Rational Truth Research Articles

The Ego Conquiro as the Paradigm of Modern Imperialism and its Violence Against the Struggle for Epistemic Justice

This article begins with a discussion of the implications of Enrique Dussel’s “I conquer, therefore I am” (ego conquiro) thesis as the paradigm of modern imperialism. According to Dussel, underlying the “myth of modernity” (mito de la modernidad) is an epistemological structure of a substantive ego that naturalizes European colonial expansion. Dussel admits that the “I conquer, therefore, I am” thesis began earlier than Descartes’s account of the cogito, which was theorized after the Spanish colonization of the Americas, but the substantive “I” that constitutes the ego conquiro nonetheless represents a theory of knowledge that served and continues to serve the political domination of bodies that have been historically victimized. Couched within the epistemic structure of Descartes’s cogito is a duality between soul and matter, where the former represents an immortal substance detached from the body, taken to be the recipe for rational truth, while the latter is reduced to a quantifiable object occupying a “zero-point” geometrical space. But the cogito became the epistemological standpoint that allowed for the justification of the many hidden forms of domination around the world, because it masks the social, economic, and geopolitical contexts and their history to the modern subject. This article will investigate the ego conquiro thesis and its link to epistemic violence, namely, epistemic racism and epistemicide, and will argue as a concluding point for a method of resistance that foregrounds philosophical pluralism to disrupt the internalization of the epistemologies of the Global North as the common-sense position(s) of today.

Dialectics and the Relationship between Philosophy and Religion in an Islamic Perspective

. Islamic philosophy and religion have undergone long phases of ups and downs, becoming a dialectic of science. Religion and philosophy in the academic world view are two entities that cannot be separated when studied academically to find the truth. Ibn Rushd asserted that the religion of sharia and the philosophy of wisdom do not conflict. Indeed, there was tension between theologians, especially al-Ghazâlî in Tahâfut al-Falasifah, and Islamic philosophers, especially peripatetic philosophers, such as Ibn Sina. This tension is reflected in Ibn Rushd's statement that "reproach from friends hurts more than reproach from enemies, because according to him, religion and philosophy are actually brothers." The research in this article uses descriptive qualitative research methods with a Library Research approach, visualizing and analyzing the phenomena in this research study. The data sources in this research come from various information, journals, and writings resulting from research on the dialectics of Islamic philosophy and religion. The focus of discussion in this article has three focuses of discussion starting from measuring the relationship between Islamic philosophy and religion, characteristics of philosophy and religion in Islam, and dialectics of philosophy and Islamic religious teachings. Philosophy and religion are two entities that cannot be separated and will continue to be discussed and studied because they are academic studies, in search of scientific and rational truth.

The Lexico-Semantic Field of Post-Truth in Socio-Political Discourse

The purpose of the review article is to identify conceptualizations of the post-truth era in the English-language socio-political communication, based on the key vocabulary of a number of reviews and sources representing the component post-truth in the media. The object of the analysis is lexical representation of the component post-truth in the media. The subject matter of the analysis is conceptual interpretation of the post-truth component in such relevant phrases as post-truth era (or politics, world of politics, politicians, society, age, knowledge and power, condition, campaign, etc.) in various authorial sources. The Russian equivalents of truth in the item post-truth are reliability (достоверность), accuracy (точность), credibility (доверие); in the media the phrase post-truth comes to mean ‘to abandon or neglect the principles of objectivity and reliability’. It has been shown that in the USA and UK socio-political field expert assessments and interpretations of the claim itself are contradictory and are often marked with skepticism. It is clear, however, that it cannot be taken literally and that in science and education discourse, with the exception of history, it manifests itself differently: in close relation to scientific rational truths or facts, but not to daily factual truths described by H. Arendt. Also, specific sets of key words are used to describe manifestations of post-truth in the media and science. “Fake news” and election campaigns don’t seem to be the major features of the post-truther media. Instead, the concepts bullshit by H. Frankfurt and post-truth game by S. Fuller are competing for this role; however, they can’t be regarded as elaborated formal rhetorical schema either. Yu.Shatin alone made a pertinent and significant attempt to describe the new post-truther rhetoric. The specialist literature review shows that the media post-truth discourse is actually a manifestation of a deep crisis in the ‘canonical’ democracy, a reflection of its agonal state in the American-British vocabulary and narratives. The paper emphasizes that this kind of discourse has not only a home dimension, but also a foreign policy one and, consequently, internal and external addressing. Its reception in Russia is distorted due to remoteness of observers, which does not allow them to see how fakes and the new post-truth vocabulary are actually interpreted by the agents in the process of intra- or intercultural confrontation.

