Reallocation Of Rights Research Articles

Article: A European Internet Access Tax

The OECD’s plans to address the challenges posed by the digitalization of the economy are progressing towards a complex system. The work of this international organization is based on two pillars – reallocation of rights and global minimum taxation on corporate profits – which should lead to the adoption of a common international model. Its outcome is uncertain; however, its implementation could require a significant amount of reliable information on the size and territorial distribution of the digital market. This purpose – the configuration of a digital tax census – could be fulfilled by the introduction of a European internet access tax that is a registration tax. Its taxpayers would be the holders of network access rights through telecommunication infrastructures located in the EU territory, and the service providers would function as substitutes for the taxpayers with the right – but not the obligation – to pass on the tax debt to the user. It would necessarily have to be a reduced tax with the objective of census purposes and a tax period of no less than three months. Based on a Catalan experience, which was unsuccessful due to its scope and characteristics, this article explores its possible implementation in the EU, within the framework of the search for solutions to the tax challenges posed by the digitalization of the economy. Digital taxation, internet access, European taxation, EU budget, EU own resources, EU fiscal policy, EU tax harmonization, EU taxation, EU tax harmonization.

A centennial literature review (1919–2019) of research publications on land readjustment from a neo-institutional economic perspective

Informed by Coasian transaction cost reasoning from a neo-institutional economic perspective, this literature review identifies and examines 225 available research works involving 188 sets of author entries spanning from 1919 to 2019. All are on or connected with land readjustment, with a focus on lot boundaries as rigidly delineated. Over the years researchers and practitioners have considered and reconsidered land readjustment under various names in different forms (whether consensual or non-consensual among land owners affected) but almost invariably involving replotting of proprietary boundaries and reallocation of rights to realigned lots in a new layout as an alternative to state taking of land (eminent domain) or developer purchase of all properties. This literature review, connected with the adoption of a policy proposal, is unique in three ways as far as land readjustment is concerned. First, it has a time span of just over a century from 1919 to 2019 and traces works on Japan from the 1920s. Second, it cross-references the works reviewed. Third, it has a theoretical interest in property rights with a specific focus on boundaries as a dimension of those rights, and articulates land readjustment as a subset of the transfer of development rights. Fourth, it employs ‘culturomics’ (Michel et al. 2011, Roth 2014) in fathoming the context of the concept land readjustment and associated terms.

Reorganization without Bankruptcy: Untying the Gordian Knot That Destroys Firm Value

This Article presents a new theory for analyzing bankruptcy-reorganization proceedings as well as a reorganization mechanism for public companies that may best meet legislative objectives: maximizing firm value and dividing it according to the claimants’ legal priorities. Called Gordian knot theory, it suggests that there is a strong structural and material connection between reorganization stages, whereby bargaining and litigation between the claimants over the reorganization pie lead to progressive destruction of the firm’s value and infringement on their legal rights. To demonstrate this theory, this Article focuses on reorganization’s allocation and reallocation stages—where the claimants’ original and new rights are determined, respectively—and how the connection between them prevents the legislative objectives from being met. Alternative approaches suggested for attaining these objectives, including Roe’s, Bebchuk’s, Baird’s, Aghion, Hart and Moore’s, and Adler and Ayres’ models, have focused on the firm’s valuation problem and suggested solving it by market mechanisms. The Gordian knot theory suggests, however, that it is impossible to attain the legislative objectives strictly by determining the firm’s value efficiently while leaving allocation problems to bargaining and litigation. This Article further presents a new mechanism for public companies that overcomes this problem by structuring reorganization in a single shot that includes the allocation and reallocation of rights, while eliminating the need for bargaining and court proceedings. It is based on a firm’s going-concern warning that auditors have to issue, explicitly indicating that there is substantial doubt as to whether the firm could remain solvent over twelve months. Under this mechanism, the warning initiates twelve months of voluntary rehabilitation. Then, if the warning is still valid, the junior classes will be able to buy out all of the senior classes at a price of the latter’s claims, similar to Bebchuk’s options model. A successful buy erases the original debt and, if the claimants do not purchase the firm, it is considered insolvent. This Article presents this mechanism—called the reorganization without bankruptcy mechanism—and discusses its advantages: inter alia, in the pre-bankruptcy period, the firm is solvent, it has not breached its contracts, and it is not involved in complex allocation disputes. These advantages bring the reorganization process in line with the legislative objectives, and allow firms to achieve rehabilitation by allowing for funding based on market mechanisms and management’s sole discretion, providing management with incentives for adequate disclosure, and initiating rehabilitation based on objective criteria — all free of bargaining and litigation biases.

Properties of Revenue Neutral Auctions: An Analysis for Tradable Pollution Rights

The paper is the first to derive and analyse theoretically the equilibrium properties of 'revenue neutral auctions', in the context of tradable pollution rights. By 'revenue neutrality' we mean that the objective of the agency distributing the rights is not to maximize earnings from the auction but to have an efficient allocation of rights by identifying the most deserving buyer through the process. The revenues earned are distributed back to the bidders following a rule. The experimental literature addresses the problem by analysing the behavior of the bidders in a revenue neutral auction but so far there has been no theoretical analysis on the equilibrium properties of such auctions. The analysis is done in a game theoretic framework. We introduce revenue neutral auction as a mechanism for reallocation of rights in the original tradable permit framework (Montgomery, 1972), in a single unit set up. The paper shows that a standard second price auction fails to be incentive compatible if revenue neutrality is introduced in the framework. Also, the efficiency of a tradable permit system with a revenue neutral auction for reallocation of rights is not independent of the initial distribution of permits, which is contrary to what has been established in the original work with a competitive secondary market.

