Real Definition Research Articles

Enhancing Community Health Programs: Roles, Operations and Data-Driven Innovations

Aims: To examine how data-driven strategies can be integrated into community health programs as innovative approaches for effective operation. Problem Statement: Numerous government engagements in different crucial sectors have limited her concerns about health provision and distribution to many citizens living in remote communities. Health provision characterized with easy accessibility and low cost should not be marginalized and should be the right of every citizen. However, many lives have been lost due to lack of this in some communities. Significance of Study: To curb this, non-profit sectors are now engaging in community health programs to ameliorate the difficulties faced by distanced citizens living in remote localities. With the advent of this program, it is imperative to incorporate data-driven strategies as innovative approaches to improve and enhance the current state of operations in community health programs. Discussion: A medical practice that addresses the well-being of people within a particular geographical location is referred to as community health. This technical review paper discusses the concepts, roles and mode of operations of community health workers and the programs that are embedded. The attributes of a robust well-functioning health system as stated by World Health Organisation (WHO) were discussed alongside program components that are often executed by village workers. Value-based care, patient-centered care and P4 medicine were identified as the major ideologies behind data-driven strategies and the characteristic features of each were adequately discussed. Conclusion: A data-driven healthcare innovative approach must put into consideration the real definition of data management policies, organize training for health care workers who are handling health data and also support the implementation in order to secure the designed information systems.

Strength as phenomenon: a pure phenomenology of sport

ABSTRACT Strength is a central element of sport and therefore an equally central topic in sports science. In sports science, strength is dealt with primarily in biomechanics. Biomechanics reduces strength – legitimately – to a scientific subject. As a result, it loses sight of strength as a lifeworld phenomenon. The discipline that allows us to grasp strength as an everyday experience is phenomenology. This essay undertakes a phenomenological analysis of strength to uncover the diversity of strength phenomena in the lifeworld of sport. The theoretical and methodological basis for this is Hermann Schmitz’s ‘new phenomenology’ (Neue Phänomenologie). With the help of new phenomenology, I first develop a real definition of strength (‘strength is an intrusive effect through one-sided incorporation’). Second, I work out the general structures of the phenomenon of ‘strength’, that is, a system comprising ten categories (‘pulling, pushing, centripetal, centrifugal, lifting, lowering, strong, weak, heavy, light’). Third, I use this system of categories for a phenomenology of sport-immanent strength phenomena. The paper thus makes a contribution to a pure phenomenology of sport.

AN ANALYSIS OF DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTION CONCEPT IN SCIENTIFIC ARTICLE

The concept of definition is a basic discussion in a study. The objectives of this study is to analyse the definition and description concept contained in scientific article. The definition and description is considered as an important thing to comprehend the concept of discussion. The analyzed article is entitled “Effects of Educational Management on Quality Education in Rural and Urban Primary Schools in Ghana” Heliyon Journal published by Elsevier Ltd. This research uses a qualitative descriptive method and a theory from Miles and Huberman as a technique of data analysis. There are five data found in article classified as a definition and description. The result shows that all the data categorized as a real definition and there is no nominal definition in the article.

Deciphering the Physiology of Nidra: A Comprehensive Review of its States of Consciousness

Sleep is crucial for maintaining overall health and wellbeing. It plays vital role in various physiological and cognitive functions. As per Ayurvedic sciences, Nidra is one among the three pillars of life1 and also Adharaneeya vega2. Nidra is one which helps to attain longevity, memory, intelligence and freedom from disease, youthfulness, excellence of lustre, complexion, voice, optimum development of physique and sense organs3. Inappropriate sleep causes disease that could be physical disease or psychosomatic disorder. As per Mandukya Upanishad, the states of consciousness are Jagruta Avastha, Swapna Avastha, Sushupta Avastha and Thuriya and through proper understanding of these states one can conclude the real definition of Nidra is Sushupta Avastha, which will help the body and mind to reset, repair and regenerate.

Predicting the axial deformation of an extensible garden hose when pressurized

Extensible or expandable garden hoses have become popular. However, their behavior may be surprising to physicists. In this paper, the stress–strain equations that explain this behavior are derived and compared with experiments. The results clearly demonstrate that, since deformation is very large, conventional definitions of strain and stress are not useful and so-called real definitions are needed instead.

