Reception Of Aristotle Research Articles

Энергия и проблема «собственного бытия» человека

The article discusses the possibilities of the concept of "energy" and the concept of "one's own being" for anthropological research. Having defined the meaning of "energy" in the ontology of Aristotle as the realization of the "first essence", the author shows how in the doctrine of St. Gregory Palamas about divine energies, this concept received its anthropological dimension, becoming the designation of the action of a person. As the realization of the "first essence" (›πόστασις), the energy of motion is closely connected with another concept of Aristotle: the "own" (εξιζ) of a thing. The "own" in Aristotle philosophy does not mean the resting "essence" (what) of a thing, but an integral way (how) of the realization of a thing in the world. It is demonstrated that knowledge about the energy of something is possible only together with knowledge about the mode of one's own being. Using the example of the division of historical epochs of Western civilization, the author illustrates the relationship between energy and interpretation of the nature of a person's own existence in the world. The concept of "one's own being" in the early philosophy of Martin Heidegger is considered as a reception of Aristotle's thought and as a project of a philosophical answer to the main anthropological question about "one's own", and therefore about the energy of a person. The question of the "own way of being" of a person in the philosophy of "Being and Time" is posed on the way to the main task of discovering the horizon for questioning about being itself. Heidegger discovers the "own being" of a person in the mode of authentic being-towards-death, which has features of horror and resoluteness. As a result of the analysis of this concept by the early Heidegger, the author points to the problem of "worldlessness" of the described way of being-in-the-world. This problem becomes apparent when trying to apply the concept of energy to Heidegger's concept of one's own being. The conclusion is made about the limitations of Heidegger's concept of "own being", which naturally arises from the method of "existential analytics". The current situation of refusal to search for the "own being" of a person both in Western culture in general and in Western philosophy is briefly considered.

The Poetics of Protest, from Africa to Minneapolis

Abstract Offering an itinerary of the thinking that led to Sentient Flesh: Thinking in Disorder, Poiēsis in Black, R. A. Judy explains the concept of “poetic socialities” mentioned in it. This explanation begins with an account of the Muslim peripatetic philosophers’ reception of Aristotle’s Poetics, focusing on ibn Sīnā’s conception of the role poetic expression’s cognitive as well as affective force plays in the instantiation of what he calls الأمة الشعرية (al-umma al-sh’irīya), “the poetic or aesthetic community.” Elaborating how and why the phrase poetic socialities is the paraphrastic translation of ibn Sīnā’s, the essay tracks the study of poetic socialites from its initial formulation regarding the 2010 Tunisian Revolution to it becoming the reference point of orientation for an interrogation of the modern concepts of sovereignty, revolution, and civic republicanism. With respect to these concepts, the study of poetic socialities enacts a critique of imperial neoliberal tendency of socialization; whereby the only tenable norm of general subjectivity is a function of speculative market value as the absolute measure not just of human progress but existence as well. Along these lines, poetic socialities is an attempt at understanding something of what is at play in te current era of popular unrest.

Bryan Brazeau, ed. The Reception of Aristotle’s Poetics in the Italian Renaissance and Beyond

Bryan Brazeau, ed. The Reception of Aristotle’s Poetics in the Italian Renaissance and Beyond

The Jewish Reception of Aristotle’s Poetics in Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-century Provence: A Survey of the Arabic Sources

Abstract The last few years have seen a renewed interest in Aristotle’s logic in the Jewish tradition, giving a decisive impulse to the research on the Greek-into-Hebrew philosophical transmission in medieval and early modern times. The present article aims to contribute to the studies on Aristotelian logic in Hebrew by focusing on a less explored aspect, namely the reception of Aristotle’s Poetics in Jewish culture.

