Real Distinctions Research Articles

Divine Simplicity, Divine Relations, and the Problem of Robust Persons

In this paper, I aim to defend a robust concept of “person” as it relates to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. I begin by situating the debate in the current context between Social Trinitarianism (ST) and Latin Trinitarianism (LT) and then zero in on Thomas Aquinas’s view of the divine Persons as subsistent relations. I will argue that such an understanding of divine Persons has two significant difficulties. First, Aquinas’s view of a strong doctrine of divine simplicity is susceptible to modal collapse. For on such a view, there are no real distinctions within God; such distinctions are conceptually only. If there are no real distinctions within God, then how can we make sense of the eternal relations within God? Second, I question whether a relation can be equated with a Person. After all, relations do not know things, perform actions, or love in the way Scripture portrays the divine Persons. I will then offer a constructive and more robust view of the divine Person—one that aligns with the control of Scripture. In doing so, I consider two objections, one centering on whether defenders of ST fall into tri-theism and the other on whether divine Persons can indeed work together.

1H Nuclear Magnetic Resonance, Infrared, and Chemometrics in Lipid Analysis of Brazilian Edible-Oil-Based Nutraceuticals

Edible oils have commercial and nutritional value due to the presence of essential fatty acids. They can be consumed fresh in the form of capsules known as nutraceuticals. The quality of such products is of interest to the consumer. In this context, this study describes a method based on high-resolution nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) and Fourier-transform mid-infrared spectroscopic analysis (FTIR), combined with statistical analyses, to differentiate different edible oils used as nutraceuticals in Brazil by fatty acid content. Through the analysis of 1H NMR spectra, the levels of saturated and unsaturated fatty acids in edible oils were characterized and quantified. Statistical analysis of the data confirmed the real distinctions between nutraceutical raw materials, with emphasis on ω-9, ω-6, and ω-3 fatty acids. The analytical approach presented also demonstrates the potential to identify the origin (animal or vegetable) of edible oils used as nutraceuticals.

Thomistic Simplicity and Distinguishing the Immanent and Economic Trinities

I argue that there is a discrepancy between the Thomistic doctrine of divine simplicity and affirming the immanent-economic distinctions in the Trinity. Since God is an absolutely simple essence whose essence it is to exist, and since the simple God exists as pure act—lacking all potential—there exist no real distinctions in God, such as physical or metaphysical parts, and there exist no divisions in the life of God, who exists in atemporal eternity. Per the immanent-economic distinctions in the Trinity, the Son is submissive to the will of the Father in the latter but not the former. This appears to be a distinction in the life of the Triune God, which is not acceptable per divine simplicity. After examining the Trinity doctrine and christology of Thomas along with possible solutions to the problem proposed, I conclude that said solutions fail to eliminate the discrepancy between Thomas’s account of simplicity and the immanent-economic distinctions in the life of the Trinity.

Fundamentos de la explicación en ciencias sociales: revisitando el constructivismo de Niklas Luhmann (20 años después)

In this work, it is argued that one of the foundations of NiklasLuhmann’s theory of social systems, namely that it has no ontology, would prevent the elaboration of explanations in sociology. Because the theory has a formal-logical foundation, which does not presuppose ontology, there are insurmountable obstacles to achieving this objective. For this reason, it is valid to wonder about the merit of a theory that, after 20 years, insists on not aligning itself with ontological premises in a robust way and suggests, therefore, a refusal to integrate sociology within the set of factual sciences. However, we think that the richness of Luhmann’s work allows a dialogue with the mainstream of contemporary theoretical practice. Three rules about what “should not be done” are revalidated from this analysis to philosophically base a theory in sociology and a key suggestion to overcome the problem of explanation in Luhmann’s sociology: social science seeks and directs its activity towards discovery and the use of substantive, real distinctions that also enrich the factual content of statements about social reality.