Ontologi Ilmu Pengetahuan

Ontology is a science that examines what is the nature of science or scientific knowledge which is popularly known by many people as science, what is the nature of rational truth or deductive truth and empirical reality that cannot be separated from science's perception of what and how. The ontology of science limits itself to scientific studies that humans can think about rationally and can observe through the five human senses. Meanwhile, the study of objects of study that are within the limits of pre-experience (such as human creation) and post-experience (such as heaven and hell) becomes an ontology of other knowledge outside of science. In language, ontology comes from the Greek word origin is "Ontos" and "Logos". Ontos is "that which exists" while Logos is "knowledge". Simply put, ontology is the science that talks about what exists. In terms, ontology is a branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of life about an existence which includes the existence of everything that exists and that may exist. And do not mix up the truth with falsehood and (do not) hide the truth while you know it. (QS. Al-Baqarah Verse 42) Ontology basically talks about the nature of "existing" science, the nature of knowledge objects, and the nature of the subject-object relationship of science. How science is viewed ontologically, the discussion is that ontology examines, analyzes knowledge based on whether knowledge really exists or does not exist. For example in Islamic Education Management, ontologically the discussion is focused on Islamic Education Management does it really exist or not, not only the study program but actually the knowledge taught in it is actually no different from Education Management in general.

Die Aufklärung der Aufklärung: Lessing und die Herausforderung des Christentums by Hannes Kerber

Reviewed by: Die Aufklärung der Aufklärung: Lessing und die Herausforderung des Christentums by Hannes Kerber Joseph A. Haydt Hannes Kerber. Die Aufklärung der Aufklärung: Lessing und die Herausforderung des Christentums. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2021. 286 pp. Hannes Kerber's monograph exploits close readings of largely neglected participants in the so-called fragments controversy to deliver a genuinely original reading of Lessing's authorial strategy during the early years of the controversy. On the strictly philological plane, this study merits attention among Lessing scholars for uncovering a host of sources within the Christian theological tradition that influenced Lessing's late religious thought. Kerber carefully documents Lessing's underappreciated sensitivity not only to the doctrinal debates that animated the formative (pre-Nicene) centuries of Christianity but also to the core theological innovations of the early Reformation. Kerber's book is no mere philological investigation, however, and his exegetical discoveries serve a broader interpretive agenda that bears on Lessing's assessment of Enlightenment philosophy and theology. In Kerber's view, Lessing believed that the religious disputes of his contemporaries systematically neglected the principles that the great theologians of both ancient Christianity and the Reformation had deemed to represent the most profound insights of Christianity. Kerber's Lessing aims to reconfigure such debates by restoring these dormant theological resources. Here, I focus on one example from Kerber's reconstruction of this strategy: Lessing's efforts to restore a Lutheran conception of faith in Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft, composed in 1777 in response to Johann Daniel Schumann's defense of Christianity in Über die Evidenz der Beweise für die Wahrheit der christlichen Religion. In his discussion, Kerber documents in extensive detail the [End Page 195] careful attention that Lessing paid to Schumann's text in crafting his famous response, with the aim of challenging the widely held belief that the essay articulates Lessing's own theory of religious and historical truth. By comparing Lessing's text to Schumann's, Kerber demonstrates that each major junction of Lessing's argument proceeds by invoking a specific passage or claim in Schumann's text. Kerber argues that Lessing does not use Schumann's essay merely as an occasion to elaborate an independent theory of revelation; instead, Lessing's text adopts the terms of Schumann's argument and drives them to their logical conclusion, thereby calling attention to the incongruence between his interlocutor's premises and the conclusions they are meant to support. Kerber convincingly argues that this text does not aim to criticize religion or divine revelation as such but rather seeks to expose a particular form of religious thinking that conceived of religious faith as a species of certainty that could be justified by historical or rational truth. Kerber's Lessing believed that this conception of faith had surreptitiously become paradigmatic for the religious thought of his contemporaries, a development that involved abandoning a category distinction that had been fundamental for the theology of the Reformation: that faith is not an issue of rational certainty, but a matter of trust. In the guise of confessional orthodoxy, Schumann—and those who shared his views about the task of Christian theology—had parted ways with this central tenet of Protestant thought and reduced Christianity to a disguised rationalism. And, Kerber argues, it is just this lost tenet that Lessing wants to restore. Far from developing a critique of orthodoxy based on the philosophical principles of the Enlightenment, Kerber's Lessing is engaged in a process of recovering traditional orthodox beliefs to criticize the innovations of his theologian contemporaries, innovations which had come at the price of forfeiting the deepest theological claim that the Reformation had proposed with respect to divine revelation. (In a subsequent chapter, Kerber turns to Nathan der Weise to elaborate what Lessing takes to be at stake in this Protestant concept, arguing that it is a central concern of the play to portray the ethical, religious, and social force of the Lutheran conception of faith when taken in its complete scope.) Kerber's aim throughout this study is to show that Lessing was equally critical of both contemporary orthodoxy and its Enlightenment critics. While it has frequently...

