Real Oil Price Shocks Research Articles

Oil Price Uncertainty and Consumer Sentiment in Advanced Economies

How does oil price uncertainty affect consumer sentiment in advanced economies? Is the response of consumer sentiment to exogenous positive and negative oil price shocks symmetric or asymmetric? Motivated to answer these questions, this paper provides a comprehensive examination of the effects of real oil price shocks on consumer sentiment in the G7 economies in the context of two classes of empirical models. With the application of a bivariate structural GARCH-in-Mean VAR model we find that (in general) oil price uncertainty has a negative and statistically significant effect on consumer sentiment in the G7 countries. Moreover, using a test of symmetry, we find that the relationship between oil prices and consumer sentiment is in general asymmetric. JEL Classification: C32, D12, Q43, O57

Energy price shocks and current account balances: Evidence from emerging market and developing economies

This paper investigates the effects of real energy price shocks on current account balances of 45 emerging market and developing economies. The investigation is based on country-specific structural vector autoregression models, where alternative specifications and identification schemes are considered for robustness purposes. The empirical results suggest that 1 % of a positive real oil price shock results in up to 0.11 (0.08) percentage points of a cumulative improvement (deterioration) in current account balances of oil exporters (importers) after five years, whereas 1 % of a positive real natural gas price shock results in up to 0.06 (0.04) percentage points of a cumulative improvement (deterioration) in current account balances of natural gas exporters (importers) after five years. Real coal price shocks result in higher current account balances of oil exporters and natural gas exporters, suggesting substitution of coal with oil and natural gas in such cases. When contributions of alternative real energy prices to the variance of current account balances are compared, real oil price shocks dominate those of real natural gas and real coal prices. The empirical results investigating the effects of oil demand versus oil supply shocks on current account balances suggest that oil demand shocks (rather than oil supply shocks) result in similar reactions of current account balances to real oil price shocks, supporting the view that the effects of oil demand shocks are different from those of oil supply shocks. The results are robust to the consideration of country-specific changes in real GDP and real effective exchange rates.

Hydrocarbon price spillover to banking performance in Eurozone

AbstractThe current study investigates the impact of real oil price shocks on the Eurozone banking sector from February 2009 to February 2022, using the Structural Vector Autoregressive method to distinguish the reaction between Eurozone bank indices and three structural indicators in the oil market shocks. The shocks include global oil demand, supply shock, and specific oil market shocks. Our findings show that the banking sector in the Eurozone responds positively toward an oil‐specific demand shock (oil price) in the short run, but it responds negatively in the medium and long run that lasts for a long time. The banking sector, on the contrary, does not react to supply shocks, which provide a significant policy implication for regulators and policymakers.

Inflation Expectations and the Pass-Through of Oil Prices

Abstract Inflation expectations and the associated pass-through of oil price shocks depend on demand and supply conditions underlying the global oil market. We establish this result using a structural VAR model of the global oil market that jointly identifies transmissions of oil demand and supply shocks through real oil prices to both expected and actual inflation. We demonstrate that economic activity shocks have a significantly longer-lasting effect on inflation expectations and actual inflation than other types of real oil price shocks, and resolve disagreements around the role of oil prices in explaining the missing deflation puzzle of the Great Recession.

THE IMPACT OF OIL PRICES ON THE FOOD INFLATION IN KAZAKHSTAN

This paper assesses empirically the effects of real oil price shocks on the food inflation in Kazakhstan for the monthly period 2004-2019 by using a VAR model. Standard unit root tests do not yield reliable results in the presence of breaks. In this regard, Zivot-Andrews (1992) has been tested with the help of unit root test. Food prices have been proven to be I(1) according to the Zivot-Andrews (1992) test, while I(0) is according to the ADF test. In subsequent steps, the causality test of the variables was performed. According to the test, there is a double-chance causality between oil prices and food prices. The short-term effect of the variables is investigated with the help of the VAR model. As a result, crude oil prices have an indirect impact on food prices.

