, it could reduce exchange rate volatility.

Securities Transaction Taxes and Market Quality of Equity and Futures Markets: Issues and Evidence

This paper discusses arguments for and against a securities transaction tax (STT) and evaluates the pros and cons based on a review of empirical evidence concerning the impact of STTs on equity and futures markets (i.e., trading volume, bid-ask spreads, and price volatility) and market efficiency in various countries. I find that an STT would likely reduce trading volume and increase trading cost, but may not reduce price volatility. The size of potential STT revenue depends on the STT's impact on market activity. A sizable STT on futures and equity markets would not only fail to generate the expected tax revenue, it would also likely hurt the international competitiveness of US equity and futures markets.

Which short-selling regulation is the least damaging to market efficiency? Evidence from Europe

Exploiting cross-sectional and time-series variations in European regulations during the July 2008–June 2009 period, we show that: (1) prohibition on covered short selling raises bid-ask spread and reduces trading volume, (2) prohibition on naked short selling raises both volatility and bid-ask spread, (3) disclosure requirements raise volatility and reduce trading volume, and (4) no regulation is effective against price decline. Overall, all short-sale regulations harm market efficiency. However, naked short-selling prohibition is the only regulation that leaves volumes unchanged while addressing the failure to deliver. Therefore, we argue that this is the least damaging to market efficiency.

Which Short-Selling Regulation is the Least Damaging to Market Efficiency? Evidence from Europe

Exploiting cross-sectional and time-series variations in European regulations during the July 2008 – June 2009 period, we show that: Prohibition on covered short selling raises bid-ask spread and reduces trading volume, prohibition on naked short selling raises both volatility and bid-ask spread, disclosure requirements raise volatility and reduce trading volume, and no regulation is effective against price decline. Overall, all short-sale regulations are detrimental to market efficiency. However, naked short-selling prohibition is the only regulation that leaves volumes unchanged while addressing the failure to deliver. Therefore, we argue that this is the least damaging to market efficiency.

Asset Pricing Under Heterogeneous Information

In an asset market where agents have heterogeneous information, asset prices not only depend their expectations of the true fundamentals but also depend on their expectations of the expectations of others.Iterations of such expectations lead to the so-called infinite regress'' problem, which makes the analysis of asset pricing under heterogeneous information challenging. In this paper, we solve the infinite-regress problem in a simple economic setting under a fairly general information structure. This allows us to examine how different forms of information heterogeneity impacts the behavior of asset prices, their return dynamics, trading volume as well as agents' welfare. We find that in general current prices exhibit long-range dependence on past shocks. Moreover, we show that information heterogeneity tends to lower the level of asset prices, increase price volatility and return variability, and reduce trading volume. It also tends to decrease agents' welfare, including those with superior information.

The economic consequences of a Tobin tax—An experimental analysis

The effects of a Tobin tax on foreign exchange markets have long been disputed. We present an experiment with currency trading on two markets, where either none, one, or both markets are taxed. Our results confirm the hitherto undisputed issues: a tax reduces trading volume, shifts market share to untaxed markets, and leads to negligible tax revenues if tax havens exist. Concerning the controversial issues we find that (i) volatility effects depend on the existence of tax havens and on market size, (ii) market efficiency decreases in taxed markets when tax havens exist, and (iii) short-term speculation is reduced.

Price-volume Correlation in the Housing Market: Causality and Co-movements

Housing market cycles are featured by a positive correlation of prices and trading volume, which is conventionally attributed to a causal relationship between prices and volume. This paper analyzes the housing markets in 114 metropolitan statistical areas in the United States from 1990 to 2002, treats both prices and volume as endogenous variables, and studies whether and how exogenous shocks cause co-movements of prices and volume. At quarterly frequency, we find that, first, both home prices and trading volume are affected by conditions in labor markets, the mortgage market, and the stock market, and the effects differ between markets with low and high supply elasticity. Second, home prices Granger cause trading volume, but the effects are asymmetric—decreases in prices reduce trading volume, and increases in prices have no effect. Third, trading volume also Granger causes home prices, but only in markets with inelastic supply. Finally, we find a statistically significant positive price–volume correlation; which, however, is mainly explained by co-movements of prices and volume caused by exogenous shocks, instead of the Granger causality between prices and volume.

Price-Volume Correlation in the Housing Market: Causality and Co-Movements

Housing market cycles are featured by a positive correlation of prices and trading volume, which is conventionally attributed to a causal relationship between prices and volume. This paper analyzes the housing markets in 114 metropolitan statistical areas in the United States from 1990 to 2002, treats both prices and volume as endogenous variables, and studies whether and how exogenous shocks cause co-movements of prices and volume. At quarterly frequency, we find that, first, both home prices and trading volume are affected by conditions in labor markets, the mortgage market, and the stock market, and the effects differ between markets with low and high supply elasticity. Second, home prices Granger cause trading volume, but the effects are asymmetric - decreases in prices reduce trading volume, and increases in prices have no effect. Third, trading volume also Granger causes home prices, but only in markets with inelastic supply. Finally, we find a statistically significant positive price-volume correlation; which, however, is mainly explained by co-movements of prices and volume caused by exogenous shocks, instead of the Granger causality between prices and volume.