Ontological Priority and Persons

On hylomorphism and a concrete view of Christ’s human nature, a human person might be defined ontologically by a real definition. Per the definitions of hylomorphism and concretism, both views depend on a thick particular “human person.” I call the dependence between the person and its definition the principle of ontological priority (POP) and I analyze how POP affects the views given two theological puzzles, namely, the disembodied intermediate state, and, following Chalcedon, a single person in Christ. I find that the entailment of the thick particular is unfavorable for both hylomorphism and concretism. Consequently, their real definitions need to be redefined.

Why Rapport Seems Challenging to Define and What to Do About the Challenge

This article explores why rapport seems challenging to define in the investigative interviewing literature. To demonstrate this issue is contemporary, I examined the most recent publications on rapport (August 2021 - January 2023; N = 19). Approximately 50% of the articles did not define rapport or posited multiple definitions, making a definitional preference impossible to detect. The 50% that specified a focal or single definition came with some form of suggestion that they were real definitions—the objective definitions of rapport. But all those definitions were different, highlighting the ambiguity of rapport in the literature. I discuss how a pragmatic approach via nominal definition can assist in flagging a single sense to use the word rapport, thereby eliminating ambiguity and limitations in assessing construct validity.

Kant’s Philosophy of Language of Philosophy: On Philosophical Terminology

Abstract Among the passages which are suggestive of a philosophy of language in Kant’s writings are his remarks and arguments on appropriate terminology for philosophical concepts. I ask what it is for Kant that makes some words more suitable than others. I reconstruct the arguments from the Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality (1764) and the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) that defend that there is no such thing as a proper, real definition for philosophical concepts (only nominal definition and exposition); in addition, philosophical concepts are only represented by terms in abstracto, not in concreto. On these grounds, in the Inquiry, Kant sustains that the reference of a term to a philosophical concept is ultimately sanctioned by the term’s ‘linguistic usage’ (Redegebrauch). I argue that this is the basis for Kant’s criterion in the Critique of Pure Reason of employing traditional terminology, words from ordinary language, or even words from extinct languages, to refer to philosophical concepts, and for his rejection of coining new terms – even for distinctly new philosophical thoughts.

Kant’s Doctrine of Definitions and the Semantic Background of theTranscendental Analytic

AbstractIn this paper I argue that Kant’s doctrine of definitions, as it is developed in theTranscendental Doctrine of Method(TDM) and in the lectures on logic, lays down the semantic background of the problem of the objective reality of the categories and of the solution Kant provides for it in theTranscendental Analytic. The distinction between nominal and real definitions introduces a two-dimensional element in Kant’s theory of concepts, and this, I argue, provides a compelling explanation for the assumption Kant makes in §13 that it is possible to possess a concept without knowing the conditions of its legitimate application. This view is supported by the parallels between Kant’s discussion of empirical, mathematical, and philosophical concepts in §13 and in theTDM. And, it allows clarifying the sense in which the arguments that prove the objective reality of the categories are, at the same time, counterfactual reflections that give us (incomplete) insight into their real definitions.

Plato’s Statesman: A Philosophical Discussion

<i>Plato’s Statesman: A Philosophical Discussion</i>

Analysis and Necessity in Arithmetic in Light of Maimon’s Concept of Number as Ratio

Abstract The article examines how Salomon Maimon’s concept of number as ratio can be used to demonstrate that arithmetical judgments are analytical. Based on his critique of Kant’s synthetic a priori judgments, I show how this notion of number fulfills Maimon’s requirements for apodictic knowledge. Moreover, I suggest that Maimon was influenced by mathematicians who previously defined number as a ratio, such as Wallis and Newton. Following an analysis of the real definition of this concept, I conclude that within the framework of Maimon’s philosophy, arithmetical judgments cannot be analytical, nor is arithmetic an objectively necessary science, but rather only subjectively necessary. We should also cast doubt on his claim that we can create real objects from pure concepts of the understanding.

Методика обучения многокомпонентным иероглифам японского языка будущих специалистов в области восточных языков и культуры и педагогов-востоковедов

The research aims to develop a methodology for memorising multicomponent ideographic signs of the Japanese language for teaching specialists in the field of East Asian languages and culture and teachers specialising in East Asian studies within the subject “Charactery”. The paper introduces real definitions and exercises for high-quality teaching of the compositional morphology of characters (glyphs) when training specialists in charactery. The scientific novelty of the research lies in developing a systematic classification of complex compositions of ideograms, which may include 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 basic repeating elements (radicals) and a typology of complex ideographic compositions that must be taken into account in the practical methodology of Japanese language teaching. A set of exercises that can contribute to the creation of pedagogical conditions for professional training and retraining of specialists in the field of East Asian languages and culture has been elaborated. As a result, the researcher has identified the influence of the pedagogical process with the use of the original teaching methodology on the change in the self-consciousness of specialists in East Asian studies, has defined professional interest as a powerful motivating factor in personality development, has proved the positive influence of the implementation of an active form of special didactics on improving the level and quality of students’ training.