Are the responses of output and investment to oil price shocks asymmetric?: The case of an oil-importing small open economy

In this paper, we investigate whether there are asymmetric effects of oil price changes on GDP, industrial production and investment in Turkey for the period between 1998:q1 and 2019:q2 applying the methodology advanced by Kilian and Vigfusson (Quant Econ 2(3):419–453, 2011a). Based on the results of the slope-based tests, we cannot find significant evidence against the null of symmetry in the effects of oil price shocks on real GDP growth, industrial production growth and investment. Next, we concentrate on the impulse response-based tests which allow us to examine the issue of asymmetry of the impulse response functions directly. Overall, both the results of the impulse response-based symmetry tests and the impulse response analysis present significant evidence confirming the asymmetry in the responses to real oil price shocks. That is, our findings show that the responses of all macroeconomic aggregates to positive oil price shocks are considerably greater than those of to negative oil price shocks, especially at short horizons. Moreover, the asymmetry seems to be more apparent in the responses of investment and industrial production growth. Our study also emphasizes the importance of using an appropriate model to analyze the underlying relations.

Oil price shocks and the equity market: Evidence for the S&P 500 sectoral indices

Using monthly returns of ten S&P 500 sectoral indices from January 1990 to January 2015, I examine the impact of demand and supply shocks of oil on the stock market. I confirm that positive shocks to U.S. production of oil and economic activity have a significant and positive influence on stock returns. Moreover, the negative and persistent effect of real oil price shocks on all sectoral indices except energy and utility found by this study. I also examine the impact of oil price volatility on stock returns. Oil price volatility has a negative and significant effect on all industries, even oil-related and oil substitutes. In addition, I get the VAR estimations for the crisis period and find that there is a substantial increase in the role of oil price shocks in the decomposition of stock returns of all sectors. Furthermore, stock returns are better explained by U.S. oil production shocks than other shocks in most sectors over the financial crisis time period. In addition, I find the asymmetric effects of oil shocks are applicable to only two out of ten sectors, implying the effect of oil price return on equity returns only in the energy and utility sectors are not asymmetric.

Oil Price Shocks and the Equity Market: Evidence for the S&P 500 Sectoral Indices

Using monthly returns of ten S&P 500 sectoral indices from January 1990 to January 2015, we examine the impact of demand and supply shocks of oil on the stock market. We confirm that positive shocks to U.S. production of oil and economic activity have a significant and positive influence on stock returns. Moreover, the negative and persistent effect of real oil price shocks on all sectoral indices except energy and utility found by this study. We also examine the impact of oil price volatility on stock returns. Oil price volatility has a negative and significant effect on all industries, even oil-related and oil substitutes. In addition, we get the VAR estimations for the crisis period and find that there is a substantial increase in the role of oil price shocks in the decomposition of stock returns of all sectors. Furthermore, stock returns are better explained by U.S. oil production shocks than other shocks in most sectors over the financial crisis time period. In addition, we find the asymmetric effects of oil shocks are applicable to only two out of ten sectors, implying the effect of oil price return on equity returns only in the energy and utility sectors are not asymmetric.

The Propagation of Regional Shocks in Housing Markets: Evidence from Oil Price Shocks in Canada

Shocks to the demand for housing that originate in one region may seem important only for that regional housing market. We provide evidence that such shocks can also affect housing markets in other regions. Our analysis focuses on the response of Canadian housing markets to oil price shocks. Oil price shocks constitute an important source of exogenous regional variation in income in Canada because oil production is highly geographically concentrated. We document that, at the national level, real oil price shocks account for 11% of the variability in real house price growth over time. At the regional level, we find that unexpected increases in the real price of oil raise housing demand and real house prices not only in oil-producing regions, but also in other regions. We develop a theoretical model of the propagation of real oil price shocks across regions that helps understand this finding. The model differentiates between oil-producing and non-oil-producing regions and incorporates multiple sectors, trade between provinces, government redistribution, and consumer spending on fuel. We empirically confirm the model prediction that oil price shocks are propagated to housing markets in non-oil-producing regions by the government redistribution of oil revenue and by increased interprovincial trade.