The Reception of Aristotle in Martin Luther’s Late Theological Writings

The Reception of Aristotle in Martin Luther’s Late Theological Writings

ПОСЛЕ ВАЙНБЕРГА. РЕЦЕНЗИЯ НА КН.: THE RECEPTION OF ARISTOTLE’S POETICS IN THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE AND BEYOND. NEW DIRECTIONS IN CRITICISM / ED. BY BRAZEAU B. - LONDON : BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC, 2020. - 312 P. - (BLOOMSBURY STUDIES IN THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION). [РЕЦЕПЦИЯ «ПОЭТИКИ» АРИСТОТЕЛЯ ИТАЛЬЯНСКИМ ВОЗРОЖДЕНИЕМ И ПОСЛЕ НЕГО. НОВЫЕ НАПРАВЛЕНИЯ В КРИТИКЕ / ПОД РЕД. БРАЗО Б.

The book written by an international team of scholars and edited by B. Brazeau explores literary criticism and reception of Aristotle's «Poetics» in early modern Italy. Revisiting the «intellectual history» of Renaissance poetic studies written by Bernard Weinberg in 1960-s, the contributors find its own place whithin the 2000-years long tradition of translations, commentaries and polemic treatises. The authors apply new methods from book history, translation studies, history of emotions and classical reception to early modern Italian texts, placing them in dialogue with 20th-century literary theory, and thus map out avenues for future study.

Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy by Tobias Hoffmann

Reviewed by: Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy by Tobias Hoffmann Julie Fox-Horton Middle Ages, angels, free will, intellectualism, voluntarism, fallibility, agency, psychology, theology tobias hoffmann. Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. xiv + 292. In Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy, Tobias Hoffmann thoroughly examines the height of the free will debate and the influence of Aristotle's action theory on theologians central to the dispute in the Latin West between the 1220s and the 1320s. The reception of Aristotle at this time caused a shift in the debate from a theologically centered reflection on the relationship between free will and sin, to a philosophical query exploring "how free agency is rooted in the powers of the soul" (1). Organized into three sections, Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy serves as an encyclopedia of medieval theologians and philosophical thinkers in the Latin West entrenched in the debate of free will as the theoretical evolution unfolds. Hoffmann's methodology for evaluating each thinker's position on the topic consists in looking at three fundamental components: their presuppositions of free will and the question of controlling one's actions, the agency of choice, and the discourse of outright evil. In Part I, "Free Will," Hoffmann begins with a brief introduction to the essential theories of free will before Aristotelian action theory entered the debate. Discussing Augustine's struggle over the issue of free will and then moving on to Peter Lombard's treatment of the issue in his Sentences, or [End Page 438] Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, which had a profound influence on theology for some time as "a principal reference text in the formation of Catholic theologians from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries," Hoffmann moves quickly on to the ideological shift (20). Beginning in the 1220s, two influential texts circulated among theologians, John of Damascus's De fide orthodoxa and portions of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, at which point Aristotle became the "principal authority in philosophy," and influential in the free will debate (22). Once medieval theologians began to reflect on Aristotle's ideas on the mechanics of decision-making, traditional notions that once focused on "the relation between free decision, sin, and grace" shifted, in what Hoffmann refers to as a psychological turn, to a "psychological foundation of free decision in reason and will" (31). During the early phases of the psychological turn in the free will debate, scholars like Thomas Aquinas—particularly through his ideas of "the will as a rational appetite" and his discourse on the relation of the intellect and will—created a divide among thinkers, characterized as either intellectualism or voluntarism (42). For voluntarism, Hoffmann points to several medieval thinkers but focuses on Henry of Ghent and his voluntarist conceptions of free will that both align with and deviate from Aquinas. Hoffmann then turns to thinkers whose theories lean toward intellectualism, focusing on Godfrey of Fontaines and his use of principles of metaphysics to address the cause of free will. During the first two decades of the fourteenth century, the free will debate evolved even further with theologians like John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, who either refined or radicalized free will theories (119). In Part II, "Whence Evil?", a theme central to medieval theologians and the debate of free will is evaluated—the origin of evil. As a premise on the origin of evil, Hoffmann turns to Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius. For Augustine, the question of the origin of evil developed from "a thorough reflection about the fall of angels" (163). In comparison, Augustine argued, according to Hoffman, "an evil will ultimately lacks an explanation," (169) while Pseudo-Dionysius argued, "evil cannot be a final cause" (173). The unifying principle for both thinkers is the belief that "evil does not have an efficient cause" (173). From Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius Hoffmann explores deeper the cause of evil according to other thinkers, such as Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Lombard, William of Auxerre, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus. After a lengthy analysis of the influence on and the contributions of these...