The Molecular Basis of Private Property

For political and economic theory in general, libertarianism in particular, property rights are a pillar of central importance. One might describe the schools of political and economic thought solely by their approach to property rights, for example libertarianism as expansive and communism as constrained, with a fair degree of accuracy on the system as a whole. Despite centuries of property rights philosophy, a fundamental weakness persists that can be most easily seen from a natural science perspective. Property classifications, such as between one's physical body, personal property, and other types of so-called private property, underlie much of the property rights theory, yet these classes are more of a result of technological limitations than philosophical or real economic distinctions. We demonstrate through a lens of molecular and developmental biology how distinctions between types of property are misguided or illusory. Using the developing human embryo as the most basic example of property acquisition, we show that all subsequent examples of greater property acquisition and its use are fundamentally the same. The point is further developed with other biological examples. Foundational concepts are of primary importance as their mistake persists through even the most elegant deductions. In order to defend itself from the political and economic attacks, the property rights ethic must be consistent and logical. For this, any artificial or contradictory concepts must be shed.

Personality and Genetic Associations With Military Service

Existing literature connects military service to regional characteristics and family traditions, creating real distinctions between those who serve and those who do not. We engage this discussion by examining military service as a function of personality. In the second portion, we examine military service as predisposed by genetics. Our findings indicate there is a significant heritability component of serving in the military. We find a significant genetic correlation between personality traits associated with progressive political ambition and military service, suggesting that military service represents a different form of political participation to which individuals are genetically predisposed. We discuss the long-term implications of our findings for policy makers and recruiters.

Multidimensional Perspectives on the Faith and Giving of Youth and Emerging Adults

This volume includes eight studies of faith and giving for youth and emerging adults. Combined,we find organizational, cultural, institutional, educational, informal, familial, and developmentalinfluences on the shape and contours of youth and emerging adult faith and giving. These studiesprovide some challenges to popular interpretations of Millennials, and to the ways researchers typicallystudy religiosity and charitable giving. Accounting for the greater demographic and cultural diversityof Millennials may require changes to interpretations of young people by religious and spiritualleaders, parents, and scholars.

The development and developmental consequences of social essentialism.

People often view certain ways of classifying people (e.g., by gender, race, or ethnicity) as reflecting real distinctions found in nature. Such categories are viewed as marking meaningful, fundamental, and informative differences between distinct kinds of people. This article examines the development of these essentialist intuitive theories of how the social world is structured, along with the developmental consequences of these beliefs. We first examine the processes that give rise to social essentialism, arguing that essentialism emerges as children actively attempt to make sense of their environment by relying on several basic representational and explanatory biases. These developmental processes give rise to the widespread emergence of social essentialist views in early childhood, but allow for vast variability across development and cultural contexts in the precise nature of these beliefs. We then examine what is known and still to be discovered about the implications of essentialism for stereotyping, inter-group interaction, and the development of social prejudice. We conclude with directions for future research, particularly on the theoretical payoff that could be gained by including more diverse samples of children in future developmental investigations. WIREs Cogn Sci 2017, 8:e1437. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1437 This article is categorized under: Psychology > Development and Aging Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief.

Seeking Indianness: Christoph Weiditz, the Aztecs, and feathered Amerindians

Christoph Weiditz's Trachtenbuch (costume book) of c. 1529–1530 pictures the dress, physical characteristics, and activities of people of varied social ranks and occupations from different regions of the Netherlands and Spain, including the Aztecs who accompanied Hernando Cortés to Spain in 1528 and joined the court of Charles V. Responding to the intense European interest in regional dress, Weiditz's thirteen paintings of indigenous Americans offered what has long been considered an eyewitness account of the Aztecs. This essay argues that although some were Mexicans, all were Brazilianized, and most were rendered as exotics on display, with physical and sartorial features fabricated from prints, descriptions, and objects representing the Americas that were circulating in Europe at the time. The dissonance between Weiditz's painted images and the Mexicans who visited Charles's court, points up how difficult it was for Weiditz and the European public to recognize real ethnic, cultural, and social distinctions among indigenous peoples and, to the contrary, how easily diverse objects and images from the American were entangled to compose a generic Indianness.

