Jackendoff Research Articles

On Ronald Langacker’s Semanticocentrism

Ray Jackendoff understands that Noam Chomsky’s linguistic models distort the nature of language due to its ‘syntactocentrism.’ Coined by Jackendoff, this term means Chomsky’s assumption that the syntactic component of language is central while the phonological and semantic components are merely interpretive. Jackendoff also states that since the 1970s many researchers have made a mistake opposite to Chomsky’s, by denying that syntax has a relevant role in grammar. Considering such a scenario, this paper analyzes Ronald Langacker’s cognitive grammar, in which syntax is replaced by semantics as the central linguistic component. The goal is to show how Langacker misrepresented language structure by doing so.

Witch, strumpet, maid and saint

Abstract Shakespeare’s Henry VI, Part 1 depicts Joan of Arc in contradictory terms. This paper discusses the narrative and literary techniques that are used to develop Joan of Arc’s characterisation, particularly the alternation of location between the Anglo-Burgundian and the French-Armagnac camp, the antagonistic staging of Joan of Arc compared to Lord Talbot and Margaret of Anjou, and the contrastive use of epithets, including the shifting positive, neutral or negative dictionary meanings and context-dependent meanings, as per Ray Jackendoff’s theory of Conceptual Semantics. This results in questioning the apparent meaning of words and concepts and thereby also the apparent judgment on the characters themselves, thus ambiguating, questioning, and ridiculing apparent certainties.

Implicatures by Sandrine Zufferey, Jacques Moeschler, and Anne Reboul

Reviewed by: Implicatures by Sandrine Zufferey, Jacques Moeschler, and Anne Reboul Stavros Assimakopoulos Implicatures. By Sandrine Zufferey, Jacques Moeschler, and Anne Reboul. (Key topics in semantics and pragmatics.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. 251. ISBN 9781107125650. $116 (Hb). It may sound like an overstatement, but what Zufferey, Moeschler, and Reboul set out to do in Implicatures truly is an ominous task. There are very few theoretical concepts within the broader field of linguistics, let alone specifically in semantics and pragmatics, that have been as hotly debated as that of implicature. Ever since Grice (1975) coined the term almost fifty years ago to describe a phenomenon that so routinely permeates verbal communication, there has been general agreement about its vital importance when it comes to discussing meaning, but the question of how it should best be approached—or even how many different types of implicature can ultimately be identified, for that matter—remains a point of debate to this day. A main reason for this has been that the general category of implicatures was originally postulated from a philosophical perspective, but eventual discussions, mainly pioneered by relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson 1995 [1986]), have focused in equal measure on its psychological instantiation. The extent, then, to which the authors of this monograph manage to not only provide an introduction to the topic that is accessible even for newcomers in the field but also masterfully synthesize the two perspectives on implicature is certainly admirable. The book is divided into three well-balanced parts, with the first laying the theoretical foundations for the discussion to follow, the second in turn dealing with each of the three types of implicature that Grice distinguished between, and the third going into empirical research on the topic. The same balance is also present across individual chapters, each of which notably includes a very useful summary, some discussion questions to help the reader monitor their understanding, and a section with pointers to essential further readings. The starting point for any discussion of implicature is bound to be the original Gricean exposition of the term, and the book at hand is no exception in this regard. Through the use of well-thought-out examples, the introductory chapter lays out this account, underlining its pivotal role, alongside speech-act theory, in the overall establishment of the field of inferential pragmatics. In doing so, it situates Grice’s theory of implicature within his broader account of meaning, it justifies the distinction between conventional and conversational implicatures, and it goes on to succinctly outline the properties of the latter category, which has, after all, received the most attention from scholars. In a section that is often missing from even textbooks of pragmatics, the chapter concludes with a very insightful discussion of a number of criticisms that the Gricean account has received, especially in view of its overarching presumption of cooperativeness. Having pinpointed the central role that implicature has played in ‘the delimitation of a very precise and well-circumscribed domain of pragmatics’ (22), the authors move on in the second chapter to discuss the place of this domain within contemporary linguistic theory—in my view, one of the absolute highlights of this book, given its originality. Here, ZM&R examine the role that inferential pragmatics can be seen to play not only in formalist approaches in the Chomskyan tradition, but also in functionalist ones within the paradigm of cognitive linguistics. Their coverage of so many topics, ranging from the competence/performance distinction to construction grammar and Ray Jackendoff’s (2002) conceptualist approach to semantics, in such a limited amount of space is nothing short of impressive. Following this comprehensive review, the upshot of the argumentation in this chapter is that none of the aforementioned frameworks can fully accommodate the inferential model of communication that Grice’s original proposal brought to the fore of current theorizing. Against this backdrop, Ch. 3 turns to relevance theory, which not only further capitalized on the inferential model of communication by extending Grice’s original rationale, but also directly [End Page 635] challenged the Gricean account and reevaluated pragmatic theory with a view to meeting the criterion of psychological plausibility. Again...

