Realism In Confidence Judgments Research Articles

Earwitnesses: the type of voice lineup affects the proportion of correct identifications and the realism in confidence judgments

According to Tulving and Thomson (1973) similarity in encoding and recall contexts will facilitate recall. We investigated if similarity between the original voice event and the voice-lineup helps people to identify the target from a voice-lineup and helps improve the realism in participants’ confidence judgments of the identification reports. Participants (N=199) tried to identify a voice heard in a dialogue context that simulated two males 22 and 27 years old planning a burglary. In the Text-lineup condition six male speakers read a text from a book and in the Dialogue-lineup condition the same speakers had a dialogue with another male speaker. Each recording lasted approx. 30 seconds. The Text-lineup condition showed better identification accuracy, lower overconfidence and better calibration compared with the Dialogue-lineup condition. These results deviate from Tulving and Thomson’s encoding specificity principle in memory psychology, maybe because text reading provides more useful voice features compared to dialogues.

The relation between personality and the realism in confidence judgements in older adults.

This study investigated the relation between personality factors, as measured by the Swedish version of the NEO-FFI questionnaire, and the realism in older adults' (aged 60-93years, n=1,384) probability confidence judgements of their answers to general knowledge questions. The results showed very small effect sizes for the contribution of the personality variables to the fit between the proportion correct answers and the level of one's confidence judgements. Although personality differed somewhat within the age span studied and between the genders no differences were found in the relation between the dimensions of the NEO-FFI and the degree of realism in the confidence judgements as a function of age or gender. In total, the results show a significant but very small effect of personality on the realism in older adults' confidence judgements of their semantic knowledge.

The realism in older people's confidence judgments of answers to general knowledge questions.

The study investigated 2 aspects of the accuracy (i.e., realism) of confidence judgments of persons age 60-93 years (N = 1,384) regarding their answers to general knowledge questions. These aspects are the level of confidence (calibration) in relation to the proportion of correct answers and the ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers by means of confidence judgments. No age differences were found for either of the 2 aspects. Gender differences were found for proportion of correct answers and confidence but not for the realism in the confidence judgments.

Assessing Cognitive Failures

This special issue, entitled “Assessing Cognitive Failures,” includes articles based on presentations at the 9th European Conference on Psychological Assessment held in Thessaloniki, Greece, 3–6 May 2007. The topic of the special issue was selected because, despite the fact that cognitive failures are frequently experienced in everyday life by people of all ages, they have not attracted much research interest. Yet, cognitive failures are as important as effective cognitive functioning, and the implications for theory (i.e., conceptualization of cognitive failures and the mechanism that underlies them), assessment, and psychological practice are very significant. In this respect, there are two aspects of cognitive failures for which assessment is needed: (a) assessment of the cognitive processes that are involved in cognitive failures, and (b) assessment of the awareness people have of their cognitive failure(s). The former allows predictions about processes whose functioning may give rise to cognitive failures, whereas the latter allows the identification of individual differences in the propensity for cognitive failures and predictions about factors related to the experience of cognitive failure and the control processes involved. Cognitive failures were originally conceptualized by Reason and Mycielska (1982) as absent-mindedness, that is, mistakes or errors people make because of slips of attention or memory failure. This implies that cognitive failures are not necessarily symptoms of a pathology of the underlying cognitive processes but rather by-products of normal functioning of cognitive processes. Cognitive failures have been defined as cognitively-based mistakes on tasks that, ordinarily, the average person can accomplish (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982; Wallace, Kass, & Stanny, 2002). Their origin has been traced to memory problems (Norman, 1981), attention problems (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997), errors in the implementation of intentions (Norman, 1981), or errors caused by distractions (Pollina, Greene, Tunick, & Puckett, 1992). Alternative theoretical schemes have broadened the classification to involve even clumsiness and problems in social interactions (Mathews, Cole, & Craig, 1990) or problems in processing information (Larsson, Alderton, Neideffer, & Underhill, 1997). In all these cases the problem seems to lie in processes that failed to fully function and control behavior. From this point of view, cognitive failures are related to executive functions and, particularly, to attention, inhibitory control, and working memory.

Adult age differences in the realism of confidence judgments: Overconfidence, format dependence, and cognitive predictors.

Realistic confidence judgments are essential to everyday functioning, but few studies have addressed the issue of age differences in overconfidence. Therefore, the authors examined this issue with probability judgment and intuitive confidence intervals in a sample of 122 healthy adults (ages: 35-40, 55-60, 70-75 years). In line with predictions based on the naïve sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), substantial format dependence was observed, with extreme overconfidence when confidence was expressed as an intuitive confidence interval but not when confidence was expressed as a probability judgment. Moreover, an age-related increase in overconfidence was selectively observed when confidence was expressed as intuitive confidence intervals. Structural equation modeling indicated that the age-related increases in overconfidence were mediated by a general cognitive ability factor that may reflect executive processes. Finally, the results indicated that part of the negative influence of increased age on general ability may be compensated for by an age-related increase in domain-relevant knowledge.

