Red Things Research Articles

Name-Avoidance and Circumlocutory Terms in Modern Irish and Scottish Maritime Memorates

In 1942, Seán Ó Súilleabháin’s Handbook of Irish Folklore was produced for collectors of the Irish Folklore Commission. Among many things related to the Irish folklore tradition, the handbook included a section on ‘Fishing Lore’. This initial inquiry was followed by a questionnaire of a fuller scale distributed among the fishermen and members of coastal communities on ‘fishing beliefs’ by the Department of Irish Folklore at UCD in 1979 (see Ní Fhloinn 2018: 352–4 for further detail). Questions relevant to this paper included the following: • Are certain kinds of people or certain animals thought to bring bad luck to the fishermen? • Are people with certain surnames regarded as unlucky? • How do fishermen react to all of these? • What attitude do fishermen have towards red-haired people and red things in general? The answers have since been carefully documented by the Department of Irish Folklore. Most recently, results of research into a specific aspect of the occupational lore of Irish fishermen, “namely, the idea that it was unlucky to mention certain words and entities while at sea” (Ní Fhloinn 2018: 13) was published. Drawing upon Ní Fhloinn’s methodological framework, I would like to examine the corpus of maritime memorates collected by Ulster University’s Stories of the Sea project since 2010 drawing particular attention to various circumlocutory fishing terms and the fishermen’s sociocultural practice of name-avoidance.

Finding categories through words: More nameable features improve category learning

What are the cognitive consequences of having a name for something? Having a word for a feature makes it easier to communicate about a set of exemplars belonging to the same category (e.g., “the red things”). But might it also make it easier to learn the category itself? Here, we provide evidence that the ease of learning category distinctions based on simple visual features is predicted from the ease of naming those features. Across seven experiments, participants learned categories composed of colors or shapes that were either easy or more difficult to name in English. Holding the category structure constant, when the underlying features of the category were easy to name, participants were faster and more accurate in learning the novel category. These results suggest that compact verbal labels may facilitate hypothesis formation during learning: it is easier to pose the hypothesis “it is about redness” than “it is about that pinkish-purplish color”. Our results have consequences for understanding how developmental and cross-linguistic differences in a language's vocabulary affect category learning and conceptual development.

The Silent Red Thing: Self-Censorship in the Hyper-Networked Hypermarket Arts

The Silent Red Thing:Self-Censorship in the Hyper-Networked Hypermarket Arts Noah Fischer (bio) I can't forget the puzzling silence of Mark di Suvero. During the Occupy Movement, Joie De Vivre, his seventy-foot-tall sculpture flanking [End Page 233] the east side of Zuccotti Park (Fig. 1), was simply known as "The Red Thing."1 General Assem bly facilitators would announce, "Food, Outreach, Direct Action, People of Color working group, meet in one hour under the red thing!" because there was substantial gathering space beneath it and the populist renaming signaled that we had invited it into the commons (Fig. 2). Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 1. Noah Fischer, View from Zuccotti Park (2018). Photograph courtesy of the artist. Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 2. Noah Fischer, The Red Thing (2018). Watercolor. Image courtesy of the artist. However, the red thing turned out instead to be a kind of Trojan horse. It was the first piece of liberated Zuccotti Park to be clawed back into Mayor Bloomberg's New York. On October 26, 2011, the New York City Police Department surrounded it with barricades (which were inexplicably marked with the logo of the Metropolitan Museum of Modern Art (Fig. 3),2 and thereafter patrolled it on threat of arrest (Fig. 4). The significance of this art-cage was recognized by the artists from the Arts & Culture Committee, who penned a common letter to the artist: OWS is now in Day 52. This movement will only continue to grow and evolve. It is our wish, and we believe yours as well, that the sculpture be integrated spatially with the activities taking place at Liberty Plaza. [End Page 234] Therefore, we ask you to make a public statement urging city authorities to keep all barricades away from this and other public sculptures in the area, allowing free access to the area under and around public sculptures.3 The letter wasn't a shot in the dark. In 1971, di Suvero had self-exiled in response to the Vietnam War. Five years earlier, in 1966, he had been approached to build the monumental Peace Tower by Irving Petlin and the Los Angeles-based Artists' Protest Committee: a work that monumentalized a collection of smaller anti-war paintings later auctioned off to support the anti-war efforts. Installed in a vacant lot, Peace Tower became a site of confrontation where anti-war demonstrators were harassed by Marines and pro-war counter-protestors, who beat up an artist during the tower's installation.4 Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 3. Naeem Mohaiemen, Zuccotti Park (2011). Photograph courtesy of the artist. Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 4. Naeem Mohaiemen, Zuccotti Park (2011). Photograph courtesy of the artist. Jailed twice for anti-war demonstrations in the 1960s and again outside the Republican National Convention in 2004, di Suvero became something of an art world anti-war icon. His work Peace Tower was remade at the 2006 Whitney Biennial, where it was placed by the curators directly outside the museum in public view, perhaps to compensate for the 2004 Biennial's stunning silence on America's two overseas wars.5 It wasn't a stretch to recognize di Suvero's aesthetics (quotidian industrial materials, strong linear formed geometry, red color) and social ideas (sculpture used in mass [End Page 235] movements) as a progeny of the monumental Leftist sculptural tradition stretching back to Vladimir Tatlin (Fig. 5). As such, the chance to speak up for OWS, a movement that had accepted his sculpture into its political constellation, seemed more a gift to the artist than an unwanted pressure. The letter was sent by trusted couriers, and it was confirmed that he received and read the letter. But di Suvero never spoke up, and a month later, the barricades that had initially encircled his sculpture expanded to encircle the entire park, while activists nursed NYPD-inflicted wounds marking their violent eviction. The issue of silenced voices has recently drifted into political discourse as the far-right media cries out accusations of censorship, often the result of traps planted by the racist and xenophobic alt...