Structural Density and Clarity, Technical Death Metal, and Anomalous’s “Ohmnivalent”

In this article I introduce the concepts of structural density and structural clarity, which describe how difficult or easy a given piece of music is to parse, and present an analysis of the song “Ohmnivalent,” by the technical death metal band Anomalous, as a case study. Because the song moves from high structural density at its start to structural clarity at its end, it allows for a nuanced discussion of the factors that contribute to these effects. I argue, drawing on the work of Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff, Dora Hanninen, David Huron, and Lawrence Zbikowski, that repetition, clear cues for segmentation, schemas, and clear categorical belonging all contribute to structural clarity, while their lack or ambivalence contribute to structural density. While my article focuses on the specifics of a single, extraordinarily complex technical death metal track, I close by suggesting that the concepts of structural density and structural clarity have wider potential applicability as ways of thinking about the experience of musical form.

Zur Suche nach Logik und Bedeutung von Musik. Geschichte und Gegenwart von Interdisziplinarität im Bereich musiktheoretischer Forschung

This essay reviews the impact of (music) psychology on music theory from the late 19th century until the present. From the beginning, music psychology’s focus on musical listening has been the main reason for this impact. The changes in Hugo Riemann’s theory from physical explanations (especially for major-minor-polarity), derived, amongst others, from Hermann von Helmholtz’ research, to a phenomenological model has been deeply influenced by the “Tonpsychologie” of Carl Stumpf who, in turn, can be termed one of the founders of gestalt theory. For Riemann, the idea that “facts of consciousness” had priority over physical conditions gained paramount importance. In particular, it seemed to explain the impression of consonance as release and dissonance as striving force more feasibly than ratios of oscillation speeds. Ernst Kurth took up this idea. His work relies on the gestalt experience, more specifically on the experience of energetic force, another foundation derived from Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Kurth’s music theory introduced a novel spatial, dynamic principle of form. Although Robert Hatten’s idea of an “energetic shaping through time” and his theory of gestures reference Kurth’s ideas, the linguistic roots of his “topic”-oriented concept betray substantial differences to Kurth’s process-based idea of musical form. Fred Lerdahl’s and Ray Jackendoff’s Generative Theory of Tonal Music connects to gestalt theoretical principles, linked, however, as only in early gestalt theory, to the idea of perceptual universals, presupposing that gestalt formations (e. g., the grouping of durations) are processed “automatically”. More recent gestalt theory has replaced this universalist idea by a stronger focus on learning. Subsequent theories of musical cognition retain the gestalt term as a prominent model. The focus of research, however, is usually not derived from questions about the cognition of musical structure alone, but guided by the intention to formalize cognition models with the help of computer programming languages, often without properly reflecting the modes of thinking and listening that such models presuppose.