The Byzantine reception of Aristotle’s Rhetoric: the 12th century Renaissance

Abstract In this paper, I argue that, after centuries of neglect, a revival of interest towards Aristotle’s Rhetoric took place in 12th century Constantinople, which led to the production of a number of commentaries. In order to give an overview of the commentary tradition on the Rhetoric, I examine first the surviving extant commentaries themselves, then the information that the commentators offer regarding their preceding interpretations, and last the traces of commentaries on the Rhetoric found in other treatises. This examination will show that, at least within a specific group of scholars, the Rhetoric was studied and commented upon like never before. Finally, I attempt to explain this revival of interest, especially with respect to the role that philosophical and rhetorical education played in 12th century Byzantium.

Şiir Mantığın Neresinde Durur?

Since the time Plato wanted to banish poetry from his ideal state by accusing Homer of “imitation”, the tension between poetry and philosophy has made itself evident. Our study aims to rethink this highly controversial relationship and to question the relationship between logic, which is the basis of the intellectual sciences, directly connected to logos, and poetry, which is seen as closer to sensation and to “mythos”. This questioning about the possibility of logical thinking through poetics will be realized through language, logic and poetics. In this context, our discussion ground will be the reception of Aristotle’s Poetics, which is accepted as the first work of philosophy of art, in Islamic philosophy, specifically in Avicenna. While commenting on Aristotle, muslim logicians and Avicenna included poetry in logic by placing Poetics in the Organon. This very inclusion invites us to think about the logical status of poetry for Avicenna. In this context, the question we will pursue with Avicenna will be essentially: What is the logical status of poetry and what is the possibility of poetic syllogism? According to Avicenna, poetry is related to the “possibles”, and in this respect, it allows to consider being and non-being together. While poetry addresses imagination, the fact that the imagination is between the sensation and the intellect, makes poetry’s position of “mediator” valuable. In order to show what this position means, we will try to discuss the relationship between poetry and logic through a number of basic themes of the Avicennian philosophy, such as powers of the soul, the relationship between sensation-imagination-intellect, the distinction of essence-existence, the importance of imitation, and types of syllogism. Finally, we will discuss, through particular examples, the place given to the poetry, and examine the possibilities of poetry and the relationship between the poetic and the logical, in terms of the aforementioned theory of poetry.

Hegel's Reception of Aristotle's Theology

AbstractIn several of his writings Hegel suggests an identification of his absolute idea/spirit with Aristotle's God in the Metaphysics. This suggestion is remarkable since it indicates that Hegel regarded his philosophy in line with classical positions in ancient metaphysics. Although there is increasing discussion of the relation between Hegel and Aristotle it is still doubtful what it was that Hegel seemed to find at the highest point of Aristotle's philosophy. To clarify this relation within the realm of first philosophy I will first give a short reconstruction of Aristotle's conception of God in order, second, to confront this conception with the absolute idea/spirit in Hegel. Against Ferrarin, I will not primarily discuss the conception of actuality/activity and infinite subjectivity; rather I will focus on Aristotle's and Hegel's ontological understanding of truth. The new thesis in my paper is that Hegel can relate his theory of the absolute idea/spirit to Aristotle's God on the basis of their shared understanding of truth. This understanding allows both of them to find the highest realization and thus the fulfillment of truth in the self-thinking thinking of God (Aristotle) or the self-thinking thinking of the absolute idea/spirit (Hegel). When Hegel seems to return to Aristotle at the end of his system, this return has its systematic link in the idea of a fulfilled truth which is God or the Absolute in the sense of self-thinking thinking. Although Hegel's return to Aristotle's theology has a certain plausibility, it is also limited by the fact that for Aristotle God's self-thinking thinking is not a process of self-determination, as Hegel finds it to be and which leads him to miss a crucial feature of Aristotle's theology.

