Rawlsian Principle Research Articles

Rawlsian Matching

We apply the Rawlsian principle to a canonical discrete object allocation problem. A matching is Rawlsian if it is impossible to improve the ranking of assignment for the worst-off agent or reduce the cardinality of the set of the worst-off agent-body. None of the well-known mechanisms are Rawlsian. We introduce an efficient and Rawlsian class of mechanisms. Strategy-proofness is incompatible with Rawlsianism; therefore, no Rawlsian mechanism is strategy-proof.

Justification of the right to subsistence in contemporary Western philosophy: challenges and solutions

The article discusses the views of modern Western philosophers on the isuue of socio-economic human rights, including the right to subsistence. The purpose of the work is to answer the question of whether the right to a decent life is morally justified. The work was carried out within the framework of the analytical approach and its inherent methodology. The author identifies several types of arguments expressed in Western literature against the right to a worthy existence. They are 1) actual impossibility of guaranteeing these rights; 2) denial of non-contractual positive obligations that could correspond to this right; 3) problematization of the imperfect nature of positive obligations corresponding to this law. It is shown that these objections in themselves are not sufficient to reject the right to a worthy existence, but they show that at the abstract level this right cannot be justified only in a “negative” sense, that is, as the right to which only the negative duties of others correspond. The author proposes to consider options for solving the problems that gave rise to discussions concerning the right to a dignified existence, outside of human rights discourse. Thus, the moral basis for the fight against poverty and other features of an “unworthy” existence can be formulated by applying to the public sphere (by analogy) the categories of civil law - condiction, tort and contract, as well as taking into account the classical conditions for the onset of legal liability. Moreover, the moral justification for securing some “decent” level of existence is achieved by referring to the general principles of fair distribution of material wealth (regardless of what is considered a “decent existence”). One of these principles is the Rawlsian principle of difference, which does not depend either on the idea of a person as a “moral agent” who requires some kind of minimum (“worthy”) level of well-being, or on understanding of the human rights nature.

RAWLSNET: Altering Bayesian Networks to Encode Rawlsian Fair Equality of Opportunity

We present RAWLSNET, a system for altering Bayesian Network (BN) models to satisfy the Rawlsian principle of fair equality of opportunity (FEO). RAWLSNET's BN models generate aspirational data distributions: data generated to reflect an ideally fair, FEO-satisfying society. FEO states that everyone with the same talent and willingness to use it should have the same chance of achieving advantageous social positions (e.g., employment), regardless of their background circumstances (e.g., socioeconomic status). Satisfying FEO requires alterations to social structures such as school assignments. Our paper describes RAWLSNET, a method which takes as input a BN representation of an FEO application and alters the BN's parameters so as to satisfy FEO when possible, and minimize deviation from FEO otherwise. We also offer guidance for applying RAWLSNET, including on recognizing proper applications of FEO. We demonstrate the use of our system with publicly available data sets. RAWLSNET's altered BNs offer the novel capability of generating aspirational data for FEO-relevant tasks. Aspirational data are free from the biases of real-world data, and thus are useful for recognizing and detecting sources of unfairness in machine learning algorithms besides biased data.

Religious Liberty and the Alleged Afterlife

It is common for religiously motivated actions to be specially protected by law. Many legal theorists have asked why: what makes religion special? What makes it worthy of toleration over and above other non-religious deeply held convictions? The answer I put forward is that religions’ alleged afterlife consequences call for a principle of toleration that warrants special legal treatment. Under a Rawlsian principle of toleration, it is reasonable for those in the original position to opt for principles of justice that accommodate actions with alleged afterlife consequences. And, under a utilitarian principle of toleration, a greater psychological harm is eased by such accommodations. Additionally, this alleged afterlife consequence is found in most of the religions that are thought to warrant some level of special toleration—not only do the Abrahamic religions have alleged afterlife consequences, but many eastern religions do as well, e.g. reincarnation.