Postmodern Ethics, Premodern Farce

Postmodern Ethics, Premodern Farce

William James’de Pragmatik Yaklaşım Bağlamında Dinin Temellendirilmesi

Pragmatism is one of the important thought traditions in the history of philosophy. Approaching facts and propositions from a functional point of view, pragmatism is not concerned with whether the facts and propositions contain rational truth and consistency. Rather, it cares about their practical consequences. This approach is not only philosophically based but has become a widely used tool in social sciences over time. This approach, first introduced by the philosopher C. S. Peirce in the 1870s, gained momentum when William James wrote Pragmatism in 1907. In the context of this work, it is understood that he was one of the names who made important contributions to the development of pragmatism, even if he was not the person who presented pragmatism independently, with his writings in the atmosphere of American functional psychology. William James describes the pragmatic approach as a philosophy of life. In addition, this point of view is important in explaining religious and psychological phenomena. Some of the results determined in the context of this study are as follows: William James focused on the concept of religious experience in terms of the God-human relationship and the pragmatic value of this relationship. For him, individual religious experience is the direct source of religious knowledge. The origin of this knowledge is religious feeling, not religious beliefs. According to William James, the religious feeling is regarded as the first and deepest source of religion. While basing his views on religion from a pragmatic point of view, he focused on the resulting results rather than the rational truth of the belief. In other words, according to him, any belief is not absolutely true but subjectively true to the extent that it adds meaning to the individual's life and makes his life easier. The main subject of this study is how William James handled religion within the framework of pragmatism as a methodological approach. The aim of this study is to first examine William James's pragmatic approach and then to examine how he grounded religion in the context of pragmatism. In this context, the study is based on William James's; He is limited to examining his works called Pragmatism, The Diversity of Religious Experience, The Will to Believe. In this study, in which the qualitative research method was followed, the related works of William James, in which he discussed the phenomenon of religion and the grounding of pragmatism, were examined by document analysis technique.

Makna Hizb dalam Al-Qur’an: Mengungkap Pesan Moral Al-Qur’an tentang Politik Identitas

The Meaning of Hizb in the Qur'an: Revealing the Moral Message of the Qur'an about Identity Politics This article discusses the moral message of the Qur'anic verses about hizb in relation to identity politics. This study is motivated by the use of the term hizb which is not in line with the moral message of the Koran and tends to be misused for the benefit of power politics. To reveal the moral message of the Koran used qualitative research by making the verses of the Koran about hizb as the object of study. Al-Qur'an verses about hizb are described thematically with the double movement theory approach, Fazlur Rahman. The results of this study indicate that the verses about hizb imply a moral message that is directly related to identity politics, especially the relationship between the existence of human plurality and divine principles. This relationship is formed by the existence of religiosity which supports the maintenance of ethical values. In addition, progressive ideas born from a nation's democracy always rest on ethical and rational truths. Ethical truth directs people consciously to maintain their identity without ignoring rational truth. Meanwhile, rational truth is placed properly in maintaining national unity in the discourse of democracy