Capital Gains Taxes and Acquisition Activity: Evidence of the Lock‐in Effect*

The lock-in effect proposes that capital gains taxes represent transaction costs that increase the reservation price for security owners and, ceteris paribus, reduce trading volume. Consistent with the lock-in effect, previous empirical research documents price and volume reactions to enacted changes in the capital gains tax rate. We investigate whether the “volume hypothesis” predicted by the lock-in effect extends to corporate acquisition activity. In particular, we analyze whether aggregate corporate acquisition activity is inversely associated with shareholder capital gains tax rates. We measure quarterly corporate acquisition activity from 1973 through 2001 using (1) the percentage of publicly traded firms acquired in a calendar quarter and (2) the percentage of market value of publicly traded firms acquired in a calendar quarter. In supplemental analysis, we measure acquisition activity at the industry level (i.e., as the percentage of firms and percentage of market value acquired by industry in each year). In each analysis we model acquisition activity as a function of the maximum long-term capital gains tax rate for individuals and other macro-economic factors previously hypothesized to be associated with acquisition activity. Consistent with a lock-in effect for corporate acquisitions, we find a significant negative association between corporate acquisition activity and the capital gains tax rate whether we measure acquisition activity in the aggregate or at the industry level. In addition, we find that this negative association is attributable to increased (decreased) taxable acquisition activity during periods of low (high) capital gains tax rates. These results suggest that, ceteris paribus, capital gains taxes represent significant transaction costs or market frictions that influence the level of corporate acquisition activity.

Trading Volume, Asset Price and Flexible Transaction Cost

We extend Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994)'s model to a world with flexible transaction cost. We find out the non-linear equilibrium price and volume and show that trading volume provides to uninformed traders useful information on the asset fundamental which cannot be inferred from the equilibrium price. We further demonstrate how transaction cost influences trading volume and the equilibrium price in very different ways. While transaction cost always reduces trading volume, its influence decreases at the margin. The impact of transaction cost on the equilibrium price is much more complicated since its effects on the demand of informed and uninformed traders are inverse. Whether the equilibrium price with transaction cost is higher or lower than that without transction cost depends upon which effect dominates.

Learning from others, reacting, and market quality

Traders pay attention to one another but are unable to perfectly deduce each others’ beliefs from transactions alone. This explains why markets are hard to beat and also why trading occurs at all. Even when traders react rationally to the actions of others, they cannot arrive easily at a common posterior assessment of value. We model a realistic market composed of traders who combine their own private information with rational learning about the information possessed by others. We compare phenomena in this market with an otherwise identical market populated by traders who receive the same private information but ignore other traders. Using simulation to engender greater realism, we find that learning usually reduces volatility, increases the accuracy of the market price as a forecast of value, reduces trading volume, and decreases the prevalence of bubbles. However, for some combinations of market conditions, learning can have the opposite effect. The marginal influences of eight different market conditions, ranging from information heterogeneity through resource diversity, are estimated. Prices, volatility, volume, and bubbles exhibit subtle and complex responses to market conditions.

The Effects of Transaction Costs on Stock Prices and Trading Volume

We study the effects of changes in bid–ask spreads on the prices and trading volumes of stocks that move from Nasdaq to the NYSE or Amex and stocks that move from Amex to Nasdaq. When stocks move from Nasdaq to an exchange, their spreads typically decrease, but the reduction in spreads is larger when Nasdaq market makers avoid odd-eighth quotes. When stocks move from Amex to Nasdaq, their spreads typically increase, but again, the increase is larger when Nasdaq market makers avoid odd eighths. We use this data to isolate the effects of transaction costs on trading volume and expected returns. We find that higher transaction costs significantly reduce trading volume, but do not have a significant effect on prices.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G10, G14.

Race to the Center: Competition for the Nikkei 225 Futures Trade

This paper examines the impact of changes in margin requirements on returns, transaction volumes, and price volatility of Nikkei 225 futures on the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE) and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). An increase in margin requirement on one exchange is shown to reduce trading volume in the implementing exchange and to shift trade to the competing exchange. Price volatility or returns are not systematically affected by changes in margin requirements. The loss of OSE`s market share of Nikkei futures trade is partly due to the increased transactions costs (relative to SIMEX), including the margin requirement.

Race to the Center: Competition for the Nikkei 225 Futures Trade

This paper examines the impact of changes in margin requirements on returns, transaction volumes, and price volatility of Nikkei 225 futures on the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE) and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). An increase in margin requirement on one exchange is shown to reduce trading volume in the implementing exchange and to shift trade to the competing exchange. Price volatility or returns are not systematically affected by changes in margin requirements. The loss of OSE’s market share of Nikkei futures trade is partly due to the increased transactions costs (relative to SIMEX), including the margin requirement.

SHAREHOLDER TRADING PRACTICES AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT HORIZONS

We investigate how shareholder trading practices might be linked to corporate investment horizons. We examine two possible linkages and analyze a range of data relevant to them. The first is excess volatility, which occurs when stock prices react not only to news about economic fundamentals, but also to trades based on non-fundamental factors. Excess volatility could lead to a higher cost of capital, and thereby reduce long-term corporate investment. The second linkage derives from an information ea between management and outside shareholders. In the presence of such a gap, maximizing short-run and long-run stock prices are not the same thing. Management may be able to raise current stock prices by undertaking certain actions that will reduce long-run value. In such a case, management faces the dilemma of which shareholders to please: those who do not plan to hold the stock for the long-run versus those who do. As shareholder horizons shorten, it can become more difficult to focus exclusively on maximizing long-run value. With respect to excess volatility, our basic conclusions are that neither changes in trading practices over time nor differences in trading practices across countries contribute significantly to any underinvestment problem. There is no evidence to indicate that measures to reduce trading volume (such as transactions taxes) would lower stock-price volatility in a way that would stimulate investment. With respect to the information gap hypothesis, we find circumstantial' evidence consistent with certain preconditions for underinvestment. This is not, however, evidence of underinvestment itself. In addition, many of the forces that can lead to underinvestment -- such as hostile takeovers -- are also related to other, positive aspects of economic performance. Policy responses therefore involve a difficult set of tradeoffs. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)