Rawlsian fairness in push and pull supply chains

We study a dyadic supply chain with firms following the Rawlsian principle of fairness and examine its impact on chain performance and firms’ profits. Different from the inequality-aversion model in the distributional fairness literature, the participants with the Rawlsian fairness concern maximize the profit of the disadvantageous party according to their own fairness criteria. Our results show that the Rawlsian principle adopted by individual firms can achieve not only fairness but also Pareto efficiency. By studying both push and pull supply chains, we find that what matters is the decision sequence between the manufacturer and the retailer. The fair-minded Stackelberg follower can induce the Stackelberg leader, no matter fair-minded or not, to offer a coordinating wholesale price. The chain coordination can be achieved only if the follower is not too demanding (i.e., it does not demand an excessively high portion of chain profit according to its fairness criterion). Additionally, a win-win outcome can be achieved, provided the follower is not too humble. All else being equal, the win-win region is larger with a higher demand uncertainty. Last but not least, we compare our results with those under the inequality-averse fairness model on a push supply chain and find that the parameter ranges of coordination and win-win are wider when the participants follow the Rawlsian principle of fairness.

Naturally and Socially Caused Inequalities: Is the Distinction Relevant for Assessments of Justice?

In ‘Justice and Nature’, Thomas Nagel claims that social institutions are not responsible for inequalities caused primarily by nature, as opposed to socially caused inequalities. I evaluate this claim. To do so, I distinguish causal responsibility from substantive responsibility. I argue that Nagel rightly identifies conditions in virtue of which social institutions are not substantively responsible for an inequality, but the causal responsibility of nature is irrelevant for that assessment. The natural/social distinction is, I hold, misleading, and I offer two pragmatic reasons to stop using it. Besides, past criticisms to the natural/social distinction have questioned whether identifying the causal responsability of nature for an inequality is descriptively meaningful, epistemically possible, and morally relevant. My reconstruction of Nagel’s view avoids these criticisms, I explain, by depriving the causal responsibility of nature of any role to identify an inequality as naturally caused. Moreover, I show that my reconstruction of Nagel’s view, purged of the natural/social distinction, helps to justify the asymmetrical treatment of class-based inequalities and inequalities among people with different native endowments in the Rawlsian principle of fair equality of opportunity.

A Proposal for an Automatic Stabilizer in Social Justice

Abstract Generally, social justice has two sides which are intercorrelated and inter-dependend: a) constitutive social justice (for example, the so called commutative social justice); b) regulative social justice (for example, the so called distributive social justice). The paper approaches the regulative social justice, more exactly, an automatic mechanism to get it. To this end, an automatic stabilizer to provide distributive social justice, according to the Rawlsian principle of difference. Such an automatic stabilizer is grounded on the wealth, more precise, on the share of the wealth which is not invested in order to benefit to the more disadvantaged class of the society. Paper does not test empirically the proposal, such a propose remaining for next intervention in this publication.

An extension of Rawls’s theory of justice for climate change

AbstractIn this paper, I argue that a new principle of background justice should be added to Rawls’s Law of Peoples because climate change is an international and intergenerational problem that can destabilize the Society of Peoples and the well-ordered peoples therein. I start with explaining the nature of my project and Rawls’s conception of stability. I argue that climate change poses a realistic threat to the stability of climate-vulnerable liberal peoples and as a result undermines international peace and security. Despite the uncertainties due to the complexity of the climate system and about the resilience of liberal societies, liberal peoples’ fundamental interests in just basic institutions and national security call for the adoption of a precautionary principle. Rawls’s own principles are, I argue, inadequate to solve the stability problem from climate change. Still, his framework provides the theoretical resources to develop a new extension. I propose a new Rawlsian principle of international, intergenerational justice that guarantees the environmental background conditions under which well-ordered peoples can sustain their basic structure over generations and sketch the principle’s institutional implementation. I conclude with the theoretical and practical significance of this extension of Rawls’s theory.