Distinctions That Must Be Preserved: On the Civil War, American Indians, and the West

Distinctions That Must Be PreservedOn the Civil War, American Indians, and the West Khal Schneider (bio) A brief tour in 1858 was enough to convince Interior Department clerk Godard Bailey that California’s new reservations had failed to live up to the promise of their inspiration. In the preceding six years, after California’s congressional delegation blocked the government’s eighteen treaties with California Indians, the federal government had improvised a reservation system based on a model with more local support: “the stately missions” where Indians were “taught under a system of discipline at once mild, firm, and paternal.”1 Bailey accepted the missions as an example of “patriarchal rule” but found that the reservations disappointed in that regard. The mission fathers improved “their own property” as they “improved the Indians”; they “grew rich” while the Indians “labored cheerfully.” The reservations, by contrast, were simply “government alms-houses.” He came to the point: at the missions, “Indians were very nearly in the condition of the slaves upon a plantation in one of the cotton-growing states.” Bailey meant it as praise. And when he wrote that it was “not in the nature of things that one should work for another as he would for himself,” he was not thinking of Indian (or African American) laborers, but the white men who oversaw their labor. “It was not to be expected,” the clerk insisted, “that a salaried supervisor of a [End Page 36] farm should manage it as profitably as the owner of it.” Luckily, the market was already providing a solution. “The only really prosperous and happy [Indians] I saw in California” were the ones laboring on certain private farms and ranches in northern California. There, Indian “feudatories” “secure the means of clothing themselves and their families,” and the owners of the farms found their “advantage in thus protecting, encouraging, and aiding” the Indians. “Can the government vicariously establish such relations with Indians?” Bailey was sure it could not. The next year Congress cut California’s Indian appropriation by 75 percent and the commissioner of Indian affairs agreed that “almost any change would be better than the present system.”2 Godard Bailey’s career in federal service and his vision of Indian Country died almost simultaneously. Early in the secession winter, he confessed to removing nearly a million dollars’ worth of Indian trust fund bonds from his safe in the Office of Indian Affairs and, at the behest of Secretary of War John B. Floyd (a relative of his), delivering them to a War Department contractor who borrowed against the value of the bonds on Wall Street.3 All escaped prosecution in the briefly famous “Great Defalcation,” but scandal followed Bailey when he returned home to South Carolina. After he threatened to shoot a man in Columbia in 1862 in answer to his insulting mention of the affair of the bonds, the man’s wife told the wartime diarist Mary Chestnut, “Everybody knew Mr. Bailey came into the Confederacy under a cloud.”4 Bailey’s was evidently not the right kind of conspiracy to subvert the federal government. However much they disdained him, Bailey shared the outlook of his southern countrymen. If Bailey’s Indian policy recommendation seems outlandish, it is because we understand the “Great Father” in Indian affairs to be a metonym for the paternalist federal government. After the Civil War, Indian policy reformers, with an eye to the experience of African American freed-people (especially freedmen) argued that here, too, a strong state could raise a downtrodden race to competent liberal citizenship.5 As Bailey’s career [End Page 37] suggests, real distinctions existed between the paternalistic policy that unfolded after the war and what Bailey approvingly called “patriarchal rule.” These distinctions should be of interest to both Civil War–era specialists trying to integrate western history into the story of the war and western historians seeking to tell the story of a longer, more expansive Civil War. This is because scholars, whether experts in the Civil War or in western history, have tended to accept the West as a field of federal administration, if not federal domination, where imperial architects built a state that comported...