Plotinus on Divine Simplicity

AbstractGavrilyuk attends to divine simplicity according to the third‐century AD pagan philosopher Plotinus. He shows that Plotinus draws his doctrine of divine simplicity from the earlier Greco‐Roman philosophical tradition, in which the nature of the “first principle” was highly contested. Aristotle offers a history of the early debate, with Anaxagoras being the first to glimpse the first principle’s simplicity. The Platonist philosophers conceived of the first principle as incorporeal, and on these grounds linked the first principle to simplicity. For his part, Aristotle associated simplicity with the absoluteness of pure actuality. The Stoics, with their essentially material understanding of the divine, ignored or denied divine simplicity. Plotinus draws upon the reception of Aristotle that is found in Alexander of Aphrodisias, Numenius, and Ammonius. According to Gavrilyuk, the signal contribution of Plotinus consists in setting forth the strongest possible doctrine of divine simplicity. Indeed, for Plotinus God’s utter simplicity means that God cannot even be thought, because thinking requires the duality of subject‐object. Plotinus conceives of the divine One as above divine Mind (nous), since the latter contains a unified plurality but not the perfect simplicity that marks the unknowable One. Gavilyuk ends his essay with an account of the qualifications made to divine simplicity by philosophers and theologians who are less radical in their doctrine than is Plotinus. He emphasizes that the Enneads’s key metaphysical insight, utterly ruling out any kind of composition from the One, has the benefit of being supremely intellectually coherent and elegant.

As Versões em Língua Árabe do De Anima de Aristóteles

The purpose of this paper is to discuss some difficulties concerning the reception of Aristotle’s De anima in Arabic language in view of direct sources, i.e., the translations and paraphrases, and indirect sources, i.e., the testimonies on them.

John Buridan on the Possibility of Defining Definition

The study of the medieval reception of Aristotle’s Topics has largely been oriented toward debates on dialectical argumentation. And this is surely right. Nonetheless, I wish to approach John Buridan’s commentary on the Topics from another perspective, which highlights some semantic features of the set of predicates around which the work is organized. Thus, in my paper I will first reconstruct Buridan’s account of the identification of the predicates discussed in the Topics. I will argue that, for him, they are different in that they reflect one or more features of the way in which definiens and definiendum relate. By doing this, I will shed light on the role the notion of definition plays in Buridan’s commentary, so that an interpretation of it as a work on definition becomes promising. In the second part of the paper, I will offer an analysis of Buridan’s first move in his commentary toward a theory of definition. It concerns the problem of whether there is a definition of definition. In examining Buridan’s answer, I will argue for the close connection between his treatment of definitions and his theory of supposition, so that distinctions among the different modes of supposition help him to disambiguate statements in their possible meanings, and thus to clarify the difficulty related to the definability of definition.

Medioplatonismo e aristotelismo

This article focuses on the reception of Aristotle among Platonist philosophers from the first century BC down to Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus’ master in Alexandria. The first-century BC Platonist philosopher Eudorus of Alexandria aimed to integrate Aristotle’s philosophy into his Pythagorean reading of Plato. A passage from Plutarch’s Life of Alexander (V. Alex. 7) offers a valuable testimony about this approach: Aristotle’s metaphysics is read against the background of Plato’s theology (‘epoptics’). Eudorus’ exegetical methods show some interesting similarities with those of the Aristotelian commentators of his time (in particular Andronicus of Rhodes and Boethus of Sidon). This picture changed during the second century AD. On the one hand, Platonic authors such as Taurus, Nicostratus and Atticus focused on the differences between the theories of Plato and Aristotle. On the other, Alcinous extensively incorporated Aristotle’s theories into his Handbook of Platonism. The debate over the harmony or disagreement between Plato and Aristotle only emerged, then, in the second century. According to the Neoplatonist philosopher Hierocles of Alexandria (fifth century), Ammonius Saccas took up this debate and showed the consonance between Plato and Aristotle as regards their most essential doctrines. The new approaches to Aristotle by Plotinus and Porphyry (based on an extensive reading of both Aristotle and the Peripatetic commentary tradition) are best understood against this background.