Poetic Thanatology of the Novel by E.M. Remarque "Life on Loan or Heaven Knows no Favorites"

The presented work examines the thanatological motifs in the work of the German writer E.M. Remarque. The influence of historical events is assumed not only on the plot and ideological levels of the novel, but also on the figurative. The hypothesis about the tendency in the work of E.M. Remarque to the widespread use of images traditionally associated with death is put forward and proved. The aim of the work is to prove the author's special understanding of the theme of death and its realization in the novel by E.M. Remarque "Life on loan or Heaven knows no favorites". The object of the study is a special Remark's representation of the category of death and its place in the literature of the "lost generation". The novelty of the research lies in the fact that the authors present a new interpretation of the title of the novel in connection with the original belonging of the characters to the afterlife. The main content of the study is the analysis of the poetical levels of the novel; motives, mythologems and images of death are analyzed at the ideological-thematic, plot, character, space-time and genre levels; citation examples are given for various connotations of death for each character of the novel by E.M. Remarque "Life on loan or Heaven knows no favorites". Special attention is paid to the phenomenon of semantic substitution of the real definition of the concept of life for an antonymic one. In conclusion, the role of death at the compositional level of the work is revealed.

J. Ladyman, D. Dennett and E.J. Lowe: How the electron exists

The paper aims to answer the question: «How does an electron exist at the beginning of the 21st century?» from the point of view of the general logic of the philosophy of science discourse, taking into account con­temporary philosophical concepts that explain what an «electron» is, and in what sense we could talk about the «existence» of such objects in the first quarter of the 21st century. A good concept of the existence of an object postulated by a successful scientific theory should at least take into account two contexts of proper philosophical reasoning – reasoning «from science», grasping the questions of the philosophical and meth­odological justification of knowledge at the level of certain «standards of rationality» that correspond to the chosen theory, and reasoning «from metaphysics», which, in the appropriate context, interpret «elec­tron» as an element of objective reality, as if the electron of scientists «actually» existed. Our thesis is that by choosing as the main elements of the concept the Dennettian ontology of patterns project and the E.J. Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian categorical ontology project, we will be able to block the problem of pessimis­tic meta-induction (H. Putnam, L. Laudan, etc.). The electron exists as a pattern that we extract from the whole set of empirical data associated with the theoretical entity «electron», whose «real definition» right now is given by the Standard Model and the accompanying concepts from quantum mechanics. In the course of the scientific revolution, the electron, as a pattern, does not disappear anywhere, since parts of the «real definitions» of the patterns of the old «paradigm», those that can be retrospectively interpreted and functionally meaningfully coupled with the new one, will be asserted within the «real definitions» of the new patterns, which indicates on the existence of a relationship of «essential dependence» between the «old» and the «new» patterns.

Solving a puzzle of definition

ABSTRACT This paper concerns the question of which logical principles hold for real definitions. Recently, Samuel Elgin has presented five principles concerning real definitions that seem initially plausible. He has shown them to be jointly inconsistent. This gives rise to a puzzle that can only be solved by denying one of the principles. In this paper, I argue against Elgin's principle of expansion, which concerns substituting a definiens for its definiendum within the definiens of a further definition. I show that this principle fails for every irreflexive notion of definition and proposes a replacement that allows to restore consistency and solve the puzzle.

Grounding and defining identity

AbstractI systematically defend a novel account of the grounds for identity and distinctness facts: they are all uniquely zero‐grounded. First, this Null Account is shown to avoid a range of problems facing other accounts: a relation satisfying the Null Account would be an excellent candidate for being the identity relation. Second, a plenitudinist view of relations suggests that there is such a relation. To flesh out this plenitudinist view I sketch a novel framework for expressing real definitions, use this framework to give a definition of identity, and show how the central features of the identity relation can be deduced from this definition.