The Musical Language of Rock

The Musical Language of Rock

O semanticocentrismo de Ronald Langacker

Para Ray Jackendoff, os modelos linguísticos desenvolvidos por Noam Chomsky distorcem a natureza da linguagem devido a seu “sintaticocentrismo”. Por esse termo, Jackendoff entende a premissa adotada por Chomsky desde o modelo padrão da gramática gerativa (Aspectos da teoria da sintaxe) até o Programa Minimalista de que o componente sintático é proeminente em relação aos componentes fonológico e semântico, que seriam tão somente interpretativos. O próprio Jackendoff, no entanto, também observa que desde ao menos os anos 1970 muitos pesquisadores cometeram o erro oposto ao de Chomsky por negar à sintaxe um papel gramatical relevante. Considerando-se esse quadro, analisa-se neste artigo a gramática cognitiva de Ronald Langacker, na qual a sintaxe é substituída pela semântica como componente linguístico central. O objetivo é mostrar como Langacker contrapôs o sintaticocentrismo chomskiano com uma espécie de “semanticocentrismo”. Ao fazê-lo, conforme se detalha neste trabalho, acabou por também deturpar gravemente a constituição da linguagem.

The Intermediate Scope of Consciousness in the Predictive Mind

There is a view on consciousness that has strong intuitive appeal and empirical support: the intermediate-level theory of consciousness, proposed mainly by Ray Jackendoff and by Jesse Prinz. This theory identifies a specific “intermediate” level of representation as the basis of human phenomenal consciousness, which sits between high-level non-perspectival thought processes and low-level disjointed feature-detection processes in the perceptual and cognitive processing hierarchy. In this article, we show that the claim that consciousness arises at an intermediate-level is true of some cognitive systems, but only in virtue of specific constraints on their active interactions with the environment. We provide ecological reasons for why certain processing levels in a cognitive hierarchy are privileged with respect to consciousness. We do this from the perspective of a prediction-error minimization model of perception and cognition, relying especially on the notion of active inference: the privileged level for consciousness depends on the specific dispositions of an organism concerned with inferring its policies for action. Such a level is indeed intermediate for humans, but this depends on the spatiotemporal resolution of the typical actions that a human organism can normally perform. Thus, intermediateness is not an essential feature of consciousness. In organisms with different action dispositions the privileged level or levels may differ as well.

Hubungan Preposisi dalam Gerak Ruang Bahasa Melayu Berdasarkan Representasi Struktur Konseptual dengan Representasi Ruang

Motion is a change from one location to another location. Motion typology definitely needsthe role of preposition as indicator and main component to express the direction of motion. Consequently, this study focuses on spatial motion and preposition that simultaneously such as (dari, daripada, ke, kepada, di, di seberang, di sekitar, di sekeliling and di sepanjang by focusing on conceptual structure perspective (abstract). This research uses data acquired from Pangkalan Data Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Malaysia as material and sample of study to be analysed using Conceptual Structure Theory (CST) (Ray Jackendoff 1997 & 2011). The argument mapping consists of three main hierarchies: argument-adjunct rules, conceptual structure representation and spatial representation. Finding reveals the existence of directional spatial motion, additive motion, becoming motion and orientative motion in function of [EVENT] and [STATE] that can predict the existence of preposition such as dari, daripada, ke, kepada, di, di seberang, di sekitar, di sekeliling and di sepanjang in bound direction, directive direction and path direction. Spatial representation also demonstrates the involvement of dimension conceptualization such as DIM 0D, DIM 2 (0+E) DIR and DIM 2 (0+E) DIR. Overall, this study has shown the relationship of motion and preposition in conceptual structure representation with spatial representation

Implicit Counterpoint in Gjerdingen's Schemata

Robert Gjerdingen has claimed that schema finding diverges from contrapuntal pitch reduction, Schenkerian or otherwise. Commentators have criticized his approach (see the reviews by Joel Lester in Journal of Music Theory [1990] and Kofi Agawu in Music Theory Spectrum [1991]) and have discussed intersections between schemata and contrapuntal reduction (see the articles by Folker Froebe and Oliver Schwab-Felisch in Music Theory and Analysis [2014] and by Stefan Rohringer in Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Musiktheorie [2015]). Here I address this conundrum from a different angle: I propose that schema analysis may be approximated by two heuristics, which are closely related to the issue identified in Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff's A Generative Theory of Tonal Music (1983) as finding the head of a time span. By giving the highest priority to tritone resolutions within a metric segment and otherwise realigning consonances with strong beats by removing dissonances, it is possible to approximate the reductive workings of schema analysis. This is demonstrated through a preliminary sample of two hundred tacit reductive decisions from Gjerdingen's Music in the Galant Style. I suggest the possibility that Gjerdingen's locally top-down search for complete patterns interacts with a more bottom-up, implicit reductive process, regardless of the identity of the emergent schema. I also discuss some of the potential implications of the heuristics for theory and analysis as well as for interdisciplinary work on schema finding.