Using intraverbal prompts to increase divergent intraverbal responses by a child with autism

We examined the effectiveness of intraverbal prompts to increase the number of divergent responses to categorical questions composed of compound stimuli (e.g., Name some red things) for a 6‐year‐old child with autism. The intraverbal prompts involved providing the function, feature, and class of the target responses. A multiple probe across behaviors design was used. Results indicated that the child's total number of divergent responses was increased and maintained during 2‐week follow‐up probe trials. Novel responses were observed across conditions.

Mao's Little red book: a global history

Preface 1. Introduction: the spiritual atom bomb and its global fallout Alexander C. Cook 2. A single spark: origins and spread of the Little Red Book in China Daniel Leese 3. Quotations songs: portable media and the Maoist pop song Andrew F. Jones 4. Mao quotations in factional battles and their afterlives: episodes from Chongqing Guobin Yang 5. Translation and internationalism Lanjun Xu 6. Maoism in Tanzania: material connections and shared imaginaries Priya Lal 7. Empty symbol: the Little Red Book in India Sreemati Chakrbarti 8. The influence of Maoism in Peru David Scott Palmer 9. The book that bombed: Mao's Little Red Thing in the Soviet Union Elizabeth McGuire 10. Mao and the Albanians Elidor Mehilli 11. Partisan legacies and anti-imperialist ambitions: the Little Red Book in Italy and Yugoslavia Dominique Kirchner Reill 12. Badge books and brand books: the Mao bible in East and West Germany Quinn Slobodian 13. Principally contradiction: the flourishing of French Maoism Julian Bourg 14. By the book: Quotations from Chairman Mao and the making of Afro-Asian Radicalism, 1966-75 Bill V. Mullen 15. Conclusion: in the beginning is the word - popular democracy and Mao's Little Red Book Ban Wang Index.