How to choose normative concepts

AbstractMatti Eklund (2017) has argued that ardent realists face a serious dilemma. Ardent realists believe that there is a mind‐independent fact as to which normative concepts we are to use. Eklund claims that the ardent realist cannot explain why this is so without plumping in favor of their own normative concepts or changing the topic. The paper first advances the discussion by clarifying two ways of understanding the question of which normative concepts to choose: a theoretical question about which concepts have the abstract property of being normatively privileged and a further practical question of which concepts we are to choose even granting some concepts are thus privileged. I argue that the ardent realist's best bet for answering the theoretical question while avoiding Eklund's dilemma is to provide a real definition of this property. I point out the difficulties for providing such a definition. I then argue that even with an answer to the theoretical question, the ardent realist faces a further dilemma in answering the practical question. In sum, though I see no knock‐down argument against ardent realism, it may nonetheless die a death by a thousand cuts. I close by considering a deeper reason for why ardent realism is so difficult to defend: every argument starts somewhere. It is unclear how there can be an Archimedean point that makes no reference to any normative concepts that can nonetheless be employed to convince everyone to adopt ours. I then briefly propose two options for someone still inclined towards realism: either (i) accept that our normative concepts are normatively privileged without attempting to explain why this is so, or (ii) be less ardent and accept a perspective‐dependent account of normativity.

Sensible individuation

AbstractThere is a straightforward view of perception that has not received adequate consideration because it requires us to rethink basic assumptions about the objects of perception. In this paper, I develop a novel account of these objects—the sensible qualities—which makes room for the straightforward view. I defend two primary claims. First, I argue that qualities like color and shape are “ontologically flexible” kinds. That is, their real definitions allow for both physical objects and mental entities to be colored or shaped. Second, a single instance of these qualities can be attributed to more than one entity. Just as we attribute the same instance of a material property to a statue and to the clay that constitutes it, single instances of sensible qualities should be attributed both to the physical objects perceived and to the perceptual states that have those instances as their objects.

Optimal Indicator of Death for Using Real-World Cancer Patients' Data From the Healthcare System.

Background: Information on patient’s death is a major outcome of health-related research, but it is not always available in claim-based databases. Herein, we suggested the operational definition of death as an optimal indicator of real death and aim to examine its validity and application in patients with cancer. Materials and methods: Data of newly diagnosed patients with cancer between 2006 and 2015 from the Korean National Health Insurance Service—National Sample Cohort data were used. Death indicators were operationally defined as follows: 1) in-hospital death (the result of treatment or disease diagnosis code from claims data), or 2) case wherein there are no claims within 365 days of the last claim. We estimated true-positive rates (TPR) and false-positive rates (FPR) for real death and operational definition of death in patients with high-, middle-, and low-mortality cancers. Kaplan−Meier survival curves and log-rank tests were conducted to determine whether real death and operational definition of death rates were consistent. Results: A total of 40,970 patients with cancer were recruited for this study. Among them, 12,604 patients were officially reported as dead. These patients were stratified into high- (lung, liver, and pancreatic), middle- (stomach, skin, and kidney), and low- (thyroid) mortality groups consisting of 6,626 (death: 4,287), 7,282 (1,858), and 6,316 (93) patients, respectively. The TPR was 97.08% and the FPR was 0.98% in the high mortality group. In the case of the middle and low mortality groups, the TPR (FPR) was 95.86% (1.77%) and 97.85% (0.58%), respectively. The overall TPR and FPR were 96.68 and 1.27%. There was no significant difference between the real and operational definition of death in the log-rank test for all types of cancers except for thyroid cancer. Conclusion: Defining deaths operationally using in-hospital death data and periods after the last claim is a robust alternative to identifying mortality in patients with cancer. This optimal indicator of death will promote research using claim-based data lacking death information.

Legal positivism and the real definition of law

ABSTRACT We explore an underappreciated tension at the heart of the debate over legal positivism. On the one hand, many legal philosophers aspire for the debate to tell us what law is, and the nature of law. But on the other hand, the positions in the debate are generally formulated such that they’re about something else: what law is necessarily connected to or dependent on. This is a genuine tension, because theses about what law is necessarily connected to or dependent on do not by themselves state or automatically settle what law is or the nature of law. This tension prompts us to propose a new approach to formulating positivism and antipositivism as theses about the real definition of law. Our proposal is simple, but fruitful. We argue that it better insulates and unifies the debate: that is, it prevents orthogonal theses from trivially vindicating or falsifying positivism and antipositivism, and it explains how different threads of the existing debate contribute to a single topic. We close by briefly considering two recent arguments about exclusive positivism (one against, by Scott Hershovitz, and one for, by Scott Shapiro), to illustrate how our discussion bears on contemporary jurisprudential debates.