While empirical study of the jury has a long history (cf. Marston, 1924), recent years have witnessed a substantial expansion of research interest. Especially noticeable has been the proliferation of studies involving attempted simulation of jury functioning. The recent popularity of the jury simulation paradigm is probably due to researchers' perception that it offers both theoretical and pragmatic potential. The jury's task, that of making a social judgment based on various kinds of information, provides an arena in which social psychologists can test a variety of theoretical conceptions: the just-world model (Jones & Aronson, 1973), the reinforcement model of attraction (Mitchell & Byrne, 1973), information integration theory (Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974), social decision scheme models (Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt, & Meek, 1975), attribution theory (Izzett & Fishman, 1976), and equity theory (DeJong, Morris, & Hastorf, 1976). At the same time, because of the intrinsic difficulties associated with research on actual juries, the jury simulation paradigm offers an apparently reasonable source of pragmatic insights about jury functioning. For example, legal prohibitions enacted to ensure absolute privacy for the jury (Burchard, 1958) bar social scientists at the door when a real jury retires for deliberation. In addition, the behavioral scientist can exercise only limited experimental control over court