Decoding the Musical Message via the Structural Analogy between Verbal and Musical Language

Abstract The topic approached in this paper aims to identify the structural similarities between the verbal and the musical language and to highlight the process of decoding the musical message through the structural analogy between them. The process of musical perception and musical decoding involves physiological, psychological and aesthetic phenomena. Besides receiving the sound waves, it implies complex cognitive processes being activated, whose aim is to decode the musical material at cerebral level. Starting from the research methods in cognitive psychology, music researchers redefine the process of musical perception in a series of papers in musical cognitive psychology. In the case of the analogy between language and music, deciphering the musical structure and its perception are due, according to researchers, to several common structural configurations. A significant model for the description of the musical structure is Noam Chomsky’s generative-transformational model. This claimed that, at a deep level, all languages have the same syntactic structure, on account of innate anatomical and physiological structures which became specialized as a consequence of the universal nature of certain mechanisms of the human intellect. Chomsky’s studies supported by sophisticated experimental devices, computerised analyses and algorithmic models have identified the syntax of the musical message, as well as the rules and principles that underlie the processing of sound-related information by the listener; this syntax, principles and rules show surprising similarities with the verbal language. The musicologist Heinrich Schenker, 20 years ahead of Chomsky, considers that there is a parallel between the analysis of natural language and that of the musical structure, and has developed his own theory on the structure of music. Schenker’s structural analysis is based on the idea that tonal music is organized hierarchically, in a layering of structural levels. Thus, spoken language and music are governed by common rules: phonology, syntax and semantics. Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff develop a musical grammar where a set of generating rules are defined to explain the hierarchical structure of tonal music. The authors of the generative theory propose the hypothesis of a musical grammar based on two types of rules, which take into account the conscious and unconscious principles that govern the organization of the musical perception. The structural analogy between verbal and musical language consists of several common elements. Among those is the hierarchical organization of both fields, a governance by the same rules – phonology, syntax, semantics – and as a consequence of the universal nature of certain mechanisms of the human intellect, decoding the transmitted message is accomplished thanks to some universal innate structures, biologically inherited. Also, according to Chomsky's linguistics model a musical grammar is configured, one governed by wellformed rules and preference rules. Thus, a musical piece is not perceived as a stream of disordered sounds, but it is deconstructed, developed and assimilated at cerebral level by means of cognitive pre-existing schemes.