Identité du moi et identité du philosophe: Rousseau dans le miroir de Socrate

AbstractThe figure of Socrates is ubiquitous in Rousseau’s work and represents the role of philosophy as well as the place of the philosopher in the city. This article first examines Rousseau’s various identifications with the Athenian philosopher in his Discourse on the Arts and Sciences and Discourse on Inequality via different topoi typical of the Socratic‐Platonic philosophy. Although Rousseau initially identifies with Socrates directly, he quickly begins to establish some distance. Later, Socrates and the philosophical pursuit of truth are set aside in favour of the figure of Jesus and a less rational truth. Some have seen this as the end of Rousseau’s identification with the Greek philosopher. Here, however, we maintain that the identification with Socrates and the reflection on the role of the philosopher continue in Rousseau’s autobiographical writings where he constructs a new identification, this time inverted, with the philosopher.

Hans Blumenberg on the rigorism of truth and the strangeness of the past

In this paper I discuss Hans Blumenberg’s The Rigorism of Truth, a short polemic that criticizes Freud and Hannah Arendt for placing (what he considers) a misplaced faith in the liberatory potential of rational truth in moments of historical disaster. The secondary literature suggests that this piece exhibits either all the signs of a late, Romantic capitulation to the ‘need’ for myth, or Blumenberg’s failure to recognize his own faith and debts to the ‘mythology’ of reason’s emancipatory hopes. My argument hinges on the claim that these readings put undue emphasis on the philosophical anthropology component of Blumenberg’s work. Instead, I offer a new reading of the essay, in keeping with an alternative reading of his theory of myth. The essay transforms, then, from a polemic regarding the need for myth, into a nuanced description of the ways in which we can overestimate our capacity to overcome it.

LA LECCIÓN INAUGURAL DE BONN Y LA COMPRENSIÓN DE LA FILOSOFÍA

In this article I offer a study of the inaugural lecture with which Joseph Ratzinger began his professorship at the University of Bonn, The God of Faith and the God of the Philosophers, in order to shed light on the understanding of philosophy that is presupposed in the text. I argue that in it, unlike what the author does in other texts, philosophy is understood as an activity essentially oriented to the knowledge of ontological, universal and rational truth, and that, precisely, these characteristics foster an alliance between philosophy and the incipient Christian faith.