Reasonable Pluralism, Interculturalism, and Sterba on Question-Beggingness

In From Rationality to Equality, James Sterba (From rationality to equality. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) argues that the non-moral, and non-controversial, principle of logic, the principle that good arguments do not beg-the-question, provides a rationally conclusive response to egoism. He calls this “the principle of non-question-beggingness” and it is supposed to justify a conception of “Morality as Compromise.” Sterba’s basic idea is that principles of morality provide a non-question-begging compromise between self-interested reasons and other-regarding reasons. I will focus, first, on Sterba’s rejection of the alternative Kantian rationalist justification of morality, and second, I discuss the logical principle of non-question-beggingness and I argue that Sterba is wrong to assume that there is a formal, logical requirement that a rational egoist must provide a non-question-begging defense of egoism. I argue that, like the Kantian, Sterba needs a more substantial conception of practical reason to derive his conclusion. My third focus is the problem of reasonable pluralism and public reason (Rawls in Political liberalism. Columbia University Press, New York, 1996; The law of peoples with the idea of public reason revisited. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999). The Rawlsian principle of public reason is analogous to Sterba’s principle of non-question-beggingness. Sterba recognizes that public policies should respect competing perspectives and that a public conception of justice must be justifiable to all reasonable people. The problem is that that reasonable people disagree about fundamental moral questions. Rawls calls this the fact of reasonable pluralism. I argue that an intercultural conception of justice is necessary to provide a response to reasonable pluralism and a shared basis for public reason.

Comment on Gavin Kerr

Abstract In this comment I challenge Kerr’s claim that a coherent expression of a ‘liberalism of freedom’ needs an extended first Rawlsian principle of justice incorporating the principle of fair equality of opportunity for two reasons. First, such an extended first principle leads to illiberal consequences by narrowing down the scope of individual responsibility for choice and effort way too much. Second, such an extended first principle misses a main Rawlsian insight, namely that in a theory of justice the principle securing basic liberties and the principle of fair equality of opportunity serve different purposes.

Not Losing Major Liberal and Rawlsian Insights

In this comment a challenge Kerr’s claim that a coherent expression of a ‘liberalism of freedom’ needs an extended first Rawlsian principle of justice incorporating the principle of fair equality of opportunity for two reasons. First, such an extended first principle leads to illiberal consequences by narrowing down the scope of individual responsibility for choice and effort way too much. Second, such an extended first principle misses a main Rawlsian insight, namely that in a theory of justice the principle securing basic liberties and the principle of fair equality of opportunity serve different purposes.

Distributive Justice and Regional Planning: The Politics of Regional Revenue-Generating Land Uses in Israel

In this article, I examine the connection between the economic strength of a local authority and the distribution of space in the region. The goal of this article is to examine the degree to which the distribution of revenue-generating land uses in Israel accords with the Rawlsian principle of distributive justice, and how that distribution affects the economic and social condition of development towns in comparison with that of the adjacent regional authorities. I also consider the role of the Israeli planning system in creating such inequalities, its justifications for doing so, and various attempts to remedy the situation.

The Rawlsian Principle and Secession-Proofness In Large Heterogeneous Societies

This paper examines a model of multi-jurisdictional formation considered by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Le Breton and Weber (2003), where the distribution of individuals is given by Lebesgue measure over the given (flnite or inflnite) interval. Every jurisdiction chooses a location of a public good and shares the cost of production among its residents. Each individual is responsible for both transportation cost to the location of the public good and her contribution towards the production of the public good. We consider a notion of a secession-proof allocation where no group of individuals can make all its members better ofi by choosing a location of the public good and a cost-sharing mechanism among its members. We show that if the support of individuals’ distribution is the real line <, the only secession-proof allocation is Rawlsian that equalizes the utilities of all individuals in the society. In the case of bounded support we show that there is a degree of approximation to the Rawlsian solution that reconciles the secession-proofness and the weakened Rawlsian principle.

On goal programming formulations of the reference point method

This paper discusses connections between the multi-criteria techniques of goal programming (GP) and the reference point method (RPM). Both approaches use a certain target point in the criterion (outcome) space as a key element to model decision maker preferences. Therefore, RPM can be expressed, similarly to GP, in the modelling framework of deviational variables. The paper gives a systematic survey and analysis of the lexicographic GP models of RPM. The corresponding preference models are formalised and analysed with respect to target values interpretations as well as the Pareto efficiency of their solutions. The properties of equity among the individual achievements of solutions are also analysed with respect to the Rawlsian principle of justice.