Trinity, Simplicity and the Status of God's Personal Relations

It is commonly argued by Christian philosophers and theologians that the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity is incompatible with the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. First, it would seem that the presence of relations in God suggests a composition of substance and accidents in him. Second, if all that is in God is God, as simplicity claims, then it would seem that one could not maintain the real distinctions between the divine persons, as the Trinity requires. In answer to these challenges this article seeks to recover Thomas Aquinas' and the Reformed scholastics' emphasis upon the subsistence and pure actuality of the personal relations in God. The article concludes that while God's personal relations are really distinct from each other, there is no real distinction between the personal relations and the divine substance and that the Trinity and the doctrine of divine simplicity are thus agreeable.

Measuring Stable Value Risk Structures -- A New Scoring System

Since 2008 there has been a major disruption in the stable value market with a Synthetic GIC shortage, with older forms of stable value coming back from the 90’s and 80’s. What is needed is a way to measure the structural risk differences of the wrap or insurance segments of stable value investment options in 401(k) s and related U.S. defined contribution plans. We do have credit ratings on the pieces of the insurance structure, and a rating on the underlying securities, but they do not get to the real distinctions of risk between the newer and older stable value options. There are three basic categories of stable value: (1) The original General Account or traditional GIC, (2) the Insurance Company Separate Account GIC and (3) the Synthetic GIC, sometimes known as a wrap. What has never been done is to quantify the risk difference between all of these categories, and then the effects of diversification within these categories, and even mixing and matching different structures within the same stable value fund. This new scoring system fills this gap.

A Third Type of Distinction in the Treatise

In this paper, I resolve a potential contradiction between two of Hume's central tenets: that complex perceptions consist of simple perceptions and that distinct things are separable. The former implies that a complex perception is not separable from its constituent simple perceptions, as a change in its constituents destroys its identity. The latter entails that the complex perception is separable from these simple perceptions, since it is distinct from them. This is a contradiction. I resolve it by appealing to a third kind of distinction in addition to the two kinds Hume mentions: real distinctions and distinctions of reason. This third distinction is a partial distinction. I argue that just as the separability principle does not apply to distinctions of reason, neither does it apply to perceptions that are only partially distinct from other perceptions. Hence, the apparent contradiction is resolved.

On Polkinghorne’s Unification of General Providence, Special Providence and Miracle

John Polkinghorne claims there are no real distinctions between general providence, special providence and miracle. In this paper I determine whether this claim could be true given Polkinghorne’s wider account of these types of divine action. I conclude that this claim could be true, but only given a particular reading of Polkinghorne. I then defend this reading in light of two potential objections.