The relation between realism in confidence judgements and the phenomenological quality of recognition memory when using emotionally valenced pictures

The aim of the study was to investigate the relation between the phenomenological quality of memory (Tulving, 1985) and the realism (validity) in confidence judgement when using emotional pictures (I.A.P.S; Lang, Ohman, & Vaitl, 1988). A series of three experiments was completed where the participants judged the phenomenological quality of their memory and/or their confidence. The results showed facilitation for the negative pictures in a matrix search task in the encoding phase, where negative pictures were more easily and quickly detected, compared to positive ones. In the memory phase of the experiments a higher degree of recollective experience (a larger proportion of 'remember' responses) was found for negative pictures. A higher level of confidence for recognition of negative pictures than for positive ones was obtained, but no general valence dependent effect on the realism in the confidence judgement was found. However, when analysing only the remember responses, negative pictures showed higher overconfidence than the positive pictures. The results support that a recollective experience induces higher confidence and overconfidence. Copyright (c) 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. (Less)

Eyewitnesses under influence: How feedback affects the realism in confidence judgements

This study investigated the effect of two types of feedback (confirmatory and disconfirmatory) on the accuracy in witnesses’ confidence judgements of their event memory. Overall, the witnesses evidenced overconfidence both when they received feedback and in the Control condition (no feedback). The results showed that confirmatory feedback caused higher overconfidence, compared both with when receiving disconfirmatory and no feedback. These results suggest that the impact of feedback on the accuracy of confidence judgements show the same pattern of results for event memory as for line-up identification tasks. Finally, when the witnesses rated the total number of questions that they had answered correctly they gave fairly correct estimates compared with their actual number of correct answers.

Stability and variability in the realism of confidence judgments over time, content domain, and gender

This study investigates the influence on the realism of confidence judgments of four different factors, the individual, the knowledge domain (crystallized and fluid intelligence), gender and cognitive style (Need-for-Cognition, NfC). Seventy-nine high-school students answered questions on word knowledge (WORD) and logical/spatial ability (DTK); both tests were administered on three occasions with two weeks between each trial. After each test question, each individual gave a confidence rating of his or her answer. The results showed some, but not perfect, individual stability. Furthermore, within-subject differences were found between domains (WORD/DTK); the participants showed better calibration and less overconfidence for the WORD-test as compared to the DTK-test. No stable gender differences were found for any of the two tests. Finally, the results show that having high NfC is not associated with better realism in confidence judgments. These results suggest that the realism of confidence judgments is, at least on the distal level, influenced by many different factors.

Realism in confidence judgements of performance based on implicit learning

In two experiments we employed calibration methods to investigate the realism of participants' confidence ratings of their own classification performance based on knowledge acquired after training on an artificial grammar. In Experiment 1 participants showed good realism (but overconfidence) for grammatical strings but very poor realism for non-grammatical strings. Method of training (string repetition in writing or mere exposure) did not affect the realism. Furthermore, the participants underestimated their overall performance. In Experiment 2, using a more complex grammar and controlling for two types of associative chunk-strength, participants showed good realism (but still overconfidence) for both letter and symbol strings, irrespective of grammaticality. Together, these experiments show that implicit learning can give rise to knowledge products that are associated with fairly realistic meta-knowledge. It is argued that both the zero-correlation criterion and the guessing criterion are misplaced when ...

Realism in confidence judgements of performance based on implicit learning

In two experiments we employed calibration methods to investigate therealism of participants' confidence ratings of their own classification performancebased on knowledge acquired after training on an artificial grammar.In Experiment 1 participants showed good realism (but overconfidence) forgrammatical strings but very poor realism for non-grammatical strings.Method of training (string repetition in writing or mere exposure) did notaffect the realism. Furthermore, the participants underestimated theiroverall performance. In Experiment 2, using a more complex grammar andcontrolling for two types of associative chunk-strength, participants showedgood realism (but still overconfidence) for both letter and symbol strings,irrespective of grammaticality. Together, these experiments show thatimplicit learning can give rise to knowledge products that are associatedwith fairly realistic meta-knowledge. It is argued that both the zero-correlationcriterion and the guessing criterion are misplaced when used to defineimplicit knowledge; two reasons being that confidence judgements may beaffected both by implicit knowledge and by inferences.

Realism in eyewitness confidence as a function of type of event witnessed and repeated recall.