Normative Pragmatism and the Language Game of Music

In his project of normative pragmatism, Robert Brandom1 rejected the naturalist concept of knowledge as based exclusively on reliable differential responsive dispositions and replaced it with a complex, linguistically- and socially-oriented picture in which understanding is not reduced to the ability of reliable responses to external impulses that we share with parrots, lichens, and thermometers, but is elevated, in a roughly Hegelian way, to a complex social status of undertaking inferential commitments and being recognized as such by others. Hence, a parrot's crying out the word might be as reliable response as possible, but it still would not qualify as a sign of understanding because a parrot does not commit himself to anything in the sense that he is not prepared to infer, e.g. that red things are also colored but not green, and, more importantly, nobody expects him to do so. In Brandom's (and Sellars's) idiom, it is exactly the participation in this game of giving and asking for reasons that distinguishes sapient from mere sentient creatures and reliable responding devices.Taking advantage of this explanatory frame, Andrew Bowie, in his book on modernity and music, transposed it to the context of art, arguing that, as far these traditional domains of sapience are concerned, are serious difficulties in Brandom's project.2 Such an accusation, of course, might be somewhat misplaced since Brandom - in the best tradition of analytic philosophy, as Bowie does not forget to mention - favors theoretical philosophy (particularly logic and semantics) to that of aesthetics, to the extent of leaving the problems of art completely aside.But this is exactly what seems to be Bowie's point. If we take into account, as he suggests, a singing bird instead of a talking one, the question arises as to what exactly it is that bird has not committed itself to (as opposed to a singing human), and there seems to be no suitable answer since music and art in general are forms of articulation which something intelligible that resists translation into discursivity.3 Hence, there might exist creatures sapient in the traditional, but not in Brandom's discursive, sense; as a result, his criterion of sapience appears to be inadequate.I work on the assumption that to deal with the problems of art - like the one mentioned by Bowie - within the framework of Brandom's normative pragmatism, one has to take into account its self-proclaimed twofold role of heir to both the normatively-oriented transcendentalism of Kant and Hegel and the naturalistically-based classical pragmatism of James and Dewey. This requires considering not only the demarcation question, which is the above-mentioned problem of the definitional difference between sentient and sapient creatures, but also the emergence question, which concerns the possibility of transition from sentience to sapience.According to Brandom4, these questions5 are more easily answered individually, as transcendentalism did by finding demarcation in a priori structures of our reason without bothering to explain their naturalistic origin, or, inversely, as shown in the classical pragmatism that, in his account of experience as an evolutionary process of adaptation to the environment, left completely aside the vast qualitative difference in capacities between sentient and sapient beings. The real challenge is to answer the questions of both demarcation and emergence at once because an easy solution to one makes the other more difficult.In the light of this, my paper has two interconnected goals: The first is to sketch the possible answer to both demarcation and emergence questions as transposed to the field of art, with particular focus on music. The second is to show how this answer relates to Brandom's game of giving and asking for reasons as a combination of the rationalist criterion of sapience with the pragmatist concept of knowledge as a specific kind of practice (namely, that of inferentially articulated claiming and asserting). …

Two Types of Qualia Theory

When bacteria enter my body, if all goes well they are detected and processed by my immune system. When I confront red things of interest in my environment, if all goes well stimulations of my retina cause activations of my optic nerve that are detected and processed by the visual and cognitive systems of my brain. These two processes resemble and differ from one another in various ways. One difference is that the latter typically involves or gives rise to a conscious experience; there is something it is like for me to undergo it.

Same Same (review)

Reviewed by: Same Same Elizabeth Bush Jocelyn, Marthe Same Same; illus. by Tom Slaughter. Tundra, 200926p ISBN 978-0-88776-885-9$15.95 R 3-6 yrs A bold graphic apple and globe share a page; facing them is a tambourine. They are "round things." In the following spread the tambourine reappears with two new buddies, a guitar and a bird, "things that make music." The bird then joins an airplane and a swarm of bees, "things that fly." And so it goes until two "red things," a chair and a dress, wait for a page turn and the opening apple to bring the exercise around full circle. This is an attractive and effective romp through pre-math skills, inviting children to explore the rudiments of grouping. Red, yellow, blue, green, black, and white objects and backgrounds are tidy and iconic, crisp enough for group enjoyment and discussion. Patterning is generally consistent, with the last object in one spread becoming the first object in the next, allowing children to make their own predictions about the coming category. The limited vocabulary, visual context clues, and oversized font are collectively a bonus for emergent readers. This should be a top choice not only for public library collections, but for preschool and kindergarten classrooms as well. Copyright © 2009 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

DOES SEEING RED REQUIRE THINKING ABOUT RED THINGS?

We continuously form perceptual beliefs about the world based on how things appear to us in our perceptual experiences. I see that the ripe tomato in front of me is red and I form the belief that this tomato is red based on my seeing it, i.e. based on my veridical perceptual experience of this red tomato. Perceptual experiences and beliefs are representational mental states. Both are defined not by what they are, i.e. their physical properties, but by what they are about, what they represent, by their content. The content of both perceptual experiences and beliefs is specified by how the world must be for them to represent things correctly; it is specified by stating the conditions under which they would be true.