Irit Meir: An Obituary

Irit Meir:An Obituary Wendy Sandler "It is about who we are when we are not rehearsing to be who we are." Don DeLillo, The Body Artist Irit Meir was born in Jerusalem, Israel on August 18, 1957. Her interests and experiences were multi-faceted, but there was a coherent core that radiated throughout her life. Two of Irit's central traits interacted so intimately that they were sometimes indistinguishable from each other: the scientific pursuit of knowledge about the nature of human language, and a profound, instinctive, and empathic engagement with other human beings. After completing her MA in English Linguistics summa cum laude at Hebrew University in the late 1980s, Irit spent a few years in the United States with husband Ronny, enjoying time with their three small daughters. Although she excelled in her studies, spoke several languages, and came from a prominent academic family, Irit didn't immediately find burning interest in a field of study that would justify devoting a career to academic pursuits. That is, until she bumped into sign language. It was a book she came across, What the Hands Reveal about the Brain by Poizner, Klima, and Bellugi, that changed everything. Her first step in what was to become a rich career was to enroll in an American Sign Language course in Los Angeles. Irit and I had previously taken a semantics course together as MA students at Hebrew University, where I had given a student presentation about sign language. Years later now—this was around 1990—newly fascinated with the importance of sign language to the understanding of language generally, and ready to return to Israel with her family, Irit wrote to me, then a junior faculty member at the University of Haifa. She asked if I needed a research assistant. I promptly applied for and received my first research grant ever; Irit joined me [End Page 671] as an RA, soon going on to complete a PhD at Hebrew University, teaching first at Oranim Teachers College, and then landing a faculty position at the University of Haifa. All the while she contributed significantly to the development of the Sign Language Research Lab, on both scientific and human levels, which were never separate for Irit. On the scientific level, Irit confronted central properties of sign languages that illuminate the interaction between the nature of language and the effect (or non-effect) of modality—such as the use of space, iconicity and its interaction with metaphor, and the principles behind the ordering of words within propositions. She endeavored to explain these phenomena rather than simply to name them. In her doctoral work on verb agreement in Israeli Sign Language, Irit noticed that the direction of movement of the hands, and the part of the hand that faced the target, were separable but interacted with one another. She showed that the phenomenon of verb agreement is neither strictly syntactic nor strictly semantic, but is best understood as an interaction of the two: The hands move from source to goal, but they typically face the syntactic object, which could be either source or goal. Adopting the model of lexical conceptual structure proposed by Ray Jackendoff for spoken language, Irit argued that, though the instantiation of verb agreement has modality-specific properties, it can be captured neatly within general theory, and is therefore understood as an explicitly linguistic phenomenon. Sign languages exploit iconicity more than spoken languages do; that is a platitude in our field. But Irit realized that iconicity is a complex phenomenon, and that like other aspects of language, it is subject to constraints. She turned to metaphor, a device exploited extensively by both spoken and signed languages. Unlike typical spoken words, basic signs are inherently made up of iconic components which themselves are often understood metaphorically. Irit investigated the interaction of metaphor and iconicity in sign language, asking whether signs were subject to metaphorical extension in the same way as spoken words. She discovered that signs can be metaphorically extended, but not in the same way as spoken words, and identified the interaction between two kinds of mapping, positing a double mapping constraint. Many signs consist of iconic mapping between the...

„Il linguaggio tra natura e storia“ – sprachtheoretische und sprachphilosophische Reflexionen Tullio De Mauros im Spannungsfeld von europäischer Tradition und angloamerikanischem Sprachdiskurs

AbstractThis article analyses Tullio DeMauro’s linguistic thought and highlights the originality of his contribution to the current linguistic debate, which revolves around two essential questions: 1.What is special about the human language (faculty)?, and 2. Why and how did it arise in the selectional process of evolution? De Mauro’s approach to language between the poles of “nature” and “history” is contrasted with the basic tenets and ideas of two main paradigms of the contemporary Anglo-American linguistic discourse, namely Noam Chomsky’s generative approach (in its minimalist version) and Ray Jackendoff’s theory of the Tripartite Parallel Architecture of language. In this way, the peculiarities and the special value of De Mauro’s approach come to the fore, combining and synthesizing the European tradition of linguistic thought, especially with its strong semiotic imprint, and modern “naturalist” linguistic theory.

North Indian Classical Music and Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s Generative Theory – a Mutual Regard

This article applies aspects ofA Generative Theory of Tonal Musicby Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff to the analysis of Hindustani (North Indian) classical music, with a double-edged purpose. On the one hand, theGTTMmethodology is used to illuminate the workings of anālāp(as performed by Vijay Rajput, a vocalist in thekhyālstyle). On the other hand, the analysis acts as a case study to assess the viability of this methodology for the analysis of Indian classical music, and in particular, to test out Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s claim thatGTTMpresents a universal musical grammar, transcending specific cultures.This pilot study considers what modifications would be necessary toGTTM’s preference rules to make a viable generative theory for Hindustani classical music—or at least for its melodic aspects, governed as these are by the principles ofrāg. With such modifications, it is possible to formally represent levels of musical knowledge involved in the production and perception of this music, and to verify the generative principles whereby a performer is able to improvise a potentially infinite number of musical utterances from a finite set of rules.The investigation also fosters a critique of Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s theories. Among the questions addressed is that of the diachronic modeling of improvised musical performance—which, unlike the score-based studies ofGTTM, cannot be analyzed entirely outside the flow of time. Consistent with this critical position is the conclusion that, rather than the pursuit of universals per se, it is an openness to the tension between universals and particulars that may lead to the most valuable knowledge.