Distinctions in the Metaphysics of Henry of Ghent

DISTINCTIONS IN THE METAPHYSICS OF HENRY OF GHENT By ROLAND J. TESKE The intentional distinction is commonly and rightly recognized as one of the hallmarks of the metaphysics of Henry of Ghent. Raymond Macken, for example, says, "Comme l'on sait, la distinction intentionnelle est une théorie bien caractéristique de Henri de Gand."1 He adds that it bears the influence of Avicenna and contributes to the view of John Duns Scotus. On the contrary , he notes, "La distinction réelle est une doctrine tout aussi charactéristique de S. Thomas."2 Certainly the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures is characteristic of the metaphysics of St. Thomas, but Henry too has real distinctions in his metaphysics. However, what Henry means by a real distinction is something quite different from what St. Thomas and his followers mean by a real distinction. So too, it is not really helpful to say that Henry considers the intentional distinction "comme une sorte de distinction intermédiaire entre la distinction réelle et la distinction de pure raison," unless one is clear about what a real distinction and a purely rational distinction are in the thought of the philosopher in question.3 It is also commonly recognized, as Macken notes, that "Henri, dans ses questions consacrées à cette distinction intentionelle entre l'essence et l'existence , n'attaquait pas en premier lieu Thomas d'Aquin, mais bien Gilles de Rome, ou plutôt, qu'il répondait à ses attaques."4 Macken even goes so far as to claim that "la distinction intentionnelle est donc une sorte de distinction réelle," although he admits that "elle a donc un certain lien avec la distinction de raison."5 Others interpret Henry's position on the distinction between essence and existence in creatures as close to that of St. Thomas. José Gómez Caffarena, for example, cites several statements of Henry in which he seems to say that there is a real distinction between essence and existence in creatures: 1 R. Macken, "Les diverses applications de la distinction intentionelle chez Henri de Gand," Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, ed. Jan P. Beckmann et al. (Berlin, 1981), 769-76, here 769. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., 770, where Macken quotes Henry to that effect. "Baptizetur ergo ille modus médius et detur ei nomen, et si non competenter possit appellari differentia secundum intentionem, ut omnino sit differre intentione et ratione, detur ei aliud nomen" (Quodlibet X, q. 7 [1518 edition], fol. 418rQ). 4 Macken. "Les diverses applications." 770. 228TRADITIO I understand that every creature differs in existence and in the intellect, because it has existence distinct from essence in the nature of the thing, and the intellect grasps them as distinct and that only God differs in understanding only, that is, when one apprehends his essence under one concept, but his existence under another.6 And Henry adds: "And in that way the essence of a creature and its existence differ really (re) in some way."7 Gómez Caffarena concludes: Me parece en consecuencia que no es en la realidad de la distinción de esencia y existencia donde hay que buscar la diferencia más profunda entre Enrique de Gante y Santo Tomás, aunque el Doctor Solemne se mostró tan celoso impugnador del antiguo bachiller de Angélico.8 Gómez Caffarena suggests, "Hay entre Santo Tomás y Enrique una diferencia de Metafísica fundamental, la consistencia especial dada por Enrique al ser de esencia."9 The being of essence, as opposed to the being of existence, as we shall see, is the being of a thing (res) that is more than a mere figment of the mind. It is a thing in this sense in which Henry speaks of a real distinction (secundum rem). A thing in this sense, however, is not something actually existing, but only an essence existing in the mind. A further complication arises because, as Jean Paulus points out, Henry distinguishes the level of metaphysics, which considers primarily essences, from that of physics, which considers really existing things.10 Separability and inseparability are, as we shall see, tied to the various sorts of distinctions, and they...

Statistical Discrimination in Labor Markets: An Experimental Analysis

Statistical discrimination occurs when distinctions between demographic groups are made on the basis of real or imagined statistical distinctions between the groups. While such discrimination is legal in some cases (e.g., insurance markets), it is illegal and/or controversial in others (e.g., racial profiling and gender-based labor market discrimination). First-moment statistical discrimination occurs when, for example, female workers are offered lower wages because females are perceived to be less productive, on average, than male workers. Second-moment discrimination would occur when risk-averse employers offer female workers lower wages based not on lower average productivity but on a higher variance in their productivity. This paper reports results from controlled laboratory experiments designed to study second-moment statistical discrimination in a labor market setting. Since decision-makers may not view risk in the same way as economists or statisticians (i.e., risk-variance of distribution), we also examine two possible alternative measures of risk: the support of the distribution, and the probability of earning less than the expected (maximum) profits for the employer. Our results indicate that individuals do respond to these alternative measures of risk, and employers made statistically discriminatory wage offers consistent with loss-aversion.

Essay: Manufacturing categories—the case of disabled athletes

My introduction to working with disabled athletes came when I went to a pre-games seminar in Athens, Greece, to prepare for the 2004 Paralympics and had to share a room with Pieter Badenhorst—a double-arm amputee. Badenhorst had lost his arms after being electrocuted at the age of 6 while lifting a heavy electrical cable after a storm at his parent’s farm. His left amputation is at shoulder level, the other at the elbow with a 6 cm stump. Since this encounter was my first with a disabled person, I was a little apprehensive about sharing a room with Pieter. Would I have to assist him in his daily activities? Should I treat him differently?