ON THE DUAL REFERENT APPROACH TO COLOUR THEORY

A dual referent approach to colour theory maintains that colour names have two intended, equally legitimate referents. For example, one might argue that ‘red’ refers both to red appearances or qualia, and also to the way red objects reflect light, the spectral surface reflectance properties of red things. I argue that normal cases of perceptual relativity can be used to support a dual referent approach, yielding an understanding of colour whose natural extension includes abnormal cases of perceptual relativity. This contrasts with Peacocke's multi-referent view, according to which such abnormal cases force us to introduce a wholly distinct kind of colour experience. I also argue that the two uses of colour names, arising from their two referents, have different extensions, even in normal perceptual circumstances, a consequence which conflicts with the heart of Rosenthal's dual referent view.

Shoemaker's The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays

This excellent collection of essays by Sydney Shoemaker covers his work over the last ten years in the philosophy of mind. Shoemaker's overarching concern in the collection is to provide an account of the mind that does justice to the first-person perspective. The two main topics are the nature of self-knowledge and the nature of sensory experience. The essays are insightful, careful, and thought-provoking. On the issue of self-knowledge, Shoemaker opposes an inner sense model of introspection and he argues for the view that our knowledge of our own mental states is self-intimating. I find much of what Shoemaker says here, both positively and negatively, persuasive. On the issue of sensory experience and, in particular, perceptual experience, Shoemaker develops a complex position that, although undeniably interesting and original, seems to me less convincing. For the remainder of this review, I shall focus upon this topic. Shoemaker believes that the qualities in terms of which we phenomenally individuate our perceptual experiences are not intrinsic qualities of the experiences themselves. The individuating qualities are qualities of the objects of the experiences (if they are qualities of anything at all). These qualities, in Shoemaker's view, are ones that the experiences represent; for there seems no other way of explaining the fact that the qualities that individuate our experiences phenomenally are always experienced as qualities of something or other, whether or not the qualities have bearers that actually exist. In the case of the experience of red, for example, the distinctive phenomenal quality is always experienced as belonging to some red thing, typically a physical surface, even if there is nothing red in the vicinity. So far, Shoemaker is in agreement with other representationalists about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. However, Shoemaker maintains that without certain qualifications, the representationalist approach

There Are No Recognitional Concepts; Not Even RED

For example, RED is a recognitional concept iff it numbers, among its constitutive possession conditions, the ability to recognize at least some red things as red. In this paper, I propose to argue -indeed, I propose to sort of provethat there are no recognitional concepts; not even RED. Lots of philosophers are sympathetic to the claim that there are recognitional concepts. For one thing, insofar as recognitional capacities are construed as perceptual capacities, the claim that there

Comment on Dretske

The conclusion of Fred Dretske's paper is strikingly counterintuitive, as he himself is the first to admit. For there is a strong inclination to hold that our sensations and feelings are internal -implying, if we are materialists, that an exact physical duplicate of a given person must be undergoing the same sensations and feelings as that person. But the point of Dretske's paper it to challenge this idea. He argues that there is, on reflection, no reason to agree with it: no reason to think that the way pains feel to S, or the way red things look to S, are facts solely about S; no reason to think that what it's like to be a molecular duplicate of S must be the same as what it's like to be S; no reason, in other words, to assume that there is such a thing as purely internal experience. The way Dretske arrives at this conclusion is surprising and ingenious. For the usual basis of the inclination to hold that phenomenal states are internal is the special epistemological access each of us has to what we are experiencing: if I have a pain then I know I do, and vice versa; and how could this be so unless the pain is wholly inside me. But Dretske argues, on the contrary, that if phenomenal states really were internal, then this fact about them would militate against first-person awareness. Thus, according to Dretske, the idea that phenomenal states are internal, far from explaining our special