A Property Rights Approach to Understanding Human Displacement from Protected Areas: the Case of Marine Protected Areas

The physical, economic, and sociocultural displacement of local peoples from protected areas generates intense discussion among scholars and policy makers. To foster greater precision and clarity in these discussions, we used a conceptual framework from the political economy literature to examine different forms of human displacement from protected areas. Using marine protected areas (MPAs) to ground our analysis, we characterized the 5 types of property rights that are reallocated (lost, secured, and gained) through the establishment of protected areas. All forms of MPA "displacement" involve reallocation of property rights, but the specific types and bundles of rights lost, secured, and gained dramatically shape the magnitude, extent, and equity of MPA impacts--positive and negative--on governance, economic well-being, health, education, social capital, and culture. The impacts of reallocating rights to MPA resources vary within and among social groups, inducing changes in society, in patterns of resource use, and in the environment. To create more environmentally sustainable and socially just conservation practice, a critical next step in conservation social science research is to document and explain variation in the social impacts of protected areas.

The market-oriented governance model of SOEs: China perspective

In the transition from centralized planned economy to market economy, reallocation of rights between the government and the market leads to the fundamental changes of economic structure, thus causing Paradigm shift from the government-oriented governance pattern in China. Based on survey of 104public listed companies in China, a descriptive analysis of the market-oriented governance pattern of SOEs is provided. The internal and external governance mechanisms in market-oriented governance model are designed to enhance the reform of modern enterprise institutions in China

No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water

The role of has featured prominently in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process, and in Arab-Israeli disputes in general. The allocation or reallocation of rights is a particularly thorny problem. Recent work (Fisher, 1995) seeks to sidestep the issue of rights allocation by appealing to the Coase theorem, which provides conditions under which the efficient use of a good does not depend on the allocation of property rights. It instead emphasizes the small use value of the in dispute, and concludes that a trade of water for peace should be eminently possible. Here, we provide a critique of this conclusion, based on two central ideas. First, the conditions of the Coase theorem are not satisfied, even approximately, and therefore the valuation of the use of cannot be analytically separated from the allocation of property rights. Second, the existence of subnational interests, and the need to have an agreement acceptable to important actors at this level, creates a further difficulty for negotiating a resolution of any dispute. Even if a trade at the national level can be agreed upon, domestic losers must be compensated enough to make it politically feasible for the national government.

The Sharing of Risks and the Risks of Sharing: Solidarity and Social Justice in the Welfare State

Solidarity as a social phenomenon means a sharing of feelings, interests, risks and responsibilities. The Western-European Welfare State can be seen as an organized system of solidarity, historically grown from group solidarity among workers, later between workers and employers, moving towards solidarity between larger social groups: between healthy people and the sick, between the young and the elderly, between the employed and the unemployed. This sharing of risks at a societal level however, has revealed the risks of sharing. In the postwar development of the welfare state, solidarity has been organized mainly in administrative forms, run by anonymous bureaucracies and giving way to free riders and calculative citizens. This article describes this development and provides arguments for a reorientation of the welfare state and for the re-allocation of rights, risks and responsibilities.

A Reallocation of Rights in Industries with Reproductive Health Hazards

The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in United Automobile Workers versus Johnson Controls prohibits hiring policies that exclude fertile women from industries posing reproductive health risks to workers and fetuses. Many toxic substances that threaten the developing fetus also pose risks to adult male and female workers. Exclusionary employment policies are socially undesirable for the following reasons: they may lead to worse reproductive outcomes if the indirect effects of lower wages and less adequate health insurance in the alternative available jobs are considered. Second, the effect of such policies could damage the individual woman's overall well-being through its economic impact and her potential loss in autonomy. Third, occupational segregation into less hazardous but lower-paying jobs reinforces gender stereotypes that are restrictive to women. The Supreme Court ruling in the Johnson Controls case reaffirms the importance of the Civil Rights Act as both a shield against unfair treatment for individual women and a commitment to eradicate sexist attitudes and economic inequality throughout society.

Can reallocation of rights help to avoid the Paretian Liberal Paradox?

In the extensive discussion on Sen's so-called "(Paretian) Liberal Paradox' (Sen, 1970) it has long been recognized that conflicts between the exercising of personal rights and Pareto optimality occur precisely because some members of society feel more strongly in opposing other people's private decisions than they do about their own private matter (see, e.g., Blau, 1975: 396). Several authors (in particular Gibbard, 1974) have proposed that in these cases the concerned individuals waive the exercise of their rights. Alternatively, one could consider the reallocation of rights as a potential way to avoid Pareto-dominated "liberal" solutions. The latter line of reasoning was followed in two recent contributions to the literature (Bernholz, 1986; Harel and Nitzan, 1987) both of which contain possibility results based on the idea of treating the allocation of rights itself as the object of inquiry. Each of these closely connected approaches, however, suffers from a major weakness or leaves important questions unanswered. It is the purpose of the present paper to point out these problems.