Duyum ve Algı Bağlamında Büyü ve Gerçek

Kâinat yaratılmış olduğundan bir yandan başta Allah’ın halikiyyeti ve kudreti olmak üzere bütün esmâu’l hüsnâsına delâlet ederken, diğer yandan, şuurlu varlıkların idrakine hitap etmesi dolayısıyla bilginin teşekkülüne yol açmaktadır. Kâinat esmâu’l hüsnâya delâlet etmesi yönüyle ilm-i ilâhiyyeye, insan idrakine düşmüş haliyle/şekliyle de ilm-i beşeriyyeye delâlet etmektedir. Kâinatın bu iki farklı yöne açılan yapısı/biçimi hem problemin kaynağını hem de çözümünü ortaya koymaktadır. Problemin ve çözümün bir arada olması zihin için paradoksal bir durum ortaya çıkarmaktadır.
 Kâinatı yaratılmış olmanın dışında sadece aklî/tabiî proses içinde insanın algısına düşen şekliyle anlayan zihin için kâinat olabildiğince açık bir fenomenal alan olup hiçbir saklı kalan yanı bulunmamaktadır; dolayısıyla böyle bir zihin kâinatı tam bir otonom sistem olarak algılamak zorunda kalmaktadır. Kâinatı yaratılmış olarak anlayan zihin ise, ilkinde olduğu gibi “açık” algıya sahip olamadığından kâinatı “mitsel” algılama tehlikesiyle karşı karşıya kalabilmektedir. Kâinatın sadece yaratılmış olduğunu bilmekle/kabul etmiş olmakla beraber başka bir bilgiye sahip olmayan bir zihin tamamen mitsel algının dışına çıkamaz. Dolayısıyla evrene hem olgusal hem de mitsel bakmak aklın/zihnin tabii bir özelliğidir. Bu açıdan başta aydınlanma felsefesi olmak üzere bütün materyalist telakkilere dayalı düşünme sistemlerinin “din” karşıtlığı kendi içerisinde oldukça tutarlıdır.
 Vahiy kâinatın yaratılmış olduğunu anlayabilen bir zihne rehberlik yapabilir; bu eşiği geçemeyen bir zihne rehberlik yapamaz. Bu açıdan Kur’an’da sık sık Alah’ın yaratıcı olmasına atıf yapılmış olması dikkat çekicidir. Allah’ın yaratıcı olduğunun bilinmesi sadece bir bilgi değil, aynı zamanda, belki daha da önemlisi zihnin vahye hazır hale gelmesini sağlamış olmasıdır, bu kelam ıstılahıyla iman aşamasıdır. Zihin vahye hazır hale geldikten sonra artık “bilgi” süreci başlar. Zihinde vahye “hazıroluşluk” durumunu ortaya çıkaramayan sadece formel seviyedeki bir bilginin Kur’an’daki/rasyonel gerçeklere geçiş yapması mümkün değildir. Peygamberlerin davetine ilk muhatap olanların vahye karşı ortak bir sesle “Bu büyüden başka bir şey değildir” şeklindeki itirazları “yalancı” açık zihnin itirazından başka bir şey değildir. İnsan zihni evreni “açık” bir fenomenal alan yapmakla gerçekten evrenin açık olacağını zannederek çıkılması zor bir yanılgıya düşebilmekte ve vahyi problemin kaynağı olarak görmek zorunda kalmaktadır. “Bu apaçık bir büyüdür” şeklindeki itiraz sadece davetin sahibi peygambere duyulan şahsi düşmanlıkla sınırlı tutulamaz; itirazın epistemolojik dayanakları vardır. Bu itirazı yapanların vahyi anlamalarından sonra bu itirazlarından vaz geçmeleri itirazın sadece iradeyle ilgili olmadığını ortaya koymaktadır.
 “Bu apaçık bir büyüdür” şeklindeki itiraz epistemolojik bir zemine sahip olması dolayısıyla davetin sadece formel şekliyle sınırlı olarak anlaşılamayacağını göstermektedir. Peygamberlerin yapmış olduğu vahye davet günümüzün diliyle söylemek gerekirse başta “eğitim felsefesi” olmak üzere bütün bilgi alanlarıyla ilişkili bir konudur. Vahye davet alternatif bir davet değil, bizzat olması gereken alternatifsiz rasyonel bir davettir. Benzer şekilde vahiy ile sorunlu olan bütün epistemolojik alanlar “Bu apaçık bir büyüdür” itirazındaki aynı arka plana sahiptir. “Bu apaçık bir büyüdür” diyenler evren ve hayat hakkında rasyonel bir tespitte bulunmanın güveni içerisinde bunu söylemekteydiler; oysa Kur’an gerçeğin böyle olmadığını bildirmektedir.
 Büyü popülist anlamının dışında Kur’an’da kullanıldığı çerçevede ele alındığında insanlık tarihi ile başlamaktadır ve aynı ağırlıkta devam etmektedir. Gerçek ile algılanan arasındaki mesafe büyünün derecesini ortaya koymaktadır. Büyü dili ütopik bir dil değil, toplumda dolanımda olabilecek kadar rasyonel bir dildir. İnsan büyüyü tanımadığında etkisine girer, tanıdığında ise etkisinden kurtulur. Büyünün sona erdiğini düşünen/zanneden zihin ise en fazla büyüye maruz kalan zihindir.

FILSAFAT BARAT ERA SKOLASTIK Telaah Kritis Pemikiran Thomas Aquinas

AbstractThis paper tries to discuss how Western philosophy critically examined the thought of Thomas Aquinas in the scholastic era. The scholastic era or known medieval philosophy whose style is the philosophy of collaborating with theology in harmony. Philosophy in the scholastic era gave birth to many famous theologians-philosophers, one of whom was Thomas Aquinas, who was the subject of this paper. After the authors traced through this paper the answer found that Aquinas was the most important figure of Western philosophy in the scholastic era. Aquinas is considered to have made a real contribution in unifying the original elements of Augustine's thought, strongly influenced by the philosophy of Neo-Platonism, with the philosophy of Aristotle.The author criticized Aquinas's view that Aristotle's philosophical system contains true rational truths. Basically using philosophical methods to understand theology is very helpful. That has been done by Aquinas; it only needs to be underlined that the method for understanding philosophy without losing the nature of theology is not entirely correct either. However there are also problems that cannot be fully explained by philosophical approaches. Like the problem of beliefs related to metaphysical problems, for example. The problem of belief in matters that are metaphysical is a problem that is difficult to explain philosophical logic. Aquinas stated that theological truth is clear to human reason. For example, it is the truth about God's existence. This truth comes from revelation, but how to explain philosophically that can satisfy curiosity so that what is believed can be understood rationally.