The Environment as a Stakeholder? A Fairness-Based Approach

Stakeholder theory is often unable to distinguish those individuals and groups that are stakeholders from those that are not. This problem of stakeholder identity has recently been addressed by linking stakeholder theory to a Rawlsian principle of fairness. To illustrate, the question of stakeholder status for the non-human environment is discussed. This essay criticizes a past attempt to ascribe stakeholder status to the non-human environment, which utilized a broad definition of the term "stakeholder." This paper then demonstrates how, despite the denial of stakeholder status, the environment is nonetheless accounted for on a fairness-based approach through legitimate organizational stakeholders. In addition, since stakeholder theory has never claimed to be a comprehensive ethical scheme, it is argued that sound reasons might exist for managers to consider their organization's impact on the environment that are not stakeholder-related.

The Environment as a Stakeholder

Stakeholder theory is often unable to distinguish those individuals and groups that are stakeholders from those that are not. This problem of stakeholder identity has recently been addressed by linking stakeholder theory to a Rawlsian principle of fairness. To illustrate, the question of stakeholder status for the non-human environment is discussed. This essay criticizes a past attempt to ascribe stakeholder status to the non-human environment, which utilized a broad definition of the term stakeholder. This paper then demonstrates how, despite the denial of stakeholder status, the environment is nonetheless accounted for on a fairness-based approach through legitimate organizational stakeholders. In addition, since stakeholder theory has never claimed to be a comprehensive ethical scheme, it is argued that sound reasons might exist for managers to consider their organization's impact on the environment that are not stakeholder-related.

Principles of Distributive Justice

In his famous book on a theory of justice, John Rawls argues that under some special conditions, referred to as an “original position,” people would unanimously choose as a principle of distributive justice, the principle of maximizing the welfare of the worst-off individual in the society. An experiment was conducted under conditions approximating Rawls's “veil of ignorance.” It was a replication of Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavy's experiment, using Polish instead of American students. In accordance with Rawls's prediction, most of experimental groups in both samples reached the consensus. However, the chosen principle was not the Rawlsian principle of maximizing the floor income, but the principle of maximizing the average income with the floor constraint. Moreover, in individual rankings and choices, the principle of maximizing the average income with a floor constraint received the highest ranks, while the Rawlsian principle received the lowest ranks. Our interpretation of these results is that the notion of distributive justice should not be reduced to considering only the welfare of the poorest.

Effects of knowledge of self‐interest and social relationship upon the use of equity, utilitarian, and Rawlsian principles of allocation

AbstractSubjects played a game and were told they had the high score, low score, or were not informed which score was their own. They were previously led to like or dislike the other. Relative performance was generally considered in allocating rewards, indicating the use of an equity principle. Performance was not used as a criteria for allocation, however, by subjects who were uncertain of their score in positive social relationships and poor performers in negative social relationships. When given a chance to increase the total group reward by deviating from the distribution ratio believed most equitable, most subjects did so. This finding indicated that a utilitarian type of principle was clearly used in conjunction with the equity principle. Few subjects, however, followed the Rawlsian principle that inequality is only tolerable when an unequal allocation gives more to each person than an equal allocation.

Rawlsian justice and the financing of the National Health Service.

ABSTRACTJohn Rawls' ATheory of Justicewas published in Britain in 1972. The summation of many years' work by Professor Rawls, it has stimulated widespread admiration and criticism. In this article Rawls' theory is summarized briefly together with some of the major criticisms that have been made of it. An attempt is then made to apply one of Rawls' principles of justice to the question of health services financing, using as a case study the recommendations of an advisory panel of the British Medical Association, which reported in 1970. These recommendations involved extending the private sector in medical care, on the argument that the flow of resources to the National Health Service would increase and, despite possible greater inequalities, result in an improvement in the level of care for all. Judged by the Rawlsian principle, these recommendations are not found likely to represent a just solution to the question of health service financing.

Further Remarks on the Rawlsian Principle of Just Saving

The implications of Rawls' 'maxi-min' welfare criterion for intergenerational justice are explored for a simple model in which each generation cares about its own and the next generation's level of consumption. In contrast with the conclusion drawn by Arrow from his narrower formulation of the problem, it is shown that the Rawlsian criterion need not preclude long run capital accumulation. The general forms of the optimal consumption, capital and utility streams are also derived undcr alternative assumptions about the psychic trade-off between own consumption and consumption of one's immediate descendents.