Reasoning In Rats Research Articles

Causal reasoning in rats' behaviour systems.

Conceiving of stimuli and responses as causes and effects, and assuming that rats acquire representational models of causal relations from Pavlovian procedures, previous work by causal model theory proponents attempted to train rat subjects to represent stimulus A as a cause of both stimulus B and food. By these assumptions, with formal help from Bayesian networks, self-production of stimulus B should reduce expectation of alternative causes, including stimulus A, and their effects, including food. Reduced feeder-directed responding to stimulus B when self-produced has been taken as evidence for a general causal reasoning capacity among rats involving mental maps of causal relations. Critics have rejoined that response competition can explain these effects. The present research replicates the key effect, but uses continuous and finer-grained measurement of a broader range of behaviours. Behaviours not recorded in previous studies contradict both prior explanations. Even results cited in support of these explanations, when measured in finer detail and continuously over longer periods, show patterns not expected by either view, but supportive of a specific-process approach with attention to motivational factors. Still, the abstract prediction from Bayesian networks holds, providing a potentially complementary normative analysis. Behaviour systems theory provides firmer framing for such theories than representational-map alternatives.

The special status of actions in causal reasoning in rats.

A. P. Blaisdell, K. Sawa, K. J. Leising, and M. R. Waldmann (2006) reported evidence for causal reasoning in rats. After learning through Pavlovian observation that Event A (a light) was a common cause of Events X (an auditory stimulus) and F (food), rats predicted F in the test phase when they observed Event X as a cue but not when they generated X by a lever press. Whereas associative accounts predict associations between X and F regardless of whether X is observed or generated by an action, causal-model theory predicts that the intervention at test should lead to discounting of A, the regular cause of X. The authors report further tests of causal-model theory. One key prediction is that full discounting should be observed only when the alternative cause is viewed as deterministic and independent of other events, 2 hallmark features of actions but not necessarily of arbitrary events. Consequently, the authors observed discounting with only interventions but not other observable events (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, rats were capable of flexibly switching between observational and interventional predictions (Experiment 3). Finally, discounting occurred on the very first test trial (Meta-Analysis). These results confirm causal-model theory but refute associative accounts.

Causal Reasoning in Rats

Empirical research with nonhuman primates appears to support the view that causal reasoning is a key cognitive faculty that divides humans from animals. The claim is that animals approximate causal learning using associative processes. The present results cast doubt on that conclusion. Rats made causal inferences in a basic task that taps into core features of causal reasoning without requiring complex physical knowledge. They derived predictions of the outcomes of interventions after passive observational learning of different kinds of causal models. These competencies cannot be explained by current associative theories but are consistent with causal Bayes net theories.

The effect of the shape of cortical lesions on reasoning in rats.

The effect of the shape of cortical lesions on reasoning in rats.

Cortical destruction of the posterior part of the brain and its effect on reasoning in rats

Cortical destruction of the posterior part of the brain and its effect on reasoning in rats