This study investigated how the type of event witnessed and a repeated test schedule for confidence influenced the realism in confidence judgments. The experimental design contrasted 2 film versions (a violent and a nonviolent scenario) and 3 tests of confidence (immediate, repeated, and delayed). On average, for all single items, participants were highly overconfident in their judgments. However, the same participants severely underestimated their own performance when they, at the end of the test session, were asked to provide an estimate of how many questions they thought they had answered correctly. Whereas the effects on realism in confidence for the 2 different film versions were small, the realism in witnesses' confidence judgments increased when participants repeated their confidence ratings. The theoretical and forensical implications of these findings are discussed.

Considering the Knowledge You Have: Effects on Realism in Confidence Judgements

In three experiments, the hypothesis was tested that the realism of subjects' item-specific confidence judgements of their own answers to general knowledge questions would be improved by making the subjects heed content which might be expected to lower their confidence ratings. In each experiment, all subjects answered knowledge questions and then rated their confidence in their chosen answer. Before each question, the subjects in the experimental condition assessed the extent of their knowledge in a knowledge-area encompassing the knowledge question. Experiments 1 and 2 differed only in the design of the knowledge-area assessment scale. In Experiment 3, when making knowledge-area assessments, the subjects were asked to find examples of knowledge they lacked in the knowledge-area. Both Experiments 2 and 3 showed significantly improved realism in the subjects' confidence judgements. An aggregate assessment of the total number of questions believed to be answered correctly, given by the subjects at the end of Experiments 2 and 3, showed underconfidence in the experimental condition, particularly in Experiment 3. The results support the idea that the content active in subjects' memory at the time when confidence judgements are made affects their realism. Furthermore, our results show that the realism of subjects' item-specific confidence judgements can be improved without giving feedback.

Realism in Confidence Judgments as a Function of Working in Dyads or Alone

This study compares the realism of confidence judgments made by individuals and pairs of their answers to general knowledge questions, using a within-subjects design. In the initial Control condition, subjects first answered 30 questions and then confidence rated the chosen answer. For the next 30 questions (Condition 2), they wrote down an argument for the chosen answer and then confidence-rated their answer. In the third condition, the 40 subjects were divided into 20 pairs who then answered and confidence-rated the same 30 questions as in Condition 2. Pair members were asked to collaborate on all parts of the task. The results showed that overconfidence decreased in the Pair condition compared with the Single conditions. Analysis of the interaction in the Pair condition showed a higher overconfidence in those instances where one pair member dominated the interaction totally. Other analyses of the interaction in the Pair condition also supported the importance of argumentation between the pair members for realistic confidence judgments. A comparison with previous research suggests that the fact that the subjects first attempted the questions individually may have increased the proportion correct answers and limited the increase in confidence in the Pair condition. A control study, checking for the effect of subjects answering the same questions twice, found no effect of repetition for any of the three calibration measures used.

The effects of arguments on realism in confidence judgements

In this study we analyzed the effects of arguments on confidence ratings of answers to general knowledge questions. In two experiments subjects answered general knowledge questions and rated their confidence in the selected answers. Before each confidence rating the subjects were given a prepared argument(s) for and/or against the chosen answer. The four experimental conditions, each contrasted with a within-subject control condition, varied with respect to the type of arguments given to the subjects (for or against the chosen answer, with or without a further argument against the first argument). In general, arguments tended to result in improved calibration but in an increased overconfidence. However, these trends were only significant for the increase in overconfidence in one of the experimental conditions. Experiment 2, using a within-subject design, compared self-generated arguments, given arguments, and no arguments against the chosen answer alternative with respect to their influence on the subjects' confidence ratings. The results showed no difference in the realism of subjects' confidence ratings between the three conditions although subjects rated the given arguments as stronger in comparison with the arguments they had generated themselves. Our results suggest that arguments, whether given to the subjects or subject generated, have no clear influence on the realism of subjects' confidence ratings.

Response selection strategies and realism of confidence judgments

Two studies were conducted to examine how response selection strategy is related to confidence ratings and to performance on general knowledge questions. In both studies subjects were asked to answer 80 general knowledge questions and to rate their confidence in the correctness of the answer selected. A pilot study, in which subjects thought aloud while answering general knowledge questions, was carried out to identify different response selection strategies. In the first study, 40 subjects were asked to indicate which of four strategies (immediate recognition, inference, intuition, or guessing) they used for selecting an answer. In Study 2, think aloud reports from 20 subjects were coded into the same four strategies. The distribution of strategies differed between the studies, but there were very similar relations among strategy, confidence, and correctness of answer in the two studies. Response selection strategy was related to correctness of answer when confidence was partialed out. More specifically, immediate recognition was associated with higher proportion correct than with the other strategies. It was also found that ratings of how difficult the knowledge questions were to fellow students of the subjects were on a much more realistic level than the confidence ratings were. It is concluded that people could improve their confidence judgments by taking into account (a) how difficult a question is to other people, and (b) the response selection strategy used for answering the question.

Realism of confidence judgments.

Realism of confidence judgments.