The Impact of Oil Shocks in a Small Open Economy New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model for an Oil-Importing Country: The Case of South Africa

ABSTRACT This article studies the effects of foreign (real) oil price shocks on key macroeconomic variables for South Africa: a net-importer of oil. We develop and estimate a small open economy New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a role for oil in consumption and production. The substitutability of oil for capital and consumption goods is low, import price pass-through is incomplete, domestic and foreign prices and wages are sticky, and the uncovered interest rate parity condition holds imperfectly. Foreign real oil price shocks have a strong and persistent effect on domestic production and consumption activities and, hence, are a fundamental driver of output, inflation, and interest rates in both the short- and long-run. Oil price shocks also generate a trade-off between output and inflation stabilization. As a result, episodes of endogenous tightening of monetary policy slow the recovery of South Africa’s real economy. Our findings go further to suggest an important role for oil prices in predicting South African output during and after the recession that followed the 2008 global financial crisis.

The Propagation of Regional Shocks in Housing Markets: Evidence from Oil Price Shocks in Canada

Shocks to the demand for housing that originate in one region may seem important only for that regional housing market. We provide evidence that such shocks can also affect housing markets in other regions. Our analysis focuses on the response of Canadian housing markets to oil price shocks. Oil price shocks constitute an important source of exogenous regional variation in income in Canada because oil production is highly geographically concentrated. We document that, at the national level, real oil price shocks account for 11% of the variability in real house price growth over time. At the regional level, we find that unexpected increases in the real price of oil raise housing demand and real house prices not only in oil-producing regions, but also in other regions. We develop a theoretical model of the propagation of real oil price shocks across regions that helps understand this finding. The model differentiates between oil-producing and non-oil-producing regions and incorporates multiple sectors, trade between provinces, government redistribution, and consumer spending on fuel. We empirically confirm the model prediction that oil price shocks are propagated to housing markets in non-oil-producing regions by the government redistribution of oil revenue and by increased interprovincial trade.

Do Inflation Expectations Propagate the Inflationary Impact of Real Oil Price Shocks?: Evidence from the Michigan Survey

This paper presents evidence that inflation expectations, as measured by the Michigan Survey of Consumers, only play a minimal role in the propagation of real oil price shocks into inflation. This is despite evidence that confirms that inflation expectations are sensitive to real oil price shocks. Further analysis suggests that after the 1990s, inflation expectations may have played no part in propagating real oil price shocks into inflation.

The Effects of Oil Price Shocks on Transitional Dynamics of Turkish Business Cycle

In this study we investigated usefulness of oil price shocks in predicting switches between the growth phases of output in Turkey using monthly data for the period 1986-2014 by extending Markov Switching framework to include time-varying transition probabilities. We investigate the issue of whether the addition of various real oil price shocks to a univariate Markov Switching model for output can characterize the dynamics of business cycles better than the fixed transition probability version of Markov Switching model. The main results are summarized as follows. We find that although information about the lags of output growth and the information contained in transition probabilities combine to help identify which state of the economy has occurred in the TVTP model, oil price shocks are not the leading indicator of Turkish business cycle.

Do Inflation Expectations Propagate the Inflationary Impact of Real Oil Price Shocks?: Evidence from the Michigan Survey

This paper presents evidence that inflation expectations, as measured by the Michigan Survey of consumers, only play a minimal role in the propagation of real oil price shocks into inflation. This is despite evidence which confirms inflation expectations are sensitive to real oil price shocks. Further analysis exploring structural breaks suggest at some point after the mid-1990s, inflation expectations may have played no part in propagating real oil price shocks into inflation.

Oil Price Shocks and Labor Market Fluctuations

We examine the impact of real oil price shocks on labor market flows in the U.S. We first use smooth transition regression (STAR) models to investigate to what extent oil prices can be considered as a driving force of labor market fluctuations. Then we develop and calibrate a modified version of Pissarides' (2000) model with energy costs, which we simulate in response to shocks mimicking the behavior of the actual oil price shocks. We find that (i) these shocks are an important driving force of job market flows; (ii) the job finding probability is the main transmission mechanism of such shocks; and (iii) they bring a new amplification mechanism for the volatility of the labor market, and should thus be seen as complementary of labor productivity shocks. Overall we conclude that shocks in oil prices cannot be neglected in explaining cyclical labor adjustments in the U.S.