Neither Yours nor Mine but Ours: On the Communal Nature of Truth and Rational Belief

ABSTRACT It is my claim that there is a significant parallel to be drawn between the relationship that holds between local success and national flourishing and the relationship that holds between rational belief and truth. This is not simply because all four can only be achieved through communal effort. I argue that understanding how local success contributes to national flourishing best illuminates the connection between rational belief and truth.

Understanding the contributions of some Russian scientists to developing systems thinking and the theory of evolution

PurposeThis study aims to explain and illustrate the character of Russian systems thinking and to show how it is different and similar to traditions in the West. This study’s second aim is to describe the contributions of some Russian scientists to developing systems thinking and the theory of evolution. This study introduces the predecessors of Charles Darwin in Russia, both supporters and critics of his ideas, as well as scientists who have made similar contributions to the development of systems thinking, particularly Vladimir Vernadsky and Alexander Bogdanov.Design/methodology/approachPhilosophical and theoretical comparisons. In the Russian intellectual tradition, the terms “Russia” and the “West” are likely codes for signifying fundamental philosophical questions about the universality of thinking and culture. The term “West” means universal, rational truth without taking into consideration any differences in life and cultural practice. The term “Russia” means impossibility of such a universal truth and a necessity to look for solutions on the level of life, not only on the level of rational thinking.FindingsPaying attention to differences in approaches to systems and cybernetics and the theory of evolution will enrich the further development of systems sciences in Russia and the West. The paper examines the philosophical underpinnings of science rather than just testing or extending an existing theory. The result is better mutual understanding among scientists with different backgrounds.Originality/valueThis study suggests new avenues for research and expands the range of conceptual possibilities. It improves mutual understanding among scholars and countries. Also, it adds to the topics discussed within the field of systems and cybernetics and the theory of evolution.

Dikotomi Moral dan Hukum sebagai Problem Epistemologis dalam Konstitusi Modern

This article discusses dichotomy between moral and legal consideration occuring in the modern constitutions that can be traced back in the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas and Niccolo Machiavelli. The analysis focuses on the epistemological aspects of this dichotomy that are rooted for long in the moral and legal concepts in the modern constitution.Through epistemological analysis, the authors conclude that the epistemic root of the dichotomy lie in the contrasting paradigm between supernatural law and modern positivism. While modern constitutionalism constructs moral concepts that presummes Divine truth, the legal concepts oriented to rational truth. These two concepts should be intergrated without dichotomy through the dictum 'moral exaltation in the primacy of the law' so that the law will be able to answer legal issues in the society.

Making Facts, Using Facts: Two Poetics of the Factual and One Theory of the Political

In political thought, there is perhaps no more penetrating scrutiny of the significance of the factual than hannah Arendt's essay “Truth and Politics.” “Facts and events,” Arendt observes, are the “invariable outcome of men living and acting together.” As such, they “constitute the very texture of the political realm” (227). Concerning words and deeds of many actors, factual truth must be the basis for deliberations and opinions in the political space. “Freedom of opinion,” she continues, “is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed and the facts themselves are not in dispute. In other words, factual truth informs political thought just as rational truth informs philosophical speculation” (234). Yet facts are infinitely fragile things, for they occur in the ever-changing field of human affairs, “established through testimony by eyewitnesses—notoriously unreliable—and by records, documents, and monuments, all of which can be suspected as forgeries” (239). Facts can be manipulated, even denied outright by the powers that be. The lie, opposed to factual truth as error is to rational truth, represents a deliberate political action, since it aims “to change the world” (246).