Statements About Universals

A feature of many versions of Nominalism is the claim that all statements putatively about universals can be translated as statements about particulars. This is certainly possible in some cases, for instance, 'Wisdom was a characteristic of Plato' is equivalent to 'Plato was wise'. I will argue that it is not, however, always possible; in particular, that it is *not possible for 'Red is a colour' and 'Red resembles pink more than blue'. The usual nominalist suggestion is that 'Red is a colour' is equivalent to something like 'Everything red is coloured'. There is a standard objection to this translation (see, e.g., A. N. Prior, 'Existence', Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York, I967, vol. 3, p. 146). Consider the scattered location, L, of all the red things. Everything L-located is coloured, but evidently L-location is not a colour. Likewise, everything red might have been triangular and vice-versa, so that everything triangular was coloured; but triangularity still would not have been a colour. The nominalist particularist can, however, side-step this objection by offering 'Necessarily, everything red is coloured' as his translation of 'Red is a colour'. For it is, at best, only contingently true that everything L-located or triangular is coloured. This reply gives a hostage to fortune, namely, the ontic commitments of such assertions of necessity. But it is arguable that these do not include a commitment to universals. It is, thus, important that the following, apparently decisive, objection is available to the realist about universals. Everything red is both shaped and extended, but red is neither a shape nor an extension. And, further, it is necessarily true that everything red is shaped and extended. This is not to deny that 'Red is a colour' entails that necessarily everything red is coloured. But the former says more than the latter. If red's being a colour were nothing more than a matter of every red thing necessarily being coloured, then red's being a shape and an extension would be nothing more than the fact that necessarily every red thing is shaped and extended. And red is not a shape and not an extension. It seems that 'Red is a colour' says, as realists maintain, something about red not reducible to something about red things. The nominalist might have recourse at this point to the distinction between analytic truth in the Fregean sense of reducibility to a logical truth by synonomy substitution and necessity in the wide sense. He might, that is, suggest 'It is analytic that everything red is coloured' as his translation. However, there are difficulties in the way of reducing 'Everything red is coloured' to a logical truth. For instance, one cannot replace 'is coloured' by 'is yellow or red or. . .'. Because one cannot

Plato on False Statement: Relative Being, a Part of Being, and Not-Being in the Sophist

Notes and Discussions PLATO ON FALSE STATEMENT: RELATIVE BEING, A PART OF BEING, AND NOT-BEING IN THE SOPHIST Recently Plato's account of not-Being in the Sophist has received considerable attention , notably in papers by David Wiggins,1 G. E. L. Owen,2 and Edward N. Lee.3 Lee's discussion is especially important because it emphasizes (in my opinion, correctly) the analogy of the partitioning of Knowledge at 257c--d. Nevertheless even Lee seems to me to fail to give a correct explanation of the Sophist's discussion of this matter. I. RELATIVE FORMS The sentence4 "Phaedo is tall," makes a statement which we may symbolize as (1) Phaedo/the Tall. The subject of the statement (Phaedo) corresponds to the subject term of the sentence ("Phaedo"); the predicate (the property or Form, the Tall) corresponds to the predicate term of the sentence ("tall"); the copulative element of the statement (Plato's participation ) corresponds to the "is''5 and is symbolized as "/". Now consider the sentence "Phaedo is taller than Simmias." In this post-Fregean era we tend to think of the statement it makes in the following way: (2) Phaedo/taller than Simmias, or, to symbolize it in a manner more closely conforming to Platonic expression: (2') Phaedo/the Tall relative to Simmlas. According to symbolizations (2) and (2") what is predicated of Phaedo is the complex predicate tallness relative to Sirnmias. For just this reason, they do not represent the Platonic conception of predications involving relational predicates. To Plato's way of thinking, what is predicated of Phaedo is not a complex predicate at all, but simply the Form of the Tall; the statement made by the sentence "Phaedo is taller than Simmias," is simply (3) Phaedo/the Tall. This is not the end of the story, of course---there is a difference between (what we might call) relative Forms, such as the Tall or the Different, and non-relative Forms, such as, e.g., the Red. The Red ("is red") is a non-relative Form (non-relative predicate expression); a red thing can be "spoken of as being what it is [i.e., red] just in itself.''e x David Wiggins, "Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of Non-Being," in Plato, A Collection of Critical Essays, Vol. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1971),pp. 268-303. 2 G. E. L Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," also in Vlastos, pp. 223-267. (Henceforth referred to as "Owen.') s Edward N. Lee, "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist," Philosophical Review, LXXXI, 3 (July, 1972),267-304. (Henceforthreferred to as "Lee.") 4 For brevity's sake, I shall speak as if statements are made by sentences rather than by utterances of sentences by speakers. 5 Not all sentences contain a term or expression which signifiesonly copulation--"Theaetetus sits," for example, contains no copula term. In Plato's terminology a subject expression is a "name," a predicate expression is a "verb." One can make a statement simply by juxtaposing a name and a verb in an uttered sentence (Sophist 262a-d). 6 See Sophist 255c-d, quoted in Section II, below. [336] NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 337 Looking, one just sees that a red thing is red, period; no comparison of a red thing to some other thing is necessary to discern its redness. On the other hand, relative Forms, unlike non-relative Forms, must necessarily be predicated of something in light of some consideration or comparison. 7 For example, one may look at Phaedo and Simmias, perceive Phaedo to be the taller of the two, and utter a sentence which expresses statement (3). Utterance of the short sentence "Phaedo is tall," would be sufficient to do the job; just "Phaedo is tall," however, would give no indication to the hearer as to the consideration (i.e., a comparison of the heights of Phaedo and Simmias) in light of which the statement was made. A sentence which made explicit the full nature of the statement would give such an indication. The statement made after comparing Phaedo and Simmias, (4) Phaedo/the Tall (relative to Simmias), or (symbolizing "relative...