Pseudo-Aristotelian De spiritu: A New Case against Authenticity

Previous articleNext article No AccessNotes and DiscussionsPseudo-Aristotelian De spiritu: A New Case against AuthenticityPavel Gregoric and Orly LewisPavel GregoricUniversity of Zagreb Search for more articles by this author and Orly LewisHumboldt-Universität zu Berlin Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Classical Philology Volume 110, Number 2April 2015 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/680674 Views: 57Total views on this site Citations: 2Citations are reported from Crossref [© 2015 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved]PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Hynek Bartoš, Colin Guthrie King Heat, Pneuma, and Soul in Ancient Philosophy and Science, 18 (Feb 2020).https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108651714Börje Bydén Introduction: The Study and Reception of Aristotle’s Parva naturalia, (Sep 2018): 1–50.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26904-7_1

Book review: The Reception of Aristotle’s Ethics, written by Jon Miller

Book review: The Reception of Aristotle’s Ethics, written by Jon Miller

Albertus Magnus: Matter, Motion, and the Heavens

327 The Thomist 78 (2014): 327-50 ALBERTUS MAGNUS: MATTER, MOTION, AND THE HEAVENS STEVEN BALDNER St. Francis Xavier University Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Canada WO OF THE most difficult concepts in natural philosophy are those of matter and motion. It is difficult to think about matter because the reality to which it refers is not any actual thing, but our concepts naturally focus on actual things. Matter is the principle of potentiality, the principle by which an actual thing might be something other than it is. What we know, however, comes from what is actual; the potential is an extension of the actual into an otherness that is not known. Immediate potentialities are fairly easy to recognize (this cold water could be hot), but their underlying principle— the pure potentiality of matter—is very hard to conceptualize. Matter, however, as it is understood in the Aristotelian tradetion , 1 is precisely this pure potentiality that is opposed to actuality. It is potentiality for change and motion, and nothing more than that. It is a real principle of material things, but is not itself a thing. Matter is fundamental to everything that we experience, but it is not itself something that we experience. It is only when we think of it in relation to form that we can conceptualize it at all, but form, the principle of actuality, is the very opposite of matter. Albert says that we have no proper 1 This is already a problematic claim; some scholars do not find a doctrine of matter as pure potentiality in Aristotle. See Christopher Byrne, “Matter and Aristotle’s Material Cause,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (2001): 85-112; William Charlton, “ ‘Prime Matter’: A Rejoinder,” Phronesis 28 (1983): 197-211; Hugh R. King, “Aristotle without Prime Matter,” Journal of the History of Ideas 17 (1956): 370-89. T 328 STEVEN BALDNER concept (proprius intellectus) of matter; it is understood in relation to form, and only insofar as we can remove from it any ideas of form.2 Motion is equally hard to conceptualize, but for a different reason. Our concepts are static: they focus on this and not that; they define, limit, put boundaries around, freeze our experience . But the world we experience is one of constant motion, change, and alteration: it is never only this and not that, but always this becoming that. Our mental world, too, is one of change, even though its concepts and propositions are static. We may say that our understanding changes or develops, but we say so not because concepts change or develop but because we replace one concept with another. We define something more accurately by adding or subtracting conceptual notes to the definition , but the conceptual notes themselves do not change. The fundamentals of the mental world are atomistic, but the world of our experience, both inner and outer, is a world of real change and motion. Albertus Magnus (1200-1280) was the first Scholastic philosopher to have taken Aristotle’s philosophy as a whole into the service of theology. It is for reason of this service that Albert commented extensively on the whole of Aristotle’s work. In the reception of Aristotle, along with Avicenna, Averroës, Maimonides , and many other commentators, the thirteenth century underwent a scientific revolution. A new scientific way of under-standing the universe was given to the Christian West, and it was Albert’s genius to have been among the first to recognize the full value of this new learning. He welcomed Aristotle and the Aristotelian entourage eagerly, recognizing that this new science would enrich the understanding of the faith, but his welcome was not uncritical, for he knew that Aristotle had to be corrected and supplemented on numerous points. Fundamental to this project of bringing Aristotelian 2 References to the works of Albert are to one of two editions: Opera Omnia, ed. E. Borgnet, 38 vols. (Paris: Vives, 1890-99); Alberti magni Opera Omnia, ed Institutum Alberti Magni Coloniense (Münster: Aschendorff, 1951-). The latter, critical edition is known as the “Cologne” edition. Albert, Summa de creaturis, p. 1, tr. 1, q. 2, a. 2 (Borgnet, ed., 34:323a-b). MATTER, MOTION, AND THE HEAVENS 329 science...