Roman Catholics and Shi'i Muslims: Prayer, Passion, & Politics (review)

Reviewed by: Roman Catholics and Shi‘i Muslims: Prayer, Passion, & Politics Paul Rich Roman Catholics and Shi‘i Muslims: Prayer, Passion, & Politics. By James A. Bill and John Alden Williams. (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press. 2002. Pp. xiv, 194. $24.95; $17.95 Paperback.) Seldom has the general public had its attention more forcefully riveted on comparative religious studies than today, when the distinctions between Muslim groups have become nightly news fare and the connection between faith and terrorism has become a matter of keen debate. The authors, both at the College of William and Mary, contend that Catholicism and Shi'ism have some common ground to explore in terms of ceremony, redemptive suffering, and social activism. They consider the power of martyrdom and of ritual, of a mother-image (Mary, Fatima), and of other congruences. The pages are enlivened by diagrams to show the taxonomy of law and politics (pp. 95, 98-99) and an engaging debate over the problems of reconciling reason with revelation. Not everyone will agree that Thomism offers as ready a reply to Muslim views on politics as the book asserts, and the contention that social sensitivity has consistently characterized both faiths will find critics. Indeed, the question is ultimately asked, "But what happens when the state wields the sword in the interest of the few and the corrupt or when the political elite promotes injustice rather than redressing it? History suggests that in these circumstances, the Church often temporizes, accommodates, and compromises" (p. 121). A danger that the volume has avoided is to smooth out the differences to the point that the very real distinctions disappear. Still, the authors find many similarities for discussion. Central to their thesis is their view that religious fervor is at a high pitch in times of difficulty. Jesus and Muhammad enter history when [End Page 521] corruption and oppression were rampant. Today people turn to religion in a time of tremendous turmoil: "There is every reason to expect that populist religious faith will represent a major ideological force in the twenty-first century, a century certain to be an age of transformation. At this time, it is important that the widely diverse world communities and cultures strive to communicate with, tolerate, and most important, understand one another" (p. 146). This is a short study and more could have been made of the style of the two faiths when it comes to politics. The view expressed that the leaders of both believe in central control, and "have adopted many similar tactics and strategies, including the use of carefully apportioned reform in order to avoid radical political change" (p. 137) certainly deserves much more extensive treatment. But it would be churlish to complain about what is a well-written and easily understood analysis of two major world faiths and of their relevance to contemporary affairs. The book is highly recommended both for libraries and discussion groups as well as the shelves of anyone interested in understanding the current tempestuous Middle Eastern situation. Paul Rich University of the Americas Puebla, Mexico Copyright © 2004 The Catholic University of America Press

Cartesian Bodies

How we understand Descartes's physics rests on how we interpret his ontological commitment to individual bodies, and in particular on how we account for their individuation. However, Descartes's contemporaries (notably, Cordemoy and Leibniz) as well as contemporary philosophers (notably, Kenny and Garber) have seen Descartes's account of the individuation of bodies as deeply flawed. In the first part of this paper, I discuss how the various problems and puzzles involved in Descartes's account of the individuation of bodies arise, and the relevance of these problems for his physics. With an eye toward resolving these puzzles, I argue for an interpretation of the Cartesian ontology in which bodies are not individuated by motion but, instead, are mind-dependent. As part of this reading, I demonstrate the sense in which we can clearly and distinctly perceive bodies, and also the senses in which the real, conceptual, and modal distinctions apply to them.

The role of specificity in the lexical encoding of participants

In addition to information about phonology, morphology and syntax, lexical entries contain semantic information about participants (e.g., Agent). However, the traditional criteria for determining how much participant information is lexically encoded have proved unreliable. We have proposed two semantic criteria (obligatoriness and selectivity) that jointly identify the participants that are lexically encoded in verbs. We tested whether one of these criteria, semantic selectivity, makes psychologically real distinctions between participant information that is lexically encoded and participant information that is not. We examined how readers integrated syntactically optional WH-constituents in filler-gap sentences when the participant information conveyed by the WH-filler was specific to a restricted class of verbs (i.e., source locations) and when it was not (i.e., event locations). Our results provide support for the role of specificity in the lexical encoding of participant information of syntactically optional constituents.