Response to Camp

Let S be an advocate of a substitution interpretation of quantifiers and R an advocate of a referential interpretation. S and R are bound to disagree about semantics on the subsentential level. For example, for S, the semantics of the predicate is a matter solely of the truth values of sentences of which is a part; for R, it is a matter of a relation between and red things. But it is not obvious that S and R disagree about semantics on the sentential level. It is at least possible that they share a project concerned with the concept of truth which can be described in terms of semantical and logical properties of whole sentences about which they agree. Put intuitively, the project is to explain why the sentences of our language have the truth conditions they have. It appears from some detailed examples (set out in papers to which Camp refers in [1]) that in attempting to carry out this project R would succeed but that S would either fail or call on semantical devices which make his subsentential semantics indistinguishable from R's. What can S do? His obvious first step is to ask that the truth project be clarified. Convention T shows us how to do this. The basic materials needed are an object language, a metalanguage which contains a system of structural-descriptive names of object-language sentences, and a translation of object-language sentences into metalanguage sentences. It is important here that a consequence relation be given along with the metalanguage, for the heart of Convention T is that all instances of

Documentation, Information Retrieval, and Other New Techniques

IN THE invitation which I received from Dean Asheim with reference to this paper, I was asked to cover the total area of development of documentation and information retrieval from an objective and theoretical point of view, rather than from any narrowly conceived concern with special techniques or special equipment. The letter indicated that twenty-five years ago, when these library institutes were initiated, the topic assigned to me was not even considered a part of librarianship. The fact that twenty-five years later the topic should be considered an essential part of your deliberations is the first important fact that should be noted. How did this new development arise out of traditional librarianship? What were the outside forces beyond librarianship whichcontributed to its development? Will it remain a separate enterprise, or will it invest librarianship in general and change its very nature? Answers to questions like these make this subject germane to an institute organized and sponsored by a graduate school of librarianship. Alfred. North Whitehead once remarked tlat all knowledge begins with the enterprise of classification. This enterprise involves naming things, separating things, and distinguishing between things in simple terms of likeness and unlikeness. He went on to say that such classification is only the beginning of science and that, if you stop at classification without on to mathematics, you have not progressed very far. What he meant by going on to is not necessarily on to technical mathematics in the form of elaborate equations, deductions, proofs, theorems, etc., but on to a recognition that the differences with which science is concerned can be treated as differences along a variable. In other words, from a scientific point of view the differences between classes or kinds are not absolute but merely points of emphasis along continuous variables. This, of course, is the major theoretical insight of evolutionary theory in biology and distinguishes Darwin from Linnaeus. We may classify things as red things and green things, and, if we remain at this level, we have an absolute difference between green and red. Green is green, red is red, green is not red, red is not green, and that is the end of the matter. On the other hand, we may recognize that the color phenomena represent different wave lengths; and in such terms we can understand that there is a mathematical or a continuous variation in color from red to green. Consider this same situation with reference to the relationship between librarianship and documentation: one might say librarianship is librarianship, documentation is documentation, librarianship is not documentation, documentation is not librarianship, and end the matter. But this is to end it on a low empirical or Linnaean level. If we are to be scientists in the modern sense,