Catholic Theology in the Thirteenth Century and the Origins of Secularism

This article examines two distinct responses to the reception of Aristotle in the thirteenth century: the Bonaventurean and the Thomist.The outcome of this debate (and the Condemnations of 1277) led to the modern separation of faith and reason. Rather than seeing voluntarism and nominalism as the cause of the modern separation of faith and reason, and theology and philosophy, it will be suggested that it is actually the other way around: the Bonaventurean response indirectly resulted in the growing separation of faith and reason, which led, in turn, to voluntarism. It is important not to confuse the Thomist and Franciscan responses, as sometimes happens in recent scholarship, including in the work of Gavin D’Costa, as will be shown. Both the Thomist and the Bonaventurean approaches are legitimate resources to respond to the (post)-secular context in which we find ourselves, and the former should not be reduced to the latter.

‘They had added not a single tiny proposition’: The Reception of the Prior Analytics in the First Half of the Twelfth Century

AbstractA study of the reception of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics in the first half of the twelfth century. It is shown that Peter Abaelard was perhaps acquainted with as much as the first seven chapters of Book I of the Prior Analytics but with no more. The appearance at the beginning of the twelfth century of a short list of dialectical loci which has puzzled earlier commentators is explained by noting that this list formalises the classification of extensional relations between general terms and that this classification had already be put forward by Boethius in his de Syllogismo Categorico and Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricas. It is pointed out the kind of text referred to as an ‘Introductio’ at the beginning of the twelfth-century follows very closely the structure of Boethius own Introductio and adds to it material drawn from his accounts of loci and the conditional propositions. It is argued that the reception of the Prior Analytics has to be understood against the background of this well developed tradition of treating together syllogisms, loci, and conditional propostions. Referring to a challenge to the formal validity of Darapti in the Ars Meliduna the paper concludes by illustrating that the theory of the syllogism presented in Prior Analytics was still controversial in the middle of the twelfth-century.

Dic cur hic?

In order to attain a deeper understanding of Aristotelian philosophy in the Renaissance, it is necessary to consider the theological implications of given facts. This article discusses a basic problem centring on the reception of Aristotle’s Ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics was widely regarded as the basis for a virtuous ethical life, yet how could a pagan philosophy, with its concepts of happiness, virtue, justice, etc., be the basis of a Christian society? The aim of the present article is to show how Lutheran scholars solved this problem in confrontation with Catholic and Calvinist scholars of the time. The first part deals with the two basic components of Aristotle’s Ethics, namely the doctrines of happiness (Eudaimonologia) and virtue (Aretologia), and attempts to show that Aristotle’s Ethics should not be understood as a system of rules, but rather as a handbook for the cultivation of practical habits in the free human being who strives to live a good life. The second part examines two key ideological confrontations in relation to Aristotle’s philosophy: between Lutherans and Calvinists in respect of definition of theology and philosophical and theological virtues on the one hand, and between Lutherans and ›the Enthusiasts‹ in respect of the concept of virtues on the other.