Introduction to the Special Issue Honoring the 2014 David E. Rumelhart Prize Recipient, Ray Jackendoff.

Introduction to the Special Issue Honoring the 2014 David E. Rumelhart Prize Recipient, Ray Jackendoff.

One Among Many: Anaphoric One and Its Relationship With Numeral One

One anaphora (e.g., this is a good one) has been used as a key diagnostic in syntactic analyses of the English noun phrase, and "one-replacement" has also figured prominently in debates about the learnability of language. However, much of this work has been based on faulty premises, as a few perceptive researchers, including Ray Jackendoff, have made clear. Abandoning the view of anaphoric one (a-one) as a form of syntactic replacement allows us to take a fresh look at various uses of the word one. In the present work, we investigate its use as a cardinal number (1-one) in order to better understand its anaphoric use. Like all cardinal numbers, 1-one can only quantify an individuated entity and provides an indefinite reading by default. Owing to unique combinatoric properties, cardinal numbers defy consistent classification as determiners, quantifiers, adjectives, or nouns. Once the semantics and distribution of cardinal numbers, including 1-one, are appreciated, many properties of a-one follow with minimal stipulation. We claim that 1-one and a-one are distinct but very closely related lexemes. When 1-one appears without a noun (e.g., Take one), it is nearly indistinguishable from a-one (e.g., take one)-the only differences being interpretive (1-one foregrounds its cardinality while a-one does not) and prosodic (presence versus absence of primary accent). While we ultimately argue that a family of constructions is required to describe the full range of syntactic contexts in which one appears, the proposed network accounts for properties of a-one by allowing it to inherit most of its syntactic and interpretive constraints from its historical predecessor, 1-one.

Form and Function in the Evolution of Grammar.

This article focuses on claims about the origin and evolution of language from the point of view of the formalist-functionalist debate in linguistics. In linguistics, an account of a grammatical phenomenon is considered "formal" if it accords center stage to the structural properties of that phenomenon, and "functional" if it appeals to the language user's communicative needs or to domain-general human capacities. The gulf between formalism and functionalism has been bridged in language evolution research, in that some leading formalists, Ray Jackendoff for one, appeal to functional mechanisms such as natural selection. In Jackendoff's view, the biological evolution of language has proceeded in stages, each stage improving communicative efficiency. This article calls into question that idea, pointing to the fact that well-understood purely historical processes suffice to explain the emergence of many grammatical properties. However, one central aspect of formalist linguistic theorizing-the idea of the autonomy of syntax-poses a challenge to the idea, central to most functionalist approaches, that the nature of grammar is a product of purely historical (as opposed to biological) evolution. The article concludes with a discussion of the origins of the autonomy of syntax, speculating that it may well have arisen over evolutionary (as opposed to historical) time.