Ontological and Epistemological Implications of Modern Science on Content Materials of Modern Constitution

Modern civilization stands firmly on the basis of modern science value. Historically, the modern science is the antithesis of traditional science accros the history of Middle Age and Renaissance. The Middle Age adheres ontologically and epistemologically to divine truth and faith while the Science Modern Age adheres ontologically to materialism human truths and epistemologically to rational, empiricism or objectivism truths. One phenomena of the modern civilization is modern constitutionalism, in practice it puts the constitution as the highest basic law of the constitutional system, and almost all modern states have a constitution as the basis of their constitutional system. Thus, this research tried to analyze the implicative relation of the modern science with the existence of content materials of the modern constitutions, especially in the context of power and human rights. By using the conceptual approach with qualitative analysis, this research found that the ontology and epistemology of the modern science strongly influenced three analyzed constitutions: the American Constitution, the Federal Republic of Germany Constitution and the Indonesian Constitution. In the context of the values of power, the effects of ontology and epistemology of the modern science appear in the practice of separation/division of power in the form of executive, legislative and judiciary institutions; while in the context of the values of human rights the effects of ontology and epistemology of the modern science appear in the significance of human freedom as individual for his/her life where the state cannot further intervene as far as it concerns the freedom of human dignity. In the content materials of the modern constitutions where the effects of ontology and epistemology of the modern science are very significant, there is no room for ontology and epistemology of science based on the metaphysics and faith since it is replaced by human rationality. Keywords: ontology of modern science; epistemology of modern science; modern constitution. DOI : 10.7176/JLPG/84-15 Publication date : April 30 th 2019

HISTORICIZING FREUD: AUTOPSY OR REINCARNATION?

The publication between 2014 and 2017 of four substantial historical biographies of Sigmund Freud raises a number of questions that should be of interest to intellectual and cultural historians. Both Freud's reputation as a pioneering empirical investigator and brilliant theorist of human subjectivity, and his influential role in framing public discussion of the unconscious dynamics and conscious expressions of the “psyche” or the “soul” have been declining for a number of decades. Apparently we have finally reached that point in time at which W. H. Auden's famous comment (in his 1939 elegy) that Freud was “a whole climate of opinion under whom we conduct our different lives” no longer resonates.1 Unlike the last major historical Freud biography, Peter Gay's Freud: A Life for Our Time (1988), which still worked assiduously to sustain the contemporary presence and thus cross-cultural and cross-temporal validity of Freud's discoveries as empirically grounded, universal rational truths, recent works by Frederick Crews, Joel Whitebook, Élisabeth Roudinesco, and Peter-André Alt attempt to historicize Freud's work in a more critical and fundamental fashion. The perspectives governing all of these studies are self-consciously “historical.” They build their interpretations of Freud's work and their judgements regarding its claims on investigations of the temporally situated, personal, sociocultural and theoretical contexts which conditioned and therefore limited or “relativized” its meaning and its truth. For three of the biographers (all except Crews) this also implies that Freud's work was not so much a completed articulation of an investigative method (either positivist or hermeneutical) that unveiled a singular interpretation or “discovery” of a general truth as the representation of an open-ended process of investigating and thinking through the problem of the origin, development and nature of the human “soul.” From this perspective the attempt to grasp Freud's work as a fully articulated truth or completed interpretation that can now be seen as historically limited or framed by specific cultural contexts is to read Freud's life and work within assumptions about closed cultural systems or temporally bounded climates of opinion, assumptions that have themselves become a part of the historical past.

Arendt, Truth, and Epistemic Responsibility

In this article, I offer a politico-philosophical perspective to reassess the much-contested role of truth in politics to put forth a principle of political action that will make sense of a “right to unmanipulated factual information,” which Hannah Arendt understands as crucial for establishing freedom of opinion. In developing a principle of epistemic responsibility, I will show that “factual truth” plays a key role in Arendt’s account of political action and provides a normative order that can extricate her account from charges of immoralism. The article will be divided into three sections: section 1 deals with the distinction between rational truths and factual truths, and the question of their validity, section 2 deals with what a principle of political action is, and lastly, section 3 proposes a principle of “epistemic responsibility” that becomes action-guiding in the political sphere, in order to shed new light on the 2013 Gezi Park protest, one of the recent democratic uprisings of our century.