Openness and the Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Shocks on Real Output in Nigeria (1960–2003)*

Abstract: This study investigates the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the real output growth in a small open economy. It is a country‐specific, time series study that verifies the implication of increasing economic openness on the efficacy of monetary and fiscal policy. A modified GARCH model was used to estimate the anticipated and unanticipated shocks. Two measures of fiscal and monetary shocks were combined with openness and real oil price shocks in a VECM model to assess the effects of anticipated and unanticipated policy shocks on the output equations. The empirical results showed that anticipated and unanticipated fiscal and monetary shocks had no significant positive effects on real output. This suggests that the open macroeconomic version of the policy ineffectiveness proposition was valid for both monetary and fiscal policy shocks in Nigeria. This is in consonance with earlier works in this area. Furthermore, the degree of openness and oil price shocks had a negative implication on the efficacy of macroeconomic policy in Nigeria; also in agreement with the Dutch Disease Syndrome. Finally, the policy implication of this study therefore is that trade liberalization policy should be implemented cautiously. The Nigerian economy is weak to withstand the unwholesome consequences of full economic integration.

All time cheaters versus cheaters in distress: An examination of cheating and oil prices in OPEC

This paper investigates the OPEC quota share system and whether there is any pattern to “cheating”. Using threshold cointegration methods, we examine each OPEC member's cheating behavior in periods of rising and falling real oil prices. Most OPEC members behave differently in response to rising oil prices than falling oil prices. For shocks of typical historical size, most members overproduce their quotas regardless of the direction of the real oil prices in the medium to long run. However, in response to large real oil price shocks, most members conform to a “public finance argument” whereby they underproduce their quotas in response to rising oil prices and overproduce in response to falling real oil prices. In an extended model with cheating by Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members, we find no statistically significant relationship between Saudi Arabian cheating and other cheating. The impulse response functions reveal that for typical shocks, neither Saudi Arabia nor other OPEC members absorb cheating by the other party. However, when there is a large incidence of cheating by other OPEC members, Saudi Arabia responds in kind: this forceful response is in line with a tit-for-tat strategy when there is “too much” cheating.

Oil-Price Shocks and Macroeconomic Adjustments: Does the Exchange Rate Regime Matter?

The recurring oil-price shocks that hit all economies in the world provide an opportunity to empirically test Friedman's hypothesis that flexible exchange regimes better absorb real external shocks. Using a sample of nine of the OECD's major oil-importing countries and Reinhart and Rogoff's de facto classification of exchange rate regimes, this paper examines whether the response of real output, prices, interest rate, and the real exchange rate to real oil-price shocks differ across exchange rate regimes. The results show that price level and the real exchange rate exhibit smoother adjustment to their long-run equilibrium when the de facto exchange rate regime was flexible. The paper also finds feedback from the real effective exchange rate and inflation rate to the domestic-currency real oil-price, supporting the growing notion that oil-price shocks are not purely exogenous to developed economies.

The role of oil price shocks on China's real exchange rate

This paper investigates to what extent the oil price shock and three other types of underlying macroeconomic shocks impact the trend movements of China's real exchange rate. By constructing a four-dimensional structural VAR model, the results suggest that real oil price shocks would lead to a minor appreciation of the long-term real exchange rate due to China's lesser dependence on imported oil than its trading partners included in the RMB basket peg regime and rigorous government energy regulations. The real shocks, as opposed to nominal shocks, are found to be dominant in the variations of the real exchange rate.

Inflation dynamics and nominal adjustment in the Baltic States

The paper seeks to explain the inflationary dynamics in the Baltic countries since the mid-1990s. Single-equation estimations generally yield poor results, while panel data estimations provide statistically and economically satisfactory findings. The main result is that the observed gradual disinflation can to a large extent be explained by adjustment to international prices. Stringent fixed exchange rate systems have exerted downward pressure on inflation both directly and via expectations to future inflation. Measures of excess capacity in the labour market have no effect on inflation, while industrial output gaps have some explanatory power. Real oil price shocks have an immediate but short-lived impact on inflation.