Attending to Free Rhythm

Attending to Free Rhythm Mitchell Ohriner (bio) I. Free Rhythm and Meter: A Problematic Opposition This article addresses the concept of entrainment in connection with a musical performance often described as lacking meter, or, phrased more positively, possessing "free rhythm" or "flowing rhythm."1 Entrainment—a concept ever more visible in music scholarship—refers to a synchronization of two or more rhythmic systems that persist through perturbation.2 As Justin London notes, entrainment is not a specifically musical phenomenon, and can also refer to the coordinated actions of athletes or circadian rhythms.3 In musical terms, these rhythmic systems may be synchronized among different groups of performers, different performers within a group, or different limbs within a single performer.4 [End Page 1] A fundamental feature of entrainment as described in the literature is periodicity (i.e., equal durations between events or pulses)—the same feature said to be absent or intermittent in music with free rhythm.5 The entrainment models of Edward Large and John Kolen, for example, show how one rhythmic system in oscillation can match the periodicity of another by monitoring asynchronies and adjusting its periodicity until synchronicity is accomplished.6 Mari Riess Jones and Marilyn Boltz's related theory of dynamic attending is also predicated on regular shifts in attention.7 In practical applications, the connection between periodicity and entrainment underlies many current beat-finding algorithms.8 Entrainment is also crucial for many of the most recent considerations of musical meter. Indeed, the leap made by London and others from a theory of entrainment to a theory of meter is a short one: musical meter arises through the simultaneous entrainment of several integer-multiple-related periodicities, such as a periodicity associated with the tactus and another associated with downbeats. To emphasize the centrality of bodily entrainment in this view of meter, perhaps in contrast to the more cognitive orientation of Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff or the poetic orientation Grosvenor Cooper and Leonard Meyer, I call this view of meter meter-as-entrainment.9 [End Page 2] Importing the idea of entrainment into a theory of musical meter confers several benefits. First, a theory of meter-as-entrainment sidesteps some of the controversies surrounding metric theory in the past thirty years. One such controversy is the necessity of hierarchy in the definition of meter. While the idea of metric hierarchy (i.e., a graded contrast between strong and weak beats) features prominently in many Western-oriented theories of meter, many scholars of various African musical traditions resist the necessity for hierarchy.10 In order to accommodate this difference, a theory of meter-as-entrainment need only allow for some listeners to resist entraining to all available periodicities; the conceptual framework of the theory need not be altered. In contrast, a theory like that of Yeston is greatly diminished without metric hierarchy. Second, a theory of meter-as-entrainment is more responsive to some aspects of music's temporality. Two rhythmic systems whose periodicities have the same frequency may be entrained, even if they are not exactly aligned. In other words, so long as the period is the same, the phase, represented as φ and ranging 0°–360°, may differ. By attending to the relative phase of different rhythmic systems—some in phase, some anti-phase, some a few degrees off—a theory of meter-as-entrainment can describe not only meter as such but also phenomena often associated with groove.11 [End Page 3] Third, a theory of meter-as-entrainment connects the concept of meter to the many benefits associated with entrainment in the psychological literature. By facilitating synchronous group behavior, entrainment is associated with greater group cohesion, prosocial behavior, and wellbeing.12 Finally, a theory of meter-as-entrainment highlights the embodied aspect of the cognition of musical meter. As Toiviainen, Luck, and Thompson show, the actions of people spontaneously moving to music reflect the meter of the music.13 In their study, spontaneous movement was coordinated to periodicities in the music. Furthermore, the slower the periodicity entrained, the larger the muscle groups the periodicity set in motion (i.e., the fastest periodicity was reflected in the arms while the slowest periodicity was reflected...

The nature and origin of language by Denis Bouchard (review)

Reviewed by: The nature and origin of language by Denis Bouchard Kristin Melum Eide The nature and origin of language. By Denis Bouchard. (Studies in the evolution of language 18.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xiii, 385. ISBN 9780199681631. $46.96. Denis Bouchard has been at the center of linguistic theorizing for more than three decades, and unlike many other forceful critics of the generative enterprise, B has always kept on top of every important ongoing development of this research program, offered substantial and useful modifications, made seemingly radical suggestions (later to be adhered to by the mainstream), and pointed out ill-conceived notions and conceptual flaws in the current consensus. Thus one does well to listen when this author publishes a new book. As suggested by the series title, the main topic of the book is on how language may have evolved in the human species, but as B points out, ‘before we can assume anything about how language emerged in humans, we have to determine what language is, and what those properties of language are whose origin we are trying to account for’ (7). Thus, a central concern is to advocate a different view on how the crucial properties of language should be characterized. Rather than putting emphasis on the formal apparatus describing the computational system, B advocates the view that all relevant properties of language follow from what Chomsky (2005) refers to as ‘third factor’ principles, that is, in B’s words, the design properties of the conceptual and perceptual properties of signs. This eliminates ‘the need to postulate an innate, language-specific set of conditions—Universal Grammar (UG), this residue of unexplained properties—thus finishing business that remains problematic in current generative theorizing’ (xiii). That means that there is no UG—which is a good thing, since UG is what remains to be explained in a theory of language, and even more so in a theory to explain the emergence of language. B thoroughly discusses and mostly dismisses a range of recent and more classical works approaching the evolution of language (like recent publications by Marc Hauser, Noam Chomsky, and W. Tecumseh Fitch; Steven Pinker and Ray Jackendoff; William Calvin and Derek Bickerton; Bickerton; James Hurford; and Chomsky). In his own approach to the emergence of language, B arms himself with the recent discovery of so-called offline brain systems: ‘a system of neurons that can be activated in absentia: the individual does not have to see or hear an action for these neuronal systems to be activated. These Offline Brain Systems (OBS) are triggered by representations of events instead of the events themselves, and produce representations of events with no brain-external realization’ (107). These systems of neurons give rise to a range of properties (a cluster of characteristics dubbed ‘the human-specific adaptive suite’, encompassing cognitive, neurological, physiological, and behavioral traits), unique to humans, whereof language is but one aspect. Thus, language or, more specifically, the emergence of signs in the human brain is a by-product of an underlying change, an emergence of a particular type of neurons in the human brain. This change was not due to a rewiring of the brain that installed some kind of language-specific apparatus in our minds, since these OBS neurons have many different functions and effects besides language. The book consists of a short introduction plus four parts partitioned into ten chapters. Part 1, ‘The emergence of language’, sets the scene for the central inquiries and outlines recent approaches (see above). Two broad approaches are particularly relevant: language is culturally evolved in response to communicative necessities, or language is biologically and genetically inscribed in the human brain. Here B quotes Tooby and Cosmides (1990:762) that ‘[i]t is magical thinking to believe that the “need” to solve a problem automatically endows one with the equipment to solve it’, and he sees ‘form before function’ as a premise in the discussion, since ‘our ancestors had to have the capacity to form Saussurean signs before they could use them for any communicative function’ (15). B discusses these previous theories thoroughly and then concludes this discussion with his diagnosis that all of these approaches...

Biolinguistics: Facts, Fiction, and Forecast

Biolinguistics, as I understand it, refers to a branch of the cognitive sciences that seeks to uncover the biological underpinnings of the human capacity to support language acquisition (the development of an I-language, where ‘I-’ is meant as ‘internal’, ‘individual’, and ‘intensional’, following Chomsky 1986). That language acquisition requires a (possibly complex and multi-faceted) biological foundation cannot be seriously put into doubt, and biolinguistics, in the wake of early works by Chomsky and Lenneberg, takes that fundamental facet of human biology as its subject matter. In his ‘discussion note’, in which he reviews The Biolinguistic Enterprise, which I co-edited with Anna Maria Di Sciullo (Di Sciullo and Boeckx 2011), Jackendoff (2011) goes through a series of important issues conceding the field, and makes several points worth highlighting, but he also commits several errors worth pointing out. This is the object of the present piece. Specifically, my aim in the pages that follow is to tease apart the real issues (‘fact’), from the rhetoric (‘fiction’) and from the different bets various researchers make concerning the future (‘forecast’). Ray Jackendoff is eminently well placed to speak about biolinguistics, since he has made seminal contributions to the field. Indeed, he is among the most committed theoretical linguists I know when it comes to establishing interdisciplinary bridges (a necessary step towards a productive biolinguistics), and has been for many years before other biolinguists joined forces (witness Jackendoff 1983, 1987, 2007). Given his stature in the field, Jackendoff’s opinion cannot be ignored. Inaccuracies, if any, should be corrected, lest beginning students of the field receive a distorted picture of the enterprise. As the title of his paper indicates, Jackendoff contrasts two views of the language faculty. As he puts it in the abstract, his aim is to “compare the theoretical stance of biolinguistics” with a constraint-based Parallel Architecture of the sort he has been advocating for decades (see the pieces collected in Jackendoff 2010, and especially Jackendoff 1997, 2002, Culicover and Jackendoff 2005). As we will see shortly, however, the contrast between his approach and “biolinguistics” conflates ‘biolinguistics’, ‘minimalism’ and ‘Chomsky’s specific proposals within minimalism and biolinguistics’, which are related, but nonetheless